This report does not constitute a rating action.
Ratings Score Snapshot
Credit Highlights
| Overview | |
|---|---|
| Institutional and economic profile | Flexibility and performance profile |
| --Indonesia maintains steady growth prospects over the next two years, with external demand dynamics likely to be moderately more supportive than in 2023. | --Indonesia's fiscal deficit will remain below 3% of GDP in 2024, following two successive years of powerful consolidation. |
| --We forecast real GDP growth close to 5% in both 2024 and 2025. | --Improvements in revenue collection have been powered by favorable commodity price dynamics, which may ebb going forward. Prudent expenditure controls also underpin Indonesia's modest fiscal deficits. |
| --The policy orientation of Indonesia's next government, which will sit in October 2024, will have important implications for the country's continued ability to attract foreign direct investment, generate higher value-added production, and improve competitiveness. | --The 2025 budgetary process is likely to maintain fiscal space for the next administration’s expenditure priorities. |
| --Indonesia's long-term growth prospects remain strong, supported by ongoing economic reforms, favorable demographics, and resource wealth that's relevant to emerging global industries such as electric vehicles. | --Indonesia's improved external position will sustain over the next one to two years, even as the country's current account enters a modest deficit. Domestic disinflation is well-entrenched, but the pace of monetary easing is likely to be limited by global inflation and financial market conditions this year. |
Indonesia's growth dynamics remain sound. Our ratings on Indonesia reflect the country's solid economic growth prospects and historically judicious policy dynamics. We anticipate real GDP growth will remain well above that of comparable emerging market economies around the world.
The country's low per capita income and elevated interest burden temper these strengths. Indonesia's GDP per capita remains low relative to that of most investment-grade peers. While the country's stock of public debt has stabilized relative to GDP, the cost of servicing debt relative to the government's limited revenue base is somewhat elevated.
Policymaking under the next government could create inflection points for fiscal, economic performance. We anticipate a smooth transition from the current government to the next one, which will form in October 2024 following elections in February. Nevertheless, the next presidential administration's approach to fiscal policy and economic reforms, and parliamentary coalition dynamics, will be important determinants of Indonesia's performance over the ensuing five years.
Outlook
The stable rating outlook reflects our expectation that Indonesia will achieve solid economic growth over the next two years. This will support prudent fiscal outcomes and stabilize debt.
Downside scenario
We may lower the ratings if Indonesia's economy slows materially, such that trend growth in real GDP per capita no longer outpaces that of peers.
Indications that changes in the net general government debt will rise consistently, and average more than 3% of GDP annually, or general government interest payments will surpass 15% of revenues on a sustained basis will exert downward pressure on the ratings.
A significant reversal of Indonesia's current account receipts, leading to a weakening in the external balance sheet or liquidity profile, would also exert downward pressure on the ratings.
Upside scenario
We may raise the ratings if Indonesia's net external indebtedness falls below 50% of current account receipts, or if gross external financing needs fall below 50% of current account receipts plus usable reserves.
A decline in Indonesia's net debt stock to less than 30% of GDP, or interest payments below 10% of general government revenues, and a sustained decline in change in net general government debt of less than 3% of GDP per year would lead to upward pressure on the ratings.
Rationale
Institutional and economic profile: New government inherits economy on a solid footing
We forecast Indonesia's economy will continue to grow at an impressive rate of about 5% per annum over the next three years, supported by stable private consumption and improving external demand. We forecast real GDP growth of 4.9% in 2024, roughly in line with the economy's 5% performance in 2023, and our 2025-2027 average growth forecast of 5%.
Indonesia has weathered a period of weaker external demand and price declines in some of its key commodity exports. We expect these conditions to stabilize over the next 12-18 months. Demand for key commodities including coal, nickel, copper, and natural gas should still support Indonesian economic activities over the next three to five years. Consumption growth has also remained steady, accelerating to 4.7% in 2023 compared with 3.7% in 2022.
