Key Takeaways
- Slowing growth of e-commerce in China and the rise of newer platforms are loosening the grip on the market for traditional players.
- Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. and JD.com Inc. face difficult choices in fending off PDD Holdings Inc., which has an aggressive focus on unbranded goods.
- For now, the ratings on Alibaba and JD.com remain underpinned by their absolute scale, resilient profit, and cash flows.
The pioneers of China e-commerce are on notice. Sector growth is stalling, competition is rising, and consumers are tightening belts. The credit profiles of Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., JD.com Inc., and Vipshop Holdings Ltd. remain intact for now. But they're increasingly looking over their shoulders at PDD Holdings Inc., which is snapping for more market share. PDD has leveraged consumer desire for value-for-money deals. The company's focus on cheap unbranded products has catapulted it to the second most popular e-commerce platform in China. And its business model has been very profitable.
On the flipside, PDD will face challenges as it seeks to sell more branded products on its platform. Meanwhile, traditional e-commerce giants will continue to generate significant cash flow, even as they sacrifice revenue and profit growth to compete.
How PDD Is Closing In On Alibaba And JD.com
Macro and micro factors are causing pain for China's big online retailers. But PDD is making big strides. The company's scale likely already exceeds that of JD.com; we base our estimate on the total gross merchandise value (GMV) spent on their platforms. PDD's share growth of the e-commerce segment is also profitable, signaling that its GMV share is sustainable. The company's EBIT share of e-commerce has jumped over the past two years, well exceeding that of JD.com.
Chart 1
At the same time, China's economic growth is slowing. The country's e-commerce market is set to grow by about 8%-9% annually over the next two years, down from a compound annual growth rate of 13% over the past five years. E-commerce spending will decelerate because of slowing growth in macro consumption and already-high online penetration for product categories, such as consumer appliances and consumer electronics.
Chart 2
(For ease of comparison, we use Alibaba's fiscal year 2017 for calendar year 2016, and so on.)
Chart 3
Expanding Territory Could Require Large Sacrifices
PDD's momentum will slow as it encroaches on the niche products and services of the traditional players. Alibaba, JD.com, and Vipshop have each staked out their own core consumer group or online consumption pattern.
Table 1
Business models of China e-commerce giants | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Company/characteristics | Alibaba | PDD | JD | Vipshop |
Third-party marketplace (3P) or direct sales (1P) model | Mainly 3P model. | Solely 3P model. | Relies on a direct sales model. | Relies on a direct sales model. |
A smaller portion of GMV from 1P model. | Growing the third-party marketplace model. | |||
Niche and advantages | One-stop shop for most consumers. | Prioritizes non-branded and low-cost products high up in search results to attract price-sensitive consumers. | Ability to operate its own logistics. | Strong position in the niche off-price apparel category. |
A platform on which To look for exotic products. | High exposure to smaller merchants and small ticket-size items with high repurchase frequency. | High quality assuance for products and services, which is particularly important for high-value merchandise such as consumer electronic products. | Good merchandising capabilities and relationships with brand partners in the apparel category. | |
The large variety of branded merchants provides better quality assurance relative to non-branded products. | Fewer stock keeping unit (SKUs) selections than Taobao, which allows manufacturers to maximize economies of scale on PDD, and accept lower unit prices. | An inventory clearance partner for brands and the preferred platform for customers seeking off-price branded apparel. | ||
Reasons for defending its competitiveness | Estimated largest number of consumers and a broad merchant base. | The second largest number of consumers. | Well-earned reputation for branded products and quality assurance. | Its narrow segment focus has induced less direct competition from the more diversified players Alibaba, JD.com and PDD. |
A distinct network advantage that is difficult to replicate. | First-mover in the value-for-money e-commerce segment, with established platform reputation. | Difficult to replicate because of the significant investments required in infrastructure. | First-mover in the off-price branded apparel sub-segment. | |
Established position in selective product categories such as home appliances and consumer electronics. |
To gain share in the other's core market, each platform faces choices that could be costly and risk harming their existing core market.
