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Pharmaceutical Industry 2024 Credit Outlook Is Stable As Revenue Growth Mitigates Pressures

Through 2027, S&P Global Ratings expects healthy, organic revenue growth of at least low- to mid-single-digit percent for most of the large, global, typically investment-grade, branded pharma companies (Big Pharma). This is primarily due to advances in medical science, especially in the therapeutic areas of:

  • Oncology, such as antibody drug conjugates (ADCs), bispecifics, and combination products;
  • Autoimmune disorders (immunology), despite competition from biosimilars;
  • Central nervous system and neurology, particularly Alzheimer's Disease; and
  • GLP-1-based treatments for obesity.

We expect these four therapeutic areas to grow, on average, by at least 8%-10% annually.

Supporting our expectations for growth are a robust wave of new drug approvals by the FDA (see chart 1), as well as Wall Street consensus estimates for the next few years for most of the Big Pharma companies we rate (see table 1) and for the broader industry (see chart 2).

Chart 1

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Table 1

Consensus expectations for big pharma revenue growth (%)
As of Dec. 19, 2023.
2022a 2023e 2024e 2025e 2026e 2027e 2028e 2029e 5-year average (2024-2028)
Eli Lilly & Co. 1 18 16 21 17 16 8 9 15.3
Novo Nordisk 26 29 21 17 13 9 9 8 14.0
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. (24) 6 5 6 6 8 6 3 6.2
Sanofi 19 3 10 8 4 4 5 4 6.1
AstraZeneca PLC 14 3 7 8 5 5 0 0 4.8
Merck & Co. Inc. 22 1 5 6 4 4 3 (4) 4.5
Amgen Inc 1 7 15 3 2 1 2 2 4.7
Roche Holding AG 1 (6) 4 6 4 3 3 8 4.0
GSK PLC (14) 1 5 6 5 4 (1) (2) 3.9
Abbvie Inc 3 (7) (1) 5 5 4 3 1 3.3
Johnson & Johnson 1 (11) 4 3 2 4 2 2 3.0
Gilead Sciencies Inc. 0 (1) 2 2 3 3 2 2 2.5
Biogen Inc. (7) (2) (3) 2 3 5 3 0 2.2
Novartis AG (2) (8) 3 4 2 2 0 1 2.0
Pfizer Inc 23 (41) 2 6 2 2 (3) 0 1.6
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 12 13 (1) (2) 2 3 2 3 0.8
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 0 (3) 3 1 (3) (1) (6) (8) (1.2)
Average 4.4 0.1 5.7 6.0 4.5 4.5 2.2 1.8 4.6
Average (excluding two companies*) 3.2 (3) 4.0 0.0 3.1 3.4 1.3 0.9 3.2
Revenue growth was negative for many companies in 2023 due to decline in COVID-19 products (PFE), divestitures (JNJ ), and loss of exclusivity of major products (ABBV and BMY). The consensus estimates may have different assumptions than S&P Global Ratings in terms of impact of Medicare price negotiation, and inclusion of not-yet-closed or future acquisitions. *Eli Lilly & Co. and Novo Nordisk are experiencing outsized revenue growth due to their leadership in obesity drugs. a--Actual. e--Estimate. Source CapitalIQ estimates, S&P Global Ratings.

Chart 2

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We have already seen the industry evolve to relatively flat trends in net price in the U.S. from annual price increases (see chart 3); our revenue forecast incorporates this alongside pressure over the next few years from the cadence of products losing exclusivity (see chart 4) and an increase in biosimilar competition in the U.S. (see chart 5). It also reflects the headwinds from the IRA, including Medicare negotiation on certain products, which takes effect January 2026 (see tables 2 and 3), notwithstanding uncertainty associated with outstanding challenges to the law and ongoing negotiations.

