Key Takeaways
- China's recovery should continue but at an uneven pace, with investment and industry lagging. We have reduced our 2023 GDP growth forecast to 5.2%, from 5.5%.
- Other Asia-Pacific economies are on track to slow due to the global slowdown and interest rate hikes. Still, domestic resilience should ensure meaningful growth.
- Modest sequential core inflation is largely alleviating the need for rate hikes. However, rate cuts will be slow to materialize, in part because of persistent high rates in the U.S.
The overall picture of Asia-Pacific economies has improved slightly in the past three months. We have nudged down our growth forecast for China to 5.2% from 5.5%. For the rest of the region, we have left it broadly unchanged because of domestic resilience.
We expect 3.8% GDP growth in 2023 for Asia-Pacific excluding China, after 4.7% in 2022. Inflation and external deficits are receding; pressure on central banks to raise rates has diminished. Calls for rate cuts will grow louder.
However, there generally is little room for lower rates any time soon in a setting of high U.S. interest rates and lingering inflation risk. The region's economy faces several risks too: challenging external financial conditions amid even higher U.S. interest rates, slower-than-expected growth in the west and China, and pockets of domestic interest rate stresses. And energy and commodity price shocks would inflame external deficits in several economies and inflation.
Global Setting: Low Growth And High Rates Loom In U.S. And Europe
We have raised our whole-year 2023 forecasts for GDP growth in the U.S. and the eurozone in part because of a better-than-expected outcome in the first quarter. Moreover, despite the banking sector turmoil in both places earlier this year, services sectors and labor markets have remained resilient in much of the second quarter. Still, the effect of higher rates is mounting. We expect little sequential growth in the second half of 2023 in both economies.
Amid low unemployment and hefty wage growth, core consumer inflation in the U.S. and Europe has remained sticky. The decline in U.S. inflation toward the Federal Reserve's 2% target will be gradual, and it will need to keep policy rates elevated.
We expect U.S. policy rates to increase and see them starting to fall only in 2024. The strain on Asia-Pacific markets and currencies will consequently persist for the rest of 2023.
China's Recovery Is Uneven But Should Continue
China's economy rebounded in the first quarter of 2023, led by consumption and services. Consumer demand has continued to recover in the second quarter. But, amid subdued exports and continued weakness in the property sector, industrial production has slowed (see chart 1).
The recovery in consumer confidence is slow. While overall unemployment has eased, rising youth unemployment--it reached 20.8% in May--has soured the already subdued sentiment stemming from housing market weakness, slow income growth, and pay cuts in some sectors.
Still, retail sales and discretionary spending are expanding more than the consumer confidence data would suggest. Real year-on-year retail sales growth has been in the double digits in the second quarter on a low base. In May, discretionary spending was 21% higher than in 2019 in nominal terms, compared with 17.3% in April. Car sales and spending on jewelry and electronics were robust (see chart 2). We expect consumption to continue to expand meaningfully in the second half of the year and in 2024.
Housing market activity softened again in the second quarter after a rebound at the start of the year. Real estate construction is still shrinking compared with a year ago. After a spurt early in the year, sales momentum has eased again amid weak confidence. A V-shaped recovery is unlikely. In turn, given the sizable stock of unsold housing weighing on the market, a pick-up in housing construction will hinge on better sales. Still, the broad bottoming out of housing sales should eventually prod construction activity.
Weak exports and confidence will continue to weigh on private sector investment. However, gradually improving profits should provide some support in the second half of the year, thus broadening the recovery.
China's headline U.S.-dollar imports were still down year-on-year in May. But in real terms, imports rose about 8% year-on-year, indicating the country's recovery has started to spill over internationally.
Chart 1
Chart 2
The deterioration in growth in industry and sentiment has prompted calls for more policy stimulus. Such stimulus is unlikely to be large in scale. Growth data will be elevated year-on-year for the second quarter, compared with the low base of last year. Policymakers are aiming for an organic recovery from the pandemic and are keen to contain financial risk and leverage. Indeed, infrastructure investment growth should ease this year as policymakers seek to contain local public debt (see "Spending Sprees Will Subside As China Refines Infrastructure Investment," published on RatingsDirect on May 29, 2023).