Indonesia's GDP per capita, which we estimate at about US$5,200 this year, is low relative to that of most investment-grade peers. Nonetheless, Indonesia's strong per capita trend growth of approximately 4.4% per year should help to alleviate this condition over time. We expect Indonesia's long-term growth to remain well above the average achieved by its peers.
Political and policy institutions in Indonesia are generally stable and free of challenges to their legitimacy. Indonesia's constructive structural dynamics will continue to underpin the economy's relative outperformance over the next three to four years. A new presidential administration and parliament will take power in October 2024. This could lead to some changes in economic and fiscal policymaking priorities. Prabowo Subianto has proposed that Indonesia could achieve a growth rate of 8% within the course of his term, suggesting an agenda that would be highly supportive of economic activity, potentially through the fiscal channel or investment-friendly reforms. Prabowo Subianto has also proposed a plan to provide free food and milk to schoolchildren, which could entail significant new funding requirements depending on the ultimate format of the program.
Flexibility and performance profile: New government's fiscal orientation to come into focus following a period of powerful consolidation
The next government's fiscal orientation will be key to determining the direction of the government's financial performance over the next few years. The outgoing government leaves behind a legacy of powerful post-pandemic consolidation, including a drop in the fiscal deficit to just 1.7% of GDP in 2023. The government has combined its strong revenue performance, supported by the mining sector, with prudent expenditure controls to effect an expeditious repair of its larger pandemic era fiscal shortfalls.
A record of fiscal discipline underpins Indonesia's credit profile, and this has remained the case throughout multiple government administrations. The foundation of Indonesia's fiscal orientation is a long-standing deficit ceiling of 3.0% of GDP, introduced in 2003. Fiscal measures to manage the country's pandemic-related social and humanitarian needs, and to mitigate both transitory and structural economic damage, led to a temporary increase in the deficit above this ceiling in 2020-2021.
The next administration will remain bound by this ceiling unless it decides to seek a change in the policy through legislative means, which would require broad political support. Indonesia's 2024 budget targets a deficit of 2.3% of GDP, moderately higher than 1.7% of GDP in 2023, reflecting a continued commitment to fiscal prudence despite a stronger revenue performance over the past two years.
The government plans to grow its expenditure by 6.1% this year, and is assuming modest state revenue growth of 1%. Revenue growth remains subject to fluctuations in commodity prices. Key for the government will be its ability to keep in check rising subsidy expenditures, which helped to offset higher food and energy prices in 2022-23 and have largely been funded by strong commodity-related revenues.
Fiscal consolidation has stabilized the government's debt stock relative to GDP, following pandemic-driven increases in 2020 and 2021. We expect net general government debt to increase by 2.5% per annum on average in 2024-2027.
Indonesia's narrow revenue base is an additional rating constraint. Strong commodity revenues and a broad-based economic recovery have helped to restore the general government's revenue base to about 15% of GDP, though this remains low compared to that of investment-grade peers. The government's mining-related revenues surged by 114.9% in 2022, with a further 28.7% jump in 2023, underscoring the strong contribution of the sector's performance to fiscal accounts during the period of rapid consolidation. It's less likely that the mining sector will enjoy such outsized growth over the next one to two years. This view drives in part our expectation that the ratio of the government's revenue to GDP will stabilize around the current level.
The government's interest burden remains elevated compared to its modest revenue profile, though the burden has retreated from a peak of 17.6% in 2020. We forecast Indonesia's interest burden will be stable at about 14.2% of revenues in 2024; the future, trend will depend on the ability of the next government to bolster tax collections, the duration of the current period of relatively higher local and foreign currency interest rates, and nominal GDP growth.
Indonesia's foreign-currency-denominated debt has fallen below 40% of total debt in recent years owing to much higher issuance of local currency debt, and the government's limited new financing needs. Foreign ownership of rupiah-denominated government bonds as a proportion of the total outstanding stock has also fallen sharply from end-2019. On aggregate value terms, the government's external indebtedness has been roughly flat over the period, and external vulnerabilities have declined in view of Indonesia's fast-growing export base.