For example, Alibaba's move to expand its number of unbranded merchants may be hazardous. By prioritizing unbranded merchants to attract highly price-sensitive consumers, Alibaba risks hurting its relationship with branded merchants and their willingness to advertise on its flagship e-commerce platform, Taobao and Tmall. Branded merchants may be less willing to pay high fees to advertise their listing, particularly if such listings appear next to low-priced unbranded products.
Alibaba could also hurt its profitability if unbranded merchants cannibalize branded merchandise. Unbranded products have much lower prices, leading to lower fees and commissions, especially when the merchants' profit margins for these products are already very thin.
PDD faces similar difficulties at the other spectrum. Branded merchants may hesitate to sell their products on PDD's platform out of concern that it could pose a risk to their brand's reputation. And PDD's more price-sensitive consumers may be less receptive to pricier branded products.
Using Subsidies To Woo Merchants
PDD could resort to using subsidies to selectively expand into branded products such as consumer electronics. Over the past few years, PDD has, for instance, selectively offered meaningful subsidies to buyers of iPhones sold by phone dealers on the PDD platform. Selling cheap iPhones is a way for PDD to attract consumers looking for value-for-money branded options and prove to consumers they can buy genuine branded products on the platform. This helps the sale of other branded products on the platform.
For Alibaba, the introduction of unbranded merchants into any product category could affect existing branded merchants. This counter-positioning is a dilemma for the company. It cannot ignore PDD, but nor can it quell the competitive threat by wholly adopting PDD's strategy.
JD.com is in a similar position in managing its relationship with branded merchants. JD's direct sales model and in-house logistics are less suitable when it comes to selling low-cost non-branded products.
Share gains aside, all platforms will strive to ensure products listed on their platforms are competitive, particularly amid soft consumer spending. To achieve this, all platforms will use subsidies, lower fees, and offer incentives to merchants to reduce prices as much as possible. But as long as consumers remain highly cost-conscious such policies are likely to further slow revenue growth and erode profit margins.
Table 2
Top listings across e-commerce platforms highlight PDD's unbranded product focus | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Description for search results of "liquid detergent" | ||||||||||||||||
App | Ranking of the listing | Is it a leading brand? | Sales volume | Price for the SKU (RMB) | Package volume (kg) | Unit price (RMB/kg) | Cheapest unit price available (RMB/kg) | |||||||||
Taobao | 1 | Yes | Over 10k persons paid | 29.9 | 2.0 | 15.0 | 11.5 | |||||||||
2 | Yes | Over 10k persons paid | 69.9 | 5.0 | 14.0 | 13.6 | ||||||||||
3 | Yes | Over 10k persons paid | 40.9 | 3.0 | 13.6 | 10.5 | ||||||||||
4 | No | Over 1k persons paid | 30.1 | 120 capsules | 0.25/capsule | 0.25/capsule | ||||||||||
JD | 1 | Yes | Over 100k customers | 29.9 | 2.0 | 15.0 | 15.0 | |||||||||
2 | Yes | Over 5 mil. cumulative comments | 24.9 | 1.0 | 24.9 | 23.6 | ||||||||||
3 | Yes | Over 10k returning customers | 42.9 | 1.0 | 42.9 | 25.0 | ||||||||||
4 | No | Over 30k returning customers | 39.9 | 2.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | ||||||||||
PDD | 1 | No | 4,021 sold | 14.8 | 2.0 | 7.4 | 6.6 | |||||||||
2 | No | Over 400k sold | 6.6 | 1.0 | 6.6 | 3.1 | ||||||||||
3 | Yes | Over 1 mil. sold | 14.5 | 1.4 | 10.7 | 9.1 | ||||||||||
4 | Yes | Over 900k sold | 19.9 | 1.1 | 18.1 | 16.9 | ||||||||||
RMB--Chinese renminbi. SKU--Stock keeping units. |
The Rise And Fall Of Taobao Deals
In 2020, Alibaba launched a separate e-commerce app called Taobao Deals (distinct from Taobao) to directly compete with PDD. Taobao Deals featured products sold directly from manufacturers as opposed to branded products or products sold through distributors or retailers. Because it was run as a separate platform, Taobao Deals had a user base of just over 300 million at its peak in 2022. This paled in comparison to Alibaba's total of 903 million active consumers for fiscal 2022 (year ending March). These consumers were mostly on Taobao (Alibaba's consumer-to-consumer platform) and Tmall (its business-to-consumer platform.)
