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SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2023

SPIVA Australia Mid-Year 2023

SPIVA Institutional Scorecard Year-End 2022

Australia Persistence Scorecard: Year-End 2022

Canada Persistence Scorecard: Year-End 2022

SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2023

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Davide Di Gioia

Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Anu R. Ganti

U.S. Head of Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Craig Lazzara

Managing Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Grace Stoddart

Quantitative Associate, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

SUMMARY

The S&P 500® rose by 16.9% in the first six months of 2023, marking a sharp rebound from its decline of 18.1% in 2022. The rally extended to smaller stocks, although less emphatically, as the S&P MidCap 400® increased 8.8% and the S&P SmallCap 600® returned 6.0%. Fixed income markets also gained ground, despite the uncertain course of inflation, continued Fed tightening, an inverted yield curve, and ructions connected to the demise of several regional banks.

Although active managers in a number of categories were able to outpace their benchmarks in the first six months of the year, in our largest and most closely watched comparison, 60% of all active large-cap U.S. equity managers underperformed the S&P 500. As Exhibit 1 illustrates, a majority of large-cap managers outperformed in only 3 of the last 23 years (missing by a whisker in 2022). But active underperformance is not a coincidence, and, as we will discuss, some of the factors that made it close last year worked in the opposite direction in the first six months of 2023.

SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2023: Exhibit 1

For smaller-capitalization U.S. equity managers, first-half results were more promising. Only 48% of mid-cap managers lagged the S&P MidCap 400, while a creditable 28% of small-cap managers underperformed the S&P SmallCap 600. What was particularly striking about our U.S. equity results was the divergent performance of growth and value specialists. Only 13% of large-cap growth managers underperformed the S&P 500 Growth index, with similar success rates among their mid- and small-cap counterparts. Meanwhile, 90% of large-cap value managers lagged the S&P 500 Value index; most mid- and small-cap value specialists also underperformed, although by smaller margins.

Funds incorporating non-U.S. stocks produced mixed results: slight outperformance among larger-cap international managers and modest underperformance among smaller caps, with generally good results for emerging markets and disappointing performance for global funds. Fixed income results were likewise mixed. The bright spots for active fixed income came in the municipal and some investment grade categories. Most government funds lagged their benchmarks, as did 100% of Core Plus Bond funds and 89% of funds in the General Investment-Grade category.

As we've noted in previous reports, underperformance rates typically rise as time horizons lengthen. Exhibit 2 illustrates the point. In the first six months of 2023, 10 of the 39 categories in this report saw more than 75% of managers underperform their benchmark. Over a five-year horizon, 24 categories saw this level of underperformance, and after 15 years, the tally rose to 32 categories. Meanwhile, after 15 years, there were no categories in which the majority of active managers outperformed.

SPIVA U.S. Mid-Year 2023: Exhibit 2

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SPIVA Australia Mid-Year 2023

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Anu R. Ganti

U.S. Head of Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Grace Stoddart

Quantitative Associate, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Davide Di Gioia

Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

The SPIVA Australia Scorecard measures the performance of Australian actively managed funds against their respective benchmarks over various time horizons, covering large-, mid- and small-cap equity funds, real estate funds and bond funds, providing statistics on outperformance rates, survivorship rates and fund performance dispersion.

Since the first publication of the S&P Indices Versus Active Funds (SPIVA) U.S. Scorecard in 2002, S&P Dow Jones Indices has been the de facto scorekeeper of the ongoing active versus passive debate. 

Mid-Year 2023 Highlights

A slim majority (55%) of Australian Equity General funds underperformed the S&P/ASX 200 in the first half of 2023. A higher percentage of funds underperformed their respective benchmarks in the International Equity General and Australian Equity A-REIT categories. Funds in the Australian Equity Mid- and Small-Cap and Australian Bonds categories had a better record: 48% and 45% underperformed their benchmarks, respectively.