Chart 3

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Chart 4

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Chart 5

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Table 2

Key drug price reform provisions of the IRA
Initiative Drugs covered Current status
Medicare drug price negotiation program. Prescription drugs covered by Medicare, that are approved for at least nine years (13 years for biologic drugs), for which there is no generic or biosimilar compeition. This law was passed. It is first effective on up to 10 drugs in January 2026, with 15 drugs to be added annually for 2027 and 2028, and 20 drugs annually thereafter. Initially, it only covers drugs in Medicare Part D, but can include drugs in Medicare Part B starting in 2028. The CBO projects this will save $100 billion over 10 years (which is less than 1% of industry revenues). It's unclear whether lower prices for Medicare may lead to lower prices for patients not covered by Medicare, such as state purchasers or commerical plans.
Constrains the ability for drugmakers to raise prices above the rate of inflation to Medicare, by introducing rebates. Both Medicare Part B drugs (typically administered by a doctor, such as those infused) and Medicare Part D drugs (self-administered drugs), with an annual price exceeding $100. This law went into effect in October 2022 (based on annual manufacturer price) for part D drugs. It went to effect Januart 2023 (based on ASP or WAC) for Part B drugs.
Cap on out-of-pocket costs for insulin to $35 month. Insulin. However, in the face of public pressure and Medicaid rebate policies that would be very costly to the three primary insulin makers (Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and Sanofi), insulin makers significantly reduced prices on their various insulin product, for all patients, including the commercially insured and uninsured, in many instances to $35/month. IRA provisions became effective January 2023. Other price reductions occurred in 2023, while others became effective January 2024. Insulin was targeted given how long it has been around and off-patent, how many patients rely on it, how critical it is to patients, and given that many patients were skipping doses due to costs.
Incentivize higher utilization of biosimilars in Medicare Part B. Drugs covered under Medicare Part B (i.e. those administered by a doctor usually an injection or infusion). Doctors who administer drugs under Medicare Part B are reimbursed 6% above above the ASP of the drug, in addition to the cost of the drug, as compensation for their services. Starting October 2022, they will receive 8% of the original drug price if they administer a biosimilar. This extends for five years. For biosimilars launched at a date after Oct 2022, the five years begins on the first day of the calendar quarter that the biosimilar is first introduced.
IRA--Inflation Reduction Act. CBO--Congressional Budget Office. ASP--Average sale price. WAC--Wholesale acquisitions cost. *Note the IRA also has provisions favorable for drugmakers, including limiting the out of pocket costs to Medicare beneficiaries to about $3300 in 2024 and stepping down to $2000 in 2025. We expect this to increase utilization of drugs, where out of pocket spending was previously a constraint for beneficiaries.

Table 3

Products selected for Medicare drug price negotiation under the IRA (effective 2026)
Product Key indication(s) Company Company-reported 2022 product revenue (bil. $) Gross revenue from Medicare for the product (bil. $)§
Eliquis Anticoagulant Bristol Myers Squibb / Pfizer 11.789 16.5
Jardiance Diabetes; heart failure Boehringer Ingelheim / Eli Lilly 6.261 7
Xarelto Anticoagulant Johnson & Johnson 6.67 6
Januvia Diabetes Merck 3.021 4.1
Farxiga Diabetes; heart failure; CKD AstraZeneca 4.698 3.3
Entresto Heart failure Novartis 4.686 2.9
Enbrel Autoimmune conditions Amgen 5.12 2.8
Imbruvica Blood cancers Abbvie / Johnson & Johnson 5.82 2.7
Stelara* Autoimmune conditions Johnson & Johnson 10.239 2.6
Fiasp, Fiasp FlexTouch, Fiasp PenFill, NovoLog, NovoLog FlexPen, NovoLog PenFill Diabetes Novo Nordisk N.A 2.6
IRA--Inflation Reduction Act. CKD--Chronic kidney disease. N.A.--Not applicable. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) will publish the negotiated prices by Sept. 1, 2024, and add up to 15 drugs annually for 2027 and 2028, and 20 drugs annually thereafter. Our base case assumes the law remains in place, despite several legal challenges to the IRA. Although these amounts are a small portion of the total revenue of the respective companies, the impact of a reduction in price flows straight through to EBITDA. *We expect Stelara to have meaningful biosimilar competition starting 2025 and to therefore be excluded from price negotiation. §Data on Medicare spend is gross (before rebates) and for the period June 2022-May 2023, whereas product revenues are net of rebates and for fiscal 2022. Source: SEC filings, Evaluate Pharma, CMS.

Only Modest Downside Risk From Additional Proposed Reforms

After a short-lived improvement during the pandemic, the pharma industry's reputation has slid again (see chart 6), and there are now a variety of proposed bills focusing on drug price reform. However, given the existing initiatives to constrain drug prices in the U.S., including advances in biosimilar competition and the passage of the IRA in 2022, we believe the potential impact of further drug industry reforms in the U.S. will be modest.

