articles Ratings /ratings/en/research/articles/241107-creditweek-how-could-trump-2-0-affect-u-s-corporate-credit-13317285 content esgSubNav
In This List
COMMENTS

CreditWeek: How Could Trump 2.0 Affect U.S. Corporate Credit?

COMMENTS

Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research

COMMENTS

Digital Assets Brief: Crypto's Trump Card

COMMENTS

Sustainability Insights: Rising Curtailment In China: Power Producers Will Push Past The Pain

COMMENTS

Credit FAQ: How Would China Fare Under 60% U.S. Tariffs?


CreditWeek: How Could Trump 2.0 Affect U.S. Corporate Credit?

(Editor's Note: CreditWeek is a weekly research offering from S&P Global Ratings, providing actionable and forward-looking insights on emerging credit risks and exploring the questions that matter to markets today. Subscribe to receive a new edition every Thursday at: https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/creditweek-7115686044951273472/)

Former President Donald Trump's successful bid to return to the White House for a second term and the potential for an accompanying "red wave" represents a historic win that could affect corporate borrowers we rate.

What We're Watching

From a legislative perspective, Republican majorities in both halves of Congress will make it easier for President-elect Trump's new administration to push through his agenda. But even if Democrats hold onto the House, presidents enjoy fairly wide latitude to sign executive orders that can change the credit landscape—including levying tariffs on imports, which appears to be the issue with the most potential ramifications for the borrowers we rate.

With the caveat that campaign rhetoric doesn't always translate into policy, President-elect Trump has suggested a 10% tariff on all goods imported to the U.S. as well as tariffs of 60% on all Chinese goods.

What We Think And Why

While S&P Global Ratings believes that these levels are unlikely and may just be a starting point for negotiations, we think that under a scenario of across-the-board tariffs of 10% and/or an increase in levies on Chinese imports to 60%, the effects would be inflationary in the short term—with companies facing higher input costs and consumers paying more for finished goods. And these levels would likely be a drag on U.S. GDP in the medium term, while underpinning still-high benchmark interest rates, and accelerate the diversification of supply chains, in particular away from China.

Increasingly protectionist trade policies that result in higher input costs for many industries will pressure profit margins. We expect those industries with highly engineered products dependent on China for specialized manufacturing to be hardest hit because these facilities are the most expensive to relocate and hardest to staff. Such products comprise semiconductors and electrical components supplied to technology companies.

This also applies to the utilities and power sectors focused on renewable energy. These companies have a meaningful reliance on China for products such as solar panels, wind turbines, and battery chemistries. Although higher tariffs can be passed through to customers, more severe trade restrictions could challenge the sector's ability to meet renewable-energy goals and effectively manage credit quality.

We anticipate that other sectors dependent on Chinese suppliers such as consumer products, retail and restaurants, health care, and homebuilders/building materials will be affected, as well. However, to the extent that this latter group depends more on commoditized imports, they would likely have more success finding alternative suppliers or moving their operations, more quickly and at a cheaper cost.

While the predominant impact of tariffs is expected to be negative to neutral, we have identified two sectors most likely to benefit from a more protectionist stance. U.S. metals and mining companies tend to be higher on the cost curve, and tariffs could go some ways to level the playing field for local buyers. Issuers in the chemicals sector would benefit in a similar fashion, although they may be facing customers with heightened price sensitivity given recent softening demand.

image

Elsewhere, various provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) are set to phase out in 2025, and Congress faces a specific deadline by which it must revisit the tax code. At least some legislative action is likely, with interest deductibility, bonus depreciation, and deductions for research and development all up for debate and potentially made permanent. This opens the door to negotiate provisions that could have credit implications, such as the corporate tax rate and the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds.

The TCJA lowered the corporate tax rate to 21%, from 35%, and Republican leaders have suggested further lowering the rate to 15% for U.S. companies that make their products in the U.S.

Naturally, a lower corporate tax rate, where applicable would reduce a company's tax expense, and taxes paid. The effects on credit ratios would appear most directly from improvements to funds from operations (FFO) and, thus, to FFO-to-debt ratios and FFO-to-interest coverage. Lower cash outflow will also boost the cash available to service debt.

As with taxes, immigration policy must go through Congress and could take longer to enact. Nonetheless, the president can influence the extent to which current laws are enforced. We observe that employers most reliant on unskilled or less-skilled labor are most likely to be affected by deportations or reduced immigration due to tighter border controls. The homebuilders, and hotels, gaming and leisure sectors stand out as facing somewhat negative effects in this regard.

What Could Change

In addition to trade- and tax-related issues, the regulatory environment is largely determined by the party in power. Clearly, this can affect energy-related industries such as oil and gas production, and others that have an outsized impact on the climate.

Also, bank regulation was last eased early in the prior Trump Administration when both houses of Congress had Republican majorities, and we believe the Republican majorities lower the odds of any regulatory tightening.

From a sovereign perspective, we expect the central government budget deficit to remain near current levels in 2025-2026—which means that the U.S.'s net general government debt could soon exceed 100% of GDP.

Writers: Joe Maguire and Molly Mintz

This report does not constitute a rating action.

North America Credit Research:David C Tesher, New York + 212-438-2618;
david.tesher@spglobal.com
U.S. Chief Economist:Satyam Panday, San Francisco + 1 (212) 438 6009;
satyam.panday@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Alexandra Dimitrijevic, London + 44 20 7176 3128;
alexandra.dimitrijevic@spglobal.com

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.