(Editor's Note: Ratings in this report are as of Dec. 31, 2022.)
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Key Takeaways
- 2022 saw the most sovereign defaults (four) in emerging markets (EM) EMEA this century.
- Including Russia, our GDP-weighted average EM EMEA foreign currency sovereign rating would have declined by nearly two notches during 2022, after Russia defaulted by using local currency to service its commercial foreign currency obligations on April 4, 2022.
- At the beginning of 2023, the balance of outlooks on the 55 EM EMEA sovereigns we rate remains negative by a factor of 2 to 1, barely changed from end-2021.
- The external environment however is notably improving as easing global inflation, a weaker dollar, and China's reopening are all supporting a (selective) return of portfolio capital inflows into EM EMEA assets.
- Despite this relief, EM EMEA's macroeconomic fundamentals remain strained. There is more sovereign debt today than two years ago, and it costs more to service. The deceleration in inflation is uneven. Finally, a series of high-stake EMEA elections is scheduled for this year with major implications for debt sustainability and growth.
2022 saw the largest number of sovereign defaults in emerging EMEA this century. Of the five foreign currency sovereign defaults globally, four were in EMEA: Ghana, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. S&P Global Ratings no longer rates the Russian Federation and our outlook and average ratings data excludes it from the calculations in this commentary. The consequences of its invasion of Ukraine included the impairment of its liquid foreign currency reserves, and its loss of access to global financial markets--including dollar settlement and payment infrastructure--leading to a rapid deterioration in its creditworthiness. As a result, on April 4, 2022, Russia defaulted after it used local currency to meet its commercial foreign currency obligations (contrary to the original promise of the security).
Including Russia, our GDP-weighted average EM EMEA foreign currency sovereign rating would have declined by nearly two notches during 2022. Excluding Russia, our GDP-weighted and unweighted EM EMEA average ratings declined by less than half a notch, despite a series of defaults.
The question is whether the outlook for EM EMEA sovereign credit has turned the page from a dismal 2022. The argument for cautious optimism is that the external environment appears to be brightening, albeit from pitch black to a hazy grey. Certainly China's reopening from its COVID-19 lockdowns is positive news for global growth prospects, and EMEA exporters. At present, three EM EMEA commodity exporters are on positive outlook (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, South Africa). Just as importantly, easing global inflation pressures and a weaker dollar could put a lid on runaway inflation in emerging markets. In addition, the early January 2023 decline in European gas futures back to pre-war levels has relieved concerns about balance-of-payments pressures across EMEA energy and food importers.
Finally, the IMF has either approved or is in the process of approving lending programs to some of the frontier markets hit hardest by a series of fiscal and external shocks last year: in particular Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Ukraine, Ghana--and 15 other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These supportive developments have driven a selective return of portfolio capital inflows into EM EMEA assets: Hungary, Romania, Turkiye, and Saudi Arabia have all issued foreign currency commercial debt in early 2023, albeit at notably higher rates than previously. But they have yet to turn the page on our sovereign ratings outlooks: at the beginning of 2023, the balance of outlooks on the 55 EM EMEA sovereigns we rate remains negative by a factor of 2 to 1, barely changed from end-2021.
The negative balance to our outlooks on emerging EMEA sovereign ratings reflects the damage done to public finances and external balance sheets from the pandemic, and the conflict in Ukraine. S&P Global Ratings' fiscal and external scores are at their lowest possible for 30% of rated EM EMEA sovereigns, with the majority of these in SSA. When assessed on a stock rather than flow basis, EM EMEA macroeconomic fundamentals remain strained. While median government debt to GDP increased by 7 percentage points (ppts) between end-2019 and end-2022 globally, the rise in debt to GDP was more than twice that level in Bahrain, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Zambia. Interest-to-revenues ratios are close to or above 30% for Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria.
Chart 1
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The war in Ukraine, which shows no sign of ending, could moreover potentially set off a second round of commodity and food inflation during the second or third quarters of 2023. While recent global trends in commodity inflation are encouraging, levels of inflation across emerging EMEA remain elevated. In 2022, 27 of 55 rated EM EMEA sovereigns saw domestic average inflation shift to double digits, compared to just four in 2019. That much price volatility triggered a series of currency devaluations via deposit dollarization and balance-of-payments pressures, which proved the most intense in frontier markets with a high dependency on imported food and fuel. These pressures, while abating in some parts of EM EMEA this year, may persist in lower income frontier markets where food and energy make up over 50% of household spending.
Finally, a lot of rebalancing still has to happen to get fiscal and external positions back to pre-war levels--and meanwhile the war continues. The widening in emerging EMEA economies' twin deficits was a considerable blow to energy-intense countries in Eastern Europe. Since 2019, combined external and fiscal deficits in both Hungary and Bulgaria have deteriorated by 10 ppts of GDP, in Poland by 8.6 ppts of GDP, and in Turkey by 7 ppts. We are also watching the recent trend, particularly in lower rated EM EMEA sovereigns, toward a shorter average maturity of domestic borrowing as the sizable increase in debt issuance since the onset of the pandemic has reduced domestic absorption in many frontier markets, most notably in Egypt and Ghana (please watch out for our upcoming global and EMEA borrowing reports).
Finally, institutional and governance factors continue to weigh on the predictability of policy making in a large number of EMEA countries, and not just those directly involved in the war. EMEA is facing a crowded 2023 electoral calendar with electoral outcomes potentially having major implications for policy settings, central bank independence, transparency of economic and public accounts, growth, balance of payments, and broader social stability.
Here are the elections to watch, and why:
Nigeria (Feb. 25)
The negative surprise for Nigeria over the last two years has been the failure of the external position to benefit as much as expected from very favorable terms of trade. As of third-quarter 2022, Nigeria, the country with the eleventh-largest stock of proven oil reserves globally, still operated a 12-month current account deficit as hydrocarbon production stagnated and exports declined. Expectations are high that the next government will take steps to ease external pressures and stimulate economic growth (including employment) by unifying the exchange rate regime, taking steps to lower pressures on FX reserves, and improving management of the critical hydrocarbon sector, leading to a recovery of export earnings. Whether the next government is able to deliver these changes remains to be seen.
Domestic political and policy uncertainty will remain elevated in the run-up to the Feb. 25 general elections, putting even modest reform efforts on hold. President Muhammadu Buhari is completing his second and final (due to constitutional limitations) presidential term. Bola Tinubu, a longstanding heavyweight in the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) party, and former governor of Lagos state, has been selected as the presidential candidate of APC and will face Atiku Abubakar of the main opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP); he was the PDP's candidate at the last elections. The choice of candidates has deviated from Nigeria's longstanding tradition of trying to rotate the presidency between a Muslim northerner and Christian southerner, with both presidential candidates now being Muslims.
Turkiye (May 14)
The May presidential and parliamentary elections will determine Turkiye's policy response to some of the less sustainable features of its current policy mix: high consumption, elevated price and wage inflation, lackluster investment spending, and an expansionist pre-election fiscal stance. Judging from the net debt-to-GDP ratio of around 32%, the Turkish sovereign still retains some fiscal flexibility. However, off-balance-sheet liabilities are growing. We estimate the FX deposit scheme (extended to end-2023) will have cost the treasury around 1.5% of GDP in 2022, while the overall public deficit last year (including losses at energy utility Botas) exceeded 6% of GDP. More critically, Turkiye's large and external indebted banking system appears to be even more vulnerable to a currency/interest rate shock than it was this time last year. Nor is currency stability guaranteed in the run-up to the elections as Turkish households explore higher yielding alternatives to the FX protected deposit scheme, and the current account deficit remains sizable. That said, deposit and errors and omissions inflows continue, partly reflecting the preservation of official relations between Turkiye and the Russian Federation. The muddle-through scenario between now and May 14 remains our base case, but it is likely to include periods of political and international tension, intensifying pressure on the Turkish lira and producing persistently high inflation. After May, some sort of policy reset appears to us to be unavoidable, even without a change in leadership. But the policy re-set is as likely to imply an intensification of financial repression, policy intervention, and exchange rate volatility as it is to signal a return to more orthodox monetary and economic policy.
Poland (Autumn 2023)
The Russia-Ukraine war has transmitted multiple shocks to the Polish economy, including a rapid widening of its fiscal and external deficits, amid an inflow of over 8 million refugees from Ukraine and upward pressure on inflation. S&P Global Ratings projects that the economy will avoid shifting into recession this year, but GDP growth will decelerate to just under 1%. Nevertheless, the recent decline in gas futures prices could somewhat relieve pressures on the Polish industrial sector (though the recent hike in VAT on petrol means that household consumption is expected to remain under pressure).
Given these intense external pressures, the disbursement of EU funds including €35 billion in recovery funds is critical for Poland's economic performance between 2023 and 2027. The standoff with the EU over the rule of law has been straining Polish-EU relations since 2015. Although the European Commission finally signed Poland's post-COVID-19 recovery plan in early June, more hurdles must be overcome before the country can access the funds, which remain stalled. Polish parliamentary elections scheduled for the fall could see a shift toward a pro-EU coalition more inclined to address EU concerns about judicial reforms and unblock EU funds, which could exceed 4% of GDP per year between now and 2027. Regardless of the election outcome, we would expect a move toward a tighter fiscal position after the elections and an only gradual recovery in growth, though the underlying fundamentals of the Polish economy (modest public debt and flexible labor and product markets) remain a credit strength.
Congo-Kinshasa (Dec. 20)
General elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo are set for Dec. 20, with the focus on whether or not there will be a smooth transition between presidential administrations. There is a risk that political tensions will increase during the second half of the year given that parties within the current coalition are likely to back competing candidates. Whether the former president, Joseph Kabila, will attempt to run again remains an open question. The relaxation of COVID-19-related restrictions in China ought to benefit DRC's mining sector, given that China is by far its largest trading partner.
Table 1
| EMEA Emerging Markets Sovereign Rating Strengths And Weaknesses | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Issuer | Sovereign foreign currency ratings | Institutional assessment | Economic assessment | External assessment | Fiscal assessment, budget performance | Fiscal assessment, debt | Monetary assessment | |||||||||
|
Abu Dhabi |
AA/Stable/A-1+ | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Albania |
B+/Stable/B | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Angola |
B-/Stable/B | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Armenia |
B+/Stable/B | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Azerbaijan |
BB+/Stable/B | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Bahrain |
B+/Positive/B | 4§ | 4 | 5* | 6 | 6 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Belarus |
SD/NM/SD | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4§ | 6 | |||||||||
|
Benin |
B+/Stable/B | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
B/Stable/B | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 6 | |||||||||
|
Botswana |
BBB+/Stable/A-2 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2§ | 1 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Bulgaria |
BBB/Stable/A-2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Burkina Faso |
CCC+/Stable/C | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6* | 4* | 5 | |||||||||
|
Cameroon |
B-/Stable/B | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Cape Verde |
B-/Stable/B | 4 | 5 | 6 | 5§ | 6 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Congo-Brazzaville |
CCC+/Stable/C | 6 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Congo, D.R. |
B-/Stable/B | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 6 | |||||||||
|
Cote d'Ivoire |
BB-/Stable/B | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Croatia |
BBB+/Stable/A-2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3§ | 3§ | |||||||||
|
Egypt |
B/Stable/B | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Ethiopia |
CCC/Negative/C | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5* | 6* | |||||||||
|
Georgia |
BB/Stable/B | 4 | 4§ | 4§ | 4 | 3 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Ghana |
SD/NM/SD | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5* | |||||||||
|
Hungary |
BBB/Negative/A-2 | 4 | 3 | 3* | 4 | 4 | 3 | |||||||||
|
Iraq |
B-/Stable/B | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4§ | 4§ | 5 | |||||||||
|
Israel |
AA-/Stable/A-1+ | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2§ | 3§ | 2 | |||||||||
|
Jordan |
B+/Stable/B | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Kazakhstan |
BBB-/Negative/A-3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Kenya |
B/Stable/B | 4 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Kuwait |
A+/Stable/A-1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Lebanon |
SD/NM/SD | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | |||||||||
|
Madagascar |
B-/Stable/B | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Montenegro |
B/Stable/B | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 6 | |||||||||
|
Morocco |
BB+/Stable/B | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | |||||||||
|
Mozambique |
CCC+/Stable/C | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Nigeria |
B-/Stable/B | 5 | 6 | 5§ | 6 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
North Macedonia |
BB-/Stable/B | 5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Oman |
BB/Stable/B | 4 | 5 | 4§ | 1§ | 3§ | 4 | |||||||||
|
Poland |
A-/Stable/A-2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | |||||||||
|
Qatar |
AA/Stable/A-1+ | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1§ | 4 | |||||||||
|
Ras Al Khaimah |
A-/Stable/A-2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Romania |
BBB-/Stable/A-3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | |||||||||
|
Rwanda |
B+/Negative/B | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Saudi Arabia |
A-/Positive/A-2 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2§ | 1 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Senegal |
B+/Stable/B | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Serbia |
BB+/Stable/B | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Sharjah |
BBB-/Negative/A-3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
St Helena |
BBB-/Stable/A-3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | |||||||||
|
South Africa |
BB-/Positive/B | 4 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 2 | |||||||||
|
Tajikistan |
B-/Stable/B | 5 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5* | 5 | |||||||||
|
Togo |
B/Stable/B | 5 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Turkiye |
B/Stable/B | 5 | 4 | 6 | 5* | 5 | 5 | |||||||||
|
Uganda |
B/Negative/B | 5 | 6 | 6* | 6 | 6 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Ukraine |
CCC+/Stable/C | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6* | |||||||||
|
Uzbekistan |
BB-/Stable/B | 5 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 4 | |||||||||
|
Zambia |
SD/NM/SD | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | |||||||||
| 1 (%) | 0.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 10.9 | 20.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| 2 (%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 18.2 | 10.9 | 7.3 | 5.5 | ||||||||||
| 3 (%) | 3.6 | 7.3 | 14.5 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 7.3 | ||||||||||
| 4 (%) | 47.3 | 29.1 | 10.9 | 21.8 | 16.4 | 34.5 | ||||||||||
| 5 (%) | 30.9 | 29.1 | 20.0 | 9.1 | 16.4 | 40.0 | ||||||||||
| 6 (%) | 18.2 | 29.1 | 30.9 | 32.7 | 27.3 | 12.7 | ||||||||||
| Median | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 5.0 | ||||||||||
| Mean | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.6 | ||||||||||
| Standard Deviation | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.9 | ||||||||||
| *Deterioration since June 2022. §Improvement since June 2022. | ||||||||||||||||
Table 2
| EMEA EM Economic Outlook | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth (%) | GG balance / GDP (%) | Net GG debt / GDP (%) | Current account balance / GDP (%) | Narrow net ext. debt / CAR (%) | ||||||
| 2022 A | 2023 A | 2022 A | 2023 A | 2022 A | 2023 A | 2022 A | 2023 A | 2022 A | 2023 A | |
|
Abu Dhabi |
8.0 | 0.5 | 10.4 | 6.7 | (305.7) | (347.2) | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|
Albania |
3.3 | 2.2 | (3.7) | (3.2) | 65.7 | 66.7 | (8.3) | (8.2) | (3.2) | 0.6 |
|
Angola |
3.3 | 2.3 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 53.9 | 54.8 | 9.4 | 5.4 | 83.9 | 97.8 |
|
Armenia |
11.2 | 6.3 | (2.3) | (3.3) | 40.0 | 44.4 | (3.8) | (2.8) | 96.4 | 100.3 |
|
Azerbaijan |
4.0 | 0.0 | 7.7 | 5.0 | (32.4) | (38.8) | 22.4 | 15.4 | (62.5) | (83.1) |
|
Bahrain |
4.8 | 2.8 | 0.2 | (1.0) | 109.2 | 107.2 | 10.9 | 7.4 | (47.2) | (47.3) |
|
Belarus |
(4.5) | (2.0) | (2.0) | (2.5) | 27.6 | 30.9 | 0.3 | (0.5) | 56.8 | 59.9 |
|
Benin |
6.5 | 5.9 | (5.5) | (4.0) | 41.0 | 41.8 | (4.7) | (4.5) | 99.8 | 94.6 |
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
3.5 | 1.5 | (1.0) | (1.0) | 23.4 | 23.1 | (3.6) | (2.9) | (1.2) | (0.3) |
|
Botswana |
3.5 | 4.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | (9.9) | (9.2) | 1.7 | 1.6 | (36.0) | (37.6) |
|
Bulgaria |
3.0 | 0.8 | (4.9) | (3.1) | 16.1 | 18.3 | (1.3) | (3.0) | (26.7) | (23.5) |
|
Burkina Faso |
3.3 | 4.5 | (8.5) | (6.5) | 49.6 | 52.0 | (3.6) | (2.1) | 118.5 | 113.9 |
|
Cameroon |
3.7 | 4.0 | (2.5) | (2.2) | 39.6 | 37.3 | (3.5) | (3.9) | 85.8 | 100.1 |
|
Cape Verde |
4.0 | 4.5 | (6.0) | (5.0) | 109.9 | 107.7 | (12.0) | (9.7) | 178.7 | 157.0 |
|
Congo-Brazzaville |
4.0 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 88.2 | 87.5 | 32.7 | 24.0 | 86.5 | 100.9 |
|
Congo, D.R. |
5.5 | 6.5 | (3.5) | (2.5) | 14.6 | 15.7 | (0.7) | (0.5) | 3.5 | 4.2 |
|
Cote d'Ivoire |
6.8 | 6.3 | (5.8) | (4.5) | 47.9 | 48.4 | (4.8) | (4.4) | 90.6 | 92.3 |
|
Croatia |
5.5 | 1.5 | (2.8) | (2.5) | 63.7 | 62.3 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
|
Egypt |
6.6 | 4.0 | (6.5) | (7.0) | 75.4 | 74.2 | (3.7) | (3.7) | 119.2 | 141.1 |
|
Ethiopia |
5.0 | 6.0 | (4.0) | (4.0) | 30.4 | 30.7 | (5.4) | (4.6) | 180.7 | 192.1 |
|
Georgia |
9.0 | 2.5 | (2.8) | (2.5) | 38.6 | 41.1 | (8.0) | (6.8) | 82.7 | 83.7 |
|
Ghana |
3.2 | 3.0 | (9.4) | (3.0) | 76.2 | 59.6 | (4.1) | (3.8) | 219.6 | 295.0 |
|
Hungary |
4.6 | 0.2 | (4.9) | (4.0) | 67.6 | 63.3 | (7.8) | (6.5) | 30.6 | 29.4 |
|
Iraq |
6.0 | 2.8 | 8.6 | (3.1) | 28.3 | 31.6 | 19.1 | 10.3 | (32.3) | (39.7) |
|
Israel |
6.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | (2.0) | 59.8 | 58.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | (49.6) | (46.1) |
|
Jordan |
2.6 | 2.5 | (1.8) | (1.5) | 80.4 | 80.4 | (6.5) | (5.8) | 54.8 | 59.6 |
|
Kazakhstan |
3.0 | 4.1 | (3.6) | (0.4) | 0.3 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 0.5 | (25.3) | (31.0) |
|
Kenya |
5.2 | 5.4 | (6.3) | (5.8) | 63.2 | 63.9 | (5.9) | (5.7) | 267.5 | 275.8 |
|
Kuwait |
7.8 | 1.4 | 11.4 | 5.4 | (360.4) | (420.6) | 34.3 | 29.5 | (446.8) | (511.8) |
|
Lebanon |
(3.0) | 1.5 | 0.2 | (3.0) | 568.8 | 470.0 | (20.0) | (16.8) | 127.8 | 122.8 |
|
Madagascar |
4.2 | 4.5 | (6.5) | (6.2) | 36.8 | 39.3 | (7.0) | (6.4) | 62.1 | 63.0 |
|
Montenegro |
6.0 | 2.3 | (7.0) | (4.5) | 64.7 | 65.0 | (12.5) | (14.2) | 153.1 | 149.3 |
|
Morocco |
1.4 | 3.5 | (5.6) | (5.3) | 62.5 | 64.2 | (4.9) | (4.8) | 28.2 | 32.1 |
|
Mozambique |
3.8 | 4.8 | (5.2) | (4.9) | 79.5 | 79.4 | (41.4) | (21.1) | 243.3 | 219.2 |
|
Nigeria |
3.1 | 2.9 | (6.2) | (5.6) | 36.7 | 39.5 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 42.7 | 51.0 |
|
North Macedonia |
1.5 | 2.2 | (5.1) | (4.0) | 52.6 | 53.4 | (8.5) | (5.8) | 34.3 | 32.9 |
|
Oman |
3.9 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 3.4 | 0.7 | (2.7) | 5.2 | 1.9 | 36.5 | 34.7 |
|
Poland |
5.5 | 0.9 | (4.5) | (5.8) | 45.3 | 47.6 | (5.1) | (2.6) | 20.4 | 20.9 |
|
Qatar |
4.8 | 2.3 | 12.2 | 8.2 | (93.8) | (107.5) | 26.9 | 20.6 | (35.1) | (64.3) |
|
Ras Al Khaimah |
2.8 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 0.8 | (12.6) | (12.9) | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|
Romania |
5.7 | 2.8 | (5.9) | (4.7) | 43.6 | 43.8 | (8.8) | (6.6) | 37.2 | 38.3 |
|
Rwanda |
6.0 | 6.5 | (8.0) | (6.6) | 67.0 | 69.8 | (12.1) | (11.5) | 175.4 | 185.8 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
8.1 | 3.4 | 5.7 | 4.3 | (54.8) | (58.1) | 13.6 | 7.0 | (92.3) | (102.6) |
|
Senegal |
5.0 | 8.5 | (6.1) | (5.0) | 65.6 | 63.7 | (15.0) | (8.7) | 158.1 | 139.3 |
|
Serbia |
2.5 | 2.1 | (3.9) | (3.3) | 46.7 | 45.6 | (9.1) | (8.1) | 31.8 | 36.8 |
|
Sharjah |
4.0 | 2.5 | (8.0) | (7.6) | 42.3 | 48.4 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|
St Helena |
1.5 | 2.3 | (2.9) | 0.0 | (6.1) | (5.7) | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
|
South Africa |
1.9 | 1.5 | (5.0) | (5.1) | 67.2 | 71.8 | (0.1) | (0.8) | 22.6 | 25.8 |
|
Tajikistan |
3.2 | 4.0 | (2.3) | (2.4) | 33.6 | 35.1 | (3.9) | (2.4) | 37.2 | 45.0 |
|
Togo |
5.0 | 5.0 | (4.0) | (3.0) | 45.6 | 45.5 | (3.4) | (3.5) | 112.1 | 114.3 |
|
Turkiye |
6.1 | 2.4 | (4.0) | (3.8) | 32.0 | 35.4 | (4.7) | (3.1) | 72.6 | 89.6 |
|
Uganda |
4.7 | 4.0 | (7.4) | (6.0) | 44.6 | 47.8 | (8.3) | (10.0) | 158.9 | 171.8 |
|
Ukraine |
(37.0) | 3.0 | (26.0) | (15.0) | 97.9 | 105.8 | 5.8 | (3.4) | 102.9 | 103.0 |
|
Uzbekistan |
5.8 | 5.0 | (4.5) | (3.5) | 17.6 | 20.0 | (2.4) | (5.6) | 24.6 | 33.5 |
|
Zambia |
2.9 | 3.2 | (7.5) | (7.5) | 112.9 | 112.7 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 112.3 | 113.3 |
Abu Dhabi (AA/Stable/A-1+)
- Analyst: trevor.cullinan@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Abu Dhabi (Emirate of), Nov 28, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 1
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Abu Dhabi's fiscal and external positions will remain strong over the next two years, amid continued prudent policy making and our hydrocarbon sector assumptions.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Abu Dhabi's strong government balance sheet and net external asset position deteriorate materially. Downward pressure on the ratings could also arise if domestic or regional events compromise political and economic stability in the emirate.
