Key Takeaways
- The 111 banks that participated in the European Banking Authority's and the European Central Bank's stress tests generally performed better under tougher assumptions than in the last exercise in 2021.
- We see only very few negative outliers and we do not expect that these will be subject to direct capital-strengthening measures.
- The results do not change our view of rated banks' creditworthiness, and therefore we do not expect any direct rating implications.
EU banks generally performed well in the European Banking Authority's (EBA) and the European Central Bank's (ECB) latest stress tests. In S&P Global Ratings' view, the results underline EU banks' overall resilience to a severe deterioration in asset quality and market shocks. At first sight, the results do not seem to challenge our view of the creditworthiness of any of the rated banks in the sample, and we do not expect any rating changes. Yet, the results reveal divergences in banks' risk profiles and capital resilience under the stress scenario.
The EBA's stress test covered 70 EU banking groups that represent about 75% of all EU banks' assets. The ECB, as supervisor of the largest eurozone banks, carried out a parallel stress test on a further 41 banks. The EBA and the ECB followed the same approach and used the same baseline and adverse scenarios (see appendix 3 for a list of the banks and their high-level results).
In aggregate, EU banks reported a common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital depletion of 459 basis points (bps) over the period in the adverse scenario, with the CET1 capital ratio dropping to 10.4% from 15.0%. These results are broadly similar to those of the last stress test conducted in 2021, despite much harsher assumptions and still highly conservative methodology choices by the EBA. Collectively, EU banks were able to absorb high modelled losses thanks to better projected profits, which were partly the result of higher interest rates. As such, the stress test results are largely in line with our own views, namely that European banks' capital buffers and higher profits have improved their resilience (see "European Banks: Resilient And Divergent As The Economic Reset Kicks In," Jan. 23, 2023).
That said, the stress test results also revealed differences between banks in terms of their overall capital depletion and stressed capital ratios. The EBA indicated that, under the adverse scenario, three banks breached their total capital requirement under the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP). A larger set of banks (34) saw their capital levels fall below their overall capital requirements, which include their combined buffer requirements. We do not expect, however, that any EU bank will be subject to immediate capital-strengthening measures as a direct result of the stress tests.
We saw no major surprises in stress test results and therefore do not expect any direct rating implications. Stress test disclosures provide a wealth of data on the relative performance of large banks' loan portfolios. This data will inform our views on rated banks' potential asset quality deterioration, in a context where weaker economic conditions and tighter funding conditions will inevitably expose stresses for some households and corporate borrowers (see "European Banks' Asset Quality: Tougher Times Ahead Require Extra Caution," April 20, 2023).
Stress Tests Are A Valuable Data Source…
The results of any stress test need to be viewed in the context of the supervisors' objectives, methodological choices, and macro-financial assumptions. For simplicity reasons, we only refer to the EBA in the following since the EBA and the ECB followed the same approach and used the same baselines and adverse scenarios.
The main objective of the EBA's stress test is to inform the broader SREP, both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. As such, the outcomes of the stress test are not measured against a set hurdle rate and, typically, do not trigger a reaction from the supervisors. Rather, the supervisors use findings from the EBA's stress test in the broader SREP. Those include quantitative results, which are a key input for setting a total capital Pillar 2 guidance (P2G, the supervisor's expectation for how much capital a bank should hold in excess of its overall capital requirement), and, for the first time, a leverage ratio P2G.
Since the EBA's methodology informs the SREP, it emphasizes the consistency of the stress test results and leaves it to the supervisors to take account of bank-specific considerations, including management actions, as part of the SREP decision-making process. This approach influences the following methodological choices:
Balance sheets remain static over the stress test horizon and dividend payout ratios remain fixed. This also applies in the adverse scenario. Payout ratios are in line with the banks' publicly stated policies.
Estimates of credit risk losses are based on the banks' models but subject to strict uniform constraints. Key constraints are:
- No cure of stage 3 assets;
- No release of accumulated provisions for stage 3 assets;
- Prescribed stressed risk weights for securitization exposures; and
- A backstop for the assessment of the migration to stage 2 assets that is set three times higher in the probability of default.
Similarly, future profit projections are also based on the banks' models, subject to uniform constraints. Key constraints include:
- Net interest income (NII) is capped at the 2022 level under the adverse scenario, despite rising interest rates;
- Net trading income (NTI) is capped at 75% of a baseline NTI derived from historical averages, despite the fact that market shocks typically correlate with higher client flows;
- Net fee and commission income is subject to supervisory caps and floors; and
- Higher-for-longer inflation increases operational expenses, but banks cannot include any cost-reduction measures.
…But Do Not Seek To Paint A Realistic Picture
Overall, the EBA's methodological choices mean that we do not view the stress test as a realistic downside scenario for banks' future capital. Rather, the results mainly provide insights into the banks' relative risk exposures and indicate the relative volatility of their capital ratios. Furthermore, differences in supervisory objectives and methodological choices make any meaningful comparison between the EBA's stress test outcomes and those of other authorities practically impossible (see appendix 1).
Finally, the EBA did not test the banks' resilience to liquidity shocks or to a broader loss of market confidence due to mounting unrealized losses or business model challenges. As such, stress test results are only one of several analytical indicators, and positive results should not be interpreted as a clean bill of health.
