Key Takeaways
- Asia-Pacific financial institutions are satisfactorily managing economic and property-sector risks. The vast majority have stable rating outlooks and our base case is for this to continue.
- Market volatility has re-emerged. The potential damage to credit profiles is limited, given our rating constructs build in expectations for such movements.
- A material downside outside our base case would be more challenging for banks at current rating levels. This could involve much higher-for-longer interest rates and borrowing costs, and a worsening of property stress.
The potential impact of volatile financial markets on the credit standing of Asia-Pacific financial institutions will be a key focus in coming months. Significant volatility affecting some markets in the past month has not caused us to change any ratings or outlooks. Our base case is that volatility by itself is unlikely to move ratings. It does adds a worrisome layer of complexity however for financial institutions already challenged across a range of risk factors.
Equity market volatility has been particularly acute in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. On Aug. 5, 2024, Japan's Topix plunged by about 12% while Taiwan's benchmark index had its largest ever price fall. While markets clawed back much of the losses the next day (see chart 1), increased volatility will likely persist. The VIX index likewise spiked before retreating, while prices for credit default swaps increased and credit spreads widened.
Chart 1
Certain sectors across the financial institutions landscape, and certain individual institutions are more vulnerable to volatile price movements.
- The broker sector stands out as clients get hit by margin calls on days of peak equity market volatility testing brokers' risk management capabilities.
- Financial institutions with more concentrated funding profiles often face greater tests when markets are volatile. The higher business and funding concentration is typically already taken into account by us in the rating constructs of these entities, often having a constraining effect.
- Strong, strategically-committed parentage for most of the large number of rated bank and nonbank financial institution subsidiary companies across Asia-Pacific offers a buffer to ratings in times of high volatility.
Meanwhile, Japan's commercial banks are resilient to recent market volatility, according to our stress tests. The risk-adjusted capital ratio at rated banking groups decreases by only about 10 basis points on average for every 10% fall in stock prices (see "Japan Banks Primed For Market Turbulence," published on RatingsDirect on Aug. 19, 2024). Further, we believe the banks can absorb unrealized losses on yen bonds by increasing net interest margins, while the rising yen will have muted impact on net operating profits.
Most fundamentally, rating risks are typically greatest where a deterioration in market prices reflects a deterioration in underlying fundamentals. Market prices can at times fluctuate significantly reflecting market sentiment-- rather than fundamentals--which can often be fickle and temporary.
We expect volatility will continue for the remainder of 2024. This may yet test the credit standing of some financial institutions. The Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts amid a range of complex geopolitical risks, and a multitude of general elections before the end of the year, add to the ongoing range of economic and property sector risks that financial institutions must manage. It could be a bumpy ride for financial institutions for the rest of the year.
Our Outlook For Global Banks Remains Steady
This resilience stems from solid capitalization, improved profitability, and still sound asset quality. As of June 30, 2024, about 75% of global bank rating outlooks were stable. Global market volatility has heightened due to various factors including a multitude of elections in 2024, escalating trade protectionism, and geopolitical tensions. This is on top of expected economic slowdowns amid higher-for-longer interest rates. We expect these factors will test business volumes, asset quality, and financing conditions. Positively, most banks' earnings continue to benefit from high interest rates and limited credit losses (see " Global Banks Country-By-Country Midyear Outlook 2024: Searching For Calmer Waters," and "Global Banks Country-By-Country Midyear Outlook 2024: Searching For Calmer Waters," July 17, 2024).
We now believe the Federal Reserve will start cutting its benchmark rate in September. The U.S. Federal Reserve has yet to explicitly signal the timing of its future actions, but so far, progress against inflation and the normalization of the labor market are likely enough for the central bank to start dialing back its tight stance on monetary policy. We think the recent loosening of the labor market indicates a normalization, as opposed to a U.S. economy that's about to slip into recession (see "Economic Research: A Cooling U.S. Labor Market Sets Up A September Start For Rate Cuts," March 5, 2024).
