Key Takeaways
- Asia-Pacific banks are managing property-sector risks and the vast majority have stable ratings outlooks.
- However, we see limited upside ratings potential during 2024, given higher-for-longer interest rates and weaker economic growth.
- More so, if downside risks emerge on property or other areas, it could become more challenging for banks to maintain outlooks at current levels.
Bank rating stability is likely to persist through 2024 in Asia-Pacific. This is even considering ongoing property sector risks, persistent higher interest rates and lower growth, and continuing high public and private sector indebtedness. Risks unambiguously remain on the downside, however.
Uncertainties over U.S. office-related real estate have so far directly affected only one rated financial institution in Asia-Pacific. Last month, we revised our outlook on Japan-based Aozora Bank Ltd. to negative from stable due to constrained financial flexibility (see "Japan-Based Aozora Bank Outlook Revised To Negative On Bleak Profitability Prospects; 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed," published on RatingsDirect on March 27, 2024). We currently see limited--if any--rating actions on other Asia-Pacific financial institutions specifically because of U.S office-related stress. This is because direct exposure of Asia-Pacific financial institutions to this sector is low.
Domestic property market stresses across Asia-Pacific are clearly the center of attention for Asia-Pacific financial institutions. We retain our view that property is likely the biggest risk to most financial institution ratings across Asia-Pacific in 2024.
In our base case, we foresee no imminent impact on the rating outlooks for most rated Chinese banks even as the property sector unwind continues. We project the nonperforming asset (NPA) ratio for China's banking sector will fluctuate between 5.5% and 5.9% over 2024-2026. We recently revised up our NPA ratio for 2024, to 5.9% from 5.0%. (see "China Banks Brace For Tide Of Bad Property Loans," published April 15, 2024).
China's distressed-asset management companies (AMCs) also must contend with higher impairment losses from large property exposures in 2024. Government support for systemically important AMCs will likely stay very high (see "China's Distressed AMCs: Government Support Will Be There," published on Feb. 2, 2024).
Property market stress persists in pockets elsewhere in Asia-Pacific. In Vietnam we estimate sector-wide nonperforming loans will be roughly flat at about 4.6% of total loans. Risks in Korea are elevated for nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) engaged in financing real estate projects. In Hong Kong, high vacancy rates of about 13% in the grade-A office sector, lower property prices, and low sales will continue to test banks' asset quality.
Our base case is that most banks can contend with higher property sector and other stresses in the context of current ratings and outlooks. Should a downside scenario emerge, negative ratings momentum would clearly be an increasing possibility. In particular, we continue to monitor financial institutions in China that are more exposed to the beleaguered Chinese property sector (see "Bulletin: Property Weakness To Continue To Weigh On China Bohai Bank's Asset Quality," published April 3, 2024). Weakening property sales in China have contributed to some downgrades of property developers, most recently including China Vanke (see "Research Update: China Vanke Downgraded To 'BB+' On Weakening Competitive Position And Surging Leverage; Outlook Negative," April 10, 2024).
Across Asia-Pacific, the ratings impact on financial institutions from property market stress has thus far been less acute than in some other regions. We recently reviewed our rated U.S. banks, focusing largely on the institutions with the highest proportion of loans for commercial real estate. As a result, we revised outlooks on five banks to negative from stable (see "Five U.S. Regional Banks Revised To Negative From Stable On Commercial Real Estate Risks; Ratings Affirmed," March 27, 2024).
Upside Ratings Momentum Is Unlikely
About 95% of Asia-Pacific banks are on stable outlook as of April 3, 2024. This resilience is largely due to solid capitalization, improved profitability, and still-sound asset quality. We expect Asia-Pacific real GDP growth will be slightly slower at 4.4% in 2024 from 4.8% in 2023.
We do not foresee the emergence of a more general upward ratings trend occurring. Various idiosyncratic country risk factors have been the main drivers of recent rating upgrades for some banks in the region. More so, risks across the region mainly remain on the downside. Should downside risks emerge, some banks may be challenged to maintain their stable outlooks.
In April 2024, we upgraded most of the non-major Australia-based banks and other financial institutions. This followed a one-notch improvement in the stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs) of all rated Australia-based banks driven by reduced industry-wide risk (see next paragraph). Due to other adjustments, such as notching related to likeliness of government support, issuer credit ratings remain unchanged on the four major Australian banks, Macquarie Bank, and two foreign-owned banks. We placed our ratings on Suncorp-Metway Ltd. on CreditWatch with positive implications. Outlooks on all the remaining Australian banks, almost all other financial institutions, and their New Zealand subsidiaries are stable.