Much Harsher Adverse Scenario Assumptions Than In The Past
Beyond the methodological choices, the stress test results also largely depend on the authorities' macro-financial assumptions. Overall, the EBA's adverse scenario was much tougher this year than in previous exercises (see charts 1 and 2 and appendix 2). At the EU level, the EBA's adverse scenario envisaged a cumulative GDP decline of 6%, with unemployment climbing to 12.4% over time. Important for credit loss models, the EBA's adverse scenario envisaged a prolonged recession, with two consecutive years of severe GDP declines and only a modest rebound in the third year, which is far worse than any recent historical precedent.
Chart 1
Chart 2
The EBA's breakdown of the GDP shock across 16 different sectors of the economy to reflect the impact of the shock at a sectoral level was a new feature of this stress test. For instance, the EBA assumed in its adverse scenario that the highly energy-intensive manufacturing sector would see a cumulative decline of 11% of gross value added, versus a decline of 4% for the real estate sector.
In its adverse scenario, the EBA also assumed a sharp correction in the financial and real estate markets, with stock prices declining by about 60% and house prices by about 15%. The EBA's macroeconomic assumptions were tougher than the assumptions the Bank of England's (BoE) made in its recent stress test, with a more prolonged decline in GDP and a higher increase in unemployment. The BoE's stress test assumptions about the peak-to-trough decline in real estate prices, however, were tougher than the EBA's.
Overall, we consider that the EBA's 2023 stress test assumptions are broadly in line with a level of stress that is commensurate with our risk-adjusted capital framework. Under this framework, we consider that a risk-adjusted capital ratio of 8% indicates that a bank should have sufficient capital to withstand a substantial stress scenario in developed markets. We describe such a scenario as one in which GDP could decline by as much as 6%, unemployment could reach up to 15%, and stock market values could drop by up to 60% (see "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," June 9, 2023).
Overall Resilience, But Widely Differing Outcomes
In the adverse scenario for 2023, tested banks modelled losses of €139 billion in the first year, driven by a jump in credit and market losses. An aggregate rise in risk-weighted assets (RWAs) of 6.6% amplified the capital depletion and reduced the system average of the fully loaded CET1 capital ratio from 15.0% to 11.2% in the first year.
For 2024 and 2025, however, banks modelled a return to positive profits, with €9 billion in 2024 and €31 billion in 2025. Elevated credit losses continued to have a significant effect on profits, but resilient revenues provided sufficient absorption. Yet, aggregate capital ratios continued to decline to 10.4% in 2025. The decline largely resulted from a further rise in RWAs, which were, on average, 13.8% higher in 2025 than in 2023.
For all banks that were subject to the EBA's stress test, we reviewed the result under the end adverse scenario for the CET1 capital ratio (see chart 3), the total capital ratio (see chart 4), and the leverage ratio (see chart 5). As expected, the outcomes differed significantly across banks.
According to the EBA, three banks breached their total SREP capital requirements. Based on our review of the results, these include: France's La Banque Postale S.A. (LBP, A+/Negative/A-1) and Greece's Alpha Services and Holdings S.A. (Alpha, B/Stable/B).
La Banque Postale S.A.
For LBP, the breach was largely driven by the chosen accounting treatment for its insurance subsidiary, which now represents around 60% of total assets. The EBA did not take into account the effect of the introduction of IFSR 17 at the start of 2023. Under this new accounting standard, insurance liabilities are now fair-valued, which offsets some of the market shocks, including interest rate shocks, on assets. Adjusting for this, we understand that LBP would not have breached its capital requirements under the adverse scenario. Similar mechanics were at play in the results of other banking groups with large insurance subsidiaries, for instance Germany's DZ Bank.
Alpha Services and Holdings S.A.
Under the adverse scenario, Alpha breached its total capital SREP requirement in the first and second year only. We note, however, that the bank has undergone a capital strengthening program in the past years. In the first half of this year, the banks issued AT1 instruments and executed two large sales of non-performing assets. The EBA's stress test did not take these into account. According to the bank, the starting total capital ratio would have been 250 bps higher with these actions, and the bank would not have shown a breach under the stress test.
Another rated bank, Barclays Bank Ireland PLC (BBI, A+/Stable/A-1)), saw one of the largest capital declines, at about 1,000 bps. The adverse scenario left the bank slightly above its capital requirements. We consider that this mainly results from BBI's relatively large exposure to unsecured consumer, corporate, and institutional lending, which are more negatively affected under the adverse scenario. Furthermore, BBI's significant capital market activities in Europe also contributed to the modelled capital depletion, with market risk losses amounting to €309 million, or 5% of starting capital, in the first year.
Almost Half Of The Banks Sampled Would Tap Into Their Capital Buffers Under The Adverse Scenario
34 banks breached their overall capital requirement at some point during the EBA's severe stress scenario. It means that these banks would tap into their capital buffers under the adverse scenario--including LBP and Alpha, which would also breach their SREP requirements. A breach of capital buffers would lead to a restriction on the distributions those banks can make to shareholders and to holders of AT1 instruments. The restrictions serve as a reminder of the regulatory purpose of AT1 instruments: to assist loss absorption when banks come under pressure.
Finally, the leverage ratio of four banks fell below the 3% minimum requirement. Apart from the LBP, those declines were relatively marginal (see chart 3).
Chart 3
Chart 4
Chart 5
On a positive note, about 44% of banks had trough CET1 ratios that exceeded, in some cases considerably, the EU average of 11.2%. Those positive outliers include diverse banks and business models, for example European subsidiaries of international investment banks such as Goldman Sachs Bank Europe, Bank of America Securities, SEB, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, and Volkswagen Bank, among others.