While we believe the successful passage of the IRA indicates the industry's influence over lawmakers has waned, we believe most lawmakers significantly value the social benefits of advances in medicine and understand the high level of investment needed to generate those innovations. As such, we anticipate legislators will balance potential cost savings with the need for economic incentives required to sustain research and development (R&D) in drug development. Supporting this is the fact that only moderate drug price reforms have passed to date, and in the instance of the IRA, with offsetting provisions that are favorable to drugmakers, namely reducing the out-of-pocket costs under Medicare.

We therefore expect any further drug industry reform would only moderately reduce profit margins no more than a few hundred basis points (bps), which is moderate relative to average industry margins of 30%-40%.

Chart 6

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That said, there are a wide variety of outstanding drug price reform proposals (see table 3). We expect some of the more moderate and targeted ones may pass, and that they will likely affect some companies more than others. We also believe that pharma companies will adapt and continue to prioritize investment in R&D and M&A to support revenue growth, even if industry conditions become a little less favorable, albeit potentially at the expense of margin pressure, increased debt leverage, or a need to lower shareholder returns.

Table 4

A selection of recent drug price reform initiatives and proposals
Initiative Proposal/law Additional details
Importing prescription drugs from Canada In January 2024, Florida got FDA approval to launch a program to import prescription drugs from Canada. In October 2020, the FDA issued regulations for U.S. state governments that want to sponsor importing certain Canadian copies of FDA-approved drugs, if it significantly reduces the cost of drugs to the U.S. consumer. There are significant hurdles to implement this initative, including quality testing and requirements to revise labeling and packaging, and limitations, such as excluding biologic drugs, controlled substances, and drugs subject to REMS. Moreover, Florida intends to limit this to individuals on Medicaid or state health plans. In addition, Canada expressed concerns about possible shortages and price increases and is acting to safeguard its drug supply.
Expand negotiation of drug prices Expand and extend IRA provisions to more products and more parts of the prescription drug market The Lowering Drug Costs for American Families Act of 2023 (H.R. 4895), proposes to expand the number of products subject to price negotiation and extend the negotiated prices and 'inflation-related rebates' in the IRA to private/commercial insurance market
Preventing exploitation of drug patents and exclusivity Proposed bills focus on preventing the delay of generic entry via patent thickets, product hopping (discontinuing old drugs to force patients to the newer version of the drug, pay for delay and "parking" arrangements, and improper use of the citizen's petition process. Proposed bills include the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2023 (S. 150) and the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act of 2023 (S. 142), which raise the standards and authorize FTC involvement; the Expanding Access to Low-Cost Generics Act of 2023 (S. 1114), which focuses on "parking"; the Ensuring Timely Access to Generics Act of 2023 (S. 1067) and Stop STALLING Act of 2023 (S. 148), which focus on improper use of the Citizen's Petition process and authorizes FTC involvement and imposes penalties; and The Interagency Patent Coordination and Improvement Act of 2023 (S.79), which encourages greater coordination between the FDA and the patent office to enhance collaboration and efficiency.
Accelerating adoption of biosimilars Proposals to eliminate the need for interchangability studies to allow substitution by pharmacists and an arrangement that allows the FDA to pursue initiatives to make the biosimilar development (approval) process easier for drugmakers. In addition to S. 142 and S. 150, which relate to patent abuse and is relevant to biologic and biosimilar drugs, too, the Biosimilar Red Tape Elimination Act of 2023 (S. 2305) proposes to eliminate the need for interchangability studies, which are currently required in most states to allow the pharmacist to substitute the biosimilar in place of the reference drug without consulting the prescribing doctor. The Biosimilar User Fee Act (BsUFA) provides the FDA with the necessary resources to maintain the review process for biosimilar biological products. As part of the fee structure, the FDA committed to enhancing transparency and communication, increasing the efficiency of biosimilar development (including allowing approval without clinical trials, where that is scientifically appropriate), and advancing the development of interchangeable products. In August 2023, the FDA removed interchangeability statement from the drug label.