Bangladesh's Political Unrest Exacerbates Banking Sector Risks
We see risk of policy inaction and a potential slowdown in financial reforms. At the central Bangladesh Bank, the departure of the governor and some senior officials could delay some of the ongoing structural reforms. For example, the central bank is due to implement prompt corrective actions in March 2025. This would have forced many banks to focus on capital adequacy, stressed assets, and weak corporate governance.
Nonetheless, we believe day-to-day operations of Bangladesh Bank are unaffected. The central bank has been able to provide liquidity backstops to banks, both in domestic and foreign currencies, and also conduct clearing and settlement. Notably, the central bank's website was hacked in late July, highlighting the vulnerability to cyber-risk (see "Bangladesh's Volatile Political Situation Elevates Banking Sector Risks," Aug. 14, 2024).
Vietnamese Lender's Collapse Brings Fraud Issues To The Fore
Saigon Commercial Banks's (SCB) collapse exposed systemic corruption, and will continue to reverberate widely. In April 2024, Truong My Lan, a prominent Vietnamese real estate developer, was convicted of fraud that was perpetrated over almost a decade. In that time, she systematically siphoned funds from SCB by placing accomplices in key positions and giving loans to her related property and shell companies. Media reports suggest that fraudulent loans account for over 90% of SCB's lending. The event has revealed both significant lapses in corporate governance at the lender, and decisive action by the central bank to take extraordinary measures to maintain stability in the sector (see "Your Three Minutes In Vietnamese Banking: Effects Of SCB Failure Reach Far," June 6, 2024).
Use Of Third-Party Technologies Adds To Bank Vulnerabilities
Banks must be prepared for the likelihood that third parties will continue to be exploited. Recent attacks in Asia-Pacific and elsewhere demonstrate that bad actors can stage attacks by identifying and exploiting weaknesses in the cyber-risk management of third parties. Attackers can use supply chains--a service provider or a third-party software--to exploit trusted relationships to gain initial access to a bank. Based on Guidewire data, smaller banking institutions face a greater risk than their larger counterparts because of their greater reliance on third-party technologies. Larger banks, in contrast, develop many of these systems inhouse(see "Cyber Risk Insights: Fortifying Digital Defense Key For Asia-Pacific Banks," July 4, 2024).
Digital Initiatives Will Propel Retail Lending In India
We estimate that state-backed digital initiatives will underpin a tripling of Indian retail borrowing by 2030, lifting Indian households' debt to about US$2.5 trillion or about 34% of GDP. Digitalization has driven financial inclusion in India, enabling mass access to savings accounts and digital payments. Yet penetration of credit remains underwhelming. Just 12% of Indians over the age of 15 had borrowed from a formal financial institution prior to 2021--less than half the global average of 28%.
That expansion in lending is underpinned by savings account penetration and a rapid increase in digital transactions, which provide the data required for lenders to make informed underwriting decisions. Meanwhile, improved digital payment infrastructure is supporting lenders' ability to collect payments and reducing barriers to lending-market competition. We expect that will strengthen India's economy and provide growth opportunities for the financial sector (see "Digital Initiatives Could Triple India's Retail Lending By 2030," July 31, 2024).
Confidence Stays In Place For In AT1 Market
This despite the 2023 turmoil that raised questions about the broader role of additional tier-1 (AT1) instruments. Banks' AT1 instruments have remained under regulatory scrutiny since March 2023, when the failure of Credit Suisse sparked turmoil in the sector. Approximately Swiss franc (CHF) 16 billion of the AT1 instruments issued by Credit Suisse were written down to zero as part of UBS' government-facilitated takeover of Credit Suisse. This heavy loss for the AT1 investors highlighted the risks associated with these instruments when banks fail.