A quarter of tested banks managed to post cumulative positive profits under the adverse scenario. Those banks included Banco Santander, DNB Bank, Raiffeisen Bank International, and Intesa Sanpaolo, among others. Some banks, such Polish PKO and Spanish Kutxabank, even maintained positive profits in the first year of the adverse scenario, when market and credit losses tend to be concentrated.
ECB Disclosures Remain Patchy
The methodology the ECB uses in its stress test is similar to the EBA's stress test methodology. In many ways, the results of the two stress tests are also similar. Yet, the ECB's disclosures still lack detailed entity-level data. Indeed, each bank's results are presented as part of a cluster with a predefined threshold for stressed CET1 and leverage ratios.
As chart 6 shows, the adverse scenario affected banks' capital ratios differently. Banks at the bottom of the chart had the lowest capital ratios, but the ECB did not explain how far the CET1 ratios dropped below the 8% threshold. It indicated that nine banks breached capital requirements under the adverse scenario, but we cannot identify them from the disclosures. Chart 7 shows the effect of the ECB's stress test on banks' leverage ratio.
Chart 6
Chart 7
Results Provide Insights Into Banks' Credit Risk Portfolios
The stress test results reveal EU banks' relative exposures to economic and financial shocks and highlight significant differences in cumulative loss rates and the share of stage 3 exposures under the adverse scenario (see chart 8).
Chart 8
Due to weaker economic growth and tighter funding conditions, we expect European banks' asset quality will face a gradual increase in credit risks. Small and midsize enterprise (SME) lending, especially to small owner-managed companies, unsecured retail loans, and commercial real estate (CRE) loans are particularly vulnerable (see "European Banks' Asset Quality: Tougher Times Ahead Require Extra Caution," April 20, 2023).
In that context, stress test results provide insights into the credit risk of banks' portfolios, even though those insights are subject to some data limitations. For each tested bank, we reviewed, in particular, the relative size and the modelled increase in stage 3 ratios of SME loans (see chart 9) and retail non-mortgage loans (see chart 10). Overall, the median stage 3 ratio would more than triple for both portfolio types if the adverse scenario materialized, indicating the portfolios' sensitivity to downside economic risk.
Retail non-mortgage loans include secured retail loans, such as car loans, which we see as inherently less risky. Yet, we cannot disentangle those portfolios from other unsecured retail loans because of the EBA's insufficient disclosures.
Chart 9
Chart 10
No Immediate Rating Impact, But Plenty To Ponder
While the results do not challenge our view of the creditworthiness of the rated banks in the sample, we will further evaluate the comprehensive bank-specific disclosures from the EBA's stress test in the coming days. We will dig deeper into the results of individual banks and discuss the main drivers, including the effects of the material methodology constraints, with the companies' management teams.
That said, the stress test results highlight the importance of NII in the overall financial resilience of European banks. Interest rates and the shape of the yield curve directly affect NII. We see potential future interest rate volatility as a potential source of risk for European banks (see "European Banks: Potential Interest Rate Volatility Calls For Caution," July 19, 2023).
Finally, we will also review the modelled performances of the banks' key portfolios to see if they are in line with our own assessments of the banks' credit risks.
Related Criteria
- S&P Global Ratings Definitions, June 9, 2023
- Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology, July 20, 2017
- Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
Related Research
- European Banks: Potential Interest Rate Volatility Calls For Caution, July 19, 2023
- Latest BoE Stress Test Signals U.K. Banks' Resilience To A Severe Downturn, July 12, 2023
- Banks Held Up Well In The Fed's Stress Test, But They Likely Won't Ramp Up Share Buybacks, July 7, 2023
- European Banks: Protecting Liquidity Will Come At An Increasing Cost, June 29, 2023
- Credit Conditions Europe Q3 2023: Latest BoE Stress Test Signals U.K. Banks' Resilience To A Severe Downturn, June 27, 2023
- Economic Outlook Eurozone Q3 2023: Short-Term Pain, Medium-Term Gain, June 26, 2023
- European Banks' Asset Quality: Tougher Times Ahead Require Extra Caution, April 20, 2023
- European Banks: Resilient And Divergent As The Economic Reset Kicks In, Jan. 23, 2023
Appendices
- Appendix 1: Differences In Stress Test Approaches In The U.S., the U.K., And The EU
- Appendix 2: Key Macro-Financial Assumptions Of The 2023 EBA Stress Test
- Appendix 3: High Level Results For The 70 Banks In The EBA Exercise
- Appendix 4: Rating Score Snapshot For Rated Banks Participating In The EBA Or The ECB 2023 Stress Tests
- Appendix 5: EU Bank Capital Stack Graphic
Appendix 1: Differences In Stress Test Approaches In The U.S., The U.K., And The EU
Regulatory stress tests are part of the supervisory toolkit in many jurisdictions, including the U.S., the U.K., and the EU. Yet, there are significant differences in objectives and methodological approaches across these three jurisdictions. We consider it crucial to keep those differences in mind when reading or interpreting stress test results.
The results of the U.S. Federal Reserve's Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test (DFAST) feed directly into banks' capital requirements via "stress capital buffer" (SCB) requirements derived by banks' hypothetical losses in the stress test's adverse scenario (see "Banks Held Up Well In The Fed's Stress Test, But They Likely Won't Ramp Up Share Buybacks," July 7, 2023). In the EU, the main objective is to inform the broader supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) and the calibration of the Pillar 2 guidance (P2G), the supervisor's expectation on the capital that a bank should hold in excess of requirements. As a consequence, there is no "pass or fail" for individual banks in the EU exercise. In the U.K., the Bank of England (BoE) compares each bank's stress test results to a dynamic "hurdle rate," reflecting the banks' minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1 and Pillar 2A) and any systemic buffers (see "Latest BoE Stress Test Signals U.K. Banks' Resilience To A Severe Downturn," July 12, 2023). If the BoE considers that a bank would fail its hurdle rate, it would generally expect this bank to take action to strengthen its capital position. In addition, the BoE uses the stress test results to calibrate the systemwide countercyclical and bank-specific Prudential Regulation Authority buffers. Those are conceptually similar to the P2G.
