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U.S. Persistence Scorecard Year-End 2025

Latin America Persistence Scorecard Year-End 2025

SPIVA® New Zealand Year-End 2025

SPIVA® Asia Ex-Japan Year-End 2025

SPIVA® MENA Year-End 2025

U.S. Persistence Scorecard Year-End 2025

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Anu R. Ganti

Head of U.S. Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Davide Di Gioia

Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Nick Didio

Quantitative Associate, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Liam Flaherty

Senior Analyst, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

Summary

As readers of our SPIVA® Scorecards know, active management is challenging.  Of all active large-cap U.S. equity funds measured, 79% underperformed the S&P 500® in 2025, worse than the 65% rate observed in 2024 and the fourth-worst year for active large-cap managers over the 25-year history of the SPIVA Scorecards.

But identifying outstanding managers can be equally, if not more, challenging.  The Persistence Scorecard shows that consistent outperformance is typically fleeting.  Among top-half funds within all reported active domestic equity categories in calendar year 2021, only a handful of funds remained in the top half over the next four years (see Exhibit 1).  For large-cap funds, the results were even less than a random distribution would suggest, evidence that active outperformance, when it occurs, tends to be the result of luck rather than genuine skill.

U.S. Persistence Scorecard Year-End 2025: Exhibit 1

Report Highlights

Persistence of outperformance, while generally better than in previous years, was fleeting, with a fraction of actively managed equity funds able to maintain consistent outperformance relative to their peers over the three- and five-year periods ending in December 2025. 

  • 29% of the top-quartile large-cap funds in calendar year 2023 maintained their position in the top quartile for the subsequent two years, higher than the 0% reported in 2024. Of the top-half large-cap funds from 2023, 49% remained in the top half by the end of 2025, roughly double the expected 25% based on random chance (see Report 1).
  • However, if we extend the clock two years, results were bleak. With the exception of small-cap funds, none of the top-quartile funds within all reported active domestic equity categories from 2021 remained in the top quartile through 2025.  Only 4.5% of the above-median large-cap active equity funds remained persistently above median; if outperformance was purely random, we would expect a rate of 6.25% (see Report 2).
  • Results further down the capitalization spectrum were generally similar to their large-cap peers, with improvements on the three-year time horizon compared to the 2024 Persistence Scorecard, but a similar lack of persistent performance over the five-year horizon. Of the top-quartile small-cap funds, 17% maintained their status for the next two years, higher than the 6% reported in 2024, but only 2% of top-quartile small-cap funds remained in the top quartile over a five-year period.
  • Looking over non-overlapping five-year periods, if performance were completely random, we would expect 50% of the winners in the first five years to also win in the second five years; if substantially more than 50% of the winners repeated in the second interval, that might be evidence of consistent skill. Results across reported equity categories fell well short of this mark.
  • Consistent with their equity counterparts, results for active fixed income managers were generally better over the three-year horizon (see Report 7). Of these, 31% of top-quartile Investment Grade Intermediate funds and 10% of High Yield funds in calendar year 2023 remained in the top quartile in each of the two succeeding years.  However, over a five-year period, the percentage of funds remaining in the top quartile was in the single digits across all reported active fixed income categories (see Report 8). 
  • Performance persisted at the other end of the spectrum. Over consecutive five-year periods, in almost every single reported equity and fixed income category, the worst-performing quartile saw the highest proportion of funds that were subsequently merged or liquidated.  For example, 23% of all fourth-quartile domestic U.S. equity funds were merged or liquidated within the subsequent five years; the comparable figure for top-quartile funds was 10% (see Reports 5 and 11).

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