Key Takeaways
- Ratings should remain broadly stable in 2023 for Asia-Pacific financial institutions. But risks to ratings are clearly on the downside amid higher inflation and lower growth. We see only a few bright spots.
- We forecast credit losses of about US$513 billion in 2023 for Asia-Pacific banks, about 9.0% above our estimate for 2022.
- Challenges may be more acute for nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), certain emerging market banks, and non-systemically important financial institutions with highly concentrated business and financial profiles.
2023 Will Be More Difficult For The Global Banking Sector
More than half of investors we polled are downbeat on the global banking outlook for the next 12-24 months. In the survey we conducted in November 2022, U.K. and Italian banks topped the investors' list for developed markets that most worry them. Turkiye and China are high in the risk watch list for emerging market banks (see "More Than Half Of Investors Polled Are Downbeat On The Global Banking Outlook," published Dec. 6, 2022).
We anticipate the significant buffers banks have built up over the past 10 years will be tested. Besides higher inflation and lower economic growth, banks and their customers also face property-sector weaknesses in many jurisdictions. Additional key risks are potentially higher corporate insolvencies exacerbated by high corporate leverage, high government leverage, and weaker property sectors (see "Global Bank Country-By-Country 2023 Outlook: Greater Divergence Ahead," and "Global Bank Outlook 2023: Greater Divergence Ahead," published Nov. 17, 2022).
Asia-Pacific will be a relative bright spot in the global economy in 2023. This may mean that downside risks affecting financial institutions in Asia-Pacific may be less severe than in some other regions. Lower global growth and higher interest rates should slow some economies in the region next year. But we generally expect GDP growth to stay healthy. S&P Global Ratings recently trimmed its GDP growth forecast for Asia-Pacific to 4.3% in 2023, that's 0.2 of a percentage point lower compared with our September outlook.
As of December 2022, 84% of rating outlooks on Asia-Pacific banks were stable, a trend we believe will persist in 2023. During the October-December 2022 quarter, we revised the economic risk trend for Thailand and Indonesia to stable from negative (see "BICRA Changes" section for more). Meanwhile the economic risk trend for New Zealand remains negative.
Conversely, there are few prospects for upward rating momentum in 2023. Some small banks in Australia may eventually benefit from upgrades considering our industry risk trend for the Australian banking sector is positive. That said, we only see this as about a one-in-three possibility.
Global and Asia-Pacific Bank Credit Losses: Our Base Case Sees Higher, But Manageable, Losses Ahead
Across the 83 banking systems that S&P Global Ratings covers, we expect credit losses will amount to about US$2.1 trillion over the three years to end-2024. While our forecast for 2024 is new, our latest forecasts for 2022 and 2023 are appreciably higher than our previous (July 2022) projections. For 2022, we see credit losses amounting to about US$680 billion, 6% above our previous forecast of about US$640 billion.
For 2023, our forecast is about US$765 billion, 10% higher than our previous forecast of about US$695 billion. A silver lining is that global banks enter 2023 with broadly healthy capital and solid balance sheets; and their net interest margins will continue to benefit from higher interest rates. This should provide comfortable headroom to absorb higher losses without depleting capital. This deteriorating picture highlights the increasingly murky economic outlook across much of the world. For regional variations, see "Credit Trends: Global Banks: Our Credit Loss Forecasts : Manageable Rise In Credit Losses As Our Base Case," published Dec. 13, 2022).
For China, we forecast credit losses of about US$436 billion in 2023, about 8.9% above our estimate for 2022 credit losses. We estimate that about 40% of Chinese property developers are in financial difficulty. In our view, real estate nonperforming loans (NPLs) will remain elevated in 2023, after doubling in 2022. They would be higher still if not for forbearance policies allowing banks to classify credit stress among developers as normal or special-mention loans. Reasonable collateral buffers on real estate loans support this approach, and we still expect banks will reclassify the loans to NPL if their loan-to-value ratios approach or exceed 100% on already problematic loans.