At the same time, the write-downs clearly demonstrated AT1 instruments' function in recapitalizing or resolving a bank that is no longer viable--both through the contractual terms and the powers that governments have in a stress scenario. The AT1 instruments therefore played the recapitalization role that regulators intended for cases where a bank is no longer viable.
Since then, market sentiment toward such instruments has recovered as issuers and investors have reconsidered their importance in the capital structure of banks. Issuance has also picked up after a temporary lull immediately following the Credit Suisse AT1 write-down. (see "The Role Of Bank AT1 Hybrid Capital One Year On From The 2023 Banking Turmoil," June 26, 2024).
BICRA Changes
Over the past quarter (through July 31, 2024), we have made the following changes to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) in the Asia-Pacific region.
Macao
We have revised our economic risk score for Macao to '6' from '5'. We assess banks operating in Macao to be exposed to an escalated risk of a material rise in credit losses. Rising nonperforming loans underscore this risk. We now see economic imbalances in Macao as high risk.
Australia
We revised our industry risk score on Australia to 2 from 3, and the overall BICRA to Group 2 from Group 3.
The actions reflect continued strengthening of institutional and governance standards in the Australian banking sector that have reduced industrywide risks. Simplified business models and advances in risk management have also contributed to this improvement.
We now assess the institutional framework for the banking industry in Australia at the lowest risk level on our scale, and in line with that in Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
We have published the following comprehensive BICRA reports in the past quarter in Asia-Pacific.
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: China, Aug. 19, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: India, Aug. 19, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Japan, July 31, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Vietnam, July 10, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Taiwan, July 15, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Brunei, June 28, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Singapore, June 26, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Macao, June 14, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: New Zealand, May 14, 2024
The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about key risks and risk trends for banking sectors in Asia-Pacific countries where we rate banks. For more detailed information, please refer to the latest BICRA on a given country. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from'1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').
Table 1
| Real GDP forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change from prior forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
| (% year over year) | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | ||||||||||
| Australia | 2.0 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | -0.3 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| China | 5.2 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Hong Kong | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| India | 8.2 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Indonesia | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Japan | 1.8 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Malaysia | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| New Zealand | 0.8 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Philippines | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Singapore | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| South Korea | 1.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Taiwan | 1.3 | 4.0 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.0 | -0.5 | -0.2 | ||||||||||
| Thailand | 1.9 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.1 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Vietnam | 5.0 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Asia-Pacific | 4.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Note: India's fiscal years run April to March; e.g., 2023 ends March 31, 2024 and so on. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||||||||
Table 2
| Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institution | Opco L-T ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | Comparable rating analysis | SACP or group SACP | Type of support | No. of notches of support | Additional factor adjustment | |||||||||||||
| Australia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Commonwealth Bank of Australia |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Macquarie Bank Ltd. |
A+/Stable | a- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
National Australia Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac Banking Corp. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb- | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China CITIC Bank Corp. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb+ | Group | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Construction Bank Corp. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Hong Kong | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of East Asia Ltd. (The) |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. (The) |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| India | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Axis Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Kotak Mahindra Bank |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | (1) | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
HDFC Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Strong | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | (3) | |||||||||||||
| ICICI Bank Ltd.§ | BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | (2) | |||||||||||||
|
State Bank of India |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Indonesia |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Japan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Chiba Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Mizuho Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Nomura Holdings Inc.* | A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Norinchukin Bank |
A/Negative | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Resona Holdings* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinkin Central Bank |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shizuoka Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Industrial Bank of Korea |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KEB Hana Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Kookmin Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Nonghyup Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Adequate | 0 | a- | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinhan Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Woori Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Malaysia |
||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Public Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Strong | Strong/Strong | (1) | a | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Malayan Banking Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