Upside scenario
We could raise our ratings on Abu Dhabi if we observe further progress on institutional reforms, including pronounced improvements in data transparency on fiscal assets and external data. Furthermore, measures to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in the emirate, such as developing domestic capital markets, could be positive for the ratings.
(Latest research update published on March 26, 2020)
Table 3
| Abu Dhabi | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 71.20 | 75.17 | 84.86 | 78.96 | 60.16 | 72.67 | 89.08 | 82.35 | 78.26 | 67.09 |
| GDP growth | 2.56 | (0.94) | 1.68 | (1.51) | (7.74) | 1.92 | 7.96 | 0.53 | 3.36 | 3.61 |
| GDP per capita growth | (1.80) | (2.26) | 0.16 | (2.91) | (8.86) | (0.57) | 5.85 | (1.45) | 1.34 | 1.58 |
| Current account balance/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| GG balance/GDP | (12.44) | (6.32) | (0.12) | 0.31 | (5.33) | 4.44 | 10.43 | 6.66 | 6.43 | 1.40 |
| GG net debt/GDP | (280.40) | (274.55) | (259.85) | (294.08) | (391.63) | (347.90) | (305.73) | (347.18) | (383.12) | (462.80) |
| CPI inflation | 2.02 | 1.59 | 3.30 | (0.84) | (2.41) | 1.48 | 5.50 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Albania (B+/Stable/B)
- Analyst: amr.abdullah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Albania 'B+/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Dec. 9, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our view that Albania can continue to manage risks from the Russia-Ukraine conflict thanks to its strong external buffers, despite the economic slowdown in Europe--Albania's largest trading partner. Additionally, the country's modest growth prospects and the government's fiscal consolidation efforts should facilitate a reduction in debt over our 2022-2025 forecast horizon.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next year if the public debt stock increases significantly beyond our expectations due to high fiscal deficits or the materialization of contingent liabilities from public-private partnerships (PPPs).
Upside scenario
We could consider raising the ratings over the next year if external funding risks decrease materially or if a pronounced reduction in fiscal deficits yields a fall in public debts levels. We could also raise the ratings if the institutional framework is strengthened, possibly through structural reforms implemented as a part of the country's EU accession objective.
Table 4
| Albania | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 4.12 | 4.54 | 5.29 | 5.41 | 5.35 | 6.53 | 6.54 | 6.51 | 7.18 | 7.71 |
| GDP growth | 3.31 | 3.80 | 4.02 | 2.09 | (3.48) | 8.52 | 3.30 | 2.20 | 3.30 | 3.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.28 | 4.03 | 4.31 | 2.68 | (2.93) | 9.92 | 3.51 | 2.40 | 3.51 | 3.71 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (7.57) | (7.51) | (6.75) | (7.91) | (8.70) | (7.56) | (8.34) | (8.18) | (7.58) | (6.98) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 117.11 | 117.17 | 116.27 | 115.18 | 119.51 | 111.33 | 106.55 | 105.14 | 105.73 | 105.31 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 11.92 | 12.15 | 7.36 | 3.26 | 2.61 | (5.88) | (3.21) | 0.59 | 2.44 | 2.98 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.83) | (2.00) | (1.63) | (1.86) | (6.71) | (4.52) | (3.70) | (3.20) | (3.10) | (2.90) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 70.22 | 67.13 | 62.77 | 62.30 | 71.46 | 66.13 | 65.65 | 66.70 | 65.87 | 65.00 |
| CPI inflation | 1.20 | 2.07 | 2.03 | 1.41 | 1.62 | 2.04 | 6.40 | 3.70 | 2.60 | 2.60 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 36.41 | 34.81 | 31.78 | 32.78 | 36.08 | 34.39 | 33.38 | 33.17 | 33.09 | 33.07 |
Angola (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: leon.bezuidenhout@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Angola 'B-/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Stable, Aug. 5, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances the country's still-large external funding needs and financing risks over the next 12 months, amid rising global headwinds, against broadly stabilizing government debt levels over 2022-2025.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if the government's access to external funding weakens, which could limit its ability to service external commercial debt; or if a deterioration in the external environment, such as lower oil prices or volumes or increasing social pressures, heightens external and fiscal pressure.
Upside scenario
Although unlikely over the next 12 months, we could raise the ratings if economic and fiscal reforms support a sustained recovery in the non-oil economy, while reducing the debt-servicing burden and borrowing costs and increasing foreign currency reserves beyond our projections.
Table 5
| Angola | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 3.51 | 4.10 | 3.29 | 2.64 | 1.78 | 2.19 | 3.80 | 3.85 | 4.05 | 4.23 |
| GDP growth | (2.60) | (0.10) | (1.30) | (0.70) | (5.60) | 1.10 | 3.30 | 2.30 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | (5.84) | (3.36) | (4.48) | (3.87) | (8.59) | (2.13) | 0.00 | (0.97) | (0.29) | (0.29) |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.05) | (0.52) | 7.30 | 6.12 | 1.49 | 11.27 | 9.36 | 5.39 | 4.16 | 0.85 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 90.85 | 84.49 | 77.63 | 87.04 | 98.54 | 89.74 | 88.09 | 102.01 | 104.24 | 115.45 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 86.46 | 84.18 | 80.03 | 103.07 | 182.74 | 118.15 | 83.91 | 97.84 | 104.41 | 116.14 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.83) | (6.31) | 2.11 | 0.60 | (1.91) | 3.80 | 4.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 0.07 |
| GG net debt/GDP | 50.38 | 54.17 | 76.06 | 94.66 | 116.41 | 73.19 | 53.91 | 54.82 | 53.89 | 52.91 |
| CPI inflation | 30.70 | 29.84 | 19.63 | 17.08 | 22.27 | 25.75 | 21.00 | 16.00 | 13.00 | 11.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 20.45 | 16.43 | 14.21 | 14.62 | 12.05 | 9.04 | 7.38 | 7.62 | 7.80 | 8.07 |
Armenia (B+/Stable /B)
- Analyst: felix.winnekens@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Armenia 'B+/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Oct. 7, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances our expectation of continued relatively robust economic growth against risk of a more pronounced downturn in the Russian economy or an acceleration in the conflict with Azerbaijan.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings on Armenia over the next 12 months if a sharp increase in geopolitical risks resulted in a significant economic slowdown requiring larger fiscal support than we currently anticipate. Negative rating pressure could also emerge if a less favorable external environment jeopardized Armenia's access to external financing.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if the potential for geopolitical risks to undermine Armenia's strong economic growth prospects were to abate. An upgrade could also follow should Armenia's external performance significantly improve, perhaps due to much higher current account receipts or a slower accumulation of external debt than we currently expect.
Table 6
| Armenia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 3.52 | 3.86 | 4.19 | 4.59 | 4.27 | 4.68 | 6.44 | 7.32 | 7.20 | 7.61 |
| GDP growth | 0.20 | 7.50 | 5.20 | 7.60 | (7.20) | 5.70 | 11.20 | 6.30 | 4.20 | 4.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.60 | 7.95 | 5.67 | 7.87 | (7.02) | 5.57 | 10.87 | 6.51 | 4.41 | 4.21 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (0.96) | (1.51) | (7.42) | (7.32) | (3.78) | (3.72) | (3.79) | (2.79) | (2.93) | (2.38) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 114.66 | 112.70 | 117.39 | 118.89 | 118.17 | 119.47 | 113.42 | 113.01 | 118.03 | 120.38 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 103.74 | 89.87 | 82.28 | 78.70 | 128.80 | 109.36 | 96.44 | 100.28 | 113.92 | 119.08 |
| GG balance/GDP | (5.52) | (4.76) | (1.60) | (0.80) | (5.11) | (4.56) | (2.30) | (3.30) | (2.90) | (2.60) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 47.03 | 50.00 | 47.41 | 44.30 | 58.33 | 53.96 | 39.98 | 44.39 | 45.69 | 44.84 |
| CPI inflation | (1.44) | 1.06 | 2.49 | 1.33 | 1.24 | 7.19 | 8.80 | 6.40 | 4.20 | 4.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 46.67 | 49.18 | 52.90 | 57.59 | 69.75 | 60.11 | 50.20 | 50.71 | 50.07 | 49.07 |
Azerbaijan (BB+/Stable /B)
- Analyst: maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Azerbaijan, Dec. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that favorable hydrocarbon prices and rising gas exports will support Azerbaijan's fiscal and balance-of-payments positions over the next year. The outlook also reflects our assumption that there is no return to an open military confrontation with Armenia, while the negative repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war remain limited for Azerbaijan.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Azerbaijan's fiscal balances prove weaker than we expect over the medium term. This could happen, for example, because aging oil fields result in oil production declining faster than we expect. Reduced hydrocarbon revenue could also weigh on Azerbaijan's broader economic prospects, with real per capita GDP growth falling further below that of peers at a similar level of economic development. In addition, ratings pressure could build if the military confrontation with Armenia escalates again, but this is not our baseline scenario.
Upside scenario
Conversely, we could consider an upgrade if Azerbaijan sustains higher external surpluses for longer than we expect, resulting in sizable external asset accumulation. Ratings upside could also build if the government implements reforms addressing some of Azerbaijan's structural impediments, including constraints on monetary policy effectiveness stemming from elevated dollarization of resident deposits and a still-weak domestic banking system.
(Latest research update published on July 23, 2022)
Table 7
| Azerbaijan | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 3.86 | 4.13 | 4.72 | 4.79 | 4.22 | 5.38 | 7.32 | 7.16 | 7.10 | 6.43 |
| GDP growth | (3.10) | 0.10 | 1.40 | 2.50 | (4.20) | 5.60 | 4.00 | 0.00 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | (4.13) | (0.79) | 0.55 | 1.63 | (4.69) | 5.21 | 3.17 | (0.79) | 0.69 | 0.69 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.60) | 4.12 | 12.84 | 9.06 | (0.53) | 15.18 | 22.41 | 15.37 | 10.74 | (1.65) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 112.70 | 105.63 | 85.42 | 88.21 | 100.92 | 76.65 | 63.08 | 69.93 | 75.92 | 96.70 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (58.87) | (60.95) | (57.20) | (75.67) | (96.73) | (75.05) | (62.54) | (83.09) | (101.13) | (137.66) |
| GG balance/GDP | 3.21 | 0.69 | 8.65 | 10.83 | (4.09) | 6.59 | 7.72 | 4.98 | 3.04 | (1.07) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (50.88) | (40.94) | (42.25) | (47.64) | (52.37) | (43.28) | (32.35) | (38.78) | (42.89) | (47.14) |
| CPI inflation | 12.44 | 12.94 | 2.30 | 2.60 | 2.80 | 6.70 | 14.00 | 9.00 | 6.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 26.15 | 16.16 | 16.30 | 18.36 | 20.58 | 18.77 | 16.14 | 18.35 | 20.19 | 24.31 |
Bahrain (B+/Positive/B)
- Analyst: giulia.filocca@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Bahrain Outlook Revised To Positive From Stable On Improving Fiscal Trajectory; 'B+/B' Ratings Affirmed, Nov. 25, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Positive
The positive outlook indicates that we expect the government will continue implementing fiscal reforms to reduce the budget deficit and benefit from additional support from other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereigns, if needed.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next 12 months if the government's budgetary position improves beyond our expectations, contributing to a sustained reduction in net debt to GDP alongside strong and sustained current account surpluses that would support Bahrain's external position. Further support for an upgrade could come from an acceleration in productivity-led per capita economic growth.
Downside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if the government's net debt and debt-servicing burden increase beyond our current assumptions despite fiscal consolidation measures. We could also revise the outlook to stable if foreign currency reserves decline sharply, limiting the government's ability to service its external debt and weighing on monetary policy effectiveness.
Table 8
| Bahrain | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 22.64 | 23.63 | 25.15 | 26.05 | 23.59 | 25.84 | 27.34 | 28.11 | 28.50 | 28.90 |
| GDP growth | 3.56 | 4.29 | 2.14 | 2.14 | (4.94) | 2.23 | 4.80 | 2.80 | 2.40 | 2.40 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.33) | (1.09) | 2.00 | 3.47 | (4.19) | 0.04 | 2.75 | 0.78 | 0.39 | 0.39 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.63) | (4.09) | (6.44) | (2.05) | (9.34) | 6.70 | 10.86 | 7.38 | 3.18 | (5.43) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 363.87 | 354.59 | 331.95 | 369.69 | 390.46 | 295.48 | 260.46 | 269.95 | 278.19 | 310.71 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (47.28) | (80.51) | (56.12) | (65.93) | (64.50) | (54.33) | (47.17) | (47.27) | (46.13) | (39.18) |
| GG balance/GDP | (13.49) | (10.01) | (6.30) | (4.71) | (12.80) | (6.52) | 0.17 | (1.04) | (2.52) | (4.60) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 58.09 | 65.60 | 74.92 | 82.76 | 115.12 | 115.90 | 109.20 | 107.18 | 108.15 | 111.17 |
| CPI inflation | 2.79 | 1.39 | 2.09 | 1.00 | (2.32) | (0.59) | 3.80 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 64.10 | 62.72 | 65.14 | 64.92 | 76.93 | 71.52 | 70.23 | 70.99 | 72.76 | 74.58 |
Belarus (SD/SD)
- Analyst: SOVIPF@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Belarus FC Ratings Affirmed At 'SD/SD' And LC Ratings At 'CCC/C'; Issue Ratings Lowered To 'D'; LC Outlook Negative, Sept. 16, 2022
Outlook:
Our long-term foreign currency rating on Belarus is 'SD'. We do not assign outlooks to 'SD' ratings.
The negative outlook on the long-term local currency rating reflects our view that macroeconomic and fiscal stress may weaken the government's ability to stay current on its local currency debt.
Downside scenario
We could lower the long-term local currency rating if we see indications that government obligations denominated in Belarusian rubles could suffer nonpayment or restructuring.
Upside scenario
We could take a positive rating action on the long-term local currency rating in the next 12 months if the macroeconomic and fiscal fallout on Belarus from the Russia-Ukraine conflict proves weaker than we anticipate.
We would raise our long-term foreign currency rating if the government cures nonpayment on its Eurobonds and we do not believe further nonpayments on these bonds are virtually certain. Our post-default sovereign ratings tend to be in the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories, depending on our evaluation of a sovereign's post-default credit factors.
