This report does not constitute a rating action.
Key Takeaways
- We believe local and regional governments' (LRGs) exposure to short-term real estate market volatility is fairly limited. Chinese LRGs and French departments are exceptions because a larger portion of their revenues is exposed to real estate market movements.
- That said, declining property valuations could squeeze LRGs' fiscal space in the long term.
- Tax revenues in larger metropolitan areas are more exposed to commercial real estate risks given changes in work and leisure trends that could weigh on property valuations.
LRGs' revenues from the real estate sector are somewhat volatile. Proceeds from land and other asset sales, as well as property transaction fees, tend to follow market trends. Exposed LRGs might see revenues decline in the short term due to a fall in valuations and fewer property transactions. We note that recurrent property taxes based on assessed value (ad valorem) could be less volatile than transaction-based taxes because the former are usually derived from an officially-registered cadastral value, rather than what the market might dictate. However, if a prolonged market contraction depresses property prices, governments might opt to significantly write down cadastral values. Furthermore, recurring taxes from commercial real estate in large metropolitan areas are particularly vulnerable to changes in work trends and leisure activities.
Although there are substantial variations across countries, we generally view LRGs' exposure to short-term real estate market volatility as limited. Taxes on real estate transactions and proceeds from land and other asset sales account for about 5% of total revenues, on average. We estimate that total payments related to the performance of the real estate sector, considering both direct and indirect exposure, amount to slightly less than 20% of LRGs' total revenue, on average.
We regard Chinese LRGs and French departments as more exposed to real estate market downturns. This is because revenues from real estate transactions and asset sales comprise 28% and 20% of their total revenues, respectively (chart 1).
Melbourne, Sydney, and London are more exposed to commercial real estate. These cities could suffer a substantial revenue reduction if their commercial real estate sectors hit hard times. This is because recurring taxes from this segment account for more than 25% of their budget revenues.
Here we look at LRGs in 20 countries outside of the U.S. and how pressure on the real estate sector is affecting their revenues. We also take a closer look at some LRGs that are more exposed to the sector.
Chart 1
China's LRGs Promote Large Land Sales To Boost Growth
Chinese LRGs generate a substantial amount of revenue from land sales, far more so than from conventional property-related taxes. Nevertheless, China uses a build-and-transfer model to manage its land sales, mostly to achieve atypical fiscal stimulus. Before LRGs release the land to the public (mainly developers) they use a parcel of that land for preliminary public investment in infrastructure (roads, utilities, pipelines, and so on). This model minimizes losses (or deficits) for most governments as they use cash accounting to book revenues and expenditures (chart 2).
Large land sales indicate the significance of the property sector to China's local economy. Property investment accounts for about one quarter of China's new investment, while total investment consistently hovers around 45% of GDP. We forecast an L-shape correction to China's property sales, which could slow down LRGs' land sales and weigh on the development of local economies. We expect the sector's land sales will stay flat in 2023 and rise by only 5% in 2024. This follows a decline in land sales of 23% in 2022.
Chart 2
French And Spanish LRGs Have Seen Property Tax Volatility
French departments' revenue risks mostly relate to property transaction taxes. This dependence exposes them to the real estate market. Property transaction taxes have historically been highly volatile and have affected local budgets, while recurrent taxes on real estate have grown at about a stable 2% annually (chart 3). Swings in transaction taxes have usually occurred alongside macroeconomic shocks. Transaction taxes declined by almost 30% after the global financial crisis and we anticipate they could drop about 15%-20% in 2023 compared to 2022 following the steep rise in interest rates that has depressed home buyers' budgets.
Chart 3
In 2021, recurrent taxes on real estate (property tax) were transferred to French municipalities. Property tax had accounted for about 56% of total real estate revenue for French departments in 2020. While they were compensated with a share of national VAT, the dependence on property transaction taxes continues to increase (chart 4).
Chart 4
The past performance of Spanish regions' revenues highlights how volatile transaction tax collections can be. In 2022, revenues from property transaction taxes reached their highest since 2007, but we now forecast a downturn in such revenues in 2023. This will be driven by a cooldown in the market amid tighter borrowing conditions because of rising interest rates (chart 5).
Spanish regions were hit significantly by the real estate market downturn in 2008-2009 and have still only partly recovered. The sharp correction saw this revenue source plummet to just 5% of total revenues in 2009, from 11% in 2007. In recent years, the regions have diversified into other sources of revenues to reduce their exposure to real estate; in 2022 real estate transaction taxes represented almost 7% of their total revenues.