CIMB Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| New Zealand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
ASB Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of New Zealand |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Philippines | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of the Philippine Islands |
BBB+/ Stable | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Singapore | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
DBS Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
United Overseas Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Taiwan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
CTBC Bank Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Thailand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB+/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | bbb- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KASIKORNBANK PCL |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bb | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Data as of August 2, 2024. In "Type of Support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. §This ICR applies to the foreigncurrency Rating only. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Opco--Operating company. L-T--Long term. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3
| Recent Rating Actions: Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Legal name | Country | From | To | ||||||
| July 30, 2024 |
Norfina Ltd. |
Australia | A+/WatchPos/A-1/WatchPos | AA-/Stable/A-1+ | ||||||
| June 28, 2024 |
Norinchukin Bank |
Japan | A/Stable/A-1 | A/Negative/A-1 | ||||||
| June 28, 2024 |
Norinchukin Australia Pty Ltd. |
Australia | A/Stable/A-1 | A/Negative/A-1 | ||||||
| June 20, 2024 |
Union Bank of India |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| June 12, 2024 |
Guangzhou Finance Holdings Group Co. Ltd. |
China | BBB+/Negative/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| June 2, 2024 |
Illawarra Credit Union Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
State Bank of India |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
Axis Bank Ltd. |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
Toronto Dominion (South East Asia) Ltd. |
Singapore | AA-/Stable/A-1+ | AA-/Negative/A-1+ | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
Indian Bank |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
Kotak Mahindra Bank |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| May 29, 2024 |
HDFC Bank Ltd. |
India | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| May 27, 2024 |
Bank of Queensland Ltd. |
Australia | A-/Stable/A-2 | A-/Negative/A-2 | ||||||
| April 29, 2024 |
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. |
China | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 29, 2024 |
China CITIC Bank Corp. Ltd. |
China | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bank of Queensland Ltd. |
Australia | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Cuscal Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Positive/A-1 | AA-/Stable/A-1+ | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Credit Union Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Newcastle Greater Mutual Group Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police & Nurses Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
G&C Mutual Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
QPCU Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Defence Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Queensland Country Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Judo Bank Pty Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Maitland Mutual Ltd |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Heritage and People's Choice Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bank Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Beyond Bank Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Regional Australia Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police Financial Services Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Illawarra Credit Union Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Stable/A-1 | A+/Positive/A-1 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Norfina Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Positive/A-1 | A+/WatchPos/A-1/WatchPos | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
AMP Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/-- | BBB/Stable/-- | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
AMP Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| *Recent rating actions are for the period April 1, 2024 to Aug. 2, 2024. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list. | ||||||||||
Related Research
Banking Sector Research
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- Ratings Component Scores For The Top 200 Banks Globally--June 2024, June 28, 2024
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- Bank Ratings Excluding Government Support: An Update, June 19, 2024
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- China's TLAC Debuts: The Road Ahead, May 20, 2024
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- Islamic Finance 2024-2025: Resilient Growth Anticipated Despite Missed Opportunities, April 29, 2024
- Malaysian Banking Sector Review: Standing Firm In The Face Of External Headwinds, April 22, 2024
- Banking Risk Indicators: April 2024 Update, April 22, 2024
- Japan's Bumper M&A Risky For Banks, April 22, 2024
- China Banks Brace For Tide Of Bad Property Loans, April 15, 2024
- Sector Review: 2024 Taiwan Banking Sector Credit Trends, April 9, 2024
- Credit FAQ: Australian Banks Are Increasing TLAC. So Why Are Bailouts Still An Option?, April 03, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Quarterly Monitor: Q1 2024, April 3, 2024
Economic And Credit Conditions Research
- Economic Research: A Cooling U.S. Labor Market Sets Up A September Start For Rate Cuts , Aug. 7, 2024
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- Global Credit Conditions Q3 2024: Soft Landing, Fragmenting Trajectories, July 1, 2024
- Economic Research: Q3 2024 Global Economic Update: The Policy Rate Descent Begins, June 26, 2024
- Asia-Pacific Sector Roundup Q3 2024: Trade Tensions To Drive A Bigger Wedge, June 26, 2024
- Credit Conditions Asia-Pacific Q3 2024: A Trade Showdown Unfolds, June 25, 2024
- Economic Outlook Emerging Markets Q3 2024: Growth On Track, Policy Risks Rising, June 24, 2024
- Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q3 2024: Exporters And EMs Are Outperforming, June 24, 2024
- Credit Cycle Indicator Q3 2024: Bumpy Ride Ahead Of A Credit Recovery In 2025, June 20, 2024
- Global Economic Update: Policy And Exchange Rate Forecasts Revised On New Fed Funds Rate Expectations, May 3, 2024
- Economic Research: Japan's Long Wait For Sustained Inflation Is Likely Ending, April 17, 2024
- Global Credit Conditions Q2 2024: Between Economic Resilience And Market Exuberance, April 02, 2024
Ratings Methodology News
- Credit FAQ: An Overview Of Our Proposed Criteria For Rating Subscription Lines Secured By Alternative Investment Funds' Capital Commitments, May 20, 2024
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Other Research
Please see Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research, published Aug. 1, 2024 which is a curated compilation of the key takeaways from our most up-to-date thought leadership.