Our economic growth forecast of 4.3% for Asia-Pacific for 2023 is much stronger than for the U.S. and the eurozone. This will underpin bank lending growth, and we anticipate manageable credit losses for most banks at current rating levels. For 2023, we forecast credit losses of about $77 billion for Asia-Pacific, excluding China. This is about 9.4% higher than in 2022.
Hybrid Non-Call Decisions Are The New Normal As Markets Remain Volatile
Given volatile market conditions, S&P Global Ratings expects more issuers to choose not to call their hybrid capital instruments on the first optional call date. The optional nature of a call is a key feature of hybrids. We expect more issuers to choose not to call in order to help manage their capital, the carrying cost of their hybrids, and the timing of any refinancing.
We saw a recent example of this in the case of Heungkuk Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (not rated). The insurer announced in November 2022 that it would not call a US$500 million hybrid, shaking investor confidence in the capacity of the Korean entities (financial and nonfinancial) to repay such securities at the first optional call date. Korea's market regulator made a statement assuring investors about Heungkuk Life's liquidity in response to the market reaction. Korea had not seen a noncall decision since 2009. The market's response prompted the insurer to reverse its decision and call the instrument, even though it could not replace the hybrid.
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) also made an announcement in November 2022 to clarify the equity-like characteristics of such hybrid issuances by banks and insurers. APRA highlighted the possibility that some issuers may not exercise a call on the instruments under current economic conditions.
A decision to call or not to call a hybrid, balances shorter- and longer-term funding and capital management considerations. Hybrids are almost always called at the first optional call date in good market conditions. The issuer can usually refinance the security more cheaply or at a broadly similar cost. This decision is more complex in tougher market conditions, however.
A noncall decision does not constitute a default and can be credit-supportive. We still recognize the financial benefits of an uncalled hybrid, even when we no longer consider that it has equity content. Previous noncalls have shown that the reputational effect is relatively short-lived, but hybrid investors will likely price in the risk of a noncall more explicitly, setting a pricing premium for some sectors or issuers. The era of cheap hybrid financing is over, for now (see "Credit Implications Of Hybrid Noncall Decisions," published Nov. 24, 2022).
In Asia-Pacific, Bailouts Would Rule The Day In The Unlikely Event Of Systemic Financial Crisis
We see extraordinary government support as likely in a crisis for most Asia-Pacific banking systems in the unlikely event it was required. Their safety net is intact. In the unlikely event of a financial crisis, bailouts of key banks would be the likely course of action for most jurisdictions, including all the G20 governments in the region.
S&P Global Ratings' expectation of such government support leads to rating uplift for many banks in the region. Banks continue to build up buffers via hybrid instruments, and governments are also progressing with the implementation of resolution frameworks that broadly align with global standards. Nonetheless, at this juncture, we think bailouts would rule the day in the unlikely event of systemic financial crisis in the region. (see "Asia-Pacific Banking: Government Bailouts Are Still Likely In The Event Of Systemic Crisis," published Oct. 10, 2022).
European banks are making solid progress toward becoming financially and operationally resolvable. In 2022, the Bank of England and Single Resolution Board followed their Swiss and U.S. counterparts' lead in publishing assessments of banks' resolvability. The outcomes underline our view for this region that there is a real alternative to taxpayer-funded bailouts; and that government support for a failing bank is an uncertain prospect (see "The Resolution Story For Europe's Banks: The Final Push To Resolvability," published Sept. 30, 2022).
China Abandons Its Zero-COVID Policy
S&P Global Ratings believes the accelerated reopening of the economy and end of zero-COVID keeps GDP on a path for 4.8% growth in 2023, with private consumption likely to recover strongly. Mobility is already increasing after December's surge in infections, and we forecast 5.8% retail sales growth (ex-petroleum) for China in 2023. The re-opening of China's economy will increase price pressures domestically and globally. But China's consumer inflation is likely to rise much less than in the U.S. and Europe in 2022. (see "Economic Research: China's Earlier Policy Shift Advances Its Recovery", published Jan. 18, 2023).