Disclosure of price and side effects in DTC drug advertising A new law that requires DTC advertisements for prescription drugs to include a "major" (i.e. prominent) statement with side effects and contraindications. There is also a proposal for DTC ads to be required to include the price of the drug. The FDA issued a final rule in November 2023 and clarifying guidance in December 2023 that require a statement of side effects and containdications that is "clear, conspicuous, and in a neutral manner", which is a higher standard than required in the past. This is effective May 20, 2024. In addition, the Drug-price Transparency for Consumers (DTC) Act of 2023 (S. 1250 / H.R. 5958), proposes to require pharma companies to include the wholesale acquisition cost for a 30-day supply (and explain price depends on insurance coverage) in DTC ads. By way of context, the U.S. is one of the only countries that allows DTC advertisements of pharmaceutical products; the view behind these bills is that these ads contribute to higher utilization and drug prices than can be ideal.
PBM price transparency Proposals for greater transparency on rebates, fees, discounts, etc., as well as prohibiting spread pricing (reimbursing pharmacy less than the price the PBM paid) There are many proposed bills focusing on PBM transparency and incentives including: The Pharmacy Benefit Manager Reform Act (S. 1339); The Pharmacy Benefit Manager Transparency Act of 2023 (S.127), which authorizes the FTC and state attorney general to enforce its mandates, including by imposing penalties for violations; The Modernizing and Ensuring PBM Accountability Act (S. 2973), which prohibits rebates tied to drug prices; The Prescription Pricing for the People Act of 2023 (S. 113); The Patients Before Middlemen Act (S. 1967); Pharmacy Benefits Manager Accountability Act (H.R. 2679); The PATIENT Act of 2023 (H.R.3561); and Healthcare Transparency Act of 2023 (H.R. 4822). These initiatives may lower out-of-pocket fees for some patients and alleviate some reputational pressures from Big Pharma, but price transparency may increase price-based competition, and the elimination of rebates could hurt working capital and increase debt leverage.
White House statement including "march-in rights" The White House announced various initiatives to promote competition to lower prescription drug costs, including "march-in rights". On Dec. 7, 2023, the Biden-Harris administration communicated its view that significant consolidation in the pharma industry is inflating drug prices and indicated plans to promote competition to lower drug pricing. This includes a proposed framework for government agencies to consider high price as a factor in exercising "march-in" rights under the Bayh-Dole Act (which allows the goverment to license a taxpayer-funded drug or invention not made accesible to the public). The statement also references FTC intiatives relating to pharma companies (see below), and actions to address misuse of the patent system to lower drug prices and expand access (referenced above).
FTC intiatives The FTC retracted statements of support for PBMs and expressed concerns with the now-evolved PBM industry. The FTC has also been working with other agencies to explore theories of harm from pharmaceutical mergers. Further, the FTC warned against improper listing of patents the FDA's "orange book' and challenged over 100 patents. The FTC had historically been supportive of PBMs but launched an inquiry into them in 2022. In July 2023, it retracted previous statements of support in light of industry changes, including vertical integration, horizontal consolidation, and growth in rebates. The 2022 inquiry reflects significant concerns about how market structures and business practises may undermine patient, pharmacies, and fair competition. In addition, in June 2023, the FTC issued a summary of new approaches to enforce antitrust laws in the pharmaceutical industry via a multilateral working group. The FTC and the department of Justice published new merger guidelines (not specific to the pharma industry) in December 2023. Finally, in September 2023, the FTC warned pharma companies they could face legal action for improper listing of patents the FDA's "orange book', the catalog of FDA-approved products with patent and exclusivity information, and challenged more than 100 patents as improperly listed.
FDA--Food and Drug Administration. REMS--Risk evaluation and mitigation strategies. IRA--Inflation Reduction Act. FTC--Federal Trade Commission. DTC-- Direct To consumer. PBM--Pharmacy benefit managers. *The FDA (is the only global regulator that) established an additional standard of 'interchangability' for biosimilars, along with a costly pathway to achieve that designation. This reflects minor molecular differences between biosimilars and the originator (that were proven not to influence efficacy) and FDA concerns that patients who switch between drugs and biosimilars might experience a loss of efficacy to the drug. In most states, pharmacists can only substitute a biosimilar in place of the original, without consulting the prescribing doctor, if the biosimilar has the interchangable designatation.

Moderate M&A Activity In 2024

We expect only a moderate or average level of M&A in 2024 (see chart 7). This is because we expect robust organic revenue growth over the next four years and because many companies already have historically high debt leverage (see chart 8). Furthermore, the FTC has tightened its restrictions on M&A--as communicated in its 2023 merger guidelines--especially in the pharma industry. It believes M&A can be harmful to competition and believes it may lead to reduced spending on R&D and slower drug innovation.