Indonesia maintains strong access to external debt capital markets and foreign direct investment (FDI). We expect the country's total external debt--net of liquid assets held by the public and financial sectors--as a share of current account receipts (CARs) to average about 61% over 2024-2027.
Indonesia's exports base, and therefore its CARs, have benefitted from higher commodity prices and a powerful post-pandemic recovery in the global economy. Momentum slowed in 2023, though, as Indonesia's terms of trade declined and external demand conditions ebbed. The Indonesian rupiah, which ended 2023 roughly flat, is generally flexible and sensitive to macroeconomic developments, which helps to prevent the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances amid external turbulence.
Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves have been buoyed by a 2023 regulation requiring a portion of the foreign exchange proceeds of resource-exporting firms to be held onshore for three months, as well as by the central bank's own foreign currency borrowing mechanism aimed at attracting foreign capital. However, these facilities remain modest contributors to the country's overall reserves of $140.4 billion as of end-March 2024. We anticipate that the foreign exchange reserves will continue to gradually climb over the next few years, as net FDI inflows outpace a moderate current account deficit.
Bank Indonesia, the central bank, maintains a sizable portfolio of government debt on its balance sheet, in part as a legacy of the burden-sharing agreement it struck with the government during the pandemic. Much of this debt will mature over the next four years, but the central bank could step in to purchase longer-dated securities on the secondary market if it does not want to pare its balance sheet.
Bank Indonesia has had significant operational independence to pursue its monetary policy target since July 2005, when it formally adopted the inflation targeting framework. The central bank has since managed inflation roughly in line with that of its regional peers; in particular, price pressures have been generally well contained since the early 2010s.
Indonesia's 2024 inflation target is 1.5%-3.5%, and we forecast consumer price inflation to average 2.8% in 2024, and 3.2% in 2025.
Bank Indonesia has relied increasingly on market-based instruments to implement its monetary policy, and the financial system has grown steadily in recent years. Monetary flexibility has been augmented by the rising flexibility of the rupiah, a floating currency subject to intermittent intervention.
| Indonesia--Selected Indicators | ||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024f | 2025f | 2026f | 2027f | |||||||||||||
| Economic indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (tril. IDR) | 14,838.8 | 15,832.7 | 15,443.4 | 16,976.8 | 19,588.1 | 20,892.4 | 22,374.1 | 24,274.0 | 26,243.8 | 28,371.2 | ||||||||||||
| Nominal GDP (bil. $) | 1,042.3 | 1,119.1 | 1,059.1 | 1,186.5 | 1,319.1 | 1,371.2 | 1,433.0 | 1,548.6 | 1,666.9 | 1,798.5 | ||||||||||||
| GDP per capita (000s $) | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.6 | ||||||||||||
| Real GDP growth | 5.2 | 5.0 | (2.1) | 3.7 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | ||||||||||||
| Real GDP per capita growth | 4.0 | 3.9 | (3.1) | 3.7 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | ||||||||||||
| Real investment growth | 6.7 | 4.5 | (5.0) | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | ||||||||||||
| Investment/GDP | 35.1 | 33.7 | 29.7 | 32.5 | 35.7 | 36.0 | 36.8 | 36.8 | 36.5 | 36.2 | ||||||||||||
| Savings/GDP | 32.1 | 31.0 | 29.3 | 32.8 | 36.7 | 35.8 | 36.0 | 35.5 | 35.1 | 34.8 | ||||||||||||
| Exports/GDP | 21.0 | 18.6 | 17.3 | 21.4 | 24.5 | 21.8 | 22.8 | 22.7 | 22.8 | 22.9 | ||||||||||||
