Overview
- Our baseline scenario assumes that the Israel-Hamas war will remain centered in Gaza, but there are risks that it could spread more widely with a more pronounced impact on the economy and security situation in Israel.
- We now forecast the Israeli economy will contract by 5% in the fourth quarter of 2023 compared with the third, before rebounding in early 2024. The contraction will stem from security-related disruptions and reduced business activity; the drafting of a large number of reservists; the foreign tourism sector shutdown; and a broader confidence shock.
- Meanwhile, we expect that additional budgetary measures to support households and businesses, as well as an increase in defense spending, will increase the average general government deficit to 5.3% of GDP in 2023-2024, compared with 2.3% of GDP in our previous forecast.
- We therefore revised the outlook on Israel to negative from stable and affirmed the 'AA-/A-1+' ratings.
Rating Action
On Oct. 24, 2023, S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on its 'AA-' long-term foreign and local currency ratings on Israel to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed the 'AA-/A-1+' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings.
As sovereign ratings (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Israel are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in article 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-established calendar (see "Calendar Of 2023 EMEA Sovereign, Regional, And Local Government Rating Publication Dates: Midyear Update," published July 6, 2023, on RatingsDirect). Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the significant increase of geopolitical and security risks around Israel, which materially affects our projections for Israel's economic and fiscal performance. The next scheduled ratings review for Israel is on Nov. 10, 2023.
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects the risk that the Israel-Hamas war could spread more widely or affect Israel's credit metrics more negatively than we expect. We currently assume the conflict will remain centered in Gaza and last no more than three to six months.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings on Israel if the conflict widens materially, increasing the security and geopolitical risks that Israel faces. We could also lower the ratings in the next 12-24 months if the impact of the conflict on Israel's economic growth, fiscal position, and balance of payments proves more significant than we currently project.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if the conflict is resolved, resulting in a reduction in regional and domestic security risks without a material longer-term toll on Israel's economy and public finances.
Rationale
The outlook revision primarily reflects the material escalation in geopolitical and security risks that Israel faces following the attack by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023, when militants crossed the border from the Gaza Strip, taking hostages and killing both military and civilian citizens. Since then, rockets have continued to be fired from Gaza into Israel. Israel has responded with aerial and artillery strikes on Gaza, where casualties have also been reported, and appears to be preparing a ground offensive in Gaza.
Although it is difficult to predict the direction of events, our base case assumes the conflict will remain centered in Gaza. We do not expect the conflict to spread more widely. Several countries in the region are trying to mediate, while U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and President Joe Biden have also held a series of meetings with Israeli and key regional Arab country officials in recent days. The U.S. has also deployed some of its military forces closer to Israel with the likely goal of deterring other regional governments from entering the conflict.
Over previous decades Israel has experienced several military escalations around Gaza, but we consider the current developments to be of a greater magnitude, and the risks of the conflict widening in the region remain. Iran and Hezbollah (a Lebanese Islamist group with close ties to Iran) have openly stated that, depending on developments in Gaza, they might intervene more extensively in the conflict. In recent days, there has also been an exchange of fire in the north of the country between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah as well as Syria.
In our view, an additional risk could come from the potential for rising tensions between the Jewish majority and Arab-Israeli minority within Israel, as happened during a previous war with Hamas in May 2021, but this risk appears to be contained at the moment.
Even though we assume the conflict will not spread beyond Gaza, we expect it will still hurt Israel's economic performance. The main avenues of transmission are the following:
- Negative direct economic effect from continuing rocket attacks and resulting logistical disruptions and reduction of business activity;
- Reduced labor force and additional costs for the government after over 300,000 IDF reserves (representing 3% of Israel's population) called to active service;
- Extended suspension of gas production at the Tamar gas field due to its proximity to Gaza;
- Adverse impact on the Israeli tourism sector from the security situation and flight suspensions; and
- Indirect effects via expected reduced domestic investment and inward foreign direct investment flows.