Yet further policy easing is likely. This would follow steps in mid-June such as the 10 bps cut in the policy rate and measures to boost business confidence. Likely measures include easing housing purchasing restrictions and mortgage down-payment requirements, expanding credit and infrastructure financing and, perhaps, fiscal support for consumption. We expect policymakers to keep such support contained, but it should put a floor under growth.
Higher-than-we-expected growth in the first quarter lifted our whole-year GDP growth forecast. However, following the weak recent data we have revised down sequential growth for the rest of the year, especially in the sector quarter. This has reduced our whole-year 2023 GDP growth forecast to 5.2%, from 5.5% and reduced our forecast for 2024 to 4.7%.
The effect of China's re-opening on domestic and global inflation has remained muted. This is because of the modest scale of the recovery and the fact that consumption and the services sector have driven it. We don't expect a major boost in the coming 12 months. Indeed, we have cut our forecast for China's inflation in 2023. But domestic and international price pressure from China should pick up as the recovery broadens and consolidates.
Geopolitical friction is accentuating the adjustment of supply chains. International firms are leading a shift of manufacturing production from China to other countries. A contraction in international trade and investment interaction with advanced countries will weigh on the country's productivity and long-term growth (see "China's Trend Growth To Slow Even As Catchup Continues," Nov. 10, 2022).
Despite these obstacles, China's overall global export market share has largely held up in the past three years. The underlying competitiveness of China's industrial sector is muting the effect of the production shift. Some companies have kept more production in China than planned. Also, shipments from mainly domestic supply chains such as domestic brand electronics, solar equipment, and electric vehicles have risen (see "Economic Research: The Changing Composition of China's Exports," May 12, 2023).
Policy Response Set To Limit Risks To China's Growth
China's key downside growth risk is that its recovery loses more steam amid weak confidence among consumers and in the housing market. A lack of major policy stimulus could accentuate that risk, but we expect a serious slowdown to trigger meaningful measures to contain any downside.
On the flipside, there could be upside risk from confidence among consumers and in the housing market rebounding more meaningfully than we expect. However, macro policy is likely to quickly turn less accommodative in case of strong growth. Thus, there is limited upside risk to growth.
A key long-term risk is a further rise in geopolitical friction and its effect on China's economic and financial ties with developed countries. Domestically, containing leverage without impeding growth requires skillful management of local government debt and financial reforms.
The Rest Of Asia-Pacific Will Slow But Not Stumble
On the external front, for most Asia-Pacific economies we see China's recovery as dulling but not offsetting the impact of the slowdown in the U.S. and Europe in 2023 (see "Asia-Pacific In 2023: China Rebound Cannot Offset Western Slowdown," Feb. 23, 2023). That is especially so given the consumption and domestic services-led nature of China's acceleration, which limits the spill-over via imports.
As confirmed by the first quarter data, weak exports have generally weighed on Asia-Pacific GDP growth this year. Indeed, the external weakness resulted in negative GDP growth in the trade-exposed economies of Singapore and Taiwan.
But across the region, robust domestic demand dampened the external drag on overall growth. In large economies such as India and Japan, GDP growth even accelerated due to the domestic resilience.
In India, growth in the March quarter outperformed our expectations and Statistics India revised up whole-year GDP growth in fiscal 2023 (year ending March 30) to 7.2% from the earlier 7.0%, confirming a strong recovery from COVID-19. In Japan, robust private consumption and investment lifted GDP growth above our expectations.
Across the region, lingering re-opening dividends helped private consumption growth exceed 4.5% year-on-year in all but four of the 12 economies for which we have disaggregated national accounts data (we have no such data for China and Vietnam) (see chart 3).
Investment momentum varied but generally improved in the first quarter (see chart 4). It was relatively soft in Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan, but particularly strong in India and the Philippines and also robust in Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea.
Chart 3
Chart 4
The S&P Global Purchasing Managers' Indices indicate that, while activity momentum in manufacturing has generally slowed, services sectors have been resilient. This is in line with the picture in the U.S. and Europe, and suggests that the fallout from higher interest rates has been contained so far.
However, we expect this effect to become more visible in the second half of 2023, especially in Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, which have had the largest interest rates increases.