Chart 7

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Chart 8

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That said, we believe companies with stagnant or declining revenues are more likely to pursue debt-financed acquisitions compared to companies with robust revenue growth, because maintaining healthy revenue growth is a high priority for Big Pharma. Indeed, many big pharma companies have demonstrated a willingness to increase debt leverage over the last decade to achieve revenue growth in line with industry peers, even at the expense of ratings downside.

A Balanced Mix Of Upgrades And Downgrades In 2024

Given our expectation for healthy revenue growth and only moderate M&A, we expect a relatively balanced mix of rating actions. This is consistent with the relatively balanced mix of positive and negative outlooks (see chart 9). In 2024, we expect upgrades will likely stem from deleveraging, following leveraging transactions in prior years, while most downgrades will likely come from debt-financed M&A.

Chart 9

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Table 5 

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This is a notable departure from trends over the past decade, in which credit ratings on Big Pharma broadly deteriorated, with 29 downgrades and six upgrades. We believe pressure on drug prices in the U.S., including the reduced ability to implement annual price increases--previously an industry norm--made it harder for Big Pharma to maintain organic revenue growth, and was a primary driver of the increase in debt-financed M&A and debt leverage, leading to most of these downgrades. Other factors that likely contributed to the wave of debt-financed M&A included an extended period of very low interest rates that ended in 2022-2023, changes to the tax laws in 2018 that provided Big Pharma access to foreign cash balances without adverse tax consequences, and scientific advances that created investment opportunities in areas with prospects for high growth and profits.

Table 6 

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Chart 10

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Dynamics Of Pharma Subindustries

Big Pharma Companies

The branded drug industry is significantly consolidated, led by about 20 Big Pharma companies.   The Big Pharma companies we rate generated about $700 billion in revenue in 2023 (including modest amounts of non-pharma revenues), which represents more than half of the approximately $1.1 trillion global drug market. Competitive dynamics, however, occur at a more granular level with a limited number of companies and drug products addressing specific diseases. The U.S. represents about 40% to 50% of global pharma industry revenues and is a uniquely attractive market for branded pharma given significantly higher prices (and margins) than other geographic markets.

M&A is an inherent part of the industry structure and helps big pharma sustain revenue growth even through waves of outsized patent expiration.   While most new drugs are initially discovered and developed by small, often pre-revenue start-up companies, successful products--those with a high-likelihood of generating significant revenue--tend to be acquired by big pharma, often in the late stages of development. This is, in part, because big pharma already has the global regulatory, marketing, and manufacturing capabilities and expertise to effectively commercialize these products.

Big Pharma companies also often resort to M&A to support revenue growth, even at the expense of rating downgrades, when their internally generated products alone can't achieve that. Maintaining revenue growth near that of peers is a key priority for Big Pharma companies. Sizable acquisitions by Big Pharma tend weigh on credit metrics and credit ratings as they are usually funded with debt, offer limited near-term profits (EBITDA), and often only provide incremental improvement to the overall business strength.

Big Pharma companies also utilize M&A to accelerate entry into therapeutic areas they consider attractive. For example, many Big Pharma companies pursued M&A in oncology or immunology, two of the largest and fastest growing therapeutic areas, on the heels of advances in scientific understanding of the immune system and the ability to regulate it to help fight cancer and autoimmune diseases. We see similar activity beginning to occur for GLP-1-based products that address obesity.

That said, in recent years Big Pharma companies have focused more of their external investments on partnership and collaboration agreements with smaller start-up companies. These agreements generally involve lower upfront capital investment, allow for greater diversity across investments than large acquisitions, and are less harmful to debt leverage, though these products are typically in the earlier stages of development when there is still a high risk of failure.

We generally view the branded pharma industry favorably from a credit perspective.   This has support from the essential life-extending nature of prescription drugs, high barriers to entry, robust profit margins, and relative insensitivity to the business cycle. This is only partially offset by the substantial ongoing investment needed (through R&D and M&A) to offset the expiration of product revenues when regulatory or patent exclusivity ends, by the drop in profitability when key products lose exclusivity (occasionally unexpectedly), and by the ongoing pressures to constrain spending on prescription drugs, especially in the U.S.