Table 9
| Belarus | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 5.04 | 5.78 | 6.35 | 6.83 | 6.52 | 7.30 | 7.58 | 7.69 | 7.67 | 7.79 |
| GDP growth | (2.50) | 2.50 | 3.10 | 1.45 | (0.67) | 2.27 | (4.50) | (2.00) | 3.00 | 2.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | (2.67) | 2.49 | 3.33 | 1.65 | (0.47) | 2.94 | (4.50) | (2.00) | 3.00 | 2.00 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.38) | (1.74) | 0.04 | (1.93) | (0.29) | 3.16 | 0.32 | (0.47) | (0.55) | (0.78) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 163.62 | 143.37 | 128.53 | 125.87 | 122.79 | 116.59 | 117.93 | 119.93 | 120.66 | 120.27 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 89.50 | 72.68 | 60.01 | 59.41 | 77.14 | 54.66 | 56.79 | 59.85 | 59.19 | 57.18 |
| GG balance/GDP | 1.49 | 2.95 | 4.01 | 2.41 | (1.65) | 0.18 | (2.00) | (2.50) | (2.50) | (1.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 33.07 | 30.86 | 27.21 | 23.26 | 29.97 | 26.44 | 27.63 | 30.88 | 34.39 | 37.60 |
| CPI inflation | 11.83 | 6.03 | 4.87 | 5.60 | 5.54 | 9.45 | 15.00 | 10.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 40.79 | 38.91 | 38.28 | 38.32 | 42.21 | 37.50 | 36.66 | 36.19 | 35.14 | 34.78 |
Benin (B+/Stable/B)
- Analyst: sebastien.boreux@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Benin, Oct. 25, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook indicates that we expect Benin's credit metrics can withstand the current external headwinds without an adverse impact on its creditworthiness. We expect strong economic growth will persist over the medium term, supported by continued reform momentum.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Benin's budgetary performance deteriorated and reforms lagged, leading to significantly weaker economic growth than we currently forecast.
Benin's creditworthiness could also deteriorate if pressures on the West African CFA franc (XOF)-to-euro exchange rate appear. A devaluation--which we do not expect--would immediately increase government debt to GDP across the WAEMU and weigh considerably on member states' fiscal performance.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if reforms boost economic growth beyond our forecast, reflecting a larger share of private-sector investment and activity; and net government debt as a share of GDP decreases significantly below our projections.
(Latest research update published on June 20, 2020)
Table 10
| Benin | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.08 | 1.13 | 1.23 | 1.21 | 1.28 | 1.41 | 1.35 | 1.42 | 1.59 | 1.74 |
| GDP growth | 3.34 | 5.67 | 6.70 | 6.87 | 3.85 | 7.16 | 6.50 | 5.90 | 6.75 | 6.75 |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.41 | 2.70 | 3.72 | 3.90 | 0.99 | 4.23 | 3.61 | 3.02 | 3.85 | 3.85 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.00) | (4.18) | (4.55) | (4.00) | (1.75) | (3.70) | (4.74) | (4.51) | (3.74) | (3.24) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 121.49 | 137.72 | 121.35 | 140.61 | 114.76 | 123.49 | 124.99 | 127.51 | 125.41 | 121.76 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 50.05 | 49.47 | 79.22 | 66.18 | 87.09 | 93.24 | 99.82 | 94.57 | 84.77 | 77.01 |
| GG balance/GDP | (4.29) | (4.20) | (2.87) | (0.52) | (4.70) | (5.71) | (5.50) | (4.00) | (2.60) | (2.25) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 28.85 | 32.80 | 32.39 | 31.20 | 37.04 | 39.70 | 41.00 | 41.77 | 41.12 | 40.16 |
| CPI inflation | (0.79) | 1.77 | 0.85 | (0.92) | 3.03 | 1.73 | 6.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 17.40 | 16.52 | 16.70 | 17.56 | 15.49 | 15.55 | 14.60 | 14.12 | 13.67 | 13.24 |
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Aug. 8, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances the risks stemming from BiH's complex and confrontational political dynamics over the next 12 months against some comparatively strong economic fundamentals, such as contained net general government debt, an improving external position, and a resilient banking sector. The outlook is based on our expectation that the ongoing confrontation between RS on one side and the FBiH and central government on the other will ultimately de-escalate, with RS remaining in BiH on largely the same terms as previously.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if domestic political confrontation escalated further, with a rising likelihood of it interfering with established debt-servicing mechanisms and having more pronounced negative implications for economic policymaking and growth.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings on BiH if domestic policy improved and we saw a move toward less confrontational and more consensus-based politics oriented to structural reforms. This could, in turn, underpin a stronger medium-term economic performance than we expect.
(Latest research update published on Feb. 4, 2022)
Table 11
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 5.27 | 5.69 | 6.34 | 6.33 | 6.29 | 7.40 | 7.30 | 7.71 | 8.61 | 9.40 |
| GDP growth | 3.74 | 3.81 | 3.35 | 2.76 | (3.16) | 7.59 | 3.50 | 1.50 | 2.00 | 3.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 5.06 | 4.89 | 4.20 | 3.47 | (2.56) | 8.13 | 4.02 | 2.01 | 2.51 | 3.52 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.51) | (4.59) | (3.13) | (2.54) | (3.17) | (2.31) | (3.58) | (2.89) | (2.58) | (2.32) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 132.47 | 127.82 | 125.65 | 126.74 | 130.44 | 122.29 | 120.46 | 116.88 | 120.14 | 120.07 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 30.68 | 20.86 | 12.19 | 5.33 | (0.29) | (7.61) | (1.20) | (0.33) | 1.13 | 1.88 |
| GG balance/GDP | 1.17 | 2.44 | 2.11 | 1.85 | (5.10) | (0.27) | (1.00) | (1.00) | (0.50) | (0.50) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 33.41 | 28.66 | 26.25 | 24.17 | 27.70 | 24.96 | 23.43 | 23.09 | 22.70 | 22.10 |
| CPI inflation | (1.10) | 1.20 | 1.40 | 0.60 | (1.10) | 2.00 | 14.00 | 6.00 | 2.50 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 50.42 | 51.50 | 51.43 | 52.28 | 52.35 | 48.32 | 45.38 | 44.07 | 43.63 | 42.78 |
Botswana (BBB+/Stable/A-2)
- Analyst: samira.mensah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Botswana 'BBB+/A-2' Ratings Affirmed On Sustained Diamond Sector Performance; Outlook Stable, Sept. 16, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 3
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook on the sovereign balances our expectation that demand for Botswana's diamonds will remain robust against downside risks stemming from weakening global economic activity.
Downside scenario
We could lower our ratings on Botswana if fiscal or external performance were materially weaker than our forecasts. This could happen, for instance, if recovery of upstream and downstream diamond segments was short-lived because of a prolonged global economic slowdown.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if economic growth or wealth levels in Botswana were to significantly increase beyond our expectations, supported by diversification of Botswana's export base, which would in turn lead to greater economic resilience.
Table 12
| Botswana | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 6.98 | 7.30 | 7.56 | 7.25 | 6.35 | 7.34 | 7.52 | 8.05 | 8.57 | 9.09 |
| GDP growth | 7.20 | 4.11 | 4.19 | 3.03 | (8.73) | 11.37 | 3.50 | 4.00 | 4.50 | 5.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 5.26 | 1.98 | 1.93 | 0.81 | (10.59) | 9.19 | 1.47 | 1.96 | 2.45 | 2.94 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 7.97 | 6.30 | 0.67 | (6.90) | (8.27) | 0.00 | 1.66 | 1.59 | 1.93 | 3.28 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 52.67 | 53.03 | 59.02 | 66.96 | 66.78 | 70.71 | 71.27 | 70.58 | 69.78 | 67.64 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (53.06) | (62.74) | (52.35) | (50.77) | (59.34) | (34.37) | (35.99) | (37.58) | (39.14) | (42.52) |
| GG balance/GDP | 0.68 | (1.19) | (5.11) | (6.21) | (9.63) | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| GG net debt/GDP | (49.28) | (48.66) | (42.56) | (32.20) | (14.67) | (10.82) | (9.87) | (9.24) | (9.00) | (8.82) |
| CPI inflation | 2.80 | 3.29 | 3.20 | 2.80 | 1.90 | 6.70 | 11.20 | 7.80 | 6.50 | 5.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 32.61 | 33.93 | 35.30 | 36.82 | 40.61 | 37.56 | 35.44 | 34.08 | 33.08 | 32.57 |
Bulgaria (BBB/Stable/A-2)
- Analyst: niklas.steinert@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Bulgaria 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Nov. 25, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances Bulgaria's weaker economic growth prospects in the near term and elevated domestic political uncertainty against Bulgaria's low net general government debt and contained interest expenditures. In our view, this affords Bulgaria a policy buffer and leaves its public finances less susceptible to a swift increase in interest rates globally. Bulgaria is currently experiencing high inflation, which, in our view, could pose challenges to it becoming a member of the eurozone in 2024.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Bulgaria's economic prospects deteriorated significantly compared to our current expectations. This could occur, for example, due to stronger second-round effects from a slowdown in global growth, the regional security situation significantly worsening, or disruptions of energy imports from Russia threatening the availability of sufficient energy supplies for Bulgaria's economy.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings on Bulgaria over the next two years, potentially by several notches, if it became a eurozone member. Improvements in Bulgaria's balance of payments position could also support an upgrade.
Table 13
| Bulgaria | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 7.54 | 8.34 | 9.41 | 9.84 | 10.10 | 12.15 | 12.57 | 13.73 | 15.94 | 17.52 |
| GDP growth | 3.04 | 2.76 | 2.68 | 4.04 | (3.96) | 7.63 | 3.00 | 0.75 | 3.50 | 3.25 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.74 | 3.51 | 3.44 | 4.78 | (3.29) | 8.18 | 3.52 | 1.26 | 4.02 | 3.77 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 3.06 | 3.31 | 0.95 | 1.86 | 0.04 | (0.49) | (1.34) | (2.97) | (2.82) | (2.73) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 104.87 | 98.45 | 102.39 | 101.84 | 104.86 | 104.31 | 104.03 | 108.42 | 113.13 | 116.20 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (15.02) | (21.30) | (25.06) | (28.47) | (42.67) | (36.00) | (26.74) | (23.48) | (18.26) | (14.56) |
| GG balance/GDP | 0.32 | 1.62 | 1.73 | 2.13 | (3.81) | (3.89) | (4.92) | (3.09) | (1.82) | (1.47) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 15.79 | 13.26 | 11.02 | 10.31 | 15.04 | 15.36 | 16.06 | 18.25 | 19.02 | 19.77 |
| CPI inflation | (1.32) | 1.19 | 2.63 | 2.46 | 1.22 | 2.84 | 15.00 | 9.75 | 3.75 | 2.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 54.30 | 52.66 | 53.60 | 53.71 | 56.10 | 52.95 | 50.28 | 48.18 | 46.78 | 46.41 |
Burkina Faso (CCC+/Stable/C)
- Analyst: etienne.polle@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Burkina Faso 'CCC+/C' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Nov. 11, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances the political, economic, and budgetary headwinds stemming from the recent coup and the worsening security situation in the Sahel region, against Burkina Faso's membership of the West African Economic and Monetary union (WAEMU).
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if institutional instability leads to a deterioration in economic growth and fiscal metrics, or if financial sanctions and economic deterioration lead to heightening rollover risks on Burkina Faso's commercial debt in the next 12 months.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings on Burkina Faso if political stability improves, with prospects of ECOWAS and/or WAEMU sanctions becoming more remote, allowing for a stronger-than-expected consolidation path. This could happen if the security and humanitarian situation improves markedly in the next two years.
Table 14
| Burkina Faso | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in '000) | 0.69 | 0.70 | 0.81 | 0.78 | 0.83 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 1.01 | 1.10 |
| GDP growth | 5.96 | 0.89 | 6.60 | 5.83 | 1.91 | 6.92 | 3.30 | 4.50 | 5.00 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.92 | (1.98) | 3.59 | 2.86 | (0.97) | 3.97 | 0.39 | 1.56 | 2.06 | 2.56 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (6.08) | (6.63) | (4.15) | (3.31) | 4.26 | 2.73 | (3.64) | (2.05) | (1.42) | (0.47) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 246.31 | 203.93 | 189.86 | 150.27 | 126.17 | 126.99 | 137.61 | 130.71 | 125.47 | 116.53 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 253.32 | 254.51 | 153.01 | 162.32 | 137.58 | 109.41 | 118.53 | 113.86 | 112.72 | 100.34 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.32) | (7.17) | (4.29) | (3.19) | (5.22) | (6.35) | (8.50) | (6.50) | (5.50) | (4.50) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 24.95 | 28.33 | 31.66 | 30.61 | 39.88 | 44.69 | 49.55 | 51.97 | 53.75 | 54.21 |
| CPI inflation | 0.44 | 1.48 | 1.96 | (3.23) | 1.88 | 3.65 | 15.00 | 6.50 | 4.00 | 3.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 25.76 | 28.57 | 26.88 | 28.70 | 29.07 | 30.10 | 30.35 | 30.37 | 30.33 | 30.29 |
Cameroon (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: etienne.polle@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Cameroon, Oct. 10, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects the balance between macroeconomic risks for Cameroon stemming from the war in Ukraine, volatile terms of trade, and the fragile security situation; and the potential for stronger balance-of-payments and fiscal performance, aided by the IMF arrangement.
Downside scenario
We would lower our ratings if external imbalances and fiscal deficits were to increase beyond our expectations, leading to a sustained decline in foreign exchange reserves and doubts about Cameroon's ability to service its debt.
Upside scenario
We would consider raising our ratings if Cameroon's fiscal policies supported declining government deficits, external financing needs eased, or external leverage decreased beyond our expectations. We could also raise the ratings in the event of a sustained decrease in security risks across the country.
(Latest research update published on Oct. 8, 2021)
Table 15
| Cameroon | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.41 | 1.47 | 1.59 | 1.53 | 1.54 | 1.66 | 1.56 | 1.63 | 1.83 | 1.96 |
| GDP growth | 4.54 | 3.54 | 3.96 | 3.47 | 0.26 | 3.65 | 3.70 | 4.00 | 4.20 | 4.40 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.79 | 0.85 | 1.28 | 0.84 | (2.27) | 1.06 | 1.13 | 1.45 | 1.67 | 1.89 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.11) | (3.29) | (3.50) | (4.27) | (3.72) | (3.99) | (3.51) | (3.89) | (4.21) | (3.71) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 89.59 | 103.51 | 102.62 | 103.56 | 105.77 | 102.41 | 98.93 | 101.88 | 105.37 | 104.65 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 59.39 | 81.71 | 89.00 | 94.28 | 115.87 | 92.77 | 85.76 | 100.12 | 110.21 | 110.28 |
| GG balance/GDP | (5.88) | (4.72) | (2.53) | (3.39) | (3.47) | (2.86) | (2.50) | (2.20) | (2.00) | (1.80) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 22.52 | 23.43 | 27.80 | 32.49 | 35.75 | 37.79 | 39.62 | 37.31 | 36.72 | 36.47 |
| CPI inflation | 0.86 | 0.64 | 1.07 | 2.45 | 2.44 | 2.27 | 5.50 | 4.20 | 3.20 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 15.38 | 14.72 | 15.74 | 15.05 | 15.65 | 16.36 | 16.98 | 16.64 | 16.59 | 16.82 |
Cape Verde (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: samira.mensah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Cape Verde 'B-/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Stable, Aug. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances our expectation of a continued economic recovery and the availability of a supportive foreign donor grant and loan facilities over the next 12 months, against the risk of higher global inflationary pressures (which could reduce the spending power of tourists to Cape Verde) and elevated fiscal risks given the very high stock of Cape Verde's general government debt.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if fiscal outcomes substantially worsened relative to our current expectations. This could result, for example, if the tourism sector failed to sustainably recover over the forecast horizon through 2025. It could also be due to contingent liabilities stemming from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or the private sector crystallizing on the government's balance sheet.
The ratings could also come under pressure if the Cape Verde escudo's (CVE's) longstanding peg to the euro came into question, particularly given that the majority of government debt is denominated in foreign currency and could thus rise substantially if the local currency depreciates, but we do not expect this to happen.
Cape Verde is currently in discussions with its bilateral creditor, Portugal, regarding relief on a portion of official debt. We would lower our ratings on Cape Verde if, beyond official debt (such as its debt to Portugal), commercial debt terms were adversely affected, but this is not our baseline scenario.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if Cape Verde's balance-of-payment outcomes significantly strengthen and if budgetary performance improves, putting the government debt-to-GDP ratio on a faster downward path over the next two to three years.
Table 16
| Cape Verde | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 3.48 | 3.71 | 4.08 | 4.07 | 3.46 | 3.89 | 3.58 | 3.76 | 4.29 | 4.67 |
| GDP growth | 4.28 | 6.31 | 4.53 | 5.67 | (14.78) | 6.95 | 4.00 | 4.50 | 5.00 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.02 | 5.05 | 3.33 | 4.48 | (15.71) | 5.80 | 2.89 | 3.39 | 3.90 | 4.39 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.47) | (6.99) | (4.50) | 0.29 | (14.78) | (11.73) | (11.99) | (9.66) | (8.17) | (5.66) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 135.37 | 137.23 | 137.04 | 132.47 | 181.32 | 194.78 | 181.31 | 168.70 | 171.84 | 167.41 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 95.53 | 108.27 | 104.32 | 93.88 | 195.76 | 172.82 | 178.65 | 157.03 | 133.52 | 115.10 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.14) | (2.75) | (2.35) | (1.63) | (8.08) | (6.75) | (6.00) | (5.00) | (4.00) | (3.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 94.57 | 92.16 | 95.21 | 89.99 | 113.94 | 110.25 | 109.93 | 107.73 | 104.59 | 100.19 |
| CPI inflation | (1.41) | 0.78 | 1.26 | 1.11 | 0.61 | 1.86 | 6.50 | 3.50 | 2.50 | 2.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 56.71 | 57.29 | 55.65 | 54.30 | 67.37 | 65.56 | 63.97 | 61.57 | 60.36 | 58.90 |
Congo-Brazzaville (CCC+/Stable/C)
- Analyst: adrienne.benassy@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Congo-Brazzaville, Sept. 5, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook indicates that S&P Global Ratings expects that an improvement in liquidity conditions will balance Congo-Brazzaville's vulnerability to oil sector shocks, persisting debt sustainability concerns, low government buffers, and weak institutional profile.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings or revise the outlook to negative if there are indications that the government might include its commercial debt obligations in any planned debt restructuring, or if renewed liquidity stress severely impairs the government's ability to service its commercial debt obligations.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings or revise the outlook to positive if Congo-Brazzaville manages to obtain sufficient official creditor financing to sustainably ease liquidity conditions against a backdrop of stronger growth, and if we see stronger evidence that commercial-debt obligations would be excluded from any potential new restructurings.