A key part of that squeeze takes place via the housing sector, as mortgage rates rise, and house prices fall. Interest rates charged to borrowers often adjust to policy rate changes with a lag (see chart 5 for Australian mortgages). That is true even when, as is the case for these Australian housing loans, the bulk involve variable interest rates. Thus the full effect of those rate rises is still to come.
Overall, we maintain our outlook for a slowdown in Asia-Pacific excluding China to a still meaningful 3.8% from 4.7% in 2022 (see chart 6), with a more pronounced deceleration in economies heavily exposed to slowing global trade and interest rate increases. In the second half of the year, rising spill-over from China's recovery should broadly offset the effect of weaker growth in the U.S. and Europe.
We see the fastest growth at about 6% in India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Growth in the region ex China should pick up to 4.4% in 2024 amid easier monetary conditions and somewhat better global growth.
The medium-term growth outlook remains relatively solid. The Asian emerging market economies remain among the fastest growing ones in our global growth outlook through 2026. India, Vietnam, and the Philippines continue to lead, with average growth of 6.7%, 6.6%, and 6.1% in 2023-2026.
Chart 5
Chart 6
Improved Inflation Outlook Eases Strain On Monetary Policy
Unlike in the U.S. and Europe, core inflation has generally either stayed at or eased to a modest pace, in sequential terms, in recent months, including in emerging markets such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (see charts 7 and 8). This means that the domestic pressure to raise policy rates has receded, even if it will take a while before central banks cut policy rates.
Notable is the declining momentum of inflation in the Philippines. It followed a 425 bps increase in policy rates in April 2022 and has largely reduced the need for additional policy rate increases; we expect one more hike of 25 bps this year.
China's monetary policy is likely to remain accommodative until the recovery is entrenched. With consumer inflation likely to remain contained in 2023, the central bank should have room to hold off on tightening monetary conditions for some time. Indeed, the current bias is toward easing.
In Japan, amid higher inflation and global interest rates, market expectations have risen for the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to abandon its ultra-accommodative monetary policy. We expect the BOJ to remain very careful, tightening monetary policy meaningfully only if it sees signs that the rise in inflation will endure. Given Japan's high government and corporate debt, rising interest rates in the absence of higher nominal growth would increase interest burdens unduly.
As the BOJ has stressed, the key to a prolonged rise in inflation is sustainably higher wage growth. Wage negotiations this spring led to higher wage increases than in recent years. There are signs that, amid a tight labor market, more firms are willing to offer higher wages to attract younger people, even at the risk of eroding the long-established largely seniority-based wage-setting arrangements. The big question is whether the steeper wage growth can spread to smaller and service sector firms and persist.
Chart 7
Chart 8
While we doubt inflation can sustainably move to the BOJ's 2% target in the next three years, we forecast an increase in trend inflation. This should provide some room for small steps toward normalizing the monetary policy stance, likely starting with adjustment to the yield curve control framework.
In India, under the assumption of normal monsoons, we expect headline consumer inflation to soften to 5% in fiscal 2024 from 6.7%. Softer crude prices and tempering of demand will bring down fuel and core inflation, respectively. The inflation and rate hike cycles have peaked, in our opinion. But we expect the Reserve Bank of India to cut rates only in early 2024, as it wants to see consumer inflation moving to 4%--the center of its target range.
In Australia and New Zealand, sticky inflation and resilient domestic demand have pushed central banks to raise policy rates to levels not seen since 2011 in the former and 2007 in the latter. Still, we expect the Reserve Bank of Australia to raise its policy rate further this year.
Higher interest rates are shaping economies and markets, with the housing market a key channel. In Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, much higher mortgage payments have contributed to a sizeable fall in housing prices. Australian housing prices have regained territory. But this uptrend may not last, given the effect of monetary policy tightening in the pipeline.
In most Asian emerging markets, lower household debt implies a smaller impact from higher rates, although household debt is elevated in Thailand and Malaysia.
Improvement In External Deficits Is A Buffer Against High U.S. Rates
In many Asia-Pacific economies, external factors play a role in monetary policy decisions. Central banks consider the effect of interest rate differentials with the U.S. on currencies. To varying degrees, they don't want to see currencies weaken too much as that could fuel so-called imported inflation or financial instability.