China's Average National Property Sales Likely To Decline By 8% In 2023
China's banks are extending their exposure to the property sector amid a real estate slump. This is policy-driven and, in the event of a major correction, would leave banks holding rapidly declining collateral.
S&P Global Ratings anticipates that financial institutions will retain some selectivity as megabanks lead the effort with plans to disperse more than Chinese renminbi (RMB) 1.8 trillion (US$256 billion) in fresh loans. This selectivity could help rein in some of the risk for banks. For developers, it means survival of the fittest since the stronger ones will get favorable treatment.
Fresh credit infusions alone won't be enough to restore homebuying sentiment. By our forecasts, national home prices will decline by up to 8% in 2023. The declines will be larger in lower-tier cities, and in tier-two cities with large inventory overhang. More visibility on the end of "zero COVID" policies would be a bigger impetus in reviving home sales, in our view (see "China's Property Lifeline Won't Stretch To All," published Dec. 5, 2022)
For China Banking TLAC Is A Work-In-Progress
We estimate that Chinese major banks have an RMB3.7 trillion capital gap to fill before January 2025 to meet new total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements. While lower than our past estimates, the gap is still hefty, and filling it will require new TLAC-eligible issuance that might largely be purchased by other domestic financial institutions--adding to potential contagion.
We believe the Chinese government, like the Japanese regime, remains highly supportive of global systemically important banks and hence would likely provide pre-emptive support to them in the event of distress (see "China's Major Banks Still Have An RMB3.7 Trillion Shortfall On TLAC Requirement," published Jan. 18, 2023).
Japanese Banks--Higher Rates Are A Double-Edged Sword
The 2023 outlook for Japanese banks remains largely stable, given accumulated levels of capital, low NPL ratios, and our base-case forecast for the economy. Rising interest rates are positive for Japanese banks' net interest margins in an inflationary environment. However, unrealized losses on available-for-sale (AFS) bonds could rise at some banks. Interest income from loans will only improve if short-term interest rates rise, and there is some chance credit costs could increase. (See "Japan Banking Outlook 2023: The Impact Of Raising Interest Rates", published Jan. 17, 2023.)
NBFIs Will Face A Tougher Test Than Banks
We anticipate there will be greater credit divergence among global and Asia-Pacific financial institutions. Weaker economic and financing conditions in 2023 will likely hit nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) earlier and harder than banks. NBFIs typically have less-diversified business profiles compared with banks, tend to be more reliant on market funding, and often don't benefit from central bank access.
2023 is already shaping as a tough year for some NBFI segments, globally and regionally. Most recently, the Mexican NBFI Mexarrend S.A.P.I. de C.V. defaulted after it failed to pay about Mexican peso (MXN) 85 million of principal and interest on its short-term local market debt due Jan. 19, 2023 (see "Mexarrend Issuer Credit Rating Cut To 'D' From 'CC' On Failure To Make Debt Payment", published Jan. 21, 2023). This default follows on the heels of three other Mexican NBFI defaults over the previous 18 months.
Some other NBFI segments have also faced pressure but by no means to the same extent. In the second half of 2022 we downgraded some nonbank asset management companies in China, and some speculative-grade residential mortgage companies in the U.S.
Emerging Markets Banks Are Not Off The Hook
There could be increased credit differentiation between developed market and emerging market banks across Asia-Pacific in 2023. Downside risks such as dollar strength, uncertainty about energy markets, and potentially weak capital flows remain relevant in emerging markets (see "Emerging Markets Monthly Highlights: Some Good News, Uncertainty Lingers," published Jan. 19, 2023). These and other risks could have negative spillover effects on banks.