(Latest research update published on March 4, 2022)
Table 17
| Congo | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 2.04 | 2.17 | 2.60 | 2.38 | 1.87 | 2.23 | 2.36 | 2.18 | 2.36 | 2.41 |
| GDP growth | (10.70) | (4.37) | (4.85) | (0.43) | (8.14) | (0.56) | 4.00 | 4.20 | 8.10 | 3.66 |
| GDP per capita growth | (12.94) | (6.80) | (7.27) | (2.95) | (10.43) | (3.08) | 1.36 | 1.56 | 5.36 | 1.03 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (48.67) | (2.85) | 6.16 | 0.41 | (0.10) | 12.63 | 32.67 | 23.99 | 21.86 | 19.90 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 170.36 | 129.55 | 114.87 | 126.24 | 125.20 | 97.85 | 76.63 | 77.10 | 75.85 | 79.66 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 202.23 | 170.24 | 102.72 | 109.61 | 158.60 | 114.95 | 86.46 | 100.92 | 107.62 | 116.36 |
| GG balance/GDP | (6.74) | (3.74) | 5.44 | 2.78 | (0.74) | 1.73 | 6.00 | 5.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| GG net debt/GDP | 87.26 | 94.13 | 76.42 | 77.75 | 110.93 | 113.19 | 88.24 | 87.54 | 81.86 | 78.16 |
| CPI inflation | 3.19 | 0.45 | 1.15 | 2.21 | 1.80 | 1.72 | 5.70 | 4.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 21.26 | 19.26 | 15.24 | 14.76 | 19.19 | 16.83 | 14.26 | 15.47 | 15.50 | 15.89 |
Congo, D.R. (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: sebastien.boreux@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Democratic Republic of Congo, Aug. 1, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable
Over the next 12 months, the stable outlook balances DRC's favorable economic prospects, donor support, the ongoing diversification of the economy, moderating external imbalances against its very low-income levels, high vulnerability to adverse commodity price swings given its reliance on the mining sector, and still-fragile domestic political and security landscape.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings on DRC if political stability were to deteriorate significantly, for example around the 2023 presidential election, or if the domestic security situation notably worsened. The ratings could also come under pressure in case of a protracted negative terms-of-trade shock, given the still-substantial reliance on the mining sector.
Upside scenario
We could upgrade DRC if the government implemented structural reforms, with economic and external performance strengthening beyond our projections and no escalation of domestic political stability and security risks.
(Latest research update published on Jan. 29, 2022)
Table 18
| Congo, D.R. | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.57 | 0.60 | 0.54 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.72 | 0.77 | 0.83 |
| GDP growth | 2.40 | 3.73 | 5.82 | 4.38 | 1.74 | 6.20 | 5.50 | 6.50 | 6.50 | 6.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.91) | 0.40 | 2.46 | 1.11 | (1.41) | 2.92 | 2.24 | 3.21 | 3.21 | 3.21 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.05) | (3.27) | (3.52) | (3.13) | (2.16) | (0.93) | (0.67) | (0.47) | (0.39) | (0.25) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 116.24 | 118.96 | 115.73 | 118.46 | 111.37 | 108.61 | 98.28 | 97.04 | 95.37 | 94.10 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 40.57 | 37.86 | 32.29 | 30.90 | 32.05 | 2.85 | 3.52 | 4.15 | 5.13 | 5.44 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.12) | 0.28 | (0.09) | (0.55) | (1.05) | (1.54) | (3.50) | (2.50) | (1.50) | (1.50) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 14.08 | 14.10 | 10.31 | 10.51 | 12.87 | 11.23 | 14.60 | 15.72 | 15.81 | 15.89 |
| CPI inflation | 2.91 | 33.86 | 33.21 | 4.70 | 11.36 | 6.00 | 12.00 | 7.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 7.76 | 5.72 | 6.26 | 6.55 | 8.05 | 7.80 | 7.37 | 7.19 | 7.07 | 6.95 |
Cote d'Ivoire (BB-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: sebastien.boreux@spglobal.com
- Latest Publication: (Full Analysis) Cote d'Ivoire, Nov. 21, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook on Cote d'Ivoire reflects the balance between our expectations of strong economic growth, underpinned by an improvement in policymaking that supports a decline in the twin deficits in the coming years, and the risk of budgetary slippages and remaining sociopolitical tensions.
Downside scenario
The ratings could come under pressure if budget deficits do not recede as we expect, or if a significant rise in sociopolitical tensions hinders economic stability.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if Cote d'Ivoire's budgetary position improved more significantly than we expect, especially if it were thanks to increased government revenue, and if external financing needs decline more than we currently anticipate.
(Latest research update published on July 6, 2021)
Table 19
| Cote d'Ivoire | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 2.01 | 2.11 | 2.31 | 2.28 | 2.33 | 2.61 | 2.52 | 2.57 | 2.93 | 3.20 |
| GDP growth | 7.19 | 7.36 | 6.89 | 6.23 | 1.95 | 7.40 | 6.75 | 6.30 | 6.80 | 6.80 |
| GDP per capita growth | 4.50 | 4.66 | 4.20 | 3.56 | (0.61) | 4.68 | 4.04 | 3.61 | 4.09 | 4.09 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (0.86) | (2.03) | (3.94) | (2.30) | (3.22) | (3.75) | (4.81) | (4.43) | (3.75) | (3.33) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 101.20 | 103.08 | 109.79 | 108.54 | 115.51 | 113.08 | 108.17 | 106.07 | 104.78 | 102.52 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 64.88 | 75.53 | 115.51 | 103.39 | 128.42 | 90.07 | 90.59 | 92.32 | 82.75 | 78.94 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.67) | (2.71) | (2.59) | (2.29) | (5.57) | (5.01) | (5.80) | (4.50) | (3.20) | (2.90) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 27.88 | 29.18 | 31.70 | 34.57 | 41.97 | 47.00 | 47.88 | 48.38 | 47.77 | 47.01 |
| CPI inflation | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.36 | (1.11) | 2.43 | 4.09 | 5.50 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 17.73 | 19.56 | 19.42 | 19.62 | 21.11 | 21.61 | 21.78 | 22.48 | 23.32 | 24.25 |
Croatia (BBB+/Stable/A-2)
- Analyst: gabriel.forss@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Croatia, Sept. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Croatia's economic growth will remain steady over the coming two years, despite rising inflation and the economic consequences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We expect the government will remain committed to its reform program, receive significant EU financing, and gradually rebuild the fiscal space it lost as a result of the pandemic.
Downside scenario
We could consider a downgrade if we observed significantly weaker fiscal positions and structurally weaker economic growth than we project. Such weakening could result if a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict led to increasingly severe economic consequences across Europe or if an abrupt halt to Europe's energy supply accentuated recessionary conditions throughout the continent. Net emigration trends and an aging population also represent a long-term risk to Croatia's growth and public finances.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if Croatia's economic growth were stronger than our current forecasts, leading to a step-up in economic wealth. In this scenario, we would expect fiscal consolidation and net general government debt to decline beyond our current projections. Rating upside could also come from Croatia's deepening integration with Europe, if it were to facilitate institutional improvements, for example within the judiciary, education, and broader business environment.
Table 20
| Croatia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 12.55 | 13.65 | 15.24 | 15.33 | 14.20 | 17.73 | 17.93 | 18.94 | 21.21 | 23.08 |
| GDP growth | 3.56 | 3.41 | 2.80 | 3.42 | (8.58) | 13.07 | 5.50 | 1.50 | 3.00 | 3.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 4.30 | 4.65 | 3.74 | 3.99 | (8.17) | 17.69 | 5.71 | 1.50 | 2.79 | 3.29 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 2.33 | 3.86 | 1.57 | 2.74 | (0.33) | 3.03 | 1.92 | 1.14 | 0.92 | 0.51 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 99.56 | 93.16 | 91.50 | 87.81 | 84.75 | 82.96 | 80.06 | 78.94 | 80.59 | 81.96 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 68.73 | 55.79 | 38.00 | 19.79 | 21.84 | 5.35 | 2.98 | 3.04 | 3.06 | 4.70 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.04) | 0.63 | (0.05) | 0.22 | (7.31) | (2.59) | (2.80) | (2.50) | (2.50) | (2.20) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 73.44 | 70.37 | 67.54 | 63.65 | 76.67 | 69.72 | 63.71 | 62.28 | 61.78 | 60.77 |
| CPI inflation | (1.12) | 1.12 | 1.50 | 0.77 | 0.15 | 2.55 | 11.00 | 5.50 | 3.50 | 2.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 61.92 | 58.10 | 56.46 | 55.02 | 61.50 | 54.76 | 49.75 | 48.55 | 48.06 | 47.39 |
Egypt (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: trevor.cullinan@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Egypt 'B/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Oct. 21, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the Egyptian authorities' commitment to economic reform, the country's strong economic growth prospects over the next two-to-three years, as well as the importance of stability in Egypt to the region as a whole, will encourage both official and commercial lenders to provide sufficient funding to meet the country's external financing needs.
Downside scenario
We could consider a negative rating action over the next 12 months if multilateral and bilateral funding support, including an IMF program, is not forthcoming and additional GCC financial support appeared to be waning.
We could also take a negative rating action if inflationary pressures result in increased risk of domestic unrest.
Upside scenario
We could consider a positive rating action over the next two-to-three years if Egypt's economic expansion significantly outperforms our forecasts, and if the reform program materially narrows government and external financing needs.
Table 21
| Egypt | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 3.66 | 2.47 | 2.58 | 3.09 | 3.63 | 3.96 | 4.32 | 3.75 | 3.61 | 3.90 |
| GDP growth | 4.35 | 4.18 | 5.31 | 5.56 | 3.57 | 3.33 | 6.60 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.05 | (0.42) | 3.25 | 4.48 | 1.00 | 1.81 | 5.03 | 2.47 | 2.47 | 2.47 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (5.96) | (6.12) | (2.38) | (3.59) | (3.06) | (4.56) | (3.69) | (3.65) | (3.54) | (2.90) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 126.16 | 129.62 | 120.90 | 120.28 | 121.99 | 133.36 | 134.73 | 154.28 | 153.82 | 148.78 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 58.85 | 66.64 | 68.11 | 82.03 | 104.83 | 139.50 | 119.19 | 141.09 | 154.48 | 150.26 |
| GG balance/GDP | (13.67) | (10.56) | (9.59) | (7.95) | (6.98) | (7.25) | (6.48) | (7.00) | (6.00) | (6.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 84.67 | 88.67 | 81.61 | 75.04 | 77.05 | 78.46 | 75.42 | 74.20 | 72.14 | 70.90 |
| CPI inflation | 10.17 | 23.34 | 21.57 | 13.89 | 5.71 | 4.50 | 8.48 | 12.00 | 8.00 | 7.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 28.18 | 30.65 | 26.28 | 24.41 | 25.81 | 28.11 | 29.69 | 28.93 | 29.23 | 29.80 |
Ethiopia (CCC/ Negative/C)
- Analyst: giulia.filocca@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Ethiopia Ratings Affirmed At 'CCC/C'; Outlook Negative, Sept. 23, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook captures the risk that we could lower the ratings on Ethiopia over the next 12 months due to increasing uncertainty on the availability of government external funding and the potential inclusion of commercial creditors in the government's debt restructuring plans.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if political tensions result in a sustained and material reduction in multilateral and bilateral financial support, further straining Ethiopia's external debt repayment capacity and already low foreign exchange (FX) reserves. These pressures could result in the country being unwilling or unable to service the interest payments on its commercial obligations, including the $33 million Eurobond coupon payment due Dec. 11, 2022.
We could also lower the ratings to 'SD' (selective default) should the government undertake a debt restructuring with commercial creditors, which we could consider a distressed debt exchange based on our criteria.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if the political situation stabilizes--for example, via a sustained ceasefire, allowing donor funding to resume and external pressures to subside--and it becomes clear that Ethiopia's commercial obligations will not be included in the upcoming debt restructuring agreement.
Table 22
| Ethiopia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 1.07 | 1.09 | 1.12 | 1.19 | 1.20 | 1.20 |
| GDP growth | 8.00 | 10.10 | 7.70 | 9.00 | 6.10 | 6.30 | 5.00 | 6.00 | 6.50 | 6.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 5.51 | 7.51 | 5.33 | 6.65 | 3.81 | 4.06 | 2.74 | 3.72 | 4.21 | 4.21 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (10.95) | (10.51) | (9.44) | (10.05) | (5.54) | (4.10) | (5.38) | (4.58) | (4.71) | (4.82) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 155.86 | 162.18 | 150.82 | 157.74 | 151.51 | 142.76 | 148.29 | 163.46 | 166.44 | 174.62 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 169.93 | 192.16 | 190.83 | 201.03 | 230.86 | 206.56 | 180.67 | 192.10 | 198.47 | 208.34 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.87) | (3.50) | (3.63) | (3.43) | (2.52) | (2.77) | (4.00) | (4.00) | (3.00) | (3.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 22.79 | 27.25 | 34.21 | 36.12 | 27.59 | 30.12 | 30.38 | 30.68 | 30.95 | 31.50 |
| CPI inflation | 9.70 | 7.40 | 14.60 | 12.60 | 19.90 | 20.20 | 33.70 | 28.00 | 16.00 | 14.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 31.62 | 35.94 | 41.11 | 47.80 | 33.12 | 31.59 | 29.11 | 27.46 | 27.12 | 27.29 |
Georgia (BB/Stable/ B)
- Analyst: maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Georgia 'BB/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Aug. 26, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances Georgia's strong ongoing economic recovery against its relatively weak external position, on a stock basis, and elevated regional security and geopolitical risks, which we expect will persist over the next 12 months.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if the government deviated significantly from its projected fiscal consolidation path. Pressure on the ratings could also build if domestic political uncertainty and confrontation between the ruling party and opposition significantly escalated, with detrimental consequences for the reform agenda, investor sentiment, and the economic growth outlook.
Upside scenario
We could raise our ratings on Georgia over the next 12 months if its economic growth or fiscal performance proved significantly stronger than we currently project while balance of payments risks did not increase at the same time.
Table 23
| Georgia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 4.06 | 4.36 | 4.72 | 4.69 | 4.26 | 5.00 | 6.73 | 7.19 | 7.16 | 7.27 |
| GDP growth | 2.91 | 4.84 | 4.84 | 4.98 | (6.76) | 10.47 | 9.00 | 2.50 | 4.50 | 4.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.72 | 4.91 | 4.75 | 5.16 | (6.59) | 10.12 | 10.18 | 1.99 | 3.98 | 4.50 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (12.49) | (8.05) | (6.77) | (5.86) | (12.50) | (10.40) | (7.97) | (6.81) | (6.68) | (5.61) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 124.08 | 119.50 | 117.29 | 117.22 | 132.01 | 124.47 | 118.65 | 120.06 | 120.88 | 120.22 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 102.75 | 88.77 | 81.74 | 80.02 | 131.76 | 104.02 | 82.73 | 83.72 | 87.43 | 88.31 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.67) | (2.97) | (2.14) | (2.97) | (9.36) | (6.35) | (2.80) | (2.50) | (2.50) | (2.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 36.04 | 35.37 | 35.72 | 37.26 | 53.99 | 46.89 | 38.57 | 41.13 | 42.56 | 43.50 |
| CPI inflation | 2.13 | 6.04 | 2.62 | 4.85 | 5.20 | 9.57 | 12.00 | 6.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 52.15 | 53.97 | 59.39 | 64.38 | 78.52 | 72.40 | 65.21 | 66.78 | 68.96 | 71.54 |
Ghana (SD/SD)
- Analyst: frank.gill@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Ghana Foreign Currency Ratings Lowered To 'SD' On Suspension Of Commercial Principal And Interest Payments, Dec. 20, 2022
Outlook:
There is no outlook on the 'SD' sovereign credit issuer ratings.
We could raise the issuer credit ratings from 'SD' upon the conclusion of upcoming commercial debt restructurings, which we characterize as distressed debt exchanges based on our methodology. Such restructurings could entail an extension of maturities that will not be compensated for by the issuer or a reduction in the face value of debt. On Dec. 4, 2022, Ghana's Ministry of Finance initiated a transaction that we classify as a distressed exchange offer on the majority of domestic local currency debt instruments. We expect the government could make an exchange offer for cross-border debt soon.
We expect to lower our ratings on Ghana's foreign currency issues to 'D' (default) if the government fails to make the next scheduled coupon payment on its commercial foreign currency debt, which we understand comes due on Jan. 18, 2023, unless authorities were to launch a distressed exchange offer before that date. Under the latter scenario, we would lower the foreign currency issue ratings to 'D' on the date of the opening of the exchange offer.
Table 24
| Ghana | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.97 | 2.07 | 2.26 | 2.25 | 2.25 | 2.49 | 1.71 | 1.26 | 1.34 | 1.49 |
| GDP growth | 3.37 | 8.13 | 6.20 | 6.51 | 0.51 | 5.36 | 3.20 | 3.00 | 5.10 | 5.10 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.08 | 5.75 | 3.90 | 4.23 | (1.61) | 3.13 | 1.02 | 0.82 | 2.88 | 2.88 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (5.06) | (3.32) | (3.04) | (2.73) | (3.05) | (3.21) | (4.10) | (3.76) | (3.80) | (3.46) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 148.00 | 135.45 | 131.05 | 136.81 | 136.67 | 137.84 | 151.16 | 169.42 | 168.08 | 164.42 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 135.16 | 125.87 | 119.05 | 106.07 | 137.17 | 145.16 | 219.64 | 294.98 | 285.29 | 260.39 |
| GG balance/GDP | (10.00) | (4.64) | (6.79) | (7.28) | (14.31) | (11.35) | (9.40) | (3.00) | (3.30) | (4.30) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 51.73 | 50.05 | 52.65 | 57.48 | 70.30 | 72.33 | 76.15 | 59.60 | 55.33 | 53.04 |
| CPI inflation | 17.45 | 12.37 | 9.84 | 8.37 | 8.73 | 9.99 | 30.00 | 19.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 18.83 | 20.71 | 15.60 | 15.32 | 14.73 | 12.39 | 9.97 | 9.16 | 8.39 | 7.91 |
Hungary (BBB/Negative/A-2)
- Analyst: niklas.steinert@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Hungary Outlook Revised To Negative From Stable On Fiscal And Economic Risks; 'BBB/A-2' Ratings Affirmed, Aug. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 3
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook reflects an at least one-in-three chance of a downgrade over the next two years if Hungary's economic or fiscal profile significantly worsens beyond our base case.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings on Hungary if significant delays or substantial cuts to EU funds occur or the supply of energy to the country is meaningfully constrained, notably given its high import dependence on Russia. In our view, either outcome could materially weaken Hungary's economic prospects and result in the government deviating from its current fiscal consolidation strategy.
We also note the challenging monetary policy environment in Hungary, as in many other countries, with the potential for higher interest rates, persistent wage pressures, and a volatile exchange rate to limit policy flexibility and potentially constrain the government's fiscal profile via higher interest costs.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook back to stable if external pressures remain manageable, allowing GDP growth to recover and improved fiscal outcomes over our forecast period to 2025.