SPIVA Australia Mid-Year 2023: Exhibit 1

  • Australian Equity General Funds: The S&P/ASX 200 gained 4.5% in the first half of 2023, while on average, Australian Equity General funds rose 4.6% on an equal-weighted basis and 4.7% on an asset-weighted basis. The underperformance rate over this period was 55%, with the proportion of underperforming funds increasing to 81%, 79% and 81% over the 5-, 10- and 15-year time horizons, respectively.
  • Australian Equity Mid- and Small-Cap Funds: The S&P/ASX Mid-Small rose 3.0% in the first half of the year, with Australian Equity Mid- and Small-Cap funds posting average gains of 3.7% on an equal-weighted basis and 5.1% on an asset-weighted basis. In this period, 48% of funds underperformed the benchmark, increasing to 64% over the 5-year horizon and 76% over the 10-year horizon.
  • International Equity General Funds: In the first six months of the year, 74% of funds in the International Equity General category underperformed the S&P Developed Ex-Australia LargeMidCap, which gained 18.1% over the period. International Equity General funds gained 16.1% and 14.8% on equal- and asset-weighted bases, respectively.  Underperformance rates increased over longer time horizons, with 95% of funds failing to beat the benchmark over 15 years.
  • Australian Bonds Funds: The S&P/ASX Australian Fixed Interest 0+ Index rose 1.7% in the first half of 2023, while Australian Bonds funds posted similar average returns of 1.7% on an equal-weighted basis and 1.9% on an asset-weighted basis. The proportion of active Australian Bonds funds that underperformed the benchmark in this period was 45%, with this percentage increasing to 48% over the three-year horizon and 62% over the five-year horizon.
  • Australian Equity A-REIT Funds: In the first half of 2023, 88% of funds in the Australian Equity A-REIT category underperformed the S&P/ASX 200 A-REIT, the highest rate of underperformance among reported categories. The S&P/ASX 200 A-REIT gained 3.9% over the period, while on average, active funds gained 2.8% on an equal-weighted basis and 2.5% on an asset-weighted basis.
  • Fund Survivorship: Liquidation rates were moderate in the first half of 2023, with the number of merged or liquidated funds in the single digits across all but one category. International Equity General funds had the highest attrition rate, with 3.5% of funds merged or liquidated over the six-month period.  The attrition rate increased over longer time horizons, with 57.7% of funds across all categories merged or liquidated in the 15 years between June 2008 and June 2023.

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SPIVA Institutional Scorecard Year-End 2022

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Tim Edwards

Managing Director and Global Head of Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Anu R. Ganti

U.S. Head of Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Craig Lazzara

Managing Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Davide Di Gioia

Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Grace Stoddart

Quantitative Associate, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

Summary

In this report, we add institutional accounts to the mutual funds analyzed in the S&P Indices versus Active (SPIVA) U.S. ScorecardWe aim to provide the institutional community with the ability to judge managers’ true skill without the possible distortions that fees may create and to illustrate the similarities and differences between the performance of open-end funds and segregated institutional accounts across categories.

This edition of our scorecard shows that underperformance rates over the long term among institutional equity accounts are generally similar to those of mutual funds, with or without fees.  However, the importance of fees in determining underperformance rates varied considerably across asset classes, with a more significant difference in fixed income categories (see Exhibit 1).

Institutional SPIVA Scorecard: Exhibit 1

Report Highlights

Overall, 2022 continued to demonstrate better long-term net-of-fees performance in institutional accounts than in mutual funds, with lower 10-year underperformance rates in all 21 reported equity segments (see Section I and Exhibit 3) and a significant improvement in the cross-category average across fixed income categories (see Exhibit 1). 

Shorter-term horizons show a broader range of outcomes, with some pockets of admirable performance.  Within U.S. equity institutional accounts, only 39% of All Large-Cap Funds underperformed the S&P 500® in 2022 on a gross-of-fees basis, the lowest underperformance rate for the category since this report’s inception in 2015 (see Report 1, Section II).  Active fixed income managers posted even stronger relative performance in 2022, with majority outperformance reported in 12 out of 17 categories.  Notably, just 9% of managers in the inflation-linked category underperformed the iBoxx TIPS Inflation-Linked Index (see Report 11, Section II).

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Australia Persistence Scorecard: Year-End 2022

Summary

Can investment results be attributed to skill or luck?  Genuine skill is more likely to persist, while luck is random and fleeting.  Thus, one measure of skill is the consistency of a fund’s relative performance.  The Persistence Scorecard measures that consistency and shows that, regardless of asset class or style focus, active management outperformance is typically relatively short-lived.

Almost no Australian funds remained in the top performance quartile within their category over five consecutive years, and none did so in four out of five reported fund categories (see Report 2).

Lowering the bar from the top quartile to the top half did not result in a significant improvement in persistence.  As Exhibit 1 illustrates, the decline in persistence across categories was consistently worse than would be expected under a random distribution.