Aside from Big Pharma, we also rate about 13 branded drugmakers that are smaller, more highly concentrated, and more highly leveraged, with speculative-grade ratings; about 21 generic drugmakers, including those selling biosimilar products and branded-generic products; and about 13 contract development and manufacturing services (CDMOs) to the pharma companies; and four animal health companies in the broader pharmaceutical industry.

Speculative-Grade Pharma Companies

The pharmaceutical industry is split between Big Pharma, which refers to about 20 global entities with good product diversity, relatively conservative leverage, and typically investment-grade ratings; and smaller, less innovative, more highly concentrated, and often aggressively leveraged companies with speculative-grade ratings. We expect industry trends to affect the two groups differently:

  • Smaller and more aggressively leveraged companies have less capacity for significant debt-financed acquisitions, but our speculative-grade ratings on these companies are often less sensitive to acquisitions, as leverage is already elevated. Moreover, for many of the companies, especially those owned by private-equity sponsors, we generally factor in an expectation for persistently high leverage.
  • Lawmakers and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs, which manage the drug benefits for health insurance companies) generally focus more on large, blockbuster products--often owned by Big Pharma--that can move the economic needle, whereas smaller specialty drugs often fly below the radar. For example, the provision for Medicare negotiation of drug prices in the IRA effectively limits itself to the highest revenue-generating products. In a similar vein, orphan drugs, which have a relatively small patient base, can often achieve very attractive pricing with less pushback from PBMs.
  • Smaller companies tend to be more focused on life cycle management (such as offering moderate improvements like more convenient dosing) and price increases to drive growth, rather than investing heavily in R&D to drive innovation. They can therefore be more vulnerable to scientific advances by competitors.

Table 7

Differences between investment-grade and speculative-grade pharma peers
Factors Investment grade Speculative grade
Scale (annual revenues) $8.5 billion to over $80 billion. A few hundred million to about $8 billion.
Number of blockbuster drugs (generate at least $1 billion in annual revenue) 2-14; median of 8. 0-1 (most have 0); companies tend to focus primarily on products with smaller markets (fewer patients).
Product concentration (percentage of revenue from top and top three products) 23% and 44%, on average. 42% and 68%, on average.
Geographic concentration (percentage of revenues from the U.S.) About 50%, on average. 74%, on average.
Investment in R&D as a percentage of revenue About 18%, on average, which we believe is sufficient to sustain and modestly increase revenues. About 7% (median), which is insufficient to sustain revenue; for this reason companies rely more on M&A, price increases, or life-cycle management to sustain or increase revenues.
Number of NMEs in the pipeline 13, on average. This supports a relatively steady cadence of new products across all stages of development. 2, on average. This reflects the lower investment in R&D and results in a limited and lumpy pipeline, greater volatility, more reliance on debt-financed M&A, life-cycle management, and aggressive pricing, which are less reliable strategies over the long term.
Focus of innovation Substantial investment in discovery and development of new and differentiated NMEs in areas of unmet medical need. A focus on acquiring products developed externally, life-cycle management, and orphan drugs where clinical trial costs are lower and pricing power is particularly strong. Companies frequently utilize weaker patents such as process, formulation, or "method of use" patents rather than more innovative "composition of matter" patents.
Ambitions for revenue growth Low- to mid-single-digit percent annual revenue growth, broadly in line with the industry. Commonly seek revenue growth well above that of the industry. Thus, they are likely to engage in credit-harming M&A to support growth ambitions.
Disease targets Focus on diseases (indications) with many patients, representing large market potential (potential blockbusters). Often focus on products prescribed by specialists (more efficient marketing), and orphan drugs (rare diseases where very high prices are tolerated).
Relative risk from drug price reform in the U.S. Legislators, the media, and PBMs primarily focus their attention on larger well-known investment-grade pharma peers and their more widely prescribed blockbuster drugs, where the total spending is higher. Substantial portion of revenues generated outside the US (about 50% on average) and more limited reliance on price increases partially mitigate this risk. With a relatively high proportion of revenues generated in the U.S., higher leverage, and some companies with more-aggressive pricing strategies than big pharma peers, we believe drug price reform (including potentially constraints on raising prices) could hurt some companies disproportionately. That said, they often remain below the radar, as they are not large enough to move the needle on total drug costs.
Financial risk (credit measures) Relatively conservative levels of debt leverage (generally below 2.5x). Aggressive leverage (generally above 3x, often well above that).
R&D--Research and development. M&A--Mergers and acquisitions. NME--New molecular entities. PBM--Pharmacy benefit manager. Sources: Company filings, S&P Global Ratings estimates. These distinctions are based on averages and broad generalizations, with certain exceptions. The loss-generating, innovation-focused start-up biotech companies are not generally rated because the very high risk profile is incompatible with the risk tolerance in conventional debt markets. Statistics are mostly based on 2020 data.
Companies Focusing On Generic Drugs, Biosimilars, And Branded Generics