As for the specific methodology choices of the various authorities, we also observe significant differences (see table 1). On the one hand, U.S. supervisors apply their own models to project profits and losses for each bank under the DFAST scenarios. They assume static balance sheets and do not take into account banks' management actions in response to the stress scenarios. They assume balance sheets that are essentially static and do not factor in any special management actions that banks might take in response to the stress scenarios. That is because the stress test is meant to ensure that "large banks are sufficiently capitalized and able to lend to households and businesses even in a severe recession." This approach produces outcomes that are comparable across banks but that could differ materially when it comes to how banks would respond in an actual adverse scenario. On the other hand, the BoE's stress test relies on banks' models to project revenues and stress losses, subject to supervisory challenges and judgmental overrides. Also, U.K. banks may take account of business-as-usual corporate plans and strategic management actions in response to the stress scenario, provided the BoE finds them credible. This approach leads to more realistic, but probably less comparable, outcomes across banks. The EBA's approach blends both the BoE's and the DFAST's approaches: EU supervisors assume static balance sheets but mainly rely on banks' models to project profits and losses. Banks' models are, however, subject to numerous supervisory constraints, which we have seen increase over time. With this approach, the EBA seeks to find a middle way in the comparability/realism trade-off.
Table 1
| High-level comparison between the EBA’s, the Bank of England’s, and the Federal Reserve’s stress test approaches | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| EBA | Bank of England | Federal Reserve | |
| Balance sheet assumption | Static balance sheet. No change to the asset base or business mix; fixed residual maturity of all assets; fixed dividend payout ratios--also in the adverse scenario--in line with the banks’ current dividend policy. | Dynamic balance sheet. Banks’ submissions reflect their corporate plans, with some constraints (for example no assumed decrease in lending market share in the adverse scenario, compared with the baseline) | Static balance sheet, including securities, trading assets, and loans. Constant risk-weighted assets (RWAs) and leverage ratio denominator, with exceptions for regulatory changes. |
| Credit risk modelling | Mostly banks’ models, but subject to constraints and exceptions. For example: (i) No cure of S3 assets; no release of S3 provisions; backstop at a threefold increase in the probability of default when assessing significant increases in credit risk (SICR); credit RWAs floored at the 2022 value. (ii) Prescribed loss parameters for sovereign exposures and stressed RWAs for securitization positions. | Banks’ models. Banks should not assume any change to their approach to calculating credit risk capital requirements, unless previously agreed with the BoE. | Supervisory models (depending on loan types). Based on internal credit ratings and other bank-reported data. |
| Profit projection | Banks’ projections, subject to constraints. For example: (i) Net interest income (NII) cap on the increase in margin on repriced assets; overall NII cap under the adverse scenario. (ii) National financial conditions index’s growth rate subject to a supervisory cap and floor in the adverse scenario. (iii) Operating expenses floored at 2022 level. | Banks’ projections with guidance. Banks should assess the effects of the baseline and stress scenario on their liquidity positions and reflect this in their funding costs; cost reductions are expected to be “modest” and to reflect only business-as-usual considerations. | Supervisory models. Based on bank-provided data and stress test macro data. |
Appendix 2: Key Macro-Financial Assumptions In The EBA 2023 Stress Test
Baseline scenario
The following are some of the key assumptions that have been incorporated into the baseline scenario in this year's stress test. They are based on the December 2022 baseline projections of the EU national central banks.
Table 2.1
| EBA's baseline scenario assumptions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU | Eurozone | |||||
| GDP growth | ||||||
| 2023 | 0.4 | 0.5 | ||||
| 2024 | 1.8 | 1.9 | ||||
| 2025 | 1.9 | 1.8 | ||||
| CPI inflation | ||||||
| 2023 | 6.7 | 6.3 | ||||
| 2024 | 3.4 | 3.4 | ||||
| 2025 | 2.3 | 2.3 | ||||
| Unemployment | ||||||
| 2023 | 6.4 | 6.9 | ||||
| 2024 | 6.4 | 6.8 | ||||
| 2025 | 6.3 | 6.6 | ||||
| Commercial real estate prices | ||||||
| 2023 | -16.3 | -16.1 | ||||
| 2024 | -11.7 | -11.5 | ||||
| 2025 | -4.4 | -4.3 | ||||
| Residential real estate prices | ||||||
| 2023 | -7.6 | -7.1 | ||||
| 2024 | -12.9 | -12.8 | ||||
| 2025 | -1.9 | -1.7 | ||||
| Long-term rates | ||||||
| 2023 | 5.9 | 5.4 | ||||
| 2024 | 5.2 | 4.8 | ||||
| 2025 | 4.9 | 4.5 | ||||
| CPI--Consumer price index. | ||||||
Adverse scenario
The adverse scenario contemplates an aggravation of geopolitical tensions, stemming from the increased polarization and the retrenchment of globalization since the war in Ukraine. An increase in geopolitical tensions would disrupt global supply chains, worsen bottlenecks, and negatively affect economic growth as a result of higher input prices and their effect on inflation. These effects would put pressure on affordability, wage increase claims, and, as a result, lead to further policy actions to contain inflation levels that would negatively impact consumer confidence, private consumption, and investment levels.