While it is difficult to gauge the scale of the downturn, we forecast Israel's quarterly GDP will drop by 5% in fourth-quarter 2023 compared with third-quarter 2023, with all expenditure components shrinking, including domestic demand, exports, and imports. This fourth-quarter GDP fall would be slightly over half of the drop experienced in the second quarter of 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In both cases, mobility became restricted, businesses shut down, and the tourism sector was disrupted. This expected drop would also be higher than the output reductions following previous military escalations (including the 2014 Gaza war, the 2012 operation in Gaza, the 2008-2009 Gaza war, and the 2006 Lebanon war).
In our view, the structure of the Israeli economy, which is mostly focused on high tech services exports, with a high percentage of employees able to work from home, should somewhat cushion the impact. Additionally, we expect that international support could mitigate some of the negative macroeconomic effects on Israel.
We anticipate the economy will return to growth in the first quarter of 2024 and recover its pre-war output levels by the end of next year. Our current headline growth forecasts are 1.5% in 2023 and 0.5% in 2024, followed by an acceleration to 5% in 2025 as confidence returns and reconstruction and the investment cycle kick in more fully.
We expect Israel's budget deficits will widen in 2023-2024 on account of likely additional government support provisions to households and businesses, as well as extra spending on defense. We forecast an average deficit of 5.3% of GDP in 2023-2024, compared with 2.3% of GDP in our previous forecast.
Israel has several buffers, in our view, which should help mitigate the economic and fiscal impact. In particular, the level of government debt is moderate, at an estimated 60% of GDP. The debt is mostly denominated in local currency and largely held domestically, meaning it is less prone to more volatile nonresident portfolio rebalancing.
The Bank of Israel's international reserves also remain strong at US$199 billion (38% of 2022 GDP) as of end-September 2023, and they cover the gross external debt of the whole economy by 1.4x. We expect Israel will continue to run recurrent current account surpluses averaging 4% of GDP in 2023-2026. The central bank has announced a US$30 billion intervention strategy to smooth excessive exchange rate volatility, as well as additional credit loosening measures for certain commercial bank customers affected by the war.
Key Statistics
Table 1
Israel--Selected indicators | ||||||||||||||||||||||
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2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023f | 2024f | 2025f | 2026f | |||||||||||||
Economic indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Nominal GDP (bil. LC) | 1,285.9 | 1,347.0 | 1,424.6 | 1,417.3 | 1,581.9 | 1,763.8 | 1,852.9 | 1,908.7 | 2,044.3 | 2,164.4 | ||||||||||||
Nominal GDP (bil. $) | 357.2 | 375.2 | 399.7 | 411.7 | 489.7 | 525.0 | 487.6 | 465.5 | 524.2 | 577.2 | ||||||||||||
GDP per capita (000s $) | 41.0 | 42.2 | 44.2 | 44.7 | 52.3 | 55.0 | 50.1 | 46.9 | 51.7 | 55.8 | ||||||||||||
Real GDP growth | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.8 | (1.5) | 9.3 | 6.5 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 5.0 | 3.8 | ||||||||||||
Real GDP per capita growth | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.8 | (3.2) | 7.5 | 4.5 | (0.5) | (1.5) | 2.9 | 1.8 | ||||||||||||
Real investment growth | 3.4 | 7.6 | 3.9 | (3.1) | 13.6 | 10.4 | 0.5 | (1.5) | 6.0 | 4.0 | ||||||||||||
Investment/GDP | 23.0 | 23.9 | 23.7 | 24.2 | 25.3 | 26.9 | 26.3 | 26.0 | 26.4 | 26.4 | ||||||||||||
Savings/GDP | 26.5 | 26.9 | 27.1 | 29.0 | 29.2 | 30.9 | 31.0 | 30.0 | 30.0 | 29.9 | ||||||||||||
Exports/GDP | 29.3 | 30.0 | 29.3 | 27.6 | 29.3 | 31.7 | 32.0 | 31.8 | 31.8 | 31.8 | ||||||||||||
