Colombian presidential election
On 17 June, Colombian's voted in the second round of the presidential election between Democratic Center (Centro Democrático: CD) candidate Iván Duque and Colombia Humana candidate Gustavo Petro.
- Incoming president Iván Duque is likely to form a multi-party coalition similar to the outgoing National Unity coalition of President Juan Manuel Santos, leading to a stable government.
- The coalition is likely to broadly support the government's economic indicatives of tax cuts, tax-evasion reduction, and limited austerity.
- Coalition allies are likely to be more guarded in supporting anti-corruption initiatives, particularly if they threaten vested interests.
- Duque will likely struggle to implement significant amendments to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) peace agreement if his coalition includes the Conservative Party (Conservador Colombiano: CC), Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), the Party of the U (Partido de la U) and the Radical Change (Cambio Radical: CR) party, as appears likely.
Results published by the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil indicate that Iván Duque secured 54% of the vote versus 41.8% for Gustavo Petro. Duque will take office on 7 August. The Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático) party, which secured 35 of 171 Lower House and 19 of 107 Upper House seats respectively is short of a majority and will need to form a coalition government to avoid the limitations of legislating by decree. Following the first round of the presidential election, Duque received endorsements from the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal: PL) and the Radical Change (Cambio Radical: CR) party (although a small minority of their representatives are rebelling and will go into opposition), alongside existing support from the Conservative Party (Conservador Colombiano: CC) and the Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation (Movimiento Independiente de Renovación Absoluta: MIRA) party, and his party is now negotiating with these parties to form a grand coalition. If Duque is successful in building a majority coalition, it is likely to take a very similar shape to the outgoing National Unity coalition, except for outgoing President Juan Manuel Santos's Partido de la U.
Economic policy
Duque's economic policy priorities include a reduction in public
expenditure, a drive to tackle tax evasion, a corporation tax cut
from 33% to 28%, conditional support for extractive industries, and
an acceleration of infrastructure development. These policies are
unlikely to prove controversial to the CD's likely coalition
partners, although there are likely to be disagreements over the
extent to which a budget deficit reduction target to 1% of GDP by
2023 should be compromised in order to pay for tax cuts if the
government is unable to balance the budget through anti-evasion
initiatives and austerity measures.
Corruption
Duque has made tackling corruption a central theme of his election
campaign. He supports a referendum scheduled for 26 August that, if
approved, would create harsher sentences for those guilty of
corruption. He has pledged to audit existing infrastructure
projects to ensure existing contracts are being fulfilled. The
centrist and left-of-center opposition have also been vocal on
tackling corruption, and are likely to support any efforts to
tackle it. However, his ability to make a significant effect on
levels of corruption in Colombia is likely to be curtailed by the
composition of his coalition given that most of the parties that
will make it up are also in the outgoing government. One exception
is the Partido de la U, which, as a result, is likely to attract
greater scrutiny.
Legal and judicial reform
Duque is proposing several legal and judicial policies to amend the
peace agreement reached between the outgoing government and the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in November
2016. These include amending the agreement so that drug trafficking
is treated as an ordinary crime and limiting the right to political
participation to those convicted of serious war crimes. He also
wants to block implementing legislation relating to transitional
justice mechanism, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
(Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz: JEP) and an increase to
forced coca eradication. His ability to implement these policies is
likely to be moderate. The CR, PL, and CC all supported the
agreement originally and have pledged ongoing support to the peace
process and are likely to frustrate any initiatives that put the
process at risk, particularly if there is evidence of large numbers
of FARC abandoning the process.
Outlook and implications
With the likely support of a multi-party coalition, Duque's
government is likely to be stable. During his victory speech, he
talked of the importance of building consensus; several of his more
controversial backers, including former president Álvaro Uribe
and Andrés Pastrana, were notably absent when he delivered the
speech. If a consensus government is formed, it is likely to
broadly support his economic plans but is likely to be more guarded
around amending the FARC peace agreement. Although some
anti-corruption initiatives are likely (not least because of the
scheduled referendum, if approved will force the government to
adopt tougher measures) they are likely to be frustrated if they
threaten coalition allies. Over the coming weeks Duque will
announce his cabinet while Congress will nominate its House and
Senate presidents. The composition of these will be a strong
indicator of the government's future policy priorities and
stability. Main figures to watch are Uribe, whose inclusion in the
cabinet would be highly divisive and undermine the government's
stability; and Germán Vargas Lleras, a defeated presidential
candidate who retains considerable influence through his CR party,
the third-largest in Congress - if he receives an important
portfolio, such as defense, or ministry of the interior, it will
likely improve the government's stability and his CR party is more
likely to stick with the coalition. The appointment of justice
minister, who will be crucial in implementing any amendment to the
FARC peace agreement, will indicate to what extent the incoming
government is serious about amending the agreement.