Despite this macroeconomic shock scenario, the EBA's stress test assumes unchanged monetary and fiscal policies.
The following are some of the key assumptions that the adverse scenario of this year's stress test was based on.
Table 2.2
| EBA's adverse scenario assumptions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU | Eurozone | |||||
| GDP growth | ||||||
| 2023 | -3.5 | -3.4 | ||||
| 2024 | -4.2 | -4.1 | ||||
| 2025 | 1.6 | 1.6 | ||||
| CPI inflation | ||||||
| 2023 | 9.7 | 9.2 | ||||
| 2024 | 5.3 | 5.2 | ||||
| 2025 | 3.8 | 3.7 | ||||
| Unemployment | ||||||
| 2023 | 7.6 | 8.1 | ||||
| 2024 | 10.4 | 10.6 | ||||
| 2025 | 12.2 | 12.4 | ||||
| Commercial real estate prices | ||||||
| 2023 | -16.3 | -16.1 | ||||
| 2024 | -11.7 | -11.5 | ||||
| 2025 | -4.4 | -4.3 | ||||
| Residential real estate prices | ||||||
| 2023 | -7.6 | -7.1 | ||||
| 2024 | -12.9 | -12.8 | ||||
| 2025 | -1.9 | -1.7 | ||||
| Long-term rates | ||||||
| 2023 | 5.9 | 5.4 | ||||
| 2024 | 5.2 | 4.8 | ||||
| 2025 | 4.9 | 4.5 | ||||
| CPI--Consumer price index. | ||||||
Appendix 3: High Level Results For The 70 Banks In The EBA Exercise
Table 3
| List of banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Starting point: December 2022 | Adverse scenario | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Total capital ratio (fully loaded) (%) | CET1 capital ratio (fully loaded) (%) | Overall capital requirement (%) | Overall capital requirement--of which: CET1 (%) | Total SREP capital requirement (%) | Total SREP capital requirement--of which: CET1 (%) | Minimum CET1 capital ratio (fully loaded) (%) | Minimum total capital ratio (fully loaded) (%) | SREP CET1 headroom (bps) | SREP total capital headroom (bps) | OCR CET1 headroom (bps) | OCR total capital headroom (bps) | |||||||||||||||
| ABANCA | 15.9% | 11.9% | 12.5% | 8.1% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 9.2% | 13.1% | 357 | 313 | 107 | 63 | ||||||||||||||
| ABN AMRO | 20.9% | 15.2% | 14.1% | 9.7% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 10.3% | 15.7% | 471 | 565 | 60 | 155 | ||||||||||||||
| AIB Group | 21.3% | 16.3% | 14.9% | 10.2% | 10.8% | 6.0% | 10.0% | 14.5% | 390 | 378 | -28 | -40 | ||||||||||||||
| ALPHA | 14.9% | 11.9% | 14.3% | 9.5% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 7.8% | 10.7% | 158 | -29 | -173 | -360 | ||||||||||||||
| MPS | 19.5% | 15.6% | 13.5% | 8.8% | 10.8% | 6.0% | 10.1% | 14.0% | 408 | 323 | 133 | 47 | ||||||||||||||
| BBVA | 15.9% | 12.6% | 12.8% | 8.6% | 9.5% | 5.3% | 9.7% | 13.0% | 432 | 351 | 103 | 23 | ||||||||||||||
| BPM | 18.1% | 12.8% | 13.0% | 8.5% | 10.3% | 5.8% | 8.5% | 13.8% | 275 | 357 | -1 | 81 | ||||||||||||||
| BCP | 16.8% | 12.5% | 13.8% | 9.2% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 8.0% | 12.3% | 209 | 179 | -116 | -146 | ||||||||||||||
| Sabadell | 17.0% | 12.6% | 13.1% | 8.6% | 10.2% | 5.7% | 8.8% | 13.1% | 308 | 294 | 14 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
| San | 15.8% | 12.0% | 13.3% | 9.1% | 9.6% | 5.4% | 10.3% | 14.1% | 495 | 450 | 126 | 82 | ||||||||||||||
| BoI | 20.8% | 15.7% | 14.5% | 10.0% | 10.3% | 5.8% | 11.4% | 16.6% | 566 | 639 | 139 | 212 | ||||||||||||||
| Pekao | 16.6% | 14.8% | 11.5% | 8.0% | 8.0% | 4.5% | 13.9% | 15.7% | 939 | 768 | 588 | 417 | ||||||||||||||
| Bankinter | 15.1% | 11.9% | 11.8% | 7.7% | 9.3% | 5.2% | 10.2% | 13.4% | 499 | 408 | 249 | 158 | ||||||||||||||
| Barclays Ireland | 22.2% | 16.5% | 15.0% | 10.0% | 11.3% | 6.4% | 6.8% | 11.6% | 42 | 30 | -324 | -336 | ||||||||||||||
| BayernLB | 21.3% | 17.4% | 13.1% | 8.7% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 9.5% | 12.6% | 382 | 258 | 77 | -47 | ||||||||||||||
| Belfius | 19.5% | 16.2% | 14.5% | 10.1% | 10.1% | 5.7% | 12.1% | 15.0% | 637 | 489 | 202 | 53 | ||||||||||||||
| BNPP | 15.7% | 12.3% | 13.6% | 9.4% | 9.4% | 5.3% | 8.3% | 11.3% | 301 | 190 | -116 | -226 | ||||||||||||||
| BofA Securities | 24.5% | 22.0% | 14.4% | 9.3% | 11.7% | 6.6% | 12.3% | 14.6% | 569 | 287 | 297 | 14 | ||||||||||||||
| BPER | 15.6% | 12.0% | 13.1% | 8.5% | 10.6% | 6.0% | 7.9% | 11.3% | 192 | 72 | -60 | -180 | ||||||||||||||
| Caixa Geral | 20.2% | 18.7% | 13.5% | 9.1% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 17.3% | 18.8% | 1172 | 880 | 822 | 530 | ||||||||||||||
| CaixaBank | 17.0% | 12.5% | 12.6% | 8.3% | 9.7% | 5.4% | 9.3% | 13.6% | 392 | 397 | 101 | 107 | ||||||||||||||
| Cassa Centrale | 21.6% | 21.5% | 13.0% | 8.4% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 18.5% | 18.5% | 1261 | 803 | 1011 | 553 | ||||||||||||||
| Citibank Ireland | 20.5% | 20.5% | 14.3% | 9.7% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 17.2% | 17.2% | 1129 | 670 | 752 | 292 | ||||||||||||||
| CGME | 21.5% | 21.5% | 15.0% | 9.7% | 12.0% | 6.8% | 12.7% | 12.7% | 599 | 74 | 301 | -224 | ||||||||||||||
| Rabobank | 21.1% | 16.0% | 14.4% | 10.1% | 9.9% | 5.6% | 11.4% | 16.1% | 586 | 622 | 133 | 169 | ||||||||||||||
| COMMERZBANK | 18.9% | 14.1% | 13.9% | 9.5% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 9.5% | 14.4% | 387 | 438 | 2 | 53 | ||||||||||||||
| Credit Mutuel | 21.3% | 18.8% | 12.8% | 8.5% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 11.4% | 13.6% | 595 | 382 | 292 | 79 | ||||||||||||||
| Danske | 21.8% | 17.4% | 17.6% | 13.1% | 10.6% | 6.1% | 10.8% | 14.3% | 466 | 369 | -233 | -329 | ||||||||||||||