Exhibit 1 - Australia Persistence Scorecard: Year-End 2022

Report Highlights

  • A minuscule percentage of actively managed equity, A-REIT and fixed income funds succeeded in maintaining consistent outperformance relative to their peers over the three- and five-year periods ending in December 2022. Persistence of alpha was rare as well: 149 Australian Equity General funds (out of a total of 346) outperformed the S&P/ASX 200 as of December 2020, and only 28 of those 149 winners—less than one-fifth—managed to continue outperforming annually through December 2022 (see Report 1b).
  • Of the actively managed International Equity General and A-REIT funds whose 12-month performance placed them in in the top quartile of their respective category as of December 2020, not a single fund maintained its top-quartile performance over the next two 12-month intervals. Extending the analysis to five consecutive years made no difference (see Report 1a and Report 2).
  • There was less conclusive evidence for or against persistence when measured over non-overlapping three-year intervals, in which the cross-category average chance of a top-quartile fund remaining in the top quartile was 25%. Extending the horizon to two consecutive five-year periods improved the average slightly to 33% (see Reports 3 and 5).
  • Poor performance continues to be an indicator of future fund closures. Across the five categories reported by our scorecard, an unweighted average of 44% of actively managed funds whose performance placed them in the bottom quartile of performance in the five years ending in December 2017 were subsequently merged or liquidated over the next five years (see Report 5).


Canada Persistence Scorecard: Year-End 2022

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Joseph Nelesen, Ph.D.

Head of Specialists, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Anu R. Ganti

U.S. Head of Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

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Davide Di Gioia

Director, Index Investment Strategy

S&P Dow Jones Indices

Summary

Can investment results be attributed to skill or luck?  Genuine skill is more likely to persist, while luck is random and fleeting.  Thus, one measure of skill is the consistency of a fund’s performance relative to its peers.  The Persistence Scorecard evaluates consistency and shows that in every style and geographic focus, active management outperformance diminishes over time, with few funds consistently outranking their peers.

Canadian equity indices suffered sharp declines in the first half of 2022, followed by fluctuations in the second half before finishing the year slightly negative.  Canadian Equity funds fared better than usual, with only 52% underperforming over the one-year period.  Among all Canadian domestic equity funds ranked in the top quartile of performance over the 12-month period ending December 2018, none maintained a top-quartile position for the next four years (see Report 2).

Canada Persistence Scorecard Year-End 2022: Exhibit 1

Exhibit 1 shows that among Canadian Equity funds ranked in the top half of peer rankings over the five-year period ending December 2017, 45% remained in the top half, while 55% fell to the bottom half, merged/liquidated or changed investment styles (see Report 6).

Report Highlights

− While slightly more than expected actively managed domestic equity funds maintained their top-quartile ranking for a few 12-month periods, persistence of ranking soon fell below what would be expected by random chance. Over five years, none were able to maintain their top-quartile ranking (see Report 2).

− Among actively managed domestic equity funds with top-quartile performance over the 12-month period ending December 2020, 9% of Canada Equity funds and 6.7% of Canada Dividend & Income Equity funds maintained top-quartile performance over the subsequent two 12-month intervals. In every other category, no funds maintained top-quartile performance over three 12-month periods (see Report 1).

− Across a five-year horizon, evidence of persistent active fund outperformance was nonexistent. Within the group of active funds achieving top-quartile performance in their respective categories over the 12-month period ending December 2018, not a single fund remained in the top quartile through each of the subsequent one-year periods through December 2022 (see Report 2).

Over discrete five-year periods, a greater-than-expected proportion of funds in two domestic equity and three international equity categories maintained their relative performance standing compared with their peers. If performance were purely random in terms of comparing funds to their peers, one would expect 25% of top-quartile funds to remain in the top quartile in a subsequent period.  Our scorecard reports an unweighted average of 40% of top-quartile Canadian Equity, 41% of top-quartile Canadian Focused Equity funds, 50% of top-quartile Global Equity funds, 31% of top-quartile International Equity funds and 46% of top-quartile U.S. Equity funds remained in the top quartile over two consecutive five-year periods (see Report 5).

Underperformance significantly increased the risk of fund closures. For example, across all actively managed equity funds in four domestic categories (Canadian Equity, Canadian Focused Equity, Canadian Dividend & Income Equity and Canadian Small/Mid-Cap Equity) that were in the bottom half of performance in the five-year period ending in December 2017, more than 35% were subsequently merged or liquidated over the next five years.  In contrast, among all funds in the top half across those same four categories for the five-year period ending December 2017, less than 18% were liquidated or merged in the subsequent five-year period (see Report 6).

− While liquidation was a more likely outcome for lower-ranked funds, style changes shared no strong relationship with underperformance. Over five-year horizons for all four domestic equity categories, the highest rate of style change, at 21%, actually occurred within the top-quartile Canadian Dividend & Income Equity funds.  The average rate of style changes across all categories for top-quartile funds was 8%, while for bottom-quartile funds it was 5% (see Reports 5 and 6).

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