Table 25
| Hungary | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 13.08 | 14.61 | 16.42 | 16.78 | 16.09 | 18.69 | 17.82 | 19.93 | 23.77 | 26.87 |
| GDP growth | 2.20 | 4.27 | 5.36 | 4.86 | (4.55) | 7.12 | 4.56 | 0.21 | 3.19 | 2.83 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.46 | 4.62 | 5.57 | 4.92 | (4.52) | 7.54 | 4.77 | 0.41 | 3.40 | 3.04 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 4.48 | 2.00 | 0.16 | (0.78) | (1.13) | (4.18) | (7.83) | (6.50) | (4.23) | (4.04) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 99.56 | 103.48 | 105.00 | 102.94 | 101.98 | 102.99 | 108.40 | 112.40 | 108.39 | 108.29 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 31.16 | 29.37 | 21.73 | 22.21 | 27.32 | 23.90 | 30.56 | 29.41 | 26.54 | 24.40 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.80) | (2.46) | (2.11) | (2.03) | (7.54) | (7.14) | (4.90) | (3.97) | (3.25) | (2.69) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 70.54 | 69.24 | 65.22 | 62.45 | 71.69 | 72.05 | 67.60 | 63.31 | 60.89 | 59.42 |
| CPI inflation | 0.45 | 2.38 | 2.92 | 3.42 | 3.37 | 5.21 | 15.00 | 16.00 | 5.50 | 4.41 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 41.04 | 38.46 | 38.69 | 40.13 | 44.80 | 45.69 | 42.34 | 40.27 | 40.27 | 41.20 |
Iraq (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: maximillian.mcgraw@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Iraq Ratings Affirmed At 'B-/B'; Outlook Stable, Aug. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our view that Iraq's foreign exchange reserves will continue to comfortably exceed debt-servicing obligations over the next 12 months, largely offsetting risks from political uncertainty, the country's weak institutional framework, and low GDP per capita.
Upside scenario
While an upgrade over the next 12 months is unlikely, we could upgrade Iraq in the medium term, if higher-than-expected GDP growth, for instance from reinvigorated reconstruction efforts, boosted the country's growth and GDP per capita and supported fiscal and external metrics. Institutional reforms and a more-stable security environment could also improve our opinion of the government's debt-servicing capacity.
Downside scenario
Iraq's political landscape and external security backdrop remain unpredictable. We could consider a downgrade if we perceived that weaknesses in the sovereign's institutional framework had reduced the government's ability or willingness to service debt. We could also lower the ratings if pressure on the fiscal or external positions increased, for instance from a sharp and prolonged decline in oil prices or production.
Table 26
| Iraq | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 4.55 | 4.99 | 5.92 | 5.94 | 4.58 | 5.05 | 6.02 | 5.83 | 5.66 | 5.10 |
| GDP growth | 13.79 | (1.82) | 2.63 | 5.51 | (11.32) | 2.78 | 6.00 | 2.80 | 2.80 | 2.20 |
| GDP per capita growth | 10.56 | (4.28) | 0.28 | 3.16 | (13.34) | 0.45 | 3.59 | 0.47 | 0.47 | (0.12) |
| Current account balance/GDP | 1.30 | 7.95 | 15.12 | 6.75 | (3.36) | 11.82 | 19.09 | 10.25 | 6.41 | 0.49 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 49.64 | 49.39 | 45.07 | 52.02 | 53.20 | 45.78 | 43.54 | 48.40 | 50.23 | 51.56 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 18.18 | 14.18 | (20.00) | (21.26) | 0.69 | (16.87) | (32.25) | (39.68) | (42.02) | (50.35) |
| GG balance/GDP | (14.58) | (1.69) | 7.78 | (4.67) | (5.86) | 2.07 | 8.58 | (3.12) | (4.20) | (6.61) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 58.09 | 51.33 | 32.48 | 33.55 | 62.63 | 44.91 | 28.26 | 31.61 | 36.07 | 45.74 |
| CPI inflation | (0.70) | 0.20 | 0.35 | (0.20) | 0.57 | 6.04 | 6.00 | 4.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 13.52 | 12.55 | 9.36 | 9.57 | 14.08 | 11.95 | 10.79 | 11.64 | 12.55 | 14.57 |
Israel (AA-/Stable/A-1+)
- Analyst: maxim.rybnikov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Israel Ratings Affirmed At 'AA-/A-1+'; Outlook Stable, Nov. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 1
- External assessment: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 2
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances elevated regional and domestic political risks against the country's persistently resilient economy, strong budgetary performance, and strong balance of payments. We also forecast that Israel's net external asset position will remain at 30% of GDP over the next two years, providing a substantial economic buffer.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if regional or domestic political risks escalated sharply and affected Israel's economic, fiscal, and balance-of-payments metrics.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if regional and domestic political and security risks were significantly reduced.
Table 27
| Israel | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 37.70 | 41.13 | 42.42 | 44.47 | 44.85 | 52.15 | 54.35 | 54.75 | 58.26 | 61.10 |
| GDP growth | 4.52 | 4.28 | 4.07 | 4.16 | (1.86) | 8.61 | 6.00 | 2.00 | 3.50 | 3.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.48 | 2.29 | 2.08 | 2.18 | (3.60) | 6.84 | 3.92 | 0.00 | 1.47 | 1.47 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 3.65 | 3.57 | 2.98 | 3.73 | 5.49 | 4.37 | 3.59 | 3.81 | 3.69 | 3.38 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 68.82 | 68.02 | 66.09 | 64.59 | 59.49 | 58.08 | 56.28 | 59.14 | 60.30 | 61.58 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (42.23) | (53.86) | (46.63) | (51.12) | (67.36) | (65.57) | (49.63) | (46.06) | (40.90) | (36.48) |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.13) | (2.02) | (4.26) | (4.51) | (11.48) | (5.50) | 0.00 | (2.00) | (2.00) | (2.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 59.36 | 57.45 | 57.80 | 57.46 | 67.18 | 64.65 | 59.80 | 58.54 | 57.43 | 56.38 |
| CPI inflation | (0.54) | 0.24 | 0.81 | 0.84 | (0.59) | 1.49 | 4.30 | 3.50 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 69.33 | 69.20 | 70.04 | 69.28 | 73.23 | 75.39 | 77.97 | 77.92 | 76.91 | 75.92 |
Jordan (B+/Stable/B)
- Analyst: samuel.tilleray@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Jordan, Sept. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects that we expect Jordan's reform momentum and donor support will remain strong over the next 12 months, offsetting the risk that external headwinds could undermine its fiscal trajectory thereby pushing the already-elevated debt burden even higher.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if reform momentum stalled, reversing progress in closing fiscal imbalances; for instance, because of rising domestic spending pressures or higher-than-expected transmission of global food and energy prices to the domestic economy. Downward ratings pressure could also build if the currently strong bilateral and multilateral donor support were to unexpectedly diminish.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if Jordan's economic growth significantly improved while fiscal performance turned out stronger than we expect, resulting in debt following a firm downward trajectory.
(Latest research update published on March 11, 2022)
Table 28
| Jordan | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 4.07 | 4.12 | 4.16 | 4.22 | 4.04 | 4.09 | 4.27 | 4.42 | 4.57 | 4.71 |
| GDP growth | 1.99 | 2.09 | 1.93 | 1.96 | (1.55) | 2.21 | 2.60 | 2.50 | 2.80 | 3.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.49) | (0.50) | (0.60) | (0.41) | (3.85) | (0.11) | 0.27 | 0.18 | 0.47 | 0.66 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (9.66) | (10.61) | (6.90) | (1.74) | (5.73) | (8.91) | (6.50) | (5.75) | (4.91) | (4.94) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 148.63 | 157.72 | 150.60 | 148.46 | 176.46 | 177.81 | 163.80 | 167.16 | 167.41 | 166.83 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 21.90 | 30.42 | 42.05 | 39.85 | 59.90 | 53.32 | 54.78 | 59.63 | 61.85 | 62.21 |
| GG balance/GDP | 0.26 | 0.87 | 1.16 | (0.50) | (5.12) | (3.09) | (1.79) | (1.54) | (1.38) | (1.14) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 68.38 | 68.09 | 67.63 | 69.31 | 78.62 | 82.56 | 80.36 | 80.36 | 79.91 | 79.34 |
| CPI inflation | (0.78) | 3.32 | 4.46 | 0.76 | 0.34 | 1.34 | 4.20 | 3.20 | 2.90 | 2.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 74.54 | 78.72 | 80.32 | 80.84 | 87.36 | 89.02 | 86.69 | 86.05 | 85.73 | 85.67 |
Kazakhstan (BBB-/Negative/A-3)
- Analyst: zahabia.gupta@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Kazakhstan Outlook Revised To Negative On Higher External And Financing Risks; 'BBB-/A-3' Ratings Affirmed, Sept. 2, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook reflects risks to Kazakhstan's oil exports through the CPC pipeline, as well as rising debt financing costs.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next two years if Kazakhstan's oil exports declined significantly for a prolonged period, weakening the economy's external position and increasing fiscal deficits. This could be the case, for instance, if the CPC pipeline's loading capacity were incapacitated for an extended period. We could also lower the ratings if inflationary pressures and rising borrowing costs continued to increase the government's debt-servicing burden.
Further disruptive factors, such as a deterioration in domestic stability, evidenced by incidents of severe civil unrest, could also lead to a downgrade.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if the medium-term fiscal trajectory improves more than we expect, reducing the pace of debt accumulation and debt-servicing requirements. This could be the case, for example, if the government materially increases its non-oil revenue base or lowers spending.
Table 29
| Kazakhstan | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 7.66 | 9.19 | 9.75 | 9.72 | 9.06 | 10.09 | 10.15 | 10.86 | 11.43 | 11.73 |
| GDP growth | 1.10 | 4.10 | 4.10 | 4.50 | (2.50) | 4.30 | 3.00 | 4.10 | 3.60 | 3.80 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.30) | 2.73 | 2.75 | 3.17 | (3.77) | 2.94 | 1.66 | 2.75 | 2.25 | 2.45 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (6.16) | (3.31) | (0.48) | (4.57) | (4.44) | (4.07) | 1.97 | 0.50 | 0.28 | (1.92) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 101.12 | 94.62 | 90.64 | 96.91 | 96.07 | 91.90 | 83.21 | 87.24 | 86.62 | 90.17 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (65.39) | 0.86 | (37.73) | (37.20) | (38.98) | (30.30) | (25.29) | (30.97) | (36.24) | (40.63) |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.99) | (3.93) | (1.24) | (0.55) | (7.30) | (4.64) | (3.58) | (0.40) | (0.42) | (1.59) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (25.91) | 1.69 | (11.74) | (10.68) | (6.36) | (3.31) | 0.26 | 0.47 | 0.51 | 1.55 |
| CPI inflation | 14.60 | 7.40 | 6.00 | 5.40 | 6.80 | 8.40 | 14.00 | 8.00 | 6.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 37.13 | 28.28 | 25.34 | 23.80 | 24.79 | 26.48 | 26.56 | 25.46 | 24.61 | 24.14 |
Kenya (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: ravi.bhatia@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Kenya Ratings Affirmed At 'B/B'; Outlook Stable, Aug. 26, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances our expectation of relatively strong economic growth and modest fiscal consolidation, against the pressures of a more difficult global financing environment. The stable outlook also assumes that the post-election handover will go relatively smoothly, without significant conflict or dislocation of institutional settings.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next year if institutional risks rise, perhaps due to significant election-related conflict or challenges to the legitimacy of political institutions. We could also lower the ratings if Kenya's economic growth prospects weakened or access to foreign funding were further curtailed, resulting in a sustained decline in foreign currency reserves.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next year or two if we see a significant and sustained improvement in Kenya's fiscal and external accounts against a backdrop of strong growth, while institutional mechanisms remain robust.
Table 30
| Kenya | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.53 | 1.63 | 1.79 | 1.91 | 1.87 | 2.01 | 2.05 | 2.11 | 2.21 | 2.31 |
| GDP growth | 4.20 | 3.82 | 5.63 | 5.16 | (0.25) | 7.52 | 5.20 | 5.40 | 5.60 | 5.60 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.71 | 1.40 | 3.22 | 2.79 | (2.47) | 5.10 | 2.83 | 3.13 | 3.33 | 3.33 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (5.39) | (7.00) | (5.41) | (5.24) | (4.76) | (5.49) | (5.87) | (5.67) | (5.47) | (5.27) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 141.47 | 152.36 | 157.77 | 157.51 | 160.93 | 166.99 | 167.44 | 191.76 | 194.60 | 200.15 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 160.61 | 176.78 | 168.02 | 195.86 | 255.89 | 238.99 | 267.54 | 275.80 | 291.70 | 307.23 |
| GG balance/GDP | (6.85) | (7.60) | (6.36) | (6.93) | (7.55) | (7.72) | (6.30) | (5.80) | (5.70) | (5.60) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 42.73 | 45.80 | 47.26 | 51.51 | 58.63 | 60.63 | 63.18 | 63.91 | 64.21 | 64.31 |
| CPI inflation | 6.32 | 7.99 | 4.69 | 5.24 | 5.40 | 6.11 | 7.50 | 6.50 | 5.40 | 5.20 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 36.89 | 34.41 | 32.24 | 31.69 | 32.95 | 31.61 | 30.62 | 29.87 | 29.09 | 28.33 |
Kuwait (A+/Stable/A-1)
- Analyst: ravi.bhatia@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Kuwait, Dec. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 3
- External assessment: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook primarily reflects the broadly favorable global oil price and production prospects for the next two years, set against Kuwait's lack of fiscal financing mechanisms. The outlook also reflects our expectation that Kuwait will likely implement additional fiscal financing mechanisms, over and above withdrawals from the government's treasury savings buffer, the GRF. This could include unblocking longstanding constraints on borrowing by introducing the long-planned new debt law, which would allow a wider range of financing options when fiscal deficits re-emerge in future.
Downside scenario
We could lower the rating if no sustainable comprehensive financing arrangements are agreed over the next two-to-three years. This could happen, for instance, because of ongoing tensions between the government and parliament, rendering the government unable to implement fiscal reforms, pass the debt law, or authorize other necessary budgetary financing mechanisms.
Upside scenario
We could raise the rating if the government successfully implements a comprehensive structural reform package aimed at improving fiscal financing mechanisms, diversifying the economy, and reducing the non-oil deficit, against a backdrop of supportive GDP growth dynamics.
(Latest research update published on July 15, 2022)
Table 31
| Kuwait | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 24.80 | 26.82 | 29.90 | 28.52 | 22.68 | 29.05 | 39.16 | 36.06 | 34.74 | 27.91 |
| GDP growth | 2.93 | (4.71) | 2.43 | (0.55) | (8.86) | 0.80 | 7.80 | 1.40 | 6.50 | 2.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | (1.09) | (6.60) | (0.27) | (3.76) | (6.81) | 1.74 | 8.56 | 1.91 | 7.04 | 3.02 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.63) | 7.96 | 14.40 | 13.11 | 4.57 | 27.81 | 34.31 | 29.52 | 27.07 | 11.38 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 143.16 | 118.64 | 111.02 | 118.67 | 131.71 | 101.79 | 89.53 | 97.13 | 101.50 | 133.17 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (682.05) | (601.24) | (517.14) | (578.10) | (808.14) | (538.12) | (446.79) | (511.76) | (545.09) | (723.08) |
| GG balance/GDP | (13.94) | (8.87) | (3.09) | (9.48) | (33.20) | (7.38) | 11.43 | 5.36 | 4.66 | (14.98) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (489.79) | (451.06) | (417.00) | (437.71) | (558.87) | (447.34) | (360.41) | (420.58) | (466.12) | (598.05) |
| CPI inflation | 3.46 | 1.54 | 0.62 | 1.05 | 2.10 | 3.42 | 4.00 | 3.00 | 2.50 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 109.42 | 101.61 | 92.65 | 97.60 | 128.82 | 100.80 | 80.69 | 91.95 | 99.77 | 129.79 |
Lebanon (SD/SD)
- Analyst: maximillian.mcgraw@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Lebanon FC Ratings Affirmed At 'SD/SD' And LC Ratings At 'CC/C'; Outlook Remains Negative On Long-Term LC Rating, Aug. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook:
Foreign currency rating: The Lebanese government defaulted on its foreign currency debt obligations in March 2020. Our foreign currency rating on Lebanon is 'SD' (selective default). We do not assign outlooks to 'SD' or 'D' (default) ratings because they express a condition and not a forward-looking opinion of default probability.
Local currency rating: The negative outlook on the 'CC' long-term local currency rating reflects our view that the government will likely decide to restructure its local currency debt as part of a broader restructuring program.
Downside scenario
Local currency rating: We could lower the local currency rating to 'SD' if the government signals that it will restructure local currency debt.
Upside scenario
Local currency rating: We could revise the outlook to stable or raise the local currency rating if we perceive that the likelihood of a distressed exchange of Lebanon's local currency commercial debt has decreased. This could occur if, for example, the government decides a foreign currency restructuring is sufficient to place government debt stock on a sustainable path.
Foreign currency rating: We would raise our long-term foreign currency rating from 'SD' upon completion of the government's bond restructuring. The rating would reflect Lebanon's post-restructuring creditworthiness, considering the resulting debt burden and macroeconomic policy prospects. Our post-restructuring ratings tend to be in the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories, depending on the sovereign's new debt structure and capacity to support that debt.
Table 32
| Lebanon | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 7.62 | 7.78 | 8.00 | 7.76 | 3.62 | 1.37 | 1.19 | 1.27 | 1.42 | 1.55 |
| GDP growth | 1.55 | 0.90 | (1.88) | (6.91) | (25.91) | (8.00) | (3.00) | 1.50 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | (1.19) | (0.65) | (2.46) | (6.86) | (25.58) | (7.59) | (3.10) | 1.30 | 1.69 | 1.69 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (24.67) | (27.29) | (27.93) | (21.17) | (12.14) | (32.02) | (20.00) | (16.81) | (14.47) | (12.45) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 125.74 | 124.85 | 130.26 | 141.87 | 129.91 | 137.81 | 149.48 | 154.91 | 150.93 | 146.64 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (68.05) | (49.42) | (26.19) | (7.69) | 63.53 | 115.92 | 127.79 | 122.79 | 108.62 | 94.06 |
| GG balance/GDP | (9.67) | (7.08) | (11.38) | (10.97) | (4.27) | 1.39 | 0.20 | (3.00) | (4.00) | (5.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 116.63 | 119.56 | 126.10 | 140.41 | 279.43 | 597.46 | 568.76 | 469.96 | 422.86 | 390.65 |
| CPI inflation | (0.78) | 4.44 | 6.07 | 2.90 | 84.86 | 154.76 | 130.00 | 50.00 | 20.00 | 15.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 99.79 | 100.79 | 94.35 | 82.55 | 50.04 | 23.48 | 16.95 | 14.47 | 13.41 | 12.72 |
Madagascar (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: sebastien.boreux@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Madagascar Outlook Revised To Stable On Pressure From Energy And Food Price Shocks; 'B-/B' Ratings Affirmed, Oct. 7, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
Our stable outlook balances relatively strong growth prospects, ongoing support from international donors, and structural reform implementation against rising budgetary and external financial pressures stemming from the terms-of-trade shock and important vulnerabilities to climate-related disasters, such as drought, flooding, and cyclones.
Upside scenario
We could raise our rating on Madagascar in case of faster budgetary consolidation than we currently expect, for example supported by meaningfully higher government revenue. In addition, ratings upside could follow a substantially improved external position, supported by rising export activity resulting, for example, from the implementation of the Plan Emergence Madagascar (PEM), and notably from investment in transport infrastructure, energy, and improving the business environment (which could boost output in export-oriented sectors).
Downside scenario
A major negative deviation from our current budgetary forecast, including the crystallization of contingent liabilities on the government balance sheet, could put downside pressure on the rating. In addition, although this is not our base case, a significant deterioration in the country's political stability could threaten its ability to service its debt and thereby constrain our assessment of the sovereign's creditworthiness.