| de Volksbank | 25.5% | 20.3% | 14.5% | 9.7% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 10.0% | 13.2% | 382 | 220 | 29 | -133 | ||||||||||||||
| Apobank | 18.3% | 16.5% | 13.0% | 8.4% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 11.3% | 12.4% | 541 | 193 | 289 | -58 | ||||||||||||||
| DBK | 18.4% | 13.4% | 15.1% | 10.5% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 8.0% | 12.3% | 210 | 178 | -247 | -279 | ||||||||||||||
| DNB | 21.8% | 18.3% | 19.5% | 15.1% | 10.1% | 5.7% | 16.1% | 19.1% | 1043 | 903 | 103 | -37 | ||||||||||||||
| DZ | 18.1% | 13.5% | 13.2% | 9.0% | 9.7% | 5.5% | 7.0% | 11.0% | 155 | 133 | -200 | -222 | ||||||||||||||
| Erste | 18.2% | 14.2% | 14.7% | 10.4% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 10.4% | 14.2% | 491 | 450 | 0 | -41 | ||||||||||||||
| Eurobank | 17.2% | 14.4% | 14.4% | 9.6% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 11.2% | 14.0% | 500 | 302 | 163 | -35 | ||||||||||||||
| GSBE | 31.7% | 31.6% | 14.0% | 9.2% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 23.2% | 23.2% | 1700 | 1225 | 1396 | 921 | ||||||||||||||
| BPCE | 17.9% | 15.1% | 13.5% | 9.2% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 9.9% | 12.2% | 429 | 217 | 77 | -135 | ||||||||||||||
| Credit Agricole | 20.7% | 17.2% | 13.0% | 8.9% | 9.5% | 5.3% | 9.9% | 12.8% | 459 | 326 | 104 | -29 | ||||||||||||||
| HASPA | 16.2% | 15.3% | 11.8% | 7.7% | 9.3% | 5.2% | 12.3% | 12.3% | 713 | 309 | 462 | 58 | ||||||||||||||
| Iccrea | 19.5% | 18.3% | 13.3% | 8.6% | 10.8% | 6.1% | 14.0% | 15.1% | 790 | 428 | 540 | 178 | ||||||||||||||
| ING | 19.4% | 14.5% | 14.8% | 10.6% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 8.9% | 12.8% | 344 | 305 | -166 | -205 | ||||||||||||||
| Intesa | 19.0% | 13.5% | 13.1% | 8.8% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 10.4% | 15.8% | 485 | 597 | 152 | 264 | ||||||||||||||
| J.P. Morgan | 33.8% | 19.7% | 14.3% | 9.5% | 10.8% | 6.0% | 13.9% | 26.7% | 783 | 1593 | 433 | 1243 | ||||||||||||||
| Jyske | 19.5% | 15.2% | 16.7% | 12.0% | 10.8% | 6.1% | 8.7% | 12.4% | 265 | 159 | -327 | -433 | ||||||||||||||
| KBC | 18.3% | 15.3% | 14.5% | 10.1% | 9.9% | 5.5% | 10.8% | 13.8% | 525 | 393 | 65 | -67 | ||||||||||||||
| Kutxabank | 17.2% | 17.2% | 11.7% | 7.7% | 9.2% | 5.2% | 14.8% | 14.8% | 966 | 563 | 716 | 313 | ||||||||||||||
| La Banque Postale | 19.0% | 14.7% | 12.8% | 8.4% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 0.0% | 3.9% | -558 | -613 | -835 | -890 | ||||||||||||||
| Lansforsakringar | 18.5% | 15.4% | 13.6% | 9.2% | 10.1% | 5.7% | 15.1% | 18.2% | 942 | 809 | 592 | 459 | ||||||||||||||
| LBBW | 20.2% | 14.3% | 13.1% | 8.8% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 8.8% | 13.9% | 331 | 403 | 0 | 72 | ||||||||||||||
| Helaba | 17.4% | 13.3% | 12.8% | 8.6% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 7.6% | 11.3% | 216 | 159 | -93 | -151 | ||||||||||||||
| Mediobanca | 15.9% | 14.0% | 12.1% | 7.9% | 9.6% | 5.4% | 8.7% | 10.5% | 334 | 92 | 78 | -164 | ||||||||||||||
| MSESE | 25.7% | 18.6% | 13.6% | 8.9% | 10.8% | 6.0% | 9.8% | 15.8% | 375 | 506 | 90 | 222 | ||||||||||||||
| NBG | 16.9% | 15.8% | 14.3% | 9.5% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 13.1% | 14.2% | 694 | 323 | 366 | -5 | ||||||||||||||
| NordLB | 18.5% | 15.1% | 13.3% | 8.7% | 10.5% | 5.9% | 7.6% | 10.6% | 169 | 10 | -113 | -273 | ||||||||||||||
| Nordea | 20.8% | 16.4% | 15.3% | 11.1% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 13.0% | 16.9% | 753 | 715 | 193 | 155 | ||||||||||||||
| Nykredit | 23.3% | 19.6% | 18.0% | 13.0% | 11.5% | 6.5% | 13.1% | 16.2% | 664 | 473 | 14 | -177 | ||||||||||||||
| OP | 19.3% | 17.5% | 13.8% | 9.3% | 10.3% | 5.8% | 12.0% | 13.6% | 619 | 338 | 264 | -17 | ||||||||||||||
| OTP | 16.7% | 15.2% | 13.2% | 8.8% | 10.0% | 5.6% | 13.1% | 14.5% | 748 | 450 | 429 | 131 | ||||||||||||||
| PIRAEUS | 16.4% | 11.5% | 14.3% | 9.4% | 11.0% | 6.2% | 8.4% | 13.2% | 217 | 220 | -108 | -105 | ||||||||||||||
| PKO | 17.6% | 16.5% | 12.5% | 9.0% | 8.0% | 4.5% | 12.9% | 14.0% | 841 | 604 | 389 | 153 | ||||||||||||||
| RBI | 20.0% | 15.6% | 15.1% | 10.6% | 10.2% | 5.7% | 12.2% | 16.1% | 647 | 588 | 162 | 102 | ||||||||||||||
| SBAB | 17.8% | 12.8% | 14.9% | 10.2% | 11.4% | 6.7% | 11.2% | 16.5% | 448 | 516 | 97 | 165 | ||||||||||||||
| SEB | 22.5% | 19.0% | 17.4% | 13.2% | 10.0% | 5.9% | 14.5% | 17.4% | 862 | 740 | 124 | 2 | ||||||||||||||
| SocGen | 17.2% | 13.3% | 13.8% | 9.3% | 10.1% | 5.7% | 8.2% | 11.6% | 250 | 151 | -115 | -215 | ||||||||||||||
| Handelsbanken | 23.9% | 19.6% | 17.8% | 13.5% | 10.1% | 5.8% | 15.5% | 19.4% | 963 | 937 | 194 | 168 | ||||||||||||||
| Swedbank | 21.8% | 17.8% | 17.7% | 13.4% | 10.3% | 6.0% | 15.8% | 19.5% | 979 | 926 | 238 | 185 | ||||||||||||||
| Sydbank | 19.5% | 17.3% | 16.1% | 11.4% | 10.8% | 6.1% | 12.5% | 14.5% | 639 | 368 | 109 | -162 | ||||||||||||||
| Unicaja | 16.4% | 13.0% | 12.7% | 8.2% | 10.2% | 5.7% | 9.7% | 13.0% | 401 | 290 | 151 | 40 | ||||||||||||||
| UniCredit | 20.5% | 16.0% | 13.4% | 9.1% | 9.8% | 5.5% | 12.0% | 16.2% | 648 | 650 | 285 | 287 | ||||||||||||||
| VW Bank | 18.3% | 18.2% | 12.8% | 8.3% | 10.3% | 5.8% | 14.7% | 14.8% | 898 | 451 | 642 | 195 | ||||||||||||||
