articles Ratings /ratings/en/research/articles/230126-americas-sovereign-rating-trends-2023-high-inflation-and-weak-growth-prospects-are-risks-to-rating-stability-12621999 content esgSubNav
In This List
COMMENTS

Americas Sovereign Rating Trends 2023: High Inflation And Weak Growth Prospects Are Risks To Rating Stability

COMMENTS

Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research

COMMENTS

Credit FAQ: Argentina's Economic Vulnerabilities Remain Substantial Despite Recent Progress

COMMENTS

Your Three Minutes In Swiss Cantons: Are Hospitals A Major Financial Risk?

COMMENTS

Your Three Minutes In CEE Sovereign Ratings: External Positions Remain Resilient


Americas Sovereign Rating Trends 2023: High Inflation And Weak Growth Prospects Are Risks To Rating Stability

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Rating Outlook And Trends

S&P Global Ratings expects that sovereign ratings in the Americas will largely remain stable in 2023, despite weak economic prospects, recently high inflation and rising cost of funding. However, we have negative outlooks on the ratings of five regional sovereigns, indicating that further erosion in credit quality is possible. Economic performance in the Latin American and Caribbean region within the Americas will depend in large part on growth in the U.S. and Asia, and on the trajectory of global inflation.

Excluding Canada and the U.S., the average credit rating of sovereigns in the Americas has remained just below 'BB' over the last year (see chart 1). The GDP-weighted average sovereign rating for these countries has also been stable between 'BB' and 'BB+' since June 2020. Including Canada and the U.S. in this calculation, the average rating improves to just above 'BB' and the GDP-weighted average figure rises slightly over 'AA-', reflecting the strong influence of these two large economies.

Chart 1

image

Sovereign credit quality for the Latin American and Caribbean region declined by almost a full notch during 2020 (see chart 1). The pandemic contributed to negative rating actions (either an outlook revision or downgrade) for more than half the sovereigns we rate between 2020 and 2021. During the second half of 2021 and in 2022, creditworthiness in these countries gradually improved, getting closer to the levels registered in 2019.

S&P Global Ratings rates 14 of the 31 sovereigns in the Americas in the investment-grade category ('BBB-' and above), the same number since December 2016 (see chart 2). The region's highest-rated sovereign is Canada ('AAA'), followed by the U.S. ('AA+'). Among the remaining sovereigns, the highest rated are Bermuda ('A+'), Falkland Islands ('A+'), and Chile ('A'). The lowest are Suriname ('SD'), and Argentina ('CCC+'). (Ratings referenced are long-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings.)

The rating categories with the largest number of sovereigns are 'BBB' and 'B', with nine and eight entities, respectively. The 'BBB' rating category has held the largest number of sovereign ratings in the region since mid-2012, but the majority of the sovereigns in the region have remained in the speculative-grade category (rated 'BB+' and below) since 2016.

Chart 2

image

Chart 3

image

Rating Actions In 2022

During 2022, we downgraded three sovereigns and upgraded two. In March 2022, we lowered our ratings on Peru to 'BBB' from 'BBB+'. In June, we lowered our long-term foreign currency rating on El Salvador to 'CCC+' from 'B-'. In October, we raised our rating on Nicaragua to 'B' from 'B-'. In December, we lowered our rating on Bolivia to 'B' from 'B+'. and raised our rating on the Dominican Republic to 'BB' from 'BB-'.

In addition to these rating actions, we revised the outlooks on Costa Rica, Curacao, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago to stable from negative. We revised the outlooks on Honduras to negative from stable and on Guatemala to positive from stable. Guatemala is the only sovereign in the Americas to have a positive outlook.

Most of the long-term ratings on sovereigns in the Americas carry stable outlooks, and in 2022, as many sovereign ratings had stable outlooks as there had been at the end of 2019. Investment-grade sovereigns with stable outlooks include Aruba, Bermuda, Canada, Chile, Curacao, Falkland Islands, Mexico, Montserrat, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, the U.S., and Uruguay. We have negative outlooks on five sovereigns: Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru.