Table 33
| Madagascar | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.61 | 0.65 |
| GDP growth | 3.99 | 3.93 | 3.19 | 4.41 | (7.14) | 4.40 | 4.20 | 4.50 | 5.50 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.23 | 1.19 | 0.48 | 1.67 | (9.56) | 1.69 | 1.50 | 1.80 | 2.79 | 2.79 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 0.38 | (0.23) | 0.72 | (2.29) | (4.44) | (4.84) | (7.00) | (6.44) | (5.97) | (5.65) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 108.46 | 102.98 | 99.68 | 94.83 | 97.12 | 92.69 | 94.69 | 97.99 | 96.96 | 96.23 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 68.34 | 66.38 | 43.75 | 51.30 | 80.11 | 65.49 | 62.05 | 62.97 | 62.75 | 63.85 |
| GG balance/GDP | (0.56) | (1.58) | (1.53) | (1.12) | (3.96) | (2.87) | (6.50) | (6.20) | (4.70) | (4.30) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 36.57 | 29.32 | 29.42 | 28.35 | 34.40 | 33.87 | 36.82 | 39.32 | 40.03 | 40.60 |
| CPI inflation | 6.00 | 8.60 | 8.56 | 5.68 | 4.17 | 5.80 | 9.50 | 8.50 | 7.50 | 6.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 12.04 | 12.74 | 13.02 | 14.14 | 16.46 | 18.38 | 18.45 | 18.64 | 18.82 | 19.19 |
Montenegro (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: gabriel.forss@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Montenegro Ratings Affirmed At 'B/B'; Outlook Stable, Sept. 2, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Montenegro's economic growth will continue to be supported by tourism exports, which have held up in the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We expect fiscal deficits and balance-of-payment risks to remain manageable and the economy's external financing channels to remain open with any residual financing needs met by domestic banks or the IFI community.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Montenegro's economic growth proved materially weaker than we forecast or if the government's access to financing became significantly curtailed. Pressure could also emerge if the budgetary deficit widens substantially from our forecast. This could, for example, occur if the government were unable to control spending over the next two-to-three years, execution of key fiscal reforms resulted in wider budgetary imbalances, or authorities undertook large debt-financed projects.
Upside scenario
We could raise our ratings on Montenegro in case faster-than-expected budgetary consolidation, alongside a broadening of its economic base, strengthened its resilience to external shocks. In this scenario, net government debt as a share of GDP could decline below 60% of GDP, supported by recurring primary surpluses. Alternatively, earlier and more rapid progress on Montenegro's EU accession bid might benefit our institutional assessment, by providing a policy anchor for Montenegro's small economy.
Table 34
| Montenegro | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 7.03 | 7.80 | 8.85 | 8.91 | 7.70 | 9.49 | 9.76 | 10.53 | 11.98 | 13.19 |
| GDP growth | 2.95 | 4.72 | 5.08 | 4.06 | (15.31) | 13.04 | 6.00 | 2.25 | 3.50 | 3.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.92 | 4.72 | 5.11 | 4.11 | (15.15) | 13.60 | 5.95 | 2.20 | 3.45 | 3.45 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (16.24) | (16.08) | (17.00) | (14.29) | (26.05) | (9.20) | (12.53) | (14.15) | (14.39) | (13.77) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 165.54 | 154.53 | 155.82 | 148.84 | 169.99 | 130.37 | 135.72 | 138.96 | 143.11 | 147.60 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 153.19 | 164.57 | 150.18 | 153.79 | 294.50 | 147.32 | 153.11 | 149.29 | 142.03 | 136.41 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.60) | (5.28) | (3.92) | (1.97) | (11.10) | (2.00) | (7.00) | (4.50) | (4.00) | (3.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 61.14 | 60.08 | 58.97 | 58.31 | 77.68 | 67.32 | 64.74 | 64.95 | 64.92 | 63.96 |
| CPI inflation | (0.27) | 2.38 | 2.60 | 0.35 | (0.26) | 2.41 | 12.75 | 8.75 | 4.00 | 2.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 49.31 | 48.78 | 49.35 | 49.59 | 60.30 | 52.66 | 47.87 | 45.72 | 44.60 | 43.55 |
Morocco (BB+/Stable/B)
- Analyst: remy.carasse@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Morocco, Oct. 3, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook on Morocco reflects our expectation that further structural economic and budgetary reforms, alongside solid economic growth, will help counterbalance budgetary pressures.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if the government's fiscal results materially underperform our expectations, for example due to a significant crystallization of contingent liabilities on the government's balance sheet. Additional rating pressure could materialize if, contrary to our forecasts, external imbalances widen and create a pronounced increase in the economy's gross financing needs.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if budgetary consolidation is markedly faster than expected, or a transition toward a more flexible exchange rate bolsters Morocco's external competitiveness. Ratings upside could also arise if the country's economic diversification strategy yields stronger and less volatile economic growth, substantially raising GDP per capita.
(Latest research update published on April. 2, 2021)
Table 35
| Morocco | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 3.24 | 3.40 | 3.62 | 3.62 | 3.38 | 3.93 | 3.93 | 4.10 | 4.35 | 4.54 |
| GDP growth | 0.52 | 5.06 | 3.07 | 2.89 | (7.19) | 7.93 | 1.40 | 3.50 | 3.40 | 3.40 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.53) | 3.96 | 1.99 | 1.83 | (8.13) | 6.86 | 0.20 | 2.27 | 2.17 | 2.17 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.75) | (3.16) | (4.88) | (3.42) | (1.17) | (2.27) | (4.90) | (4.84) | (4.46) | (4.12) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 92.51 | 92.77 | 94.53 | 94.15 | 89.33 | 85.28 | 90.13 | 90.91 | 91.92 | 92.13 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 33.58 | 30.87 | 30.41 | 30.47 | 31.14 | 24.65 | 28.19 | 32.11 | 31.58 | 31.55 |
| GG balance/GDP | (4.50) | (3.50) | (3.70) | (3.80) | (7.10) | (5.90) | (5.60) | (5.30) | (4.60) | (4.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 45.48 | 48.83 | 50.30 | 51.59 | 62.98 | 60.70 | 62.48 | 64.21 | 65.69 | 66.59 |
| CPI inflation | 1.64 | 0.75 | 1.60 | 0.20 | 0.69 | 1.37 | 5.90 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 73.12 | 71.03 | 70.12 | 69.98 | 77.72 | 71.80 | 69.70 | 68.03 | 67.00 | 66.05 |
Mozambique (CCC+/Stable/C)
- Analyst: samira.mensah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Mozambique 'CCC+/C' Ratings Affirmed On Delayed LNG Projects; Outlook Stable, Oct. 21, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances our view of Mozambique's ability to meet its financial obligations in the next 12 months against uncertainties as to when significant liquefied natural gas (LNG) production will begin and the associated revenue will become available to the government. Significant delays in this regard could undermine the government's ability to meet its Eurobond obligations over the medium term.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if we assess that additional economic or external shocks, or further delays to the Area 1 LNG project, are likely to make the government less willing or able to service its commercial debt obligations in a timely manner.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next six-to-12 months if the large Area 1 LNG project sustainably resumes, reducing the risk of a distressed debt restructuring of Mozambique's 2031 Eurobond.
Table 36
| Mozambique | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.43 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.52 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.67 |
| GDP growth | 3.82 | 3.74 | 3.44 | 2.31 | (1.20) | 2.33 | 3.80 | 4.80 | 5.80 | 6.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.88 | 0.78 | 0.47 | (0.62) | (4.01) | (0.56) | 0.87 | 1.85 | 2.82 | 3.50 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (34.06) | (18.25) | (29.88) | (19.07) | (27.33) | (22.82) | (41.43) | (21.12) | (22.84) | (23.55) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 180.29 | 152.72 | 161.94 | 171.19 | 180.45 | 166.13 | 198.53 | 173.18 | 177.15 | 173.81 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 383.33 | 263.75 | 313.23 | 288.87 | 396.25 | 279.31 | 243.30 | 219.20 | 202.48 | 186.01 |
| GG balance/GDP | (7.98) | (6.46) | (8.58) | (2.12) | (6.41) | (5.82) | (5.20) | (4.90) | (4.40) | (4.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 96.61 | 74.78 | 77.50 | 71.59 | 90.91 | 78.69 | 79.52 | 79.39 | 78.35 | 76.87 |
| CPI inflation | 19.85 | 15.11 | 3.91 | 2.78 | 3.14 | 5.69 | 10.50 | 9.00 | 8.00 | 7.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 37.40 | 28.69 | 26.25 | 25.62 | 28.11 | 28.33 | 27.34 | 24.12 | 22.93 | 22.01 |
Nigeria (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: ravi.bhatia@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Nigeria Ratings Affirmed At 'B-/B'; Outlook Remains Stable, Aug. 5, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances fiscal risks from reduced oil production and delays to subsidy reform over the next 12 months against Nigeria's comparatively deep domestic financial markets and its stock of FX reserves, especially given the limited external commercial debt repayments through 2025. Improved oil prices alongside oil sector reforms and upcoming refinery projects should support Nigeria's longer term economic growth.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Nigeria's fiscal performance proved weaker than we expect; for example as a result of additional government spending or revenue underperformance. The latter could happen if Nigeria's oil production volumes recovered slower than we forecast as a result of continued technical problems, oil theft, or international oil companies reducing their commitment to operations in Nigeria. We could also lower the ratings if the government's deficit financing strategy came under strain, for instance as a result of tighter global funding conditions for emerging markets or because domestic banks and pension funds were less willing to absorb additional local currency debt. Ratings pressure could also build up if social unrest were to rise significantly in the run-up to the elections.
Upside scenario
We could raise our ratings if Nigeria experiences significantly stronger economic performance than we currently expect while external financing pressures moderate and fiscal imbalances reduce--particularly the very high cost of servicing government debt.
Table 37
| Nigeria | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 2.09 | 1.80 | 1.82 | 2.01 | 1.96 | 2.04 | 1.99 | 1.98 | 2.02 | 2.05 |
| GDP growth | (1.62) | 0.81 | 1.92 | 2.21 | (1.79) | 3.65 | 3.11 | 2.91 | 2.84 | 2.78 |
| GDP per capita growth | (4.17) | (1.79) | (0.68) | (0.38) | (4.26) | 1.02 | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0.18 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 1.31 | 3.96 | 2.04 | (3.39) | (3.95) | (0.43) | 2.49 | 1.71 | 1.83 | (0.13) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 77.93 | 71.86 | 82.11 | 94.51 | 105.93 | 93.42 | 83.67 | 101.11 | 101.81 | 112.96 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 1.53 | 9.16 | 4.15 | 19.39 | 35.39 | 37.33 | 42.67 | 50.95 | 60.04 | 79.49 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.95) | (5.42) | (4.32) | (4.69) | (5.66) | (6.00) | (6.22) | (5.63) | (4.66) | (5.20) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 15.09 | 24.83 | 29.72 | 33.88 | 33.48 | 30.34 | 36.67 | 39.49 | 40.53 | 42.41 |
| CPI inflation | 15.70 | 16.50 | 12.10 | 11.40 | 13.25 | 16.95 | 20.00 | 16.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 15.38 | 13.32 | 11.30 | 11.48 | 12.43 | 13.24 | 14.74 | 16.55 | 17.75 | 19.22 |
North Macedonia (BB-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: amr.abdullah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: North Macedonia 'BB-/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Aug. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our view that multiple risks arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the next 12 months are counterbalanced by North Macedonia's proactive policymaking as well as its moderate government debt and contained interest costs. We project North Macedonia's general government interest payments will amount to around 5% of government revenues over the next four years, which is comparatively modest in a global context.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if North Macedonia's balance of payments performance proved weaker than we expect, leading to a higher depletion of international reserves and possibly presenting risks to the stability of the denar peg. This scenario could entail the additional risk that domestic residents increasingly convert deposits from local into foreign currency, but this is not our baseline scenario. The ratings could also come under pressure if fiscal deficits worsened beyond our expectations in the medium term, leading to a protracted build-up of government leverage in contrast to our current projection of net general government debt stabilizing at close to 53% of GDP through 2025.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if structural reform implementation strengthened North Macedonia's institutional settings while its fiscal performance improved, with net general government debt trending down, alongside robust GDP growth.
Table 38
| North Macedonia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 5.15 | 5.45 | 6.11 | 6.07 | 5.83 | 6.71 | 6.62 | 7.09 | 8.01 | 8.78 |
| GDP growth | 2.85 | 1.08 | 2.88 | 3.91 | (6.11) | 3.96 | 1.50 | 2.20 | 2.80 | 3.10 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.74 | 0.96 | 2.80 | 3.82 | (6.07) | 4.34 | 1.52 | 2.21 | 2.80 | 3.10 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (2.90) | (0.86) | (0.13) | (3.28) | (3.43) | (3.45) | (8.48) | (5.81) | (3.93) | (3.18) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 109.92 | 106.37 | 109.45 | 112.04 | 114.42 | 113.61 | 117.99 | 113.26 | 112.44 | 111.18 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 28.23 | 32.62 | 24.34 | 23.12 | 33.60 | 26.45 | 34.32 | 32.94 | 30.70 | 28.84 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.68) | (2.82) | (1.08) | (2.14) | (8.33) | (5.40) | (5.10) | (4.00) | (3.40) | (2.40) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 38.60 | 40.36 | 39.34 | 41.00 | 50.96 | 51.56 | 52.61 | 53.36 | 53.58 | 52.76 |
| CPI inflation | (0.20) | 1.40 | 1.50 | 0.80 | 1.20 | 3.20 | 14.00 | 7.20 | 3.50 | 2.60 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 48.10 | 48.77 | 48.95 | 49.67 | 54.96 | 53.96 | 51.23 | 50.32 | 50.37 | 50.38 |
Oman (BB/Stable/B)
- Analyst: maximillian.mcgraw@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Oman Upgraded To 'BB' From 'BB-' On Stronger External And Fiscal Performance; Outlook Stable, Nov. 25, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances the recent and expected strengthening in Oman's fiscal and balance-of-payments positions against the economy's structural susceptibility to adverse oil price shocks.
Downside scenario
We could lower the rating over the next 12 months if fiscal reform implementation slows, or less favorable terms of trade result in larger fiscal deficits or a worse external position than we currently expect.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next 12 months if ongoing reforms further strengthen Oman's fiscal position, for instance, due to a continued reduction in government debt or faster-than-expected deleveraging in the state-owned enterprise sector.
Table 39
| Oman | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 17.02 | 17.73 | 19.88 | 18.88 | 16.98 | 19.48 | 23.32 | 22.50 | 21.75 | 19.59 |
| GDP growth | 5.05 | 0.30 | 1.29 | (1.13) | (3.38) | 3.09 | 3.90 | 3.00 | 2.20 | 1.60 |
| GDP per capita growth | (1.02) | (2.91) | 0.36 | (2.46) | 0.81 | 1.81 | (1.05) | 0.49 | 0.69 | 0.10 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (16.69) | (13.42) | (4.37) | (4.56) | (16.21) | (4.86) | 5.24 | 1.90 | 0.18 | (4.70) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 165.24 | 142.10 | 125.78 | 122.28 | 154.60 | 129.76 | 105.62 | 107.18 | 112.31 | 121.64 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (23.04) | 18.99 | 24.48 | 36.04 | 64.70 | 58.62 | 36.51 | 34.71 | 36.58 | 45.27 |
| GG balance/GDP | (15.29) | (11.43) | (5.68) | (5.55) | (14.56) | (2.22) | 5.78 | 3.35 | 1.14 | (5.38) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (25.34) | (9.31) | (5.17) | (2.68) | 12.11 | 10.20 | 0.66 | (2.68) | (3.87) | 1.15 |
| CPI inflation | 1.12 | 1.59 | 0.88 | 0.14 | (0.90) | 1.55 | 3.00 | 2.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 75.30 | 74.72 | 70.18 | 74.97 | 88.99 | 79.93 | 66.75 | 70.55 | 75.14 | 85.46 |
Poland (A-/Stable/A-2)
- Analyst: karen.vartapetov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Poland 'A-/A-2' Foreign Currency Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Sept. 30, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
- Monetary assessment: 2
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects the balance between macroeconomic risks stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war and the buffers provided by the country's strong external and government balance sheets.
Downside scenario
The ratings could come under pressure if the negative impact of the conflict in Ukraine were more severe than we currently expect, resulting in a much weaker medium-term growth outlook. Ratings downside could also materialize in the event of a material and protracted reduction in EU transfers to Poland as a result of continuous political tensions between Poland and EU authorities, for example. Both scenarios, coupled with looser spending control, could result in more extended fiscal pressure, putting government debt on a sustained upward path.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if, once the effects of the conflict subside, Poland resumed its strong economic performance, and the government's fiscal performance proved stronger than we currently project.
Table 40
| Poland | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 12.38 | 13.82 | 15.50 | 15.70 | 15.79 | 17.96 | 17.88 | 18.87 | 21.78 | 24.12 |
| GDP growth | 2.95 | 5.14 | 5.95 | 4.45 | (2.02) | 6.85 | 5.50 | 0.90 | 3.20 | 2.80 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.06 | 5.12 | 5.93 | 4.46 | (1.98) | 7.18 | 5.83 | 1.22 | 3.52 | 3.12 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (1.02) | (1.15) | (1.93) | (0.24) | 2.46 | (1.41) | (5.07) | (2.63) | (1.98) | (2.03) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 90.53 | 90.68 | 92.92 | 89.24 | 84.06 | 87.85 | 89.07 | 88.35 | 89.02 | 90.07 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 46.15 | 48.06 | 34.95 | 29.00 | 24.46 | 15.08 | 20.43 | 20.88 | 18.64 | 16.72 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.40) | (1.49) | (0.25) | (0.74) | (6.92) | (1.84) | (4.50) | (5.80) | (2.90) | (2.90) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 48.73 | 45.84 | 43.21 | 40.55 | 50.09 | 46.93 | 45.29 | 47.63 | 47.00 | 47.87 |
| CPI inflation | (0.20) | 1.60 | 1.18 | 2.14 | 3.63 | 5.25 | 13.30 | 12.90 | 6.20 | 3.10 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 54.72 | 52.64 | 52.41 | 50.78 | 49.80 | 46.39 | 41.40 | 38.75 | 38.09 | 38.50 |
Qatar (AA/Stable/A-1+)
- Analyst: trevor.cullinan@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Qatar Upgraded To 'AA' On Declining Debt Burden; Outlook Stable, Nov. 4, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 1
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our view that Qatar's fiscal and external buffers should continue to benefit from the country's status as one of the world's largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the next two years, further boosted once production increases in relation to the North Field Expansion (NFE) over 2025-2027.
Upside scenario
We could consider raising the ratings if risks related to Qatar's external position reduced, including a reduction in the country's external funding needs, alongside a significant improvement in data transparency, for example, via the provision of full international investment position data, including information on the government's external assets.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings should Qatar experience a significant external shock, perhaps due to a material worsening of its terms of trade, which, among other things, could reduce our estimate of government liquid assets to below 100% of GDP.