| bps--Basis points. OCR--Overall capital requirement. CET1--Common equity tier 1. SREP--Supervisory review and evaluation process. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appendix 4: Rating Score Snapshot For Rated Banks Participating In The EBA Or The ECB 2023 Stress Tests
Table 4.1
| Rated banks in the EBA stress test | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding | Liquidity | Funding and liquidity | SACR | Support notches | Adjustment notch | Opco long-term ICR | Outlook | |||||||||||||||
| ABANCA Corporación Bancaria S.A. | bbb | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb- | - | BBB- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| ABN AMRO Group N.V. | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +2 (ALAC) | -1 | A | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| AIB Group plc | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +2 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| ALPHA SERVICES & HOLDINGS S.A. | bb | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bb- | - | BB- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +1 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Banco Comercial Português, SA | bbb- | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bb+ | - | BB+ | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| Banco de Sabadell S.A. | bbb | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb- | +1 (ALAC) | BBB | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| Banco Santander S.A. | bbb | Very strong | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Bank of Ireland Group PLC | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +2 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA | bbb | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate and Strong | bbb+ | - | BBB+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Bankinter, S.A. | bbb | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +1 (ALAC) | A- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Belfius Banque SA | a- | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +1 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| BNP Paribas | bbb+ | Very strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| BPCE | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +1 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| CaixaBank, S.A. | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +1 (ALAC) | A- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Commerzbank AG | bbb+ | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb | +1 (ALAC) | BBB+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Coöperatieve Rabobank U.A. | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Crédit Agricole | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Credit Mutuel | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +2 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Danske Bank | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +2 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| de Volksbank N.V. | bbb+ | Moderate | Very strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +2 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Deutsche Apotheker- und Ärztebank eG | bbb+ | Moderate | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb- | +5 (Group) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Deutsche Bank AG | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb | +2 (ALAC) | A- | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| DNB Bank Group | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a+ | +1 (ALAC) | AA- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a+ | - | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Erste Group Bank AG | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Strong | Strong and Strong | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Eurobank Ergasias Services and Holdings S.A. | bb | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bb- | - | B | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| Iccrea Banca S.p.A. – Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo | bbb- | Adequate | Adequate | Constrained | Strong | Strong | Strong and Strong | bb+ | - | BB+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| ING Groep N.V. | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. | bbb- | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb | - | BBB | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Jyske Bank | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +1 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| KBC Group NV | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| La Banque Postale | bbb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Moderate | Strong | Strong | Strong and Strong | bbb | +4 (Group) | A+ | Negative | |||||||||||||||
| Länsförsäkringar Bank AB (publ) | a- | Moderate | Very strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +1 (Group) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Mediobanca - Banca di Credito Finanziario S.p.A. | bbb- | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb | - | BBB | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| National Bank of Greece S.A. | bb | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bb- | - | BB- | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| Nordea Bank Abp | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a+ | +1 (ALAC) | AA- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Nykredit Realkredit | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +2 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| OTP Bank Nyrt. | bbb- | Strong | Adequate | Moderate | Strong | Strong | Strong and Strong | bbb | -1 Additional factor | BBB- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