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- Australian Property Spotlight 2024, July 30, 2024
- Cyber Risk Insights: Through the APAC Lens, July 24, 2024
- Global Banks Midyear Outlook 2024 - APAC/EMEA Session, July 17, 2024
- 2024 Global Emerging Markets Virtual Conference: Is Emerging Asia Picking Up Steam?, July 3, 2024
- 2023 Banking Sector Turmoil: Key Impacts (APAC/EMEA Session), June 28, 2024
- What's Behind Our Recent Rating Actions On India?, May 31, 2024
- Sector Update: Key Credit Risks For Malaysian Banks And Economic Outlook, May 8, 2024
- Alternative Investment Funds: Subscription Lines Request For Comment Overview (APAC Session), May 8, 2024
- Asia-Pacific 2Q 2024 Banking Update: As Good As It Gets, April 24, 2024
- Spotlight On Shadow Banks: Global Trends And APAC's Risk Realities, April 16, 2024
This report does not constitute a rating action.
S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2092; gavin.gunning@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3532; ryan.tsang@spglobal.com |
| Geeta Chugh, Mumbai + 912233421910; geeta.chugh@spglobal.com | |
| Kensuke Sugihara, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8475; kensuke.sugihara@spglobal.com | |
| Vera Chaplin, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2058; vera.chaplin@spglobal.com | |
| Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055; susan.chu@spglobal.com | |
| Sharad Jain, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2077; sharad.jain@spglobal.com | |
| Peter Sikora, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2094; peter.sikora@spglobal.com | |
| Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887; nico.delange@spglobal.com | |
| Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081; lisa.barrett@spglobal.com | |
| HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3597; hongtaik.chung@spglobal.com | |
| Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3508; daehyun.kim@spglobal.com | |
| Emily Yi, Hong Kong + 852 2532 8091; emily.yi@spglobal.com | |
| Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8578; chizuru.tateno@spglobal.com | |
| Ming Tan, CFA, Singapore + 65 6216 1095; ming.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Ivan Tan, Singapore + 65 6239 6335; ivan.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Phyllis Liu, CFA, FRM, Hong Kong +852 2532 8036; phyllis.liu@spglobal.com | |
| Nikita Anand, Singapore + 65 6216 1050; nikita.anand@spglobal.com | |
| Yiran Zhong, Hong Kong 25333582; yiran.zhong@spglobal.com | |
| Xi Cheng, Shanghai + 852 2533 3582; xi.cheng@spglobal.com | |
| Eunice Fan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6818; eunice.fan@spglobal.com | |
| YuHan Lan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6810; yuhan.lan@spglobal.com | |
| Andy Chang, CFA, FRM, Taipei +886-2-2175-6815; andy.chang@spglobal.com | |
| Shinoy Varghese, Singapore +65 6597-6247; shinoy.varghese1@spglobal.com | |
| Research Assistant: | Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai |
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