Table 41
| Qatar | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 58.42 | 60.98 | 68.55 | 63.89 | 53.80 | 67.12 | 72.95 | 79.71 | 79.63 | 76.14 |
| GDP growth | 3.06 | (1.50) | 1.23 | 0.69 | (3.56) | 1.50 | 4.81 | 2.28 | 2.46 | 2.77 |
| GDP per capita growth | (3.85) | (3.15) | 0.00 | (2.45) | (0.83) | 1.78 | (4.72) | 11.42 | 1.45 | 0.75 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (5.45) | 3.99 | 9.08 | 2.42 | (2.07) | 14.65 | 26.86 | 20.63 | 17.10 | 3.97 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 163.01 | 179.63 | 181.88 | 199.63 | 229.88 | 201.86 | 175.71 | 183.65 | 185.77 | 233.33 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (140.58) | (110.27) | (78.23) | (88.09) | (83.40) | (45.65) | (35.07) | (64.25) | (70.31) | (96.09) |
| GG balance/GDP | (9.16) | (7.60) | 2.22 | 0.97 | (2.23) | 0.00 | 12.15 | 8.23 | 5.07 | (4.55) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (113.38) | (100.54) | (80.65) | (96.91) | (128.94) | (119.21) | (93.83) | (107.50) | (124.30) | (132.71) |
| CPI inflation | 2.68 | 0.64 | 0.10 | (0.90) | (2.57) | 2.31 | 5.50 | 2.30 | 2.00 | 1.80 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 109.59 | 109.99 | 106.09 | 129.35 | 174.35 | 153.54 | 134.86 | 139.81 | 144.12 | 153.67 |
Ras al Khaimah (A-/Stable/A-2)
- Analyst: zahabia.gupta@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah 'A-/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Oct. 14, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 3
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectations that RAK's government will maintain its prudent fiscal stance over the next two years and that GDP growth will average 2.7% over 2022-2025.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next two years if RAK's economic prospects materially strengthen.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if the government's strong fiscal position deteriorates, for example, if weaker-than-expected economic activity leads to persistent budgetary deficits and an accumulation of government debt. We could also lower the ratings if debt-service costs significantly increase.
Table 42
| Ras Al Khaimah | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 29.13 | 29.63 | 29.81 | 28.82 | 28.37 | 28.99 | 29.89 | 30.34 | 30.87 | 31.42 |
| GDP growth | 5.26 | 3.22 | 1.23 | 0.60 | (4.38) | 3.00 | 2.80 | 2.50 | 2.75 | 2.80 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.29 | 0.32 | (1.30) | (2.23) | 0.65 | 0.49 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.29 |
| Current account balance/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| GG balance/GDP | 1.70 | 0.87 | 1.71 | 1.90 | 2.48 | 2.84 | 1.20 | 0.78 | 0.60 | 0.65 |
| GG net debt/GDP | (3.74) | (4.77) | (5.22) | (7.54) | (8.02) | (12.01) | (12.57) | (12.86) | (12.93) | (13.04) |
| CPI inflation | (0.40) | 2.36 | 4.20 | (1.90) | (0.70) | 0.80 | 4.75 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Romania (BBB-/Stable/A-3)
- Analyst: niklas.steinert@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Romania 'BBB-/A-3' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Oct. 14, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
- Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances economic risks from the Russia-Ukraine conflict--mainly in the form of surging inflation and more adverse economic developments in Romania's main trading partners--and the country's high twin deficits against the buffers provided by its still-modest stock of external and government debt and incoming EU transfers. We anticipate that commitments under the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will continue to anchor authorities' commitment to political reforms and fiscal consolidation.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next two years if:
- The government's medium-term fiscal consolidation efforts prove insufficient, failing to sustainably reduce deficits below 4% of GDP, or if the government's financing costs increase beyond our expectations; or
- Financing for Romania's twin deficits were to be increasingly oriented toward debt-creating external flows, perhaps due to lower-than-expected inflows of EU funds.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if we see evidence that Romania can sustain high economic growth, while the current account deficit (CAD) and government's fiscal deficit narrow, indicating the economy's strengthening productive capacity.
Table 43
| Romania | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 9.52 | 10.78 | 12.36 | 12.87 | 12.91 | 14.79 | 15.75 | 16.85 | 19.03 | 20.98 |
| GDP growth | 2.86 | 8.20 | 6.03 | 3.85 | (3.68) | 5.10 | 5.66 | 2.80 | 4.00 | 3.75 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.43 | 8.84 | 6.63 | 4.49 | (3.25) | 5.80 | 6.19 | 3.14 | 4.34 | 4.09 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (1.58) | (3.10) | (4.65) | (4.89) | (4.99) | (7.27) | (8.82) | (6.59) | (5.96) | (5.56) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 103.90 | 100.75 | 102.70 | 103.15 | 101.75 | 102.14 | 105.29 | 104.96 | 105.58 | 105.66 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 31.33 | 33.02 | 26.50 | 26.23 | 39.98 | 32.36 | 37.18 | 38.29 | 36.63 | 36.52 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.51) | (2.52) | (2.84) | (4.35) | (9.31) | (7.11) | (5.90) | (4.70) | (3.50) | (2.90) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 29.88 | 29.00 | 29.60 | 32.01 | 41.86 | 44.48 | 43.57 | 43.83 | 43.89 | 43.83 |
| CPI inflation | (1.07) | 1.08 | 4.08 | 3.91 | 2.33 | 4.10 | 13.50 | 8.50 | 4.00 | 4.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 29.21 | 27.47 | 26.72 | 25.61 | 27.01 | 27.77 | 24.99 | 23.42 | 22.52 | 21.91 |
Rwanda (B+/Negative/B)
- Analyst: leon.bezuidenhout@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Rwanda 'B+/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Negative, July 29, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook reflects that rising global inflationary pressures and large twin deficits could exacerbate external and debt vulnerabilities more than we currently expect. The outlook also reflects risks to our expectations for economic growth.
Downside scenario
We may lower the rating over the next 12 months if government debt rises above our current expectations and available concessional financing is insufficient to cover it.
Rating pressures could also materialize if Rwanda's economic growth moderates or its policy options weaken, weighing on growth, fiscal, and external metrics.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if fiscal and external debt metrics improve significantly above our expectations, underpinned by robust and sustainable economic growth and contained inflation.
Table 44
| Rwanda | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.76 | 0.78 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.04 |
| GDP growth | 5.97 | 3.97 | 8.58 | 9.47 | (3.36) | 10.88 | 6.00 | 6.50 | 7.00 | 7.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 4.13 | 1.33 | 5.89 | 6.82 | (5.64) | 8.33 | 3.92 | 4.41 | 4.90 | 5.39 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (15.31) | (9.46) | (10.11) | (11.89) | (12.05) | (10.90) | (12.14) | (11.54) | (10.95) | (10.41) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 127.75 | 112.76 | 110.51 | 114.18 | 113.07 | 108.76 | 112.27 | 112.61 | 114.36 | 116.43 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 102.41 | 103.61 | 105.06 | 122.38 | 172.06 | 168.85 | 175.40 | 185.79 | 195.85 | 203.05 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.78) | (3.69) | (3.59) | (5.02) | (8.60) | (6.89) | (8.00) | (6.56) | (5.56) | (5.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 38.13 | 41.50 | 44.94 | 50.53 | 62.21 | 65.27 | 67.04 | 69.79 | 70.83 | 70.80 |
| CPI inflation | 5.72 | 4.84 | 1.36 | 2.43 | 7.72 | 0.82 | 13.50 | 10.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 19.50 | 19.34 | 20.41 | 20.74 | 26.36 | 26.17 | 24.87 | 24.90 | 24.75 | 24.44 |
Saudi Arabia (A-/Positive/A-2)
- Analyst: ravi.bhatia@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Saudi Arabia 'A-/A-2' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Positive On Strong Fiscal And Economic Growth Dynamics, Sept. 16, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 1
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Positive
The positive outlook reflects strong GDP growth and fiscal dynamics, tied to the country's emergence from the COVID-19 pandemic, rising oil production, and the government's reform programs.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings over the next two years if Saudi Arabia's productivity-led per capita economic growth accelerates significantly beyond our expectations, supported by continued structural reform and fiscal consolidation, while maintaining domestic institutional stability.
Downside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if broad-based and sustainable improvements to GDP growth do not materialize, or if we observed fiscal weakening including an erosion of the government's net asset position beyond our expectations. A sustained rise in domestic or regional and global geopolitical instability could also weigh on the ratings.
Table 45
| Saudi Arabia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 20.32 | 21.46 | 25.18 | 23.49 | 20.09 | 23.45 | 28.83 | 28.40 | 27.27 | 27.55 |
| GDP growth | 1.67 | (0.74) | 2.51 | 0.33 | (4.14) | 3.24 | 8.10 | 3.36 | 2.55 | 2.04 |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.96 | (1.79) | 1.43 | (4.93) | (6.31) | 1.72 | 5.98 | 1.33 | 0.54 | 0.04 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.70) | 1.52 | 8.81 | 4.76 | (3.24) | 5.32 | 13.62 | 6.96 | 1.01 | 0.13 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 36.15 | 39.28 | 41.33 | 44.68 | 49.22 | 52.88 | 51.80 | 55.04 | 61.09 | 65.51 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (268.01) | (203.97) | (146.60) | (149.76) | (202.91) | (120.97) | (92.33) | (102.55) | (104.31) | (90.27) |
| GG balance/GDP | (15.80) | (7.34) | (5.05) | (2.50) | (9.54) | (0.75) | 5.68 | 4.31 | 1.14 | (4.35) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (95.11) | (81.88) | (63.60) | (69.02) | (75.76) | (65.82) | (54.83) | (58.07) | (60.78) | (55.02) |
| CPI inflation | 2.07 | (0.84) | 2.46 | (2.09) | 3.45 | 3.06 | 2.46 | 2.54 | 1.86 | 1.82 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 60.92 | 56.50 | 48.95 | 53.36 | 69.82 | 68.12 | 62.47 | 69.64 | 78.22 | 81.97 |
Senegal (B+/Stable/B)
- Analyst: sebastien.boreux@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Senegal 'B+/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Dec. 2, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable rating outlook balances the risks from short-term issues from the conflict in Ukraine and Senegal's strong medium-term economic prospects, supported by structural economic and budgetary reforms.
Downside scenario
Downward pressure on the rating could emerge if the government's budgetary performance deteriorates more than we expect, and real GDP growth rates are significantly weaker than our forecasts. This could occur, for example, if the fallout from the war in Ukraine is much greater than we anticipate or, while unlikely, there are significant delays to large projected increases in Senegal's hydrocarbon production.
Senegal's creditworthiness could also deteriorate if economic imbalances increase, or the West African franc (XOF) weakens against the euro. A devaluation--which we do not expect, given the XOF's peg to the euro--would immediately increase the ratio of government debt to GDP, placing considerable strain on Senegal's fiscal performance.
Upside scenario
We could upgrade the sovereign in the next 12 months should external imbalances decrease materially, or net government borrowing requirements decline faster than our projections while economic growth accelerates so as to decrease the public debt-to-GDP ratio.
Table 46
| Senegal | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.27 | 1.36 | 1.46 | 1.44 | 1.46 | 1.60 | 1.52 | 1.65 | 1.92 | 2.07 |
| GDP growth | 6.37 | 7.39 | 6.21 | 4.23 | 1.72 | 6.20 | 5.00 | 8.50 | 10.00 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.43 | 4.43 | 3.30 | 1.40 | (0.99) | 3.36 | 2.19 | 5.60 | 7.06 | 2.68 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.19) | (7.28) | (9.58) | (8.11) | (10.87) | (13.52) | (15.03) | (8.67) | (3.57) | (3.49) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 120.04 | 133.42 | 137.48 | 130.33 | 129.86 | 136.08 | 139.70 | 130.93 | 118.65 | 112.20 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 103.51 | 120.37 | 119.51 | 120.41 | 155.75 | 149.25 | 158.13 | 139.34 | 111.47 | 94.50 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.27) | (2.97) | (3.72) | (3.92) | (6.41) | (6.31) | (6.10) | (5.00) | (3.50) | (3.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 42.97 | 44.01 | 51.62 | 52.17 | 59.28 | 62.58 | 65.59 | 63.71 | 60.72 | 60.01 |
| CPI inflation | 0.84 | 1.32 | 0.46 | 1.76 | 2.55 | 3.00 | 8.50 | 4.00 | 2.00 | 1.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 32.45 | 34.48 | 33.20 | 33.48 | 33.07 | 32.34 | 31.53 | 30.32 | 29.26 | 29.51 |
Serbia (BB+/Stable /B)
- Analyst: amr.abdullah@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Serbia 'BB+/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Dec. 9, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances the rising macroeconomic risks from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and economic slowdown for the country's key trading partners, against Serbia's sound medium-term growth prospects and broadly conservative fiscal management, which is supported by its credible policy framework.
Downside scenario
We could consider lowering our ratings if the Russia-Ukraine conflict and extended economic slowdown for key trading partners had a significant and more protracted effect on Serbia than we currently expect, resulting in pronounced repercussions for the medium-term growth outlook. This scenario would also disrupt the government's medium-term fiscal consolidation plans and result in higher public debt. Other downside triggers include a marked deterioration Serbia's foreign exchange (FX) reserve position, potentially from protracted balance-of-payments weakness.
Upside scenario
We could raise our ratings on Serbia if we determine that the macroeconomic effects from the war in Ukraine and economic slowdown for Serbia's key trading partners are contained. Likely signals include an improvement in Serbia's growth prospects, external balances, and public finances. An upgrade would also depend on subsiding geopolitical uncertainty.
Table 47
| Serbia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 5.77 | 6.29 | 7.25 | 7.42 | 7.73 | 9.23 | 9.27 | 10.01 | 10.56 | 11.00 |
| GDP growth | 3.34 | 2.10 | 4.50 | 4.33 | (0.94) | 7.39 | 2.50 | 2.10 | 3.33 | 3.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 3.88 | 2.65 | 5.07 | 4.89 | (0.28) | 8.41 | 3.02 | 2.61 | 3.85 | 3.52 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (2.92) | (5.24) | (4.84) | (6.87) | (4.13) | (4.31) | (9.09) | (8.07) | (6.13) | (4.76) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 97.78 | 103.31 | 103.66 | 107.55 | 99.40 | 98.98 | 99.18 | 100.64 | 100.70 | 100.03 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 60.88 | 57.60 | 44.65 | 42.35 | 44.86 | 27.47 | 31.77 | 36.76 | 37.09 | 36.79 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.19) | 1.10 | 0.64 | (0.20) | (8.05) | (4.14) | (3.90) | (3.30) | (2.40) | (1.50) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 62.03 | 52.71 | 48.42 | 44.46 | 49.44 | 48.14 | 46.70 | 45.59 | 46.77 | 46.95 |
| CPI inflation | 1.12 | 3.13 | 1.96 | 1.85 | 1.58 | 4.09 | 11.90 | 11.10 | 4.00 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 43.43 | 42.17 | 43.50 | 44.34 | 48.50 | 46.92 | 44.99 | 43.49 | 43.47 | 44.01 |
Sharjah (BBB-/Negative/A-3)
- Analyst: trevor.cullinan@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Emirate of Sharjah 'BBB-/A-3' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Negative, Oct. 21, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 3
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook reflects our view of risks to Sharjah's fiscal position over the next two years.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if we were to assess the government's debt burden as continuously rising, resulting in further upward pressure on already-high interest payments. The ratings could also come under pressure if additional contingent liabilities materialized on the government's balance sheet, inflating public sector leverage.
Upside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if Sharjah's fiscal performance strengthened, for instance, because of reforms that contained debt near current levels
Table 48
| Sharjah | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 24.61 | 25.27 | 25.77 | 25.66 | 24.03 | 24.56 | 26.18 | 26.98 | 27.79 | 28.49 |
| GDP growth | 2.98 | 2.00 | (1.77) | 3.98 | (10.26) | 5.23 | 4.00 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.79 | (0.01) | (2.43) | 2.48 | (6.52) | 2.66 | 2.97 | 1.49 | 1.49 | 0.99 |
| Current account balance/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.22) | (1.95) | (2.86) | (4.39) | (7.62) | (8.21) | (7.99) | (7.56) | (7.18) | (6.88) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 9.36 | 10.91 | 14.09 | 19.85 | 30.35 | 36.92 | 42.29 | 48.37 | 53.95 | 59.14 |
| CPI inflation | 0.82 | 2.74 | 4.47 | (2.98) | 0.16 | (0.46) | 3.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
St Helena (BBB-/Stable/A-3)
- Analyst: leon.bezuidenhout@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) St. Helena, Oct. 3, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 3
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 4
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances S&P Global Ratings' expectation of strong and ongoing support from the U.K. government against the very small and narrow economy and rising global inflationary pressures.
Downside scenario
We would lower the ratings if financial support from the U.K. (unsolicited; AA/Negative/A-1+) diminishes and St. Helena's tax revenue is insufficient to compensate for this, or if the U.K.'s external position deteriorates more than we expect. We could also lower the ratings if the pandemic, or another severe natural disaster, proves to have a long-term and sustained impact on St. Helena's economy.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if St. Helena's economic growth accelerates significantly faster than we forecast, and tax collection rises markedly.
(Latest research update published on April 3, 2020)
Table 49
| St Helena | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 11.18 | 9.58 | 10.52 | 10.53 | 11.03 | 12.32 | 11.73 | 13.70 | 15.19 | 16.35 |
| GDP growth | (7.06) | 0.00 | 2.88 | (2.54) | 2.35 | 0.80 | 1.50 | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.40 |
| GDP per capita growth | (4.96) | (3.97) | 3.56 | 3.16 | 3.02 | 2.95 | 2.53 | 2.81 | 2.30 | 2.40 |
| Current account balance/GDP | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| GG balance/GDP | (0.48) | (0.69) | (1.15) | (1.32) | 6.13 | (4.08) | (2.85) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| GG net debt/GDP | (7.48) | (15.15) | (12.78) | (11.33) | (13.91) | (9.57) | (6.11) | (5.68) | (5.39) | (5.11) |
| CPI inflation | 2.60 | 5.11 | 3.75 | 3.28 | 1.07 | 1.32 | 5.30 | 5.00 | 4.00 | 3.50 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 37.38 | 48.99 | 46.55 | 44.96 | 43.07 | 40.99 | 39.31 | 38.43 | 37.93 | 37.40 |
South Africa (BB-/Positive/B)
- Analyst: zahabia.gupta@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: South Africa 'BB-/B' Foreign Currency Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Remains Positive, Nov. 18, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 4
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 2
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 2
Outlook: Positive
The positive outlook reflects our expectation that a net external creditor position, a path toward fiscal consolidation, and the implementation of some structural reforms could lead to an easing of fiscal and economic pressures.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if growth in economic output and fiscal consolidation continue on a sustained basis, against a backdrop of structural and governance reforms and supportive external sector dynamics.
Downside scenario
We could revise the outlook to stable if external or domestic shocks subdue South Africa's economic growth over the forecast period, or if fiscal financing or external pressures significantly increase. This could, for example, result from a sharper global economic downturn, particularly in China.
We could also revise the outlook to stable if the expected debt transfer from Eskom (CCC+/Negative/--) to the sovereign balance sheet significantly weakens the sovereign's fiscal trajectory without addressing operational and financial shortcomings at the public utilities company.