|
Piraeus Financial Holdings S.A. |
bb | Adequate | Constrained | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | b+ | - | B+ | Positive | |||||||||||||||
| Raiffeisen Bank International AG | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Strong | Strong and Strong | a- | - | A- | Negative | |||||||||||||||
| SBAB Bank AB – group | a- | Moderate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a- | +2 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken - group | a- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Société Générale S.A. | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | +2 (ALAC) | A | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Svenska Handelsbanken - group | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a+ | +1 (ALAC) | AA- | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Swedbank - group | a- | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | A+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| UniCredit S.p.a. | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb | - | BBB | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| Volkswagen Bank GmbH | bbb+ | Constrained | Very strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate and Adequate | bbb+ | - | BBB+ | Stable | |||||||||||||||
| ICR--Issuer credit rating. Opco--Operating company. SACR--Stand-alone credit profile. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table 4.2
| Rated banks in the ECB stress test | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding | Liquidity | Funding and liquidity | SACR | Support notches | Adjustment notch | Opco long-term ICR | Outlook | |||||||||||||||
| Argenta Bank- en Verzekeringsgroep nv | bbb+ | Moderate | Very Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | a- | +1 (ALAC) | - | A- | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Banca Mediolanum S.p.A. | bbb- | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb | - | - | BBB | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, S.A. | bbb | Moderate | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bb+ | - | - | BB+ | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Bank of Cyprus Holdings Public Limited Company | bb- | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bb- | - | - | BB- | Positive | ||||||||||||||
| Bank of Valletta plc | bbb- | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb- | - | - | BBB- | Negative | ||||||||||||||
| Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat, Luxembourg | a- | Adequate | Very Strong | Moderate | Strong | Strong | Strong | a+ | +3 (Group) | - | AA+ | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Banque Internationale à Luxembourg S.A. | a- | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb+ | +1 (ALAC) | - | A- | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| BNG Bank N.V. | bbb+ | Adequate | Very Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | a+ | +5 (Group) | - | AAA | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Crelan SA; Crelan NV | a- | Constrained | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb | +1 (ALAC) | - | BBB+ | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb | +3 (Group) | - | A | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG | bbb+ | Constrained | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb | +1 (ALAC) | +1 | BBB+ | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Finecobank S.p.A | bbb- | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb- | - | +1 | BBB | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Ibercaja Banco SA | bbb | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb- | - | - | BBB- | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V. | bbb+ | Adequate | Very Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | a+ | +5 (Group) | - | AAA | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. Ljubljana | bbb- | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | bbb- | +1 (ALAC) | - | BBB | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| RCI Banque SA | bbb | Moderate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | bbb- | - | - | BBB- | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| UBS Europe SE | a- | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | a | +1 (ALAC) | - | A+ | Stable | ||||||||||||||
| ICR--Issuer credit rating. Opco--Operating company. SACR--Stand-alone credit profile. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appendix 5: EU Bank Capital Stack Graphic
This report does not constitute a rating action.
| Primary Credit Analysts: | Nicolas Charnay, Frankfurt +49 69 3399 9218; nicolas.charnay@spglobal.com |
| Claudio Hantzsche, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9188; claudio.hantzsche@spglobal.com | |
| Laura Jimenez, London +44 2071760839; laura.jimenez@spglobal.com | |
| Secondary Contact: | Giles Edwards, London + 44 20 7176 7014; giles.edwards@spglobal.com |
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