These rating actions were driven mainly by continued strengthening of institutional and governance standards in the Australian banking sector. Simplified business models and advances in risk management have also contributed to improved industry risks. We now assess the institutional framework for the banking industry in Australia at the lowest risk level on our scale, and in line with that in Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Consequently, we revised our industry risk score on Australia to 2 from 3, and the overall Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) to 2 from 3. These scores are on a scale of 1 (lowest risk) to 10 (highest risk) (see "Most Non-Major Australian Banks Upgraded On Strengthened Institutional Framework; Outlooks Stable," published April 2, 2024).
Earlier in 2024, we raised long-term issuer credit ratings on Indonesia's three largest state-owned banks. Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT, and Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT were revised to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'(see "Ratings On Three Indonesian State-Owned Banks Raised On Higher Government Support; Outlook Stable," Jan. 18, 2024).
Higher-For-Longer Rates Will Test Asset Quality
In the past year, profitability for most banks was boosted mainly because of the interest margins benefit associated with higher interest rates. While this also contributed to incrementally higher credit losses for some banks, these were of a magnitude that could be absorbed at current rating levels. We do, however, anticipate that some banks may ultimately be challenged to maintain asset quality metrics if interest rates remain elevated above our base case and weigh down further than we expect on economic growth prospects.
Singapore banks will see thinner interest margins, but higher loan growth in 2024. In the past year, weak borrowing has been the only sore spot for Singapore banks. High interest rates rapidly boosted interest incomes even as the cost of funds was slow to catch up. Meanwhile, credit conditions remained benign with asset quality supported by strong household balance sheets, full employment conditions, and resilient corporate financial buffers (see "The Fed Pivot Will Change Dynamics For Singapore Banks," March 5, 2024).
Bank of Japan Will Slowly Increase Interest Rates
We anticipate that the Bank of Japan will likely slowly increase the policy interest rate to around 1% by 2027 (see "Japan's Long Wait For Sustained Inflation Is Likely Ending," April 16, 2024). We do not anticipate this well-telegraphed change in monetary policy will have an immediate or major impact on the stand-alone credit profiles of Japan's rated banks.
In our base-case scenario, a gradual rise in yen interest rates will lift earnings in Japan's banking sector. However, the banking industry is likely to become more polarized when interest rates rise, reflecting disparity in the strength and weakness of each bank's core business (see "Japan Banking Outlook 2024: BOJ Hikes Will Widen Disparities," Jan. 24, 2024).
Banks In Australia And China On Track To Meet TLAC Requirements
The total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) for banks in Australia and China is growing steadily. Noted are the significantly different market dynamics at play in each of these jurisdictions.
Under Australia's TLAC framework, the four major banks, are required to raise their TLAC to 18.25% of risk-weighted assets by January 2026. These big four are: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB) and Westpac Banking Corp. These banks will mainly use Tier 2 capital--we estimate their collective annual issuance in each of the next two years to be about A$15 billion-A$20 billion. The Australian major banks should not face any significant hurdles in funding this volume, in our view (see "Credit FAQ: Australian Banks Are Increasing TLAC. So Why Are Bailouts Still An Option?," April 3, 2024)
Banks in China are also progressing well along this path and are likely to benefit from the country's realignment of capital rules with the Basel III framework. China's new capital management rules make some important amendments to the stricter standards the country formulated more than 10 years ago. These new domestic standards took effect at the start of the year and take cues from the latest moves in international regulatory reform. One important change was to revise down the output floor on risk-weighted assets to 72.5%--the floor set in Basel III--from a previous 80% threshold (see "Realigned Capital Rules To Cut China Banks' TLAC Needs," March 7, 2024).
We anticipate extraordinary government support as the most likely resolution mechanism for most Asia-Pacific banking systems, in the unlikely event it was required. This is our long-standing view for the Asia-Pacific. We assess systemically important, private sector commercial banks in 15 of the 19 banking jurisdictions we cover to be potential beneficiaries of extraordinary government support.
India's Financial Regulator Stepping Up Its Focus On Governance
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is showing a serious commitment to improving governance and transparency at finance companies and banks. We believe recent measures will curtail lenders' overexuberance, enhance compliance culture, and safeguard customers. In our view, the RBI has diminishing tolerance for issues relating to non-compliance, customer complaints, data privacy, governance, know-your-customer, and anti-money laundering.
RBI measures include restraining IIFL Finance Ltd. and JM Financial Products Ltd. from disbursing gold loan and loans against shares respectively; and asking Paytm Payments Bank Ltd.to stop onboarding of new customers. These actions followed noncompliance problems by the institutions. They are a departure from the historically nominal financial penalties imposed for breaches (see "India's Regulatory Clampdown May Raise The Cost Of Capital," March 26, 2024).