Table 1

Latin America And The Caribbean Sovereign Rating Strengths And Weaknesses
Issuer Sovereign foreign currency ratings Institutional assessment Economic assessment External assessment Fiscal assessment, budget performance Fiscal assessment, debt Monetary assessment

Argentina

CCC+/Negative/C 6 5 6 6 5 6

Aruba

BBB/Stable/A-2 2 5 4 2 4 4

Bahamas

B+/Stable/B 4 4 6 6 4

Barbados

B-/Stable/B 5 5 6 4 5 6

Belize

B-/Stable/B 6 6 6 6 5

Bermuda

A+/Stable/A-1 2 2 3 1 4 5

Bolivia

B/Stable/B 5 5 5* 6 3 4

Brazil

BB-/Stable/B 4 5 2 6 6 3

Canada

AAA/Stable/A-1+ 1 1 2 2 4 1

Chile

A/Stable/A-1 2 4 4 3 2* 2

Colombia

BB+/Stable/B 3 4 6 4 4 3

Costa Rica

B/Stable/B 4 4 5 6 6 4

Curacao

BBB-/Stable/A-3 3 5 2 3 1 5

Dominican Republic

BB/Stable/B 3 4 5 5 4

Ecuador

B-/Stable/B 6 5 6 4 6

El Salvador

CCC+/Negative/C 5 5 5 6 6 6

Falkland Islands

A+/Stable/A-1 3 2 4 1 1 6

Guatemala

BB-/Positive/B 4 5 3 4 4 4

Honduras

BB-/Negative/B 5 5 2 6* 4 4

Jamaica

B+/Stable/B 4 6 4 2 6 4

Mexico

BBB/Stable/A-2 3 5 2 3 4 3

Montserrat

BBB-/Stable/A-3 2 5 3 4 1 5

Nicaragua

B/Stable/B 5

Panama

BBB/Negative/A-2 3 3 4 3* 4 5

Paraguay

BB/Stable/B 4 5 2 3 3 5

Peru

BBB/Negative/A-2 4 4 3 2 3 3

Suriname

SD/NM/SD 6 6 6 6 6 6

Trinidad and Tobago

BBB-/Stable/A-3 3 3 4 4

Turks and Caicos

BBB+/Stable/A-2 2 4 4 1 1 6

U.S.

AA+/Stable/A-1+ 1 1 2 5 6 1

Uruguay

BBB/Stable/A-2 3 3 2 5 4 5
1 (%) 6.5 6.5 0.0 12.9 12.9 6.5
2 (%) 16.1 6.5 25.8 9.7 6.5 3.2
3 (%) 22.6 9.7 16.1 19.4 16.1 12.9
4 (%) 25.8 22.6 22.6 22.6 29.0 29.0
5 (%) 16.1 45.2 12.9 9.7 12.9 25.8
6 (%) 12.9 9.7 22.6 25.8 22.6 22.6
Median 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Mean 3.7 4.3 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.3
Standard deviation 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.4
*Deterioration since June 2022. §Improvement since June 2022

Table 2

Americas Economic Outlook
--Real GDP growth (%)-- --GG balance/GDP (%)-- --Net GG debt/GDP (%)-- --Current account balance/GDP (%)-- --Narrow net ext. debt/CAR (%)--
2022 2023 2022 2023 2022 2023 2022 2023 2022 2023

Argentina

4.6 0.5 (3.7) (3.7) 68.7 63.0 (1.3) (1.2) 175.0 165.7

Aruba

3.6 2.6 (2.5) (2.3) 53.8 52.7 (3.9) (0.2) 2.2 5.2

Bahamas

8.0 1.1 (2.9) (2.2) 74.3 72.7 (9.9) (10.8) 49.5 48.4

Barbados

9.0 3.0 (3.1) (1.9) 113.7 107.7 (10.2) (7.2) 66.1 61.8

Belize

4.0 3.0 (5.3) (4.0) 66.9 67.0 (8.9) (7.4) 119.7 121.8

Bermuda

3.2 2.0 (1.5) (1.0) 5.0 4.4 11.8 11.5 (79.6) (81.5)

Bolivia

3.0 3.5 (6.8) (5.5) 57.0 61.5 (1.0) (1.7) 60.1 69.2

Brazil

2.9 0.5 (4.4) (6.3) 57.9 63.6 (2.5) (2.8) (2.8) (5.2)

Canada

3.1 0.1 (2.1) (1.8) 48.1 49.4 0.0 (0.5) 95.2 109.3

Chile

2.5 (0.5) 1.5 (2.7) 30.0 31.6 (8.0) (3.7) 97.3 92.6

Colombia

7.7 1.1 (6.5) (4.5) 59.0 59.3 (6.5) (4.4) 131.3 126.4

Costa Rica

4.2 2.8 (3.0) (3.4) 61.0 59.5 (4.9) (4.2) 44.4 48.2

Curacao

5.5 3.0 (3.2) (2.2) (37.6) (33.0) (26.9) (25.9) (45.6) (28.6)

Dominican Republic

5.0 4.0 (3.9) (3.6) 53.2 53.3 (5.1) (3.3) 80.7 76.6

Ecuador

2.7 2.6 (2.0) (1.8) 57.5 55.9 2.0 1.6 98.7 101.6

El Salvador

2.4 2.0 (3.1) (3.7) 74.8 75.5 (8.4) (6.2) 73.7 79.0

Falkland Islands

2.2 2.2 