Chart 5
Property Taxes Are More Predictable But Subject To Shifts In Commercial Real Estate
Many LRGs across different countries rely on property taxes as their main and most stable revenue source. For example, in French cities, Israeli municipalities, and New Zealand municipalities these accounted for more than 25% of budget revenue in 2022. Melbourne, Sydney, London, and Toronto receive more than 30% of budget revenues from these taxes.
Recurring taxes come under different names but are universally levied on residential and commercial real estate, with property value as a base in most cases. Usually, this value remains stable despite short-term market volatility but may follow long-term price trends with some time lag. Local governments have the flexibility to raise tax rates in case of long-term downward value corrections.
However, substantial increases in tax rates on real estate may reduce a city's attractiveness for citizens and businesses, thereby further damaging its tax base. This is especially so for commercial real estate, which is currently suffering from lower demand in large metropolitan cities due to changes in work trends, commuting, and leisure patterns.
Chart 6
Dependence on property taxes levied on commercial real estate may exert downward pressure on budgetary performance in large metropolitan cities. Based on information from a group of selected cities, we estimated that owners of commercial property pay more than 50% of recurring real estate revenues.
Chart 7
A contraction in the real estate market could lead to a significant revenue decline for large metropolitan areas. Melbourne, London, Sydney, and Toronto are examples of metropolitan areas that depend heavily on recurrent taxes on real estate. On average, 27% of their total revenue comes from recurrent taxes on commercial real estate, followed by 17% from residential real estate.
Real Estate Market Exposure Goes Beyond Direct Taxes
The real estate sector represents a substantial part of local economies. On average, it accounts for about 13% of GDP and in France, New Zealand, Canada and Spain this figure tops 15% (chart 8). A structural contraction in real estate may lead to a corresponding loss in tax revenues from companies operating in the sector. This could result in a larger revenue decline than the direct payments from the real estate sector would suggest.
China appears to be an outlier, because we used the so-called narrow scope definition reported by the central government. Nevertheless, property investment (promoted by LRGs' large land sales) is one of the main drivers of China's high investment.
Chart 8
Related Research
- European Housing Markets: Sustained Correction Ahead, July 20, 2023
- Local And Regional Governments' Positive Momentum Is Losing Steam, June 29, 2023
- Could Empty Offices Lead To Empty Coffers For U.S. Cities?, June 22, 2023
- Stimulus Is A Highwire Act For China's City Governments Facing Property Go-Slow, June 21, 2023
Primary Credit Analysts: | Felix Ejgel, London + 44 20 7176 6780; felix.ejgel@spglobal.com |
Hugo Soubrier, Paris +33 1 40 75 25 79; hugo.soubrier@spglobal.com | |
Manuel Becerra, Madrid +34 914233220; manuel.becerra@spglobal.com | |
Secondary Contacts: | Anthony Walker, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2019; anthony.walker@spglobal.com |
Martin J Foo, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2016; martin.foo@spglobal.com | |
Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055; susan.chu@spglobal.com | |
Kensuke Sugihara, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8475; kensuke.sugihara@spglobal.com | |
Bhavini Patel, CFA, Toronto + 1 (416) 507 2558; bhavini.patel@spglobal.com | |
Alejandro Rodriguez Anglada, Madrid + 34 91 788 7233; alejandro.rodriguez.anglada@spglobal.com | |
Noa Fux, London 44 2071 760730; noa.fux@spglobal.com | |
Stephanie Mery, Paris + 0033144207344; stephanie.mery@spglobal.com | |
Carl Nyrerod, Stockholm + 46 84 40 5919; carl.nyrerod@spglobal.com | |
Maxim Rybnikov, London + 44 7824 478 225; maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com | |
Karen Vartapetov, PhD, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9225; karen.vartapetov@spglobal.com | |
Michael Stroschein, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9251; michael.stroschein@spglobal.com | |
Dina Shillis, CFA, Toronto + 1 (416) 507 3214; dina.shillis@spglobal.com | |
Wenyin Huang, Singapore (86) 10-6569-2736; Wenyin.Huang@spglobal.com | |
YeeFarn Phua, Singapore + 65 6239 6341; yeefarn.phua@spglobal.com | |
Sarah Sullivant, Austin + 1 (415) 371 5051; sarah.sullivant@spglobal.com |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.