Real exports growth | 4.9 | 5.6 | 2.9 | (2.4) | 14.9 | 8.6 | (2.0) | 1.0 | 4.8 | 4.0 | ||||||||||||
Unemployment rate | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 | ||||||||||||
External indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Current account balance/GDP | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.6 | ||||||||||||
Current account balance/CARs | 9.9 | 8.0 | 9.5 | 14.6 | 11.0 | 10.2 | 12.3 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 9.2 | ||||||||||||
CARs/GDP | 36.2 | 37.2 | 36.0 | 33.4 | 36.0 | 38.3 | 38.4 | 39.3 | 39.0 | 38.6 | ||||||||||||
Trade balance/GDP | (2.9) | (4.5) | (3.8) | (2.8) | (4.4) | (5.0) | (4.2) | (4.9) | (5.4) | (5.5) | ||||||||||||
Net FDI/GDP | 2.6 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 0.0 | (1.5) | 1.0 | 2.5 | ||||||||||||
Net portfolio equity inflow/GDP | 0.0 | (4.1) | (1.5) | (5.2) | (0.7) | 1.3 | (2.0) | (2.0) | (2.0) | (2.0) | ||||||||||||
Gross external financing needs/CARs plus usable reserves | 68.0 | 66.1 | 65.0 | 60.2 | 58.5 | 57.3 | 56.8 | 58.9 | 60.6 | 60.5 | ||||||||||||
Narrow net external debt/CARs | (53.9) | (46.6) | (51.5) | (68.7) | (66.9) | (54.6) | (54.0) | (56.1) | (52.8) | (51.1) | ||||||||||||
Narrow net external debt/CAPs | (59.8) | (50.7) | (56.9) | (80.4) | (75.2) | (60.8) | (61.6) | (62.4) | (58.1) | (56.3) | ||||||||||||
Net external liabilities/CARs | (112.5) | (98.4) | (110.2) | (135.2) | (89.8) | (80.2) | (98.3) | (112.1) | (111.4) | (110.9) | ||||||||||||
Net external liabilities/CAPs | (124.9) | (107.0) | (121.8) | (158.3) | (100.9) | (89.4) | (112.2) | (124.6) | (122.6) | (122.2) | ||||||||||||
Short-term external debt by remaining maturity/CARs | 29.6 | 27.7 | 26.5 | 29.9 | 27.0 | 28.2 | 28.1 | 30.1 | 27.5 | 24.5 | ||||||||||||
Usable reserves/CAPs (months) | 10.1 | 10.6 | 10.6 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 12.0 | ||||||||||||
Usable reserves (mil. $) | 113,011 | 115,279 | 126,014 | 173,297 | 212,992 | 194,218 | 190,317 | 194,972 | 201,787 | 209,290 | ||||||||||||
Fiscal indicators (general government; %) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Balance/GDP | (2.3) | (4.4) | (4.6) | (11.5) | (5.5) | (1.6) | (5.0) | (5.5) | (3.0) | (2.0) | ||||||||||||
Change in net debt/GDP | 0.5 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 9.3 | 2.6 | 0.6 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 2.5 | 1.8 | ||||||||||||
Primary balance/GDP | 0.6 | (1.6) | (1.9) | (8.8) | (3.0) | 0.8 | (2.3) | (2.6) | (0.2) | 0.8 | ||||||||||||
Revenue/GDP | 37.5 | 35.9 | 35.0 | 34.4 | 36.8 | 37.6 | 33.6 | 34.6 | 34.9 | 34.9 | ||||||||||||
Expenditures/GDP | 39.8 | 40.3 | 39.6 | 45.9 | 42.3 | 39.1 | 38.6 | 40.1 | 37.9 | 36.9 | ||||||||||||
Interest/revenues | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 8.1 | 8.0 | ||||||||||||
Debt/GDP | 59.8 | 60.1 | 59.2 | 70.9 | 67.8 | 60.5 | 64.2 | 67.4 | 65.5 | 63.6 | ||||||||||||
Debt/revenues | 159.6 | 167.6 | 169.1 | 206.3 | 184.3 | 161.0 | 191.1 | 194.9 | 187.7 | 182.1 | ||||||||||||
Net debt/GDP | 57.6 | 58.0 | 57.9 | 67.4 | 63.0 | 57.1 | 60.7 | 64.0 | 62.3 | 60.6 | ||||||||||||
Liquid assets/GDP | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 4.8 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.0 | ||||||||||||
Monetary indicators (%) | ||||||||||||||||||||||
CPI growth | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | (0.6) | 1.5 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | ||||||||||||
GDP deflator growth | 0.0 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | ||||||||||||
Exchange rate, year-end (LC/$) | 3.47 | 3.75 | 3.46 | 3.22 | 3.11 | 3.52 | 4.20 | 4.00 | 3.80 | 3.70 | ||||||||||||
Banks' claims on resident non-gov't sector growth | 4.0 | 6.2 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 14.2 | 13.4 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 7.0 | 5.0 | ||||||||||||
Banks' claims on resident non-gov't sector/GDP | 69.4 | 70.3 | 69.8 | 73.5 | 75.2 | 76.5 | 76.5 | 75.7 | 75.6 | 75.0 | ||||||||||||