Learnings Since SVB
Contagion risks impacting the Asia-Pacific banking sector have ameliorated in the year since authorities in the U.S. and Switzerland stepped in to quell contagion risk. No other major events have occurred after the demise of regional lenders Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank in the U.S., and the much larger Zurich-based Credit Suisse. Nonetheless, in our view, regulators remain acutely aware of the sector's sensitivities and continue to take steps to reinforce the resilience of the financial system--through tighter supervision and tougher regulation (see "CreditWeek: What Have We Learned In The Year Since SVB Triggered Turmoil In The Banking Sector?," March 14, 2024).
Risks Emerging From The Shadows
The risks facing shadow banks are on the rise amid tighter financing conditions. In our view, shadow financing plays an important role in credit intermediation by enhancing efficiency and depth in financial markets. Nonetheless, their concentration in certain economic sectors, among other characteristics, means that they are not immune to economic and interest rate cycles. We therefore expect their financial positions to come under stress periodically.
Traditional banks' exposures to shadow banks are not as limited as they first appear. Although the shadow banking sector is not a source of rating pressure for global traditional banks right now, it is an area to watch in 2024. In particular, we will monitor how banks manage their direct exposures to NBFIs and other shadow banks, and how regulators implement the various recommendations that global standard-setting bodies have issued to mitigate NBFI-related risks (see "Global Shadow Banks Face Scrutiny As Risks Rise," March 20, 2024).
BICRA Changes
Over the past quarter (through April 3, 2024), the following changes have been made to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) in Asia-Pacific.
Australia
We revised our industry risk score on Australia to 2 from 3, and the overall Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) to Group 2 from Group 3.
The actions reflect continued strengthening of institutional and governance standards in the Australian banking sector that have reduced industrywide risks. Simplified business models and advances in risk management have also contributed to this improvement.
We now assess the institutional framework for the banking industry in Australia at the lowest risk level on our scale, and in line with that in Canada, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
Macao
We have assigned the Macao Special Administrative Region to BICRA Group '5'. The economic risk score for Macao is '5' and the industry risk score is '5'. Both trends are both stable.
We have published the following comprehensive BICRA reports in the past quarter in Asia-Pacific.
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Mongolia, Jan. 11, 2024
- Macao Assigned To Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Group '5', Jan. 9, 2024
Table 1
| Real GDP Forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change from prior forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
| (% year over year) | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | ||||||||||
|
Australia |
2.1 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
China |
5.2 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Hong Kong |
3.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.2 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | ||||||||||
|
India |
7.6 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Indonesia |
5.0 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Japan |
1.9 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Malaysia |
3.7 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.6 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
New Zealand |
0.6 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
|
Philippines |
5.6 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | ||||||||||
|
Singapore |
1.1 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | -0.4 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
South Korea |
1.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Taiwan |
1.3 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
|
Thailand |
1.9 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.1 | -0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Vietnam | 5.0 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Asia Pacific | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Note: For India, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27, 2027 = FY 2027 / 28. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||||||||
Table 2
| Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institution | Opco L-T ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | Comparable rating analysis | SACP or group SACP | Type of support | No. of notches of support | Additional factor adjustment | |||||||||||||
| Australia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Commonwealth Bank of Australia |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Macquarie Bank Ltd. |
A+/Stable | a- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
National Australia Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac Banking Corp. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb- | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China CITIC Bank Corp. Ltd. |
BBB+/Positive | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Group | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Construction Bank Corp. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB+/Positive | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Hong Kong | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of East Asia Ltd. (The) |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. (The) |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| India | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Axis Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | (1) | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Kotak Mahindra Bank |
BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | (1) | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
HDFC Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Strong | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | (3) | |||||||||||||
|
ICICI Bank Ltd.§ |
BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
State Bank of India |
BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
| Indonesia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Japan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Chiba Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. * |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mizuho Financial Group Inc. * |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Nomura Holdings Inc. * |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Norinchukin Bank |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Resona Holdings Inc. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinkin Central Bank |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shizuoka Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc. * |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings * |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Industrial Bank of Korea |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KEB Hana Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Kookmin Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Nonghyup Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Adequate | 0 | a- | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinhan Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Woori Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Malaysia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Public Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Strong | Strong/Strong | (1) | a | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Malayan Banking Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