At the outset, Taobao Deals faced several challenges. For one, its smaller user base made it harder to attract manufacturers to sell on the platform. Manufacturers typically required large sales volumes to achieve economies of scale. Meanwhile, PDD was quickly acquiring new users through its social features. For instance, PDD granted discounts to buyers if they invited friends to make group purchases. It also embarked on a partnership with Tencent Holdings Ltd.'s Weixin/WeChat messaging app. Taobao Deals lacked these advantages.
Secondly, according to a third-party source, Taobao Deals reportedly had a commission rate on transactions of 2%-5% or more. This range was similar to that of Taobao and Tmall, but meaningfully higher than PDD's 0.5%-3%. It's possible that the higher commission rates further reduced the incentive for lower-cost manufacturers to sell on Taobao Deals.
This raises two questions. Why did Alibaba launch Taobao Deals on a separate platform from Taobao and Tmall, thereby limiting Taobao Deals with a smaller initial user base? And if Taobao Deals did charge a higher commission rate, what was its motive?
One possibility is that Alibaba was concerned about the cannibalization of Taobao and Tmall's more profitable business and merchants by Taobao Deals. A lower commission rate on Taobao Deals could incentivize merchants to divert purchases from Taobao to Taobao Deals. It may well have been the success of Taobao and not PDD that ultimately led Taobao Deals to consolidate within Taobao.
Warnings Signs To Look For
Key data points indicate the general health of an e-commerce platform (see table 3).
Table 3
Warning signs to look for | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Indicator | User traffic* | Merchants | GMV | Revenue | Profits and cash flows | |||||||
Usefulness | High | Low | Low | Medium | High | |||||||
Advantages | Users are necessary to attract merchants, which attracts more users, creating a virtuous positive feedback loop. | Large number of merchants on the platform points to product variety, which attracts users. | Historically GMV was important to gain relevance and scale. | Revenue is more directly tied to the e-commerce platform's economics than GMV. | The bottom line on the financial health of a platform. | |||||||
More merchants equals more fees. | GMV is an indication of market share and directly comparable across platforms and with NBS spending data as it ignores accounting differences such as 1P and 3P. | Revenue definition is more standardized due to accounting rules. | Ignores differences in business models and accounting choices. | |||||||||
Platforms typically charge a commission on the spending that takes place on their platforms. | Revenue data is readily available. | |||||||||||
Limitations | User spending can vary significantly across platforms. | Limited availability of data. | GMV share can be bought, sometimes unprofitably. | Differences in accounting for 1P and 3P limits comparability across platforms | High variability due to one-off costs, gains, and losses. | |||||||
User data can be difficult to track. | Merchants vary greatly in size, quality, and profitability. | Definition of GMVs is not consistent. | Revenue does not account for associated costs such as customer acquisition costs. | Not a leading indictator. | ||||||||
Segemented data may not be available. | ||||||||||||
Data availability | Publicly available data can be sporadic. | Data is spotty and largely unavaiable. | Reporting of GMV data has discontinued over the past few years. | Regularly disclosed In financial reports. | Regularly disclosed in financial reports. | |||||||
Some third-party data providers disclose user traffic (as measured by MAU) or user time spent on the platform. | ||||||||||||
*Includes monthly active users (MAU), annual active consumers (AAC), or user time spent. GMV--Gross merchandise value. |
Chart 4
Chart 5
Chart 6
Chart 7
Rating Implications For China E-commerce Issuers
Alibaba (A+/Stable/--)
We believe the company can maintain its dominant market position in e-commerce space, given it has the highest customer base and widest range of online goods in China. Alibaba and other players face many challenges. Primarily, these include the increasing competition from PDD, which is increasing its presence in branded products and has a current advantage in nonbranded products. Alibaba is not standing still, though. We believe the company can attract value-for-money merchants and provide subsidies while still protecting its profitability and relationship with branded merchants.