Foreign currency share of claims by banks on residents | 4.3 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.9 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | ||||||||||||
Foreign currency share of residents' bank deposits | 18.6 | 19.7 | 19.1 | 18.3 | 19.6 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | ||||||||||||
Real effective exchange rate growth | 6.9 | (1.9) | 1.1 | (4.1) | 6.3 | 4.3 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | ||||||||||||
Sources: The Bank of Israel, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, International Monetary Fund (Economic Indicators); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, The Bank of Israel (External Indicators); The Bank of Israel, Ministry of Finance of the Government of Israel (Fiscal Indicators); and The Bank of Israel, International Monetary Fund (Monetary Indicators). | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Adjustments: None | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Definitions: Savings is defined as investment plus the current account surplus (deficit). Investment is defined as expenditure on capital goods, including plant, equipment, and housing, plus the change in inventories. Banks are other depository corporations other than the central bank, whose liabilities are included in the national definition of broad money. Gross external financing needs are defined as current account payments plus short-term external debt at the end of the prior year plus nonresident deposits at the end of the prior year plus long-term external debt maturing within the year. Narrow net external debt is defined as the stock of foreign and local currency public- and private- sector borrowings from nonresidents minus official reserves minus public-sector liquid claims on nonresidents minus financial-sector loans to, deposits with, or investments in nonresident entities. A negative number indicates net external lending. f--Forecast. N/A--Not applicable. LC--Local currency. CARs--Current account receipts. FDI--Foreign direct investment. CAPs--Current account payments. The data and ratios above result from S&P Global Ratings' own calculations, drawing on national as well as international sources, reflecting S&P Global Ratings' independent view on the timeliness, coverage, accuracy, credibility, and usability of available information. |
Ratings Score Snapshot
Table 2
Israel--Ratings score snapshot | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Key rating factors | Score | Explanation | ||||
Institutional assessment | 4 | Generally effective policymaking that promotes sustainable public finance and balanced economic growth. Given that relations between Israeli-Jews, Israeli-Arabs, and Palestinians are strained at times, we consider that Israel's civil society is subject to ethnic tensions. Nevertheless, we see a low probability of social upheaval. | ||||
Economic assessment | 1 | Based on GDP per capita ($) as per the Selected Indicators table above. | ||||
External assessment | 1 | Based on narrow net external debt (% of current account payments) and gross external financing needs (% of current account receipts plus usable reserves) as per the Selected Indicators table above. | ||||
Fiscal assessment: flexibility and performance | 3 | Based on the change in net general government debt (% of GDP) as per the Selected Indicators table above. | ||||
Fiscal assessment: debt burden | 4 | Based on net general government debt (% of GDP) and general government interest expenditure (% of general government revenues) as per the Selected Indicators table above. | ||||
Monetary assessment | 2 | Managed-float exchange-rate regime. The central bank has a track record of operational independence. It uses market-based monetary instruments and has the ability to act as a lender of last resort. Consumer price index as per the Selected Indicators table above; the local currency financial and capital markets are deep. | ||||