Table 50
| South Africa | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 5.82 | 6.75 | 6.99 | 6.61 | 5.67 | 6.96 | 6.70 | 6.46 | 6.78 | 6.87 |
| GDP growth | 0.66 | 1.16 | 1.52 | 0.30 | (6.34) | 4.91 | 1.89 | 1.48 | 1.67 | 1.70 |
| GDP per capita growth | (0.91) | (0.46) | (0.59) | (1.49) | (7.67) | 4.00 | 1.11 | (0.02) | 0.17 | 0.20 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (2.68) | (2.37) | (2.94) | (2.57) | 1.97 | 3.68 | (0.09) | (0.83) | (1.45) | (1.69) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 105.52 | 104.26 | 108.09 | 108.47 | 95.44 | 88.12 | 93.43 | 96.09 | 97.81 | 98.94 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 29.13 | 45.31 | 44.70 | 49.60 | 28.64 | 16.56 | 22.64 | 25.77 | 27.54 | 27.99 |
| GG balance/GDP | (3.30) | (3.75) | (3.66) | (5.20) | (10.04) | (4.79) | (5.00) | (5.10) | (4.80) | (4.60) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 43.55 | 45.24 | 48.46 | 54.85 | 65.46 | 65.27 | 67.17 | 71.79 | 73.43 | 75.03 |
| CPI inflation | 6.34 | 5.20 | 4.70 | 4.03 | 3.32 | 4.50 | 6.81 | 5.81 | 4.28 | 4.10 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 79.56 | 77.78 | 80.50 | 81.45 | 86.59 | 81.52 | 78.88 | 77.00 | 76.39 | 76.05 |
Tajikistan (B-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: giulia.filocca@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Tajikistan 'B-/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Aug. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Tajikistan's debt-service needs will remain moderate in the next 12 months, owing to the still-high component of concessional borrowing in the government's debt stock, which helps offset risks from its structurally volatile external position.
Downside scenario
We could lower the rating if Tajikistan's external debt levels increase sharply or if geopolitical risks escalate resulting in significant downward pressure on its exchange rate and foreign currency reserves. We could also lower the rating if Tajikistan's government debt-servicing capacity becomes strained; for example, because of reduced access to concessional funding.
Upside scenario
We could consider an upgrade if we see a sustained improvement in Tajikistan's fiscal and external performance, as evidenced by a sharp deceleration in the accumulation of government debt and a continued strengthening of the country's external position.
Table 51
| Tajikistan | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.80 | 0.81 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.08 | 1.10 |
| GDP growth | 6.90 | 7.10 | 7.60 | 7.50 | 4.50 | 9.00 | 3.20 | 4.00 | 6.00 | 6.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 4.31 | 4.49 | 4.99 | 4.96 | 2.13 | 6.65 | 0.98 | 1.76 | 3.72 | 3.72 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.18) | 2.22 | (5.03) | (2.23) | 4.32 | 8.40 | (3.87) | (2.42) | (1.85) | (1.81) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 127.76 | 102.58 | 102.64 | 101.56 | 96.96 | 79.48 | 82.02 | 82.70 | 84.46 | 88.51 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 91.44 | 76.31 | 85.26 | 85.87 | 64.90 | 30.09 | 37.19 | 45.03 | 52.21 | 58.95 |
| GG balance/GDP | (8.44) | (5.05) | (3.32) | (1.67) | (1.84) | (2.16) | (2.33) | (2.36) | (2.35) | (2.37) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 34.90 | 39.17 | 40.16 | 37.01 | 40.71 | 35.35 | 33.59 | 35.09 | 35.99 | 37.09 |
| CPI inflation | 6.10 | 6.70 | 5.40 | 8.00 | 9.40 | 9.02 | 10.50 | 9.00 | 7.40 | 6.80 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 18.39 | 14.21 | 12.77 | 12.41 | 13.02 | 12.20 | 11.88 | 11.72 | 11.36 | 11.13 |
Togo (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: remy.carasse@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Togo, Sept. 19, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our view that Togo will continue to implement structural economic reforms, leading to gradual improvements in economic and budgetary performance.
Downside scenario
The ratings could come under pressure if the government's budgetary performance deteriorates beyond our expectations and real GDP growth rates are significantly weaker than our forecasts. We could also lower the ratings if we see pronounced pressure on WAEMU's international reserves and on the West African CFA franc (XOF) to euro exchange rate.
Upside scenario
Ratings upside could arise if Togo's economic growth is markedly stronger than we forecast, while external and budgetary deficits, and net government debt as a share of GDP, decrease materially.
(Latest research update published on Oct. 22, 2021)
Table 52
| Togo | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.80 | 0.83 | 0.90 | 0.89 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.98 | 1.09 | 1.17 |
| GDP growth | 5.56 | 4.35 | 4.98 | 5.46 | 1.81 | 5.45 | 5.00 | 5.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.93 | 1.79 | 2.44 | 2.94 | (0.60) | 2.97 | 2.53 | 2.53 | 3.02 | 3.02 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (7.24) | (1.51) | (2.60) | (0.77) | (0.27) | (2.26) | (3.37) | (3.48) | (3.20) | (2.94) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 134.57 | 148.48 | 142.63 | 142.56 | 127.42 | 126.12 | 121.01 | 122.78 | 121.20 | 119.39 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 125.37 | 109.72 | 122.13 | 110.24 | 92.85 | 100.17 | 112.06 | 114.31 | 111.03 | 109.38 |
| GG balance/GDP | (7.07) | (0.21) | (0.58) | 1.61 | (6.97) | (4.57) | (4.00) | (3.00) | (2.50) | (2.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 49.69 | 46.10 | 46.19 | 37.78 | 43.07 | 45.23 | 45.58 | 45.52 | 45.11 | 44.34 |
| CPI inflation | 1.29 | (0.98) | 0.93 | 0.69 | 1.83 | 4.30 | 6.00 | 3.50 | 2.50 | 2.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 32.18 | 31.62 | 30.82 | 30.69 | 29.85 | 29.89 | 28.57 | 27.72 | 26.99 | 26.34 |
Turkiye (B/Stable/B)
- Analyst: SOVIPF@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Turkiye Ratings Lowered To 'B' From 'B+'; Outlook Stable, Sept. 30, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 4
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects balanced risks to Turkiye's creditworthiness: the central government's remaining fiscal space against still-notable balance of payments vulnerabilities, contingent liabilities from state banks and public enterprises, and unpredictable policy settings.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if the financial strength of the banking system and public finances weaken further in connection with renewed exchange rate pressure and a worsening inflation outlook. This could be the case, for example, if domestic residents dollarized their savings significantly further or withdrew them from the financial system, or if banks' access to foreign funding deteriorated.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if we observed sustained and enhanced predictability of public policy and effectiveness of monetary policy while Turkiye's balance-of-payments position strengthened, particularly the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkiye's (CBRT) net foreign currency reserves.
Table 53
| Turkiye | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 10.88 | 10.62 | 9.51 | 9.15 | 8.61 | 9.63 | 8.77 | 7.74 | 8.19 | 9.01 |
| GDP growth | 3.32 | 7.50 | 2.98 | 0.78 | 1.94 | 11.35 | 6.10 | 2.40 | 2.80 | 3.20 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.93 | 6.18 | 1.48 | (0.61) | 1.38 | 9.95 | 4.74 | 1.09 | 1.48 | 1.88 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.07) | (4.66) | (2.58) | 1.42 | (4.43) | (0.89) | (4.73) | (3.12) | (2.60) | (2.02) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 165.69 | 152.76 | 154.33 | 130.25 | 147.22 | 156.22 | 160.87 | 161.83 | 158.59 | 153.64 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 120.68 | 125.59 | 105.84 | 86.25 | 111.37 | 69.75 | 72.62 | 89.55 | 90.61 | 87.72 |
| GG balance/GDP | (1.71) | (1.97) | (2.77) | (3.16) | (2.87) | (2.27) | (4.00) | (3.80) | (3.00) | (3.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 24.22 | 23.76 | 26.93 | 28.82 | 34.75 | 35.23 | 31.99 | 35.37 | 34.27 | 33.75 |
| CPI inflation | 7.78 | 11.14 | 16.33 | 15.18 | 12.28 | 19.60 | 73.10 | 42.40 | 17.30 | 12.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 61.99 | 62.92 | 58.89 | 56.59 | 65.77 | 62.07 | 51.03 | 53.70 | 56.99 | 61.35 |
Uganda (B/Negative/B)
- Analyst: leon.bezuidenhout@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Uganda Outlook Revised To Negative On Rising Fiscal And External Vulnerabilities; 'B/B' Ratings Affirmed, Dec. 9, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative
The negative outlook reflects that large fiscal and external deficits will persist, increasing the sovereign's vulnerability to challenging domestic and external financing conditions, despite the IMF support program.
The outlook also reflects potential risks to policymaking and growth due to rising financing gaps, the recent Ebola outbreak, and the expected global economic slowdown in 2023.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings over the next six-to-12 months if fiscal gaps are larger than expected and concessional financing proves insufficient to meet government needs. This could further elevate the government's debt burden, especially from more costly commercial sources, and increase interest costs.
The ratings could also come under pressure if economic performance deteriorates significantly, leading to materially worse fiscal and external positions.
Upside scenario
Although an upgrade is unlikely in the next 12 months, we could revise the outlook to stable if either a strong economic recovery or fiscal consolidation reduce the government's financing needs and debt to GDP starts decreasing. Increasing traction on reforms to materially increase tax receipts as a share of GDP would also contribute to the stability of public finances, and therefore the ratings.
Table 54
| Uganda | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 0.76 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.80 | 0.81 | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 0.98 |
| GDP growth | 4.78 | 3.13 | 6.30 | 6.44 | 2.95 | 3.54 | 4.65 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 1.02 | (0.67) | 2.42 | 2.73 | (0.36) | 0.50 | 1.41 | 0.78 | 1.74 | 1.74 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (4.53) | (3.42) | (5.61) | (7.46) | (6.78) | (9.24) | (8.27) | (10.04) | (9.86) | (9.56) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 103.37 | 98.14 | 101.05 | 111.17 | 113.18 | 121.32 | 127.27 | 138.18 | 138.76 | 145.79 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 64.91 | 66.80 | 74.61 | 80.53 | 103.55 | 124.60 | 158.90 | 171.84 | 188.18 | 199.95 |
| GG balance/GDP | (4.04) | (3.25) | (4.06) | (4.86) | (7.11) | (9.36) | (7.35) | (6.00) | (5.50) | (5.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 24.05 | 26.58 | 29.80 | 30.60 | 37.21 | 42.50 | 44.64 | 47.78 | 49.78 | 51.34 |
| CPI inflation | 7.01 | 5.40 | 3.23 | 2.60 | 2.33 | 2.48 | 3.44 | 9.50 | 6.00 | 5.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 11.91 | 11.69 | 11.66 | 12.11 | 12.40 | 12.66 | 12.81 | 12.18 | 11.98 | 11.96 |
Ukraine (CCC+/Stable/C)
- Analyst: karen.vartapetov@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Ukraine, Sept. 12, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook balances our view of the reduction in Ukraine's government debt-service requirements and our expectation of steady international financial support against risks to Ukraine's economy, external balances, public finances, and financial stability stemming from the ongoing war.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings in the next 12 months should the security outlook deteriorate, putting further pressure on Ukraine's foreign exchange reserve position or the government's administrative capacity, or resulting in much higher government gross financing needs than we currently anticipate. Absent an escalation of the conflict, material delays in foreign donor support could also lead to a downgrade.
Upside scenario
We could raise the ratings if Ukraine's security environment and medium-term economic outlook significantly improve.
(Latest research update published on Aug. 19, 2022)
Table 55
| Ukraine | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 2.18 | 2.64 | 3.09 | 3.66 | 3.76 | 4.86 | 3.74 | 3.51 | 3.64 | 3.70 |
| GDP growth | 2.44 | 2.36 | 3.49 | 3.20 | (3.75) | 3.35 | (37.00) | 3.00 | 7.00 | 5.00 |
| GDP per capita growth | 2.85 | 2.78 | 3.97 | 3.77 | (2.45) | 4.41 | (30.00) | (2.83) | 5.94 | 4.48 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (2.00) | (3.09) | (4.92) | (2.67) | 3.37 | (1.62) | 5.82 | (3.41) | (7.08) | (7.56) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 118.75 | 115.26 | 114.78 | 106.56 | 94.61 | 100.83 | 89.67 | 106.14 | 111.46 | 114.43 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 131.78 | 109.69 | 94.53 | 83.18 | 86.32 | 61.38 | 102.92 | 102.99 | 101.21 | 103.22 |
| GG balance/GDP | (2.17) | (1.38) | (2.11) | (2.12) | (5.61) | (1.60) | (26.00) | (15.00) | (7.00) | (5.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 78.73 | 69.03 | 58.84 | 48.64 | 58.32 | 48.93 | 97.89 | 105.79 | 104.20 | 104.95 |
| CPI inflation | 13.91 | 14.44 | 10.95 | 7.89 | 2.73 | 9.36 | 21.00 | 17.00 | 9.00 | 7.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 42.77 | 34.59 | 30.55 | 24.69 | 22.56 | 18.82 | 23.97 | 21.69 | 21.20 | 19.81 |
Uzbekistan (BB-/Stable/B)
- Analyst: zahabia.gupta@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: Uzbekistan 'BB-/B' Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Stable, Dec. 2, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 5
- Economic assessment: 5
- External assessment: 3
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
- Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable
The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Uzbekistan's comparatively strong fiscal and external stock positions should help its economy withstand additional possible negative macroeconomic spillover effects from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and weak global growth over the next 12 months.
Downside scenario
We could lower the ratings if Uzbekistan's fiscal and external positions weaken more than we currently expect. This could, for instance, result from more significant negative fallout from the Russia-Ukraine conflict for Uzbekistan via the trade and remittances channel beyond 2022. It could also be the case if public and financial sector external debt continues to rise at a fast pace, in contrast to our current expectation of the increase moderating.
In addition, the ratings could come under pressure if the financial performance of key state-owned enterprises (SOEs) weakens, leading to the transfer of contingent liabilities to the government's balance sheet.
Upside scenario
Although unlikely in the next year, we could raise the ratings if Uzbekistan's economic reforms and increased integration with the global economy result in stronger economic growth potential and broader diversification of export receipts and fiscal revenue.
Table 56
| Uzbekistan | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 2.68 | 1.90 | 1.58 | 1.77 | 1.73 | 1.96 | 2.15 | 2.32 | 2.53 | 2.71 |
| GDP growth | 5.93 | 4.40 | 5.35 | 5.71 | 1.89 | 7.42 | 5.75 | 5.00 | 5.50 | 5.50 |
| GDP per capita growth | 4.13 | 2.68 | 3.46 | 3.68 | (0.04) | 5.25 | 3.61 | 2.88 | 3.37 | 3.37 |
| Current account balance/GDP | 0.25 | 2.38 | (6.83) | (5.62) | (5.02) | (6.96) | (2.40) | (5.58) | (5.84) | (6.02) |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 73.82 | 70.48 | 80.11 | 81.55 | 76.97 | 79.80 | 76.83 | 86.02 | 90.09 | 94.95 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | (91.85) | (78.26) | (52.26) | (24.03) | (12.99) | 9.35 | 24.61 | 33.51 | 40.09 | 41.42 |
| GG balance/GDP | (0.50) | (1.95) | 0.37 | (3.77) | (4.30) | (5.22) | (4.50) | (3.50) | (3.00) | (2.80) |
| GG net debt/GDP | (12.73) | (17.57) | (8.65) | 2.48 | 10.01 | 13.16 | 17.63 | 19.95 | 21.42 | 22.73 |
| CPI inflation | 5.49 | 13.76 | 17.50 | 14.50 | 12.98 | 10.86 | 12.50 | 11.00 | 10.00 | 9.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 20.81 | 35.09 | 39.65 | 40.76 | 47.02 | 45.41 | 44.89 | 49.03 | 56.54 | 64.99 |
Zambia (SD/SD)
- Analyst: maximillian.mcgraw@spglobal.com
- Latest publication: (Full Analysis) Zambia, Aug. 22, 2022
Rating score snapshot:
- Institutional assessment: 6
- Economic assessment: 6
- External assessment: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
- Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
- Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook:
The stable outlook on the local currency sovereign credit rating balances our expectation that the government's fiscal position will improve over the next 12 months against its large stock of debt and the risk that local currency debt could be included in a potential restructuring, although our base-case expectation is that it will be excluded.
The Zambian government defaulted on its foreign currency debt obligations in October 2020 when it did not pay on its eurobonds. Our foreign currency rating on Zambia is 'SD' (selective default). Ratings at 'SD' do not carry outlooks. These ratings express a condition, default, and not a forward-looking opinion of default probability.
Downside scenario
We could lower the local currency ratings within the next 12 months if the government signals that it will restructure local currency debt as part of its broader debt restructuring program. We could also take this action if its liquidity position deteriorates, for instance because of fiscal deficits greater than our forecasts or a marked increase in domestic supplier arrears.
Upside scenario
We could raise the local currency ratings if it became clear that Zambia's local currency government debt would be excluded from the debt restructuring and if we obtained more clarity on the post-restructuring debt profile.
We expect to raise our foreign currency ratings from 'SD' once Zambia's debt restructuring plan is completed. The subsequent foreign currency ratings would reflect Zambia's post-restructuring creditworthiness, considering the resulting debt burden and macroeconomic policy prospects. Our ratings following a debt restructuring tend to be in the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories, depending on the sovereign's new debt structure and capacity to support that debt.
Table 57
| Zambia | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022e | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e | |
| GDP per capita (in ‘000) | 1.28 | 1.54 | 1.52 | 1.31 | 0.99 | 1.12 | 1.41 | 1.47 | 1.51 | 1.56 |
| GDP growth | 3.76 | 3.50 | 4.03 | 1.44 | (2.80) | 4.60 | 2.90 | 3.20 | 3.20 | 3.20 |
| GDP per capita growth | 0.69 | 0.49 | 1.05 | (1.45) | (5.56) | 1.55 | (0.10) | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| Current account balance/GDP | (3.26) | (1.68) | (1.30) | 0.65 | 12.01 | 12.93 | 1.52 | 0.47 | 1.02 | 1.46 |
| Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR | 118.32 | 115.33 | 114.95 | 115.84 | 101.47 | 103.62 | 109.03 | 111.86 | 111.16 | 110.08 |
| Narrow net external debt/CAR | 90.12 | 96.67 | 92.98 | 132.06 | 150.07 | 116.02 | 112.26 | 113.25 | 111.71 | 110.28 |
| GG balance/GDP | (5.75) | (7.59) | (8.15) | (8.15) | (13.78) | (8.48) | (7.50) | (7.50) | (6.50) | (6.00) |
| GG net debt/GDP | 54.73 | 58.70 | 70.19 | 85.28 | 131.81 | 113.68 | 112.91 | 112.65 | 111.40 | 109.73 |
| CPI inflation | 17.87 | 6.58 | 7.49 | 9.15 | 15.73 | 22.02 | 11.50 | 10.00 | 9.00 | 8.00 |
| Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP | 12.16 | 11.31 | 11.82 | 12.74 | 12.61 | 9.06 | 9.24 | 9.38 | 9.52 | 9.67 |
Related Research
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Frank Gill, Madrid + 34 91 788 7213; frank.gill@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contact: | Samuel Tilleray, London + 442071768255; samuel.tilleray@spglobal.com |
| Additional Contact: | Sovereign and IPF EMEA; SOVIPF@spglobal.com |
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