We do note that prices for metal commodities used in construction have sharply increased in the past month amid expectations of rising demand in China. Headline inflation across emerging markets has continued to decelerate as energy prices decrease. However, core inflation is still rising in emerging markets in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, although in a few cases it has begun to slow on a sequential basis. Emerging market financing conditions have also improved in the past month, reflecting a better-than-expected situation in energy markets and China's reopening.
Systemically Important Players Versus The Rest
There is also scope for greater variation between stronger, systemically important financial institutions (typically banks) versus non-systemically important financial institutions. Most notably in Asia-Pacific, our view applies across the Chinese and Indian banking sectors. In these jurisdictions there is significant divergence already between the small cohort of government-related and other strong systemically important banks, and the very large cohort of small, non-systemically important banks and other financial institutions.
The group of non-systemically financial institutions across Asia-Pacific is large and diverse. Those entities with more highly concentrated business and financial profiles may face a tighter squeeze in the higher inflation and lower growth environment of 2023.
Collapse of FTX.com Will Have Ripple Effects For Digital Assets
S&P Global Ratings believes that the collapse of cryptocurrency exchange FTX.com will ripple through the digital assets ecosystem and sharpen regulatory impetus. Contagion risks to traditional finance (TradFi) appear contained for now. The bear market in the crypto industry began in May 2022 with the sharp depreciation of many digital assets and the collapse of a few crypto players. This has already materially diminished the volatile emerging ecosystem, and tested TradFi entities' (limited) exposure to it.
We anticipate continued growth in applications and protocols that leverage the benefits, including transparency, of blockchain technology. But these developments are likely to have a durable effect on centralized actors in the ecosystem and the broader crypto industry (see "The FTX Crypto Exchange Crisis Will Sharpen Regulators' Focus," published Nov. 10, 2022).
Table 1
| Real GDP Forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change from Sept. 2022 forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
| (% year over year) | 2021a | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | ||||||||||
| Australia | 4.9 | 3.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 0.0 | (0.1) | (0.1) | ||||||||||
| China | 8.1 | 3.2 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 0.1 | (0.1) | ||||||||||
| Hong Kong | 6.3 | (2.6) | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.0 | (2.0) | 0.0 | 0.3 | ||||||||||
| India | 8.7 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 6.9 | (0.3) | (0.5) | 0.2 | ||||||||||
| Indonesia | 3.7 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | (0.1) | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Japan | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | (0.1) | (0.2) | (0.3) | ||||||||||
| Malaysia | 3.1 | 8.9 | 3.2 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 2.3 | (1.2) | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| New Zealand | 4.8 | 2.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 2.5 | (0.2) | (1.6) | (0.9) | ||||||||||
| Philippines | 5.7 | 7.1 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 0.8 | (0.5) | 0.2 | ||||||||||