As the Fed hiked its policy rate aggressively, Asia-Pacific currencies depreciated across the board against the U.S. dollar between end-2021 and the third quarter of 2022 (see chart 9).
The external pressure eased temporarily when financial markets started to price in the expectation that the Fed would cut rates in the second half of 2023. More recently, though, as the markets realized that this was unrealistic given the inflation challenge in the U.S., that appreciation trend halted, and in some cases reversed.
Under our forecast of U.S. rates likely to remain higher for longer, in many Asia-Pacific economies interest differentials with the U.S. will remain testing for quite some time, maintaining stress on currencies.
Notwithstanding this interest rate hurdle, external vulnerability has eased in several Asian economies that ran external deficits in 2022. In India, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, external deficit trends have improved this year as oil prices have declined; and, in New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, rising tourism revenues are making a difference (see chart 10).
Chart 9
Chart 10
In South Korea, after the large decline of the surplus to 1.8% of GDP in 2022, the current account balance has continued to decrease amid export weakness. Given the unfavorable interest rate differential with the U.S. and steady portfolio outflows, this trend could weigh on the Korean won. However, we expect the Bank of Korea will remain unfazed by the effect of a weaker won on inflation, since both headline inflation and prices of imported commodities in won terms have eased considerably.
Risks To The Outlook
One key risk is that growth in the U.S. and Europe slows more than we anticipate due to larger-than-expected required monetary tightening amid sticky inflation. The other is that substantial setbacks to China's recovery weigh on growth in Asia-Pacific.
Big increases in global energy and commodity prices would stoke inflation and external deficits and fuel renewed depreciation strain on currencies amid elevated U.S. interest rates.
Other risks center on monetary policy. In economies such as Australia, risks are similar to that in the U.S.: central banks may need to tighten rates further to rein in inflation, and that could trigger a sharper slowdown. In Japan, the BOJ must walk a fine line. Rising inflation poses risks, if unattended. But premature interest rate increases would stifle growth and raise interest burdens unduly.
Overall, despite the reduction of our growth forecast for China, the picture for the region has improved. Amid resilient domestic demand, the slowdown in 2023 should remain modest in most economies while easing inflation and external deficits have meant a reprieve for central banks. Yet, high U.S. interest rates, risks to growth, and external deficits persist. Continued vigilance is vital.
Appendix
Table 1
| Real GDP Forecast | Change from prior forecast | |||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (% year over year) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | ||||||||||
| Australia | 3.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 2.3 | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| China | 3.0 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.5 | -0.3 | -0.3 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Hong Kong | -3.5 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.0 | -1.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| India | 7.2 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Indonesia | 5.3 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Japan | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Malaysia | 8.7 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 0.8 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| New Zealand | 2.3 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 2.6 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Philippines | 7.6 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| Singapore | 3.6 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.6 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.3 | ||||||||||
| South Korea | 2.6 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Taiwan | 2.4 | 0.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | -1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Thailand | 2.6 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Vietnam | 8.0 | 5.5 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Asia Pacific | 3.9 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.5 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Note: For India, 2022 = FY 2022 / 23, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||||||||
Table 2
| Inflation (year average) | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (%) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |||||||
| Australia | 6.6 | 6.0 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.4 | |||||||
| China | 2.0 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | |||||||
| Hong Kong | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | |||||||