| Real exports growth | 6.5 | (0.5) | (8.4) | 18.0 | 16.2 | 1.3 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.1 | ||||||||||||
| Unemployment rate | 5.3 | 5.2 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.0 | ||||||||||||
| External indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Current account balance/GDP | (2.9) | (2.7) | (0.4) | 0.3 | 1.0 | (0.1) | (0.8) | (1.4) | (1.5) | (1.4) | ||||||||||||
| Current account balance/CARs | (13.1) | (13.8) | (2.3) | 1.3 | 3.9 | (0.5) | (3.4) | (5.8) | (6.1) | (5.9) | ||||||||||||
| CARs/GDP | 22.4 | 19.7 | 18.3 | 22.3 | 25.6 | 23.1 | 23.7 | 23.6 | 23.7 | 23.7 | ||||||||||||
| Trade balance/GDP | (0.0) | 0.3 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | ||||||||||||
| Net FDI/GDP | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | ||||||||||||
| Net portfolio equity inflow/GDP | (0.5) | (0.1) | (0.5) | 0.2 | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | (0.3) | ||||||||||||
| Gross external financing needs/CARs plus usable reserves | 95.9 | 98.2 | 88.6 | 87.0 | 86.2 | 90.2 | 92.7 | 92.9 | 93.1 | 92.9 | ||||||||||||
| Narrow net external debt/CARs | 100.9 | 115.6 | 132.6 | 90.4 | 66.9 | 72.8 | 67.6 | 62.9 | 58.6 | 54.7 | ||||||||||||
| Narrow net external debt/CAPs | 89.2 | 101.6 | 129.6 | 91.6 | 69.6 | 72.4 | 65.4 | 59.5 | 55.3 | 51.7 | ||||||||||||
| Net external liabilities/CARs | 153.3 | 171.5 | 164.3 | 117.3 | 84.3 | 95.2 | 89.0 | 84.7 | 80.6 | 76.7 | ||||||||||||
| Net external liabilities/CAPs | 135.5 | 150.8 | 160.7 | 118.8 | 87.7 | 94.7 | 86.1 | 80.1 | 75.9 | 72.4 | ||||||||||||
| Short-term external debt by remaining maturity/CARs | 36.3 | 38.3 | 45.2 | 33.0 | 27.2 | 28.9 | 28.5 | 25.1 | 23.6 | 22.2 | ||||||||||||
| Usable reserves/CAPs (months) | 5.9 | 5.8 | 7.8 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.3 | ||||||||||||
| Usable reserves (bil. $) | 120.7 | 129.2 | 135.9 | 144.9 | 137.2 | 143.5 | 149.3 | 155.5 | 162.1 | 169.3 | ||||||||||||
| Fiscal indicators (general government %) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Balance/GDP | (1.8) | (2.2) | (6.1) | (4.5) | (2.3) | (1.6) | (2.2) | (2.6) | (2.5) | (2.5) | ||||||||||||
| Change in net debt/GDP | 3.2 | 2.2 | 7.4 | 5.1 | 3.7 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.5 | ||||||||||||
| Primary balance/GDP | (0.2) | (0.4) | (3.9) | (2.3) | (0.3) | 0.6 | (0.1) | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.5) | ||||||||||||
| Revenue/GDP | 14.9 | 14.2 | 12.5 | 13.6 | 15.2 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | ||||||||||||
| Expenditures/GDP | 16.7 | 16.3 | 18.6 | 18.2 | 17.5 | 16.6 | 17.2 | 17.6 | 17.5 | 17.5 | ||||||||||||
| Interest/revenues | 10.8 | 12.3 | 17.6 | 16.1 | 13.6 | 14.3 | 14.2 | 13.7 | 13.6 | 13.5 | ||||||||||||
| Debt/GDP | 30.1 | 30.6 | 39.8 | 41.1 | 40.1 | 39.4 | 39.1 | 38.7 | 38.3 | 38.0 | ||||||||||||
| Debt/revenues | 202.4 | 215.6 | 319.0 | 301.6 | 264.1 | 262.6 | 260.3 | 257.7 | 255.5 | 253.4 | ||||||||||||
| Net debt/GDP | 27.2 | 27.6 | 35.7 | 37.6 | 36.2 | 35.6 | 35.4 | 35.2 | 35.1 | 35.0 | ||||||||||||
| Liquid assets/GDP | 3.0 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.0 | ||||||||||||
| Monetary indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| CPI growth | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.1 | ||||||||||||
| GDP deflator growth | 3.8 | 1.6 | (0.4) | 6.0 | 9.6 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 3.0 | ||||||||||||
| Exchange rate, year-end (IDR/$) | 14,481.0 | 13,901.0 | 14,105.0 | 14,269.0 | 15,731.0 | 15,416.0 | 15,650.0 | 15,700.0 | 15,750.0 | 15,800.0 | ||||||||||||
| Banks' claims on resident non-gov't sector growth | 12.4 | 5.8 | (1.2) | 4.6 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | ||||||||||||
| Banks' claims on resident non-gov't sector/GDP | 36.0 | 35.7 | 36.2 | 34.4 | 32.8 | 33.3 | 34.2 | 34.7 | 35.3 | 35.9 | ||||||||||||