| Singapore | 7.6 | 3.6 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 0.3 | (0.3) | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| South Korea | 4.1 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 0.1 | (0.4) | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Taiwan | 6.6 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Thailand | 1.5 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Vietnam | 2.5 | 8.3 | 6.3 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 1.7 | (0.2) | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| Asia Pacific | 6.7 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 0.3 | (0.2) | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Note: For India, 2021 = FY 2021 / 22, 2022 = FY 2022 / 23, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26. a--Actual. Source: S&P Global Economics. | ||||||||||||||||||
Related Research
Banking Sector Research
- Sector And Industry Variables For Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Published For December 2022, Dec. 21, 2022
- Taiwan's Export Growth To Slow In 2023; Credit Outlook Remains Stable, Says Report, Dec. 21, 2022
- Research Update: ANZ Banking Group And Subsidiaries Ratings Affirmed Following Approval Of Restructure; Outlook Stable, Dec. 20, 2022
- Hacked Off: Australia Strengthens Cyber Security, Dec. 19, 2022
- Bulletin: China Merchants Bank To Shake Off Property Downturn, Investigation Of Former President, Dec. 15, 2022
- Credit FAQ: How Unrealized Losses On Securities Affect U.S. Bank Ratings, Dec. 13, 2022
- Credit Trends: Global Banks: Our Credit Loss Forecasts : Manageable Rise In Credit Losses As Our Base Case, Dec. 13, 2022
- Forecasts For Global Banks' Credit Losses, Dec. 13, 2022
- Japan's Megabanks: Solid Foundations In A Jittery World, Dec. 09, 2022
- Equity Content Assessment Of Korean Bank And Insurance Hybrids Unchanged Following Recent Call Event, Dec. 07, 2022
- The Improving Resolvability Of Europe's Midsize Banks Offers Greater Protection To Senior Creditors, Dec. 07, 2022
- More Than Half Of Investors Polled Are Downbeat On The Global Banking Outlook, Dec. 06, 2022
- China's Property Lifeline Won't Stretch To All, Dec. 05, 2022
- Malaysian Banks Are Approaching 2023 With Caution, Dec. 05, 2022
- Credit Implications Of Hybrid Noncall Decisions, Nov. 24, 2022
- Research Update: Axis Bank Upgraded To 'BBB-/A-3' On Improving Asset Quality; Outlook Stable, Nov. 21, 2022
- Global Bank Country-By-Country 2023 Outlook: Greater Divergence Ahead, Nov. 17, 2022
- U.S. GSIB Industry Report Card For Third-Quarter 2022 Published, Nov. 17, 2022
- Derivatives Exchanges Are Riding The Wave Of Volatility, 2023 Could Pose A Stiffer Test, Nov. 17, 2022
- European Banks' Residential Mortgage Losses Should Remain Contained Even As Economies Slow, Nov. 15, 2022
- SLIDES: Downside Risks Will Endure For Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions In 2023, Nov. 15, 2022
- Strong Economic Recovery Supports Indonesian Banks; Economic Risk Trend Revised To Stable; BICRA Group Remains '6', Nov. 14, 2022
- The FTX Crypto Exchange Crisis Will Sharpen Regulators' Focus, Nov. 10, 2022
- Banking Risk Indicators: November 2022 Update, Nov. 10, 2022
- Top 50 European Banks: Higher Rates Support Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratios, Nov. 10, 2022
- European Banks: The Agile Will Come Out Stronger, Nov. 09, 2022
- Australian Regulator's Reminder On Hybrids Should Be No Surprise, Nov. 09, 2022
- Bulletin: National Australia Bank Can Maintain Robust Earnings, Nov. 09, 2022
- Bulletin: Rising Rates To Support Margins For Australia's Westpac, Nov. 07, 2022
- Korea's Large Securities Firms Are Better Equipped To Handle Liquidity Stress, Nov. 03, 2022
- Credit FAQ: A Slower China: Where Are The Pockets Of Risk?, Nov. 03, 2022
- China's Affordable Housing Leasing Plan Could Cost Up To RMB2 Trillion, Oct. 31, 2022
- Bulletin: Macquarie Group's Diversity Supports Earnings, Oct. 28, 2022
- Bulletin: ANZ Can Sustain Rebound In Home Lending Growth, Oct. 27, 2022
- Potential Rating Implications Of The Proposed Rules To Resolve Large U.S. Regional Banks, Oct. 24, 2022
- Business Development Companies' Asset Coverage Ratios Could Feel The Strain Of A Weakening Economy, Oct. 20, 2022