CIMB Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| New Zealand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
ASB Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of New Zealand |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Philippines | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of the Philippine Islands |
BBB+/ Stable | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Singapore | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
DBS Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
United Overseas Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Taiwan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
CTBC Bank Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Thailand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB+/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | bbb- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KASIKORNBANK PCL |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bb | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Data as of April 3, 2024. In "Type of Support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. §This ICR applies to the foreigncurrency Rating only. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Opco--Operating company. L-T--Long term. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3
| Recent Rating Actions: Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Date | Legal name | Country | From | To | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bank of Queensland Ltd. |
Australia | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Cuscal Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Positive/A-1 | AA-/Stable/A-1+ | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Credit Union Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Newcastle Greater Mutual Group Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police & Nurses Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
G&C Mutual Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
QPCU Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Defence Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Queensland Country Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Judo Bank Pty Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Maitland Mutual Ltd |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Heritage and People's Choice Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Bank Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Teachers Mutual Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Beyond Bank Australia Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Regional Australia Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Police Financial Services Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Illawarra Credit Union Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Stable/A-1 | A+/Positive/A-1 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
Suncorp-Metway Ltd. |
Australia | A+/Positive/A-1 | A+/WatchPos/A-1 | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
AMP Ltd. |
Australia | BBB-/Positive/-- | BBB/Stable/-- | ||||||
| April 2, 2024 |
AMP Bank Ltd. |
Australia | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| March 27, 2024 |
Aozora Bank Ltd. |
Japan | BBB/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Negative/A-2 | ||||||
| March 7, 2024 |
Taiwan Shin Kong Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. |
Taiwan | BBB/Negative/A-2 | BBB-/Negative/A-3 | ||||||
| January 30, 2024 |
Ping An Bank Co. Ltd. |
China | BBB+/Negative/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| January 25, 2024 |
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
Thailand | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
| January 18, 2024 |
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT |
Indonesia | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| January 18, 2024 |
Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT |
Indonesia | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| January 18, 2024 |
Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT |
Indonesia | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
| *Recent rating actions are for the period January 1, 2024 to April 3, 2024. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||
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Ratings Methodology News
- Sector And Industry Variables | Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: March 2024, March 26, 2024
- Criteria | Financial Institutions | Request for Comment: Request For Comment: Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology, Jan. 25, 2024
Other Research
Please see "Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research," published April 10, 2024 which is a curated compilation of the key takeaways from our most up-to-date thought leadership.
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- Sector Update: Key Credit Risks For Philippine Banks, Economy And Sovereign Ratings, March 27, 2024
- Spotlight On Emerging Markets - Navigating Liquidity Challenges: Insights For Indian Banks, Finance Companies, And The Economy, March 5, 2024
- Asia-Pacific Sector Trends 2024, Jan. 30, 2024
- European Banking Insights: What Basel III Finalization Means For Bank Ratings, Jan. 18, 2024
- Understanding S&P Global Ratings Stablecoin Stability Assessment, Jan. 10, 2024
This report does not constitute a rating action.
S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2092; gavin.gunning@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3532; ryan.tsang@spglobal.com |
| Geeta Chugh, Mumbai + 912233421910; geeta.chugh@spglobal.com | |
| Kensuke Sugihara, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8475; kensuke.sugihara@spglobal.com | |
| Vera Chaplin, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2058; vera.chaplin@spglobal.com | |
| Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055; susan.chu@spglobal.com | |
| Sharad Jain, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2077; sharad.jain@spglobal.com | |
| Peter Sikora, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2094; peter.sikora@spglobal.com | |
| Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887; nico.delange@spglobal.com | |
| Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081; lisa.barrett@spglobal.com | |
| HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3597; hongtaik.chung@spglobal.com | |
| Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3508; daehyun.kim@spglobal.com | |
| Emily Yi, Hong Kong + 852 2532 8091; emily.yi@spglobal.com | |
| Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8578; chizuru.tateno@spglobal.com | |
| Ming Tan, CFA, Singapore + 65 6216 1095; ming.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Ivan Tan, Singapore + 65 6239 6335; ivan.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Phyllis Liu, CFA, FRM, Hong Kong +852 2532 8036; phyllis.liu@spglobal.com | |
| Nikita Anand, Singapore + 65 6216 1050; nikita.anand@spglobal.com | |
| Yiran Zhong, Hong Kong 25333582; yiran.zhong@spglobal.com | |
| Xi Cheng, Shanghai + 852 2533 3582; xi.cheng@spglobal.com | |
| Eunice Fan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6818; eunice.fan@spglobal.com | |
| YuHan Lan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6810; yuhan.lan@spglobal.com | |
| Andy Chang, CFA, FRM, Taipei +886-2-2175-6815; andy.chang@spglobal.com | |
| Research Assistant: | Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai |
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