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CEE Brief: Growth Will Decelerate, But The Outlook Isn't Bleak

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Per capita growth in 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE-11) outpaced that in many other emerging markets (EMs) globally in the years before the COVID-19 pandemic.  Average real GDP per capita in CEE-11 countries increased by over 4.2% annually over 2014-2019 and was only surpassed by growth in Asian EMs. Yet we project CEE-11 countries' growth will decline to 2.8% or below over the medium term. This could add pressure to the region's already strained public finances.

Chart 1

image

What's Happening

Three developments will impair growth in CEE-11 countries, with increasing demographic and labor supply constraints constituting the first one.  Average employment levels in the region rose 5-10 percentage points over 2014-2019, while unemployment rates remain among the lowest globally. That said, CEE-11 countries are the only EM region globally whose population has declined. Recent censuses, for example in Bulgaria, indicate an even stronger population decline in the region than previously estimated. What's more, a disproportionate share of the population is aged between 50 and 65 and could retire from the workforce over the next few years.

Secondly, EU fund inflows will likely reduce over the longer term due to increasing income levels in CEE-11 countries.  Cohesion and agricultural funds available to CEE-11 countries under the EU's 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework are equivalent to about 19% of the region's annual 2021 GDP, compared with 28% of the annual 2014 GDP under the 2014-2020 framework. Additional Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds, at almost 5% of the 2021 GDP, will partially offset this decline over the short term but are only available for the next 2-3 years. Net fund flows from the EU to CEE-11 countries could shrink further if poorer candidate countries in the region join the EU. In fact, we would expect several CEE-11 members to become net contributors to the EU's cohesion policy in such a scenario.

Thirdly, past CEE growth benefited from exceptionally favorable financing conditions, which we do not expect to return.  We think it is unlikely that inflation and central bank policy rates in CEE-11 countries will return to the lows of 2012-2020, given wage pressures from tight labor markets and higher global policy rates.

Why It Matters

Even if still strong in a global comparison, slower economic growth could put pressure on CEE-11 countries' public finances and derail long-term fiscal consolidation plans.  We expect CEE countries will run some of the highest fiscal deficits of all rated sovereigns in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa over the next few years. This is because of generous social transfers, elevated defense expenditure, and rising interest bills. Government debt as a share of GDP is therefore set to increase for most CEE-11 sovereigns through 2027 and beyond. These fiscal dynamics could delay the disbursements of some EU funds, including RRF funds, which are partly contingent on governments' fiscal consolidation efforts.

What's Next

Nearshoring could help bolster foreign direct investments (FDI) into CEE-11 countries and support growth.  The prospects of FDI flows into CEE-11 countries are affected by tight labor markets, higher energy costs, and Germany's ailing automotive sector, which impairs CEE-11 countries' manufacturing sector. That said, CEE countries could become an attractive destination for nearshoring in high value-added sectors, such as IT and business services. This is because of lessons drawn from the supply chain disruptions over 2021-2022, the increased political focus on strengthening the European economy, and CEE-11 countries' competitive labor costs and skilled workforce.

Related Research

Primary Credit Analyst:Niklas Steinert, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9248;
niklas.steinert@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Karen Vartapetov, PhD, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9225;
karen.vartapetov@spglobal.com
Christian Esters, CFA, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9262;
christian.esters@spglobal.com
Carl Sacklen, London;
carl.sacklen@spglobal.com

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