Key merchants will still aim to tap the 900 million annual active consumers of Taobao and Tmall (TTG), many of whom are seeking branded products. Competition will squeeze margins, but EBITA at the group should remain steady at about Chinese renminbi (RMB) 200 billion a year.
Alibaba's annual free operating cash flow should exceed RMB130 billion each year. S&P Global Ratings' estimate takes into account stronger growth for its overseas businesses, including Alibaba International Digital Commerce and Cainiao (driven by AliExpress). The cash flow supports the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'aa-' on Alibaba and provides plenty of buffer to the long-term issuer rating of 'A+', which is capped by the sovereign rating on China (A+/Stable/--).
Nevertheless, we are vigilant for signs that the 'aa-' SACP is deteriorating. These could include: (1) a notable loss of users or merchants on TTG's platform; and (2) declining profitability and cash flow at TTG. Such deterioration could relate to rising subsidies or sales and marketing costs, falling commission rates or fees, or other signs of erosion due to competition.
JD.com (A-/Stable/--)
Competition from other platforms is unlikely to materially affect JD.com's competitiveness. This is because it proposes a different value proposition to consumers. Online shoppers who prefer JD.com cite its timely delivery and the quality assurance of the products and services sold on its platform. The company achieves such standards because it handles its own logistics across China and uses a direct sales model for the majority of its sales.
JD.com is managing to grow volumes in a tough market, without sacrificing margins. Its EBITDA margin is expanding faster than its revenue. The retailer has parlayed its strength in supply-chain efficiencies and merchant relationship to lower product costs, and subsequently passes on the cost savings to consumers.
The rating on JD.com indicates the company can tolerate some downside risk. Our base case assumes the competition among JD.com and other platforms in 2024 will remain at current levels. If competition intensifies more than we expect, it could pose a downside risk to our 5% revenue growth forecast for JD.com in 2024. The company still has some buffer when we compare its profit or cash flow scale and market position with other 'A-' rated companies.
Vipshop (BBB/Stable/--)
The company focuses on the niche off-price apparel category where it is not directly competing with the larger e-commerce platforms. A slower economy and weaker consumer sentiment have caused Vipshop to be more cautious about increasing spending on customer acquisition. It has focused more on its merchandising to strengthen its product range and ability to offer competitive prices.
Our base case assumes Vipshop will maintain a relatively high EBITDA margin of above 8% in 2024-2025. This will support the company's strong EBITDA and free operating cash flow generation and consequently its credit strength.
On the flipside, in the unlikely scenario that the larger platforms expand into the off-price apparel category, it could weaken Vipshop's market position. The bigger platforms have more financial resources to mount a sustained promotional strategy to gain market share. Were this to occur, Vipshop would be prone to losing more of its price-sensitive customers.
The macroeconomic environment could evolve; new platforms could emerge; competition could intensify; and regulation could tighten. What is certain is that consumer and merchant behavior will change accordingly. How the e-commerce pioneers and the younger players adapt will be crucial to determining which platforms get the edge and defend or gain share in this sizable market.
Editor: Lex Hall
Related Research
- JD.com Can Grow Market Share Without Losing Margin, March 7, 2024
- Alibaba Set To Lose More Market Share To Lower-Cost Rivals, Feb. 19, 2024
- China Retail Sales Will Likely Grow Slower Than GDP This Year, Jan. 23, 2024
- Credit FAQ: Alibaba Stares Down Competitive Threats, Feb. 1, 2023
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analysts: | Cathy Lai, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3569; cathy.lai@spglobal.com |
Clifford Waits Kurz, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3534; clifford.kurz@spglobal.com | |
Secondary Contacts: | Aras Poon, Hong Kong (852) 2532-8069; aras.poon@spglobal.com |
Sandy Lim, CFA, Hong Kong 2533 3544; sandy.lim@spglobal.com |
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