- Research Update: Malaysia's Public Bank Bhd. 'A-/A-2' Ratings Affirmed On Strong Capitalization And Asset Quality; Outlook Stable, Oct. 17, 2022
- Bulletin: Kookmin Bank's Indonesian Subsidiary Drags Asset Quality, Oct. 12, 2022
- Top 100 Banks: A Modest Capital Erosion Is On The Cards, Oct. 10, 2022
- Asia-Pacific Banking: Government Bailouts Are Still Likely In The Event Of Systemic Crisis, Oct. 10, 2022
- Australia's Banks Are Slowly Tuning In To The Risks Of Cyber Attacks, Oct. 05, 2022
- Thai Banks Are At A Recovery Crossroads, Oct. 04, 2022
- ESG Research Published: Bank Regulation And Disclosure To Foster Climate-Related Risk Analysis, Oct. 03, 2022
Economic And Credit Conditions Research
- Economic Research: China's Policy Emphasis (2022) and Deglobalization (2023), Dec. 15, 2022
- Economic Research: Crypto Collapses (2022), Rising Resiliency (2023), Dec. 15, 2022
- Global Credit Conditions Downside Scenario: Inflation, Geopolitics Are Twin Threats To Our Base Case, Dec. 08, 2022
- Credit Conditions Asia-Pacific Q1 2023: Still Above Water, Dec. 01, 2022
- Global Credit Outlook 2023: No Easy Way Out, Dec. 01, 2022
- Economic Research: Global Macro Update: Surprising Resilience Unlikely To Last Into 2023, Nov. 30, 2022
- Economic Research: Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q1 2023: Global Slowdown Will Hit, Not Halt, Growth, Nov. 28, 2022
- Hard To Avoid Write-Downs Or Defaults Given Historic High Global Debt Burden, Report Says, Nov. 21, 2022
- Economic Research: Excess Savings Is A Double-Edged Sword, Nov. 24, 2022
- Asia-Pacific Sector Roundup Q1 2023: Cracks In The Wall, Nov. 14, 2022
- Credit FAQ: A Slower China: What Are The Macro Implications?, Nov. 03, 2022
- The Complications Of A Stronger Dollar, Oct. 12, 2022
Ratings Methodology News
- None
Other Research
Please see Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research, published Jan. 18, 2023, which is a curated compilation of the key takeaways from our most up-to-date thought leadership.
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- To Call Or Not To Call: Credit Implications Of Hybrid Noncall Decisions, Dec. 13, 2022
- What's In Store For Vietnam Credit In 2023 After A Rapid Post-COVID Recovery?, Dec. 08, 2022
- Global Banking Outlook 2023 – Greater Divergence Ahead, Nov. 22, 2022
- Asia-Pacific Credit Outlook 2023: Cracks In The Wall, Nov. 15, 2022
- Thai Banks At A Recovery Crossroads, Oct. 19, 2022
- A Slower China: Cross-Sector Credit Updates, Oct. 11, 2022
BICRA Changes
Over the past quarter (through December 20, 2022), following changes have been made to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) in the Asia-Pacific region.
Indonesia
We have revised our economic risk trend for Indonesia to stable from negative. This reflects our belief that the country's economic recovery is underway. We forecast GDP to grow 5.4% in 2022 and 5.0% in 2023, compared with 3.7% in 2021. Indonesian banks are enjoying a revival of loan growth and profitability. Elevated credit costs seen during the COVID-19 pandemic are also receding. We expect banking sector loans in Indonesia to increase by 8%-10% in 2022 and 2023, staging a turnaround from the COVID-19-induced contraction in 2020. Banks' cost of credit has been steadily declining from a peak in 2020 and could approach pre-pandemic levels in the next 18-24 months.
Thailand
We have revised our economic risk trend for Thailand to stable from negative. The opening of borders means tourism is improving faster than expected. We anticipate this trend will continue. Moreover, in our view, Thailand will benefit from recovery in domestic demand, which has accumulated since the COVID-19 pandemic and has further to go. Lastly, banks have built buffers as well. As of June 30, 2022, the sector's provision coverage was about 165%, with a capital adequacy ratio of 19.6%. Banks' improving earnings also aided these buffers.
We have published the following comprehensive BICRA reports in the past quarter in Asia-Pacific.