We believe the more intense price-based competition in the generics market reflects:

  • The more commodity-like nature of generic drugs;
  • The relatively high fragmentation among generic drug makers;
  • Our view that competitors in India have grown in scale and quality.
  • Increased negotiating power of buyers from the consolidation of buying groups; and
  • Ongoing efforts from the private and public sectors to contain health care costs.

The generic drug industry has been under pressure since 2017, from factors including advancing competition from India-based manufacturers, a wave of consolidation among buying consortia, an FDA initiative to clear the backlog of generic products seeking approval, and from exposure to opioid liabilities. Pricing trends were severely negative in the U.S. generics subsector in 2017-2018, with double-digit percent annual declines, although pressures persisted even as that gradually improved to the more typical low- to mid-single-digit percent annual price declines in subsequent years. This pressure contributed to a decline in revenues and profits and to a wave of downgrades in recent years.

Table 8 

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We believe competitive dynamics have stabilized and the leading companies have evolved to focus on higher-value products with at least moderate barriers to competition. We expect price erosion to remain at a more normal pace going forward, supporting rating stability for the generic companies in 2024.

We also expect significant opportunities for revenue growth in the blossoming market for biosimilars (the generic equivalent of biologic drugs) in the U.S. (see chart 5 above, table 9), even as that opportunity is attracting many participants and as branded drugmakers cut prices to preserve market share once their products lose exclusivity, which reduces the potential market opportunity for biosimilars.

Table 9

Estimated 2023 U.S. biosimilars market revenues
Brand Avastin Epogen Herceptin Humira Lucentis Neulasta Neupogen Remicade Rituxan Total
Reference drug Bevacizumab Epoetin alfa Trastuzumab Adalimumab Ranibizumab Pegfilgrastim Filgrastim Infliximab Rituximab
Therapeutic area/indication Oncology CKD Anemia Oncology Immunology Ophthalmology Blood Blood Immunology Oncology
# of approved biosimilars to date 5 1 5 9 2 6 3 4 3 38
# of launched biosimilars to date 4 1 5 9 2 6 3 3 3 36
Amgen 518 98 165 782
Biocon 114 20 125 259
Biogen 55 55
Coherus BioSciences 38 102 139 279
CSL 37 37
Organon 15 66 55 231 367
Pfizer 309 263 13 118 252 319 1274
Sandoz 22 134 88 243
Teva 140 128 412 680
Total 842 301 432 417 157 398 216 483 731 3975
Only includes reference company's and products with U.S. biosimilar revenues in 2023. Excludes about $900 million relating to insulin (Lantus and Humalog) and growth hormone (Genotropin) products. These estimates may not be comprehensive as Amneal (not included) expects modest U.S. biosimilar revenue in 2023. Source: Samsung Bioepis Biosimilar Market Report, Evaluate Pharma revenue estimates.

Notwithstanding improved market conditions, generic drug companies still need to constantly develop and launch new products to sustain or grow revenues to offset persistent price erosion on launched products. We believe companies that invest a higher proportion of revenue in R&D, such as Sandoz Group AG, which invested about 9% of revenue in R&D in 2022, will be better positioned to sustain robust organic revenue growth than peers with lower levels of reinvestment, such as Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (5.6%) and Viatris Inc. (4.3%). We also view companies with a focus on biosimilars as well as complex-generic drugs as more favorable, as those products generally benefit from higher barriers to entry, less competition, and stronger gross profit potential compared to the generic version of simpler small-molecule drugs. Some drugmakers have a mix of branded and generic drug products.