| Foreign currency share of claims by banks on residents | 13.6 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 12.4 | 12.2 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | ||||||||||||
| Foreign currency share of residents' bank deposits | 15.0 | 14.6 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 15.6 | 16.1 | 15 | 15.00 | 15 | 15.00 | ||||||||||||
| Real effective exchange rate growth | (6.3) | 4.5 | (1.8) | (1.5) | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.93 | 2.93 | 2.93 | 2.93 | ||||||||||||
| Sources: Bank Sentral Republik Indonesia (Economic/External Indicators), International Monetary Fund and Bank Sentral Republik Indonesia (Monetary Indicators), Directorate General of Budget Financing and Risk Management, Ministry of Finance and Bank Sentral Republik Indonesia (Fiscal/Debt Indicators). | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Adjustments: None | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Definitions: Savings is defined as investment plus the current account surplus (deficit). Investment is defined as expenditure on capital goods, including plant, equipment, and housing, plus the change in inventories. Banks are other depository corporations other than the central bank, whose liabilities are included in the national definition of broad money. Gross external financing needs are defined as current account payments plus short-term external debt at the end of the prior year plus nonresident deposits at the end of the prior year plus long-term external debt maturing within the year. Narrow net external debt is defined as the stock of foreign and local currency public- and private- sector borrowings from nonresidents minus official reserves minus public-sector liquid claims on nonresidents minus financial-sector loans to, deposits with, or investments in nonresident entities. A negative number indicates net external lending. IDR--Indonesian rupiah. CARs--Current account receipts. FDI--Foreign direct investment. CAPs--Current account payments. The data and ratios above result from S&P Global Ratings' own calculations, drawing on national as well as international sources, reflecting S&P Global Ratings' independent view on the timeliness, coverage, accuracy, credibility, and usability of available information. | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Country--Rating Component Scores | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Key rating factors | Score | Explanation | ||||
| Institutional assessment | 3 | Generally effective policymaking promoting balanced economic growth and sustainable public finances. Moderate policy predictability, with possible policy shifts with changes in administration. Generally cohesive civil society. | ||||
| Economic assessment | 4 | Based on GDP per capita (US$) and growth trends as per Selected Indicators in table 1.Weighted average real GDP per capita trend growth over a 10-year period is well above that of sovereigns in the same GDP category. | ||||
| External assessment | 3 | Based on narrow net external debt (% of current account receipts) and gross external financing needs (% of current account receipts and usable reserves) as per the Selected Indicators in table 1. | ||||
| Fiscal assessment: flexibility and performance | 3 | Based on the change in net general government debt (% of GDP) as per Selected Indicators in table 1. | ||||
| Fiscal assessment: debt burden | 4 | Based on net general government debt (% of GDP) and general government interest expenditure (% of general government revenue) as per Selected Indicators in table 1. | ||||
| Monetary assessment | 3 | The rupiah is a free-floating currency. However, the central bank intervenes intermittently in foreign exchange markets.The central bank has operational independence and uses market-based monetary instruments such as seven-day repo rate, however there is some reliance on reserve requirements. CPI as per Selected Indicators in table 1. The central bank has the ability to act as lender of last resort for the financial system. | ||||