Indicative rating | aa | As per Table 1 of "Sovereign Rating Methodology." | ||||
Notches of supplemental adjustments and flexibility | -1 | Event risk related to potential cases of rapidly rising external political crises, such as a large-scale ground war with Iran and armed confrontation with Hamas. | ||||
Final rating | ||||||
Foreign currency | AA- | |||||
Notches of uplift | 0 | Default risks do not apply differently to foreign-and local-currency debt. | ||||
Local currency | AA- | |||||
S&P Global Ratings' analysis of sovereign creditworthiness rests on its assessment and scoring of five key rating factors: (i) institutional assessment; (ii) economic assessment; (iii) external assessment; (iv) the average of fiscal flexibility and performance, and debt burden; and (v) monetary assessment. Each of the factors is assessed on a continuum spanning from 1 (strongest) to 6 (weakest). S&P Global Ratings' "Sovereign Rating Methodology," published on Dec. 18, 2017, details how we derive and combine the scores and then derive the sovereign foreign currency rating. In accordance with S&P Global Ratings' sovereign ratings methodology, a change in score does not in all cases lead to a change in the rating, nor is a change in the rating necessarily predicated on changes in one or more of the scores. In determining the final rating the committee can make use of the flexibility afforded by §15 and §§126-128 of the rating methodology. |
Related Criteria
- General Criteria: Environmental, Social, And Governance Principles In Credit Ratings, Oct. 10, 2021
- Criteria | Governments | Sovereigns: Sovereign Rating Methodology, Dec. 18, 2017
- General Criteria: Methodology For Linking Long-Term And Short-Term Ratings, April 7, 2017
- General Criteria: Principles Of Credit Ratings, Feb. 16, 2011
- General Criteria: Methodology: Criteria For Determining Transfer And Convertibility Assessments, May 18, 2009
Related Research
- Credit Conditions: War In The Middle East Compounds Global Geopolitical Risks, Oct. 18, 2023
- Israel Ratings Affirmed At 'AA-/A-1+'; Outlook Stable, May 12, 2023
In accordance with our relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable (see 'Related Criteria And Research'). At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action (see 'Related Criteria And Research').
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed | ||
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Israel |
||
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment | ||
Local Currency | AA+ | |
Israel |
||
Senior Unsecured | AA- | |
Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action | ||
To | From | |
Israel |
||
Sovereign Credit Rating | AA-/Negative/A-1+ | AA-/Stable/A-1+ |
Certain terms used in this report, particularly certain adjectives used to express our view on rating relevant factors, have specific meanings ascribed to them in our criteria, and should therefore be read in conjunction with such criteria. Please see Ratings Criteria at www.spglobal.com/ratings for further information. A description of each of S&P Global Ratings' rating categories is contained in "S&P Global Ratings Definitions" at https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/504352. Complete ratings information is available to RatingsDirect subscribers at www.capitaliq.com. All ratings affected by this rating action can be found on S&P Global Ratings' public website at www.spglobal.com/ratings. Alternatively, call S&P Global Ratings' Global Client Support line (44) 20-7176-7176.
Primary Credit Analyst: | Maxim Rybnikov, London + 44 7824 478 225; maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com |
Secondary Contact: | Karen Vartapetov, PhD, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9225; karen.vartapetov@spglobal.com |
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