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Mongolia, Dec. 08, 2022
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Indonesia, Dec. 01, 2022
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Korea, Nov. 10, 2022
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Bangladesh, Nov. 10, 2022
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Thailand, Oct. 18, 2022
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Malaysia, Oct. 10, 2022
Table 2
| Issuer Credit Ratings And Component Scores For The Top 60 Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institution | Opco L-T ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | Comparable Rating Analysis | SACP or Group SACP | Type of support | No. of notches of support | Additional factor adjustment | |||||||||||||
| Australia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Commonwealth Bank of Australia | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Macquarie Bank Ltd. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| National Australia Bank Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Westpac Banking Corp. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. | A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Bank of China Ltd. | A/Stable | bbb- | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Bank of Communications Co. Ltd. | A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China CITIC Bank Co. Ltd. | BBB+/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Group | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China Construction Bank Corp. | A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. | BBB+/Developing | bb+ | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. | A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd. | A/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd. | BBB/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Hong Kong | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | -1 | |||||||||||||
| Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| The Bank of East Asia Ltd. | A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| India | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Axis Bank Ltd. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Bank of India | BB+/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Constrained | Strong/Strong | 0 | bb | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| HDFC Bank Ltd. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | -2 | |||||||||||||
| ICICI Bank Ltd. § | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| State Bank of India | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Constrained | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Indonesia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Japan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Chiba Bank Ltd. | A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Mizuho Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Nomura Holdings Inc.* | A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Norinchukin Bank | A/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Resona Holdings* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Shinkin Central Bank | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Shizuoka Bank Ltd. | A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Industrial Bank of Korea | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| KEB Hana Bank | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Kookmin Bank | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Korea Development Bank§ | AA/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Moderate | Constrained | Moderate/ Adequate | 0 | bb- | GRE | 10 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Nonghyup Bank | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Adequate | 0 | a- | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Shinhan Bank | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Woori Bank | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Malaysia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Public Bank Bhd. | A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Strong | Strong/Strong | -1 | a | None | 0 | -1 | |||||||||||||
| Malayan Banking Bhd. | A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| CIMB Bank Bhd. | A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| New Zealand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| ASB Bank Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Bank of New Zealand | AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Westpac New Zealand Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Singapore | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| DBS Bank Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| United Overseas Bank Ltd. | AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Taiwan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| CTBC Bank Co. Ltd. | A/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. | A+/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Thailand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. | BBB+/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | bbb- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| KASIKORNBANK PCL | BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. | BBB-/Stable | bb | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. | BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Data as of Dec. 31, 2022. "Type of Support" column -"None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. §This ICR applies to the Foreign Currency Rating only. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3
| Recent Rating Actions: Asia-Pacific Banks | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Release date | Org legal name | Org country | From | To | ||||||||||
| Nov. 21, 2022 | Axis Bank Ltd. | India | BB+/Positive/B | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | Upgrade | |||||||||
| Oct. 19, 2022 | Guangzhou Finance Holdings Group Co. Ltd. | China | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB+/Negative/A-2 | Outlook | Negative | ||||||||
| *Recent rating actions are for the period Oct. 1, 2022 to Dec. 31, 2022. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list. | ||||||||||||||
Editor: Lex Hall
Digital designer: Halie Mustow
This report does not constitute a rating action.
S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2092; gavin.gunning@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Vera Chaplin, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2058; vera.chaplin@spglobal.com |
| Ryoji Yoshizawa, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8453; ryoji.yoshizawa@spglobal.com | |
| Sharad Jain, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2077; sharad.jain@spglobal.com | |
| Geeta Chugh, Mumbai + 912233421910; geeta.chugh@spglobal.com | |
| Ivan Tan, Singapore + 65 6239 6335; ivan.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887; nico.delange@spglobal.com | |
| Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3508; daehyun.kim@spglobal.com | |
| HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3597; hongtaik.chung@spglobal.com | |
| Eunice Fan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6818; eunice.fan@spglobal.com | |
| Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8578; chizuru.tateno@spglobal.com | |
| Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3532; ryan.tsang@spglobal.com | |
| Ming Tan, CFA, Singapore + 65 6216 1095; ming.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081; lisa.barrett@spglobal.com | |
| Research Assistant: | Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.