Table 10

Divergent economics of branded drugs, generics, and premium generics
  Conventional branded drugs Premium generics (biosimilars, complex generics, 505(b)2 products) Conventional generic drugs
Development costs High development costs (R&D averages 20% of revenue), plus substantial M&A. Moderate development costs Modest development costs (R&D averages less than 10% of revenues)
Clinical trial testing Extensive clinical testing Often involves some clinical testing No clinical testing
Level of innovation High innovation Moderate innovation Low innovation
Success rate Relatively low Relatively high Relatively high
ROI Long time frame for returns Varies Relatively short time frame for returns
Barriers to competition Relatively high: Based on high investment costs and patent protection Moderate: Based on substantial capital costs, unique organizational knowledge/expertise, or patents on drug delivery. These are surmountable barriers. Low: Absent patent protection, these markets typically become commodity like.
Marketing costs Substantial: Typically involves sales force and advertising Moderate: Some sales force Limited to none
Product pricing power High price for duration of patents Moderate pricing power Low price (aside from first 180 days for first-to-file)
Life cycle of product revenue Product revenues grows gradually over time with rise in volume. Revenues typically peak near the end of the period of exclusivity, followed by a sharp drop with the entrance of generic competition Varies Revenue often jumps upon launch of a product, then declines gradually over time as more generic competitors enter the market and prices and market share decline.
Reinvestment costs and sustainability of revenue growth Given limited product life, companies need to heavily reinvest (over 20% of revenues) to sustain and increase revenue over the long term. Varies Given the natural erosion in product prices and revenues, companies need to invest at least 5%-10% of revenues to sustain or increase revenue over time.

That said, we expect outstanding price-fixing litigation, intensification of competition in some larger biosimilar markets, and a potential increase in FDA inspections of foreign manufacturing facilities as potential risks in 2024.

Outlook for branded-generic products

More than a dozen rated companies are exposed to the "branded-generic" drug market, including leading branded and generic companies such as Sanofi, Viatris, Organon, and Abbott Laboratories.

Branded generics are drugs for which the patent has expired but are marketed under a brand name. Typically, it's the brand used by the original patented product, though in some markets, there are brands other than the original product. The brand implies higher quality, safety, and efficacy than an unbranded generic. These products are priced at a premium over unbranded generics--substantial in percentage terms but still low enough to appeal to middle-class patients paying out-of-pocket.

Demand for branded generics is meaningful in emerging markets including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and other geographies where there is patient concern about the quality of unbranded generics. The market characteristics vary across countries, but these markets generally offer doctors and patients a product choice. Patients often pay for these drugs out-of-pocket. In some markets, such as small countries, there might be no valid alternative to a branded generic, at least for some period. Companies invest in marketing their branded generic products, typically to doctors, to support demand, similar to products on-patent.

Branded generic businesses are not exposed to the sharp drop in revenue that occurs with on-patent drugs, nor the intense price-based competition of unbranded generic drugs in the U.S., where regulatory assurance of high quality makes them interchangeable and commodity-like. This market has support from a steady stream of new products and a rapidly expanding middle class in emerging markets, increasing demand.

We believe revenues for branded generic products often erode over time (typically gradually) as patients (paying out-of-pocket) or health care systems seek to transition to lower-cost options. We believe there can also be more acute pressure in specific geographies driven by changes to government reimbursement. China implemented a volume-based procurement (VBP) policy in 2019 that included several rounds of drug sourcing bidding aimed at increasing products sourced from China and reducing pharmaceutical spending. As a result, branded generic products from foreign manufacturers were subject to significant competition in the country's hospital channel. We believe foreign products with strong brand recognition in the region can somewhat mitigate the loss in sales within the hospital channel by increasing volume in the fast-growing retail channel, in which patients can choose to pay a premium for the brand-name drug. Sales volume in the retail channel is aided by a growing middle class in China that can pay cash for branded drugs, which can limit revenue declines here. These regulatory risks can also be partially mitigated by product and geographic diversification.

Chart 11

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Related Research

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analyst:David A Kaplan, CFA, New York + 1 (212) 438 5649;
david.a.kaplan@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Arthur C Wong, Toronto + 1 (416) 507 2561;
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Tulip Lim, New York + 1 (212) 438 4061;
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Nikolay Popov, Dublin + 353 (0)1 568 0607;
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Brian Rubin, New York + 212-438-1773;
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Makiko Yoshimura, Tokyo (81) 3-4550-8368;
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