| Indicative rating | bbb | As per table 1 of "Sovereign Rating Methodology." | ||||
| Notches of supplemental adjustments and flexibility | 0 | |||||
| Final rating | ||||||
| Foreign currency | BBB | |||||
| Notches of uplift | 0 | Default risks do not apply differently to foreign- and local-currency debt. | ||||
| Local currency | BBB | |||||
| S&P Global Ratings' analysis of sovereign creditworthiness rests on its assessment and scoring of five key rating factors: (i) institutional assessment; (ii) economic assessment; (iii) external assessment; (iv) the average of fiscal flexibility and performance, and debt burden; and (v) monetary assessment. Each of the factors is assessed on a continuum spanning from 1 (strongest) to 6 (weakest). S&P Global Ratings' "Sovereign Rating Methodology," published on Dec. 18, 2017, details how we derive and combine the scores and then derive the sovereign foreign currency rating. In accordance with S&P Global Ratings' sovereign ratings methodology, a change in score does not in all cases lead to a change in the rating, nor is a change in the rating necessarily predicated on changes in one or more of the scores. In determining the final rating the committee can make use of the flexibility afforded by §15 and §§126-128 of the rating methodology. | ||||||
Related Criteria
- General Criteria: Environmental, Social, And Governance Principles In Credit Ratings, Oct. 10, 2021
- Criteria | Governments | Sovereigns: Sovereign Rating Methodology, Dec. 18, 2017
- General Criteria: Methodology For Linking Long-Term And Short-Term Ratings, April 7, 2017
- General Criteria: Methodology For Rating Sukuk, Jan. 19, 2015
- General Criteria: Principles Of Credit Ratings, Feb. 16, 2011
- General Criteria: Methodology: Criteria For Determining Transfer And Convertibility Assessments, May 18, 2009
Related Research
- Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q2 2024: APAC Bides Its Time On Monetary Policy Easing, March 26, 2024
- Sovereign Ratings Score Snapshot, April 2, 2024
- 2024 Global Sovereign Rating Trends: Mixed Feelings, Dec. 14, 2023
- Sovereign Risk Indicators, April 9, 2024 (An interactive version of the Sovereign Risk Indicators can be found at www.spratings.com/SRI)
- Sovereign Debt 2024: Asia-Pacific Central Government Borrowing Stabilizes At Close To US$4 Trillion, Feb. 28, 2024
- Asia-Pacific Sovereign Rating Trends 2024: Geopolitics Continue To Cloud Outlook, Dec. 14, 2023
- Research Update: Indonesia Ratings Affirmed At 'BBB/A-2'; Outlook Stable, July 4, 2023
| Ratings Detail (as of April 21, 2024)* | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Indonesia | ||||||
| Sovereign Credit Rating | BBB/Stable/A-2 | |||||
| Transfer & Convertibility Assessment | BBB+ | |||||
| Senior Unsecured | BBB | |||||
| Sovereign Credit Ratings History | ||||||
| 27-Apr-2022 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | |||||
| 17-Apr-2020 | BBB/Negative/A-2 | |||||
| 31-May-2019 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | |||||
| *Unless otherwise noted, all ratings in this report are global scale ratings. S&P Global Ratings credit ratings on the global scale are comparable across countries. S&P Global Ratings credit ratings on a national scale are relative to obligors or obligations within that specific country. Issue and debt ratings could include debt guaranteed by another entity, and rated debt that an entity guarantees. | ||||||
| Primary Contact: | KimEng Tan, Singapore 65-6239-6350; kimeng.tan@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contact: | Andrew Wood, Singapore 65-6239-6315; andrew.wood@spglobal.com |
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