| India | 6.7 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.8 | |||||||
| Indonesia | 4.2 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.2 | |||||||
| Japan | 2.5 | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | |||||||
| Malaysia | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | |||||||
| New Zealand | 7.1 | 5.7 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | |||||||
| Philippines | 5.8 | 5.9 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 2.9 | |||||||
| Singapore | 6.1 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.3 | |||||||
| South Korea | 5.1 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 2.1 | 2.0 | |||||||
| Taiwan | 2.9 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.7 | |||||||
| Thailand | 6.1 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | |||||||
| Vietnam | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.4 | |||||||
| Note: For India, 2022 = FY 2022 / 23, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 20206 / 27. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||
Table 3
| Policy Rate (year end) | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |||||||
| Australia | 3.10 | 4.60 | 4.10 | 3.35 | 3.10 | |||||||
| China | 2.75 | 2.65 | 2.75 | 2.85 | 2.85 | |||||||
| India | 6.50 | 6.25 | 5.25 | 5.00 | 5.00 | |||||||
| Indonesia | 5.50 | 5.75 | 4.75 | 4.50 | 4.50 | |||||||
| Japan | -0.07 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.25 | |||||||
| Malaysia | 2.75 | 3.00 | 2.75 | 2.75 | 2.75 | |||||||
| New Zealand | 4.25 | 5.50 | 5.00 | 4.00 | 3.50 | |||||||
| Philippines | 5.50 | 6.50 | 5.25 | 4.00 | 4.00 | |||||||
| South Korea | 3.25 | 3.50 | 2.75 | 2.50 | 2.50 | |||||||
| Taiwan | 1.75 | 1.88 | 1.63 | 1.38 | 1.13 | |||||||
| Thailand | 1.25 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 1.25 | 1.00 | |||||||
| Note: China's one year Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) rate is shown. For India, 2022 = FY 2022 / 23, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||
Table 4
| Exchange Rate (year end) | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | ||||||||||
| Australia | 0.66 | 0.67 | 0.69 | 0.71 | 0.72 | |||||||||
| China | 7.12 | 7.07 | 6.86 | 6.69 | 6.56 | |||||||||
| Hong Kong | 7.82 | 7.82 | 7.78 | 7.75 | 7.75 | ` | ||||||||
| India | 82.3 | 83.0 | 83.5 | 85.0 | 86.5 | |||||||||
| Indonesia | 15,569 | 15,000 | 15,100 | 15,200 | 15,200 | |||||||||
| Japan | 143.3 | 129.0 | 124.4 | 120.6 | 117.8 | |||||||||
| Malaysia | 4.41 | 4.60 | 4.40 | 4.31 | 4.21 | |||||||||
| New Zealand | 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.63 | 0.64 | |||||||||
| Philippines | 57.4 | 54.8 | 54.0 | 52.2 | 51.0 | |||||||||
| Singapore | 1.34 | 1.34 | 1.33 | 1.32 | 1.31 | |||||||||
| South Korea | 1,365 | 1,285 | 1,228 | 1,182 | 1,147 | |||||||||
| Taiwan | 31.4 | 30.8 | 30.4 | 30.0 | 29.6 | |||||||||
| Thailand | 36.4 | 34.9 | 34.4 | 34.0 | 33.6 | |||||||||
| Note: According to FX market convention, for Australia and New Zealand exchange eates are shown as U.S. Dollars per local currency unit. For all other currencies, exchange rates shown as local currency units per U.S. Dollar. For India, 2022 = FY 2022 / 23, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||||
Table 5
| Unemployment (year average) | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (%) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | |||||||
| Australia | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | |||||||
| China | 5.6 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | |||||||
| Hong Kong | 4.3 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | |||||||
| Indonesia | 5.8 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.2 | |||||||
| Japan | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | |||||||
| Malaysia | 3.8 | 5.3 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 4.7 | |||||||
| New Zealand | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | |||||||
| Philippines | 5.4 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.2 | |||||||
| Singapore | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | |||||||
| South Korea | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | |||||||
| Taiwan | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | |||||||
| Thailand | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |||||||
| Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||
Editor: Lex Hall
Digital Designer: Halie Mustow
Related Research
- Spending Sprees Will Subside As China Refines Infrastructure Investment, May 29, 2023
- Economic Research: Changing Composition Of China's Exports, May 12, 2023
- Economic Research: Asia-Pacific In 2023: China Rebound Cannot Offset Western Slowdown, Feb. 23, 2023
- Economic Research: China's Trend Growth To Slow Even As Catchup Continues, Nov. 10, 2022
This report does not constitute a rating action.
| Asia-Pacific Chief Economist: | Louis Kuijs, Hong Kong +852 9319 7500; louis.kuijs@spglobal.com |
| Asia-Pacific Economist: | Vishrut Rana, Singapore + 65 6216 1008; vishrut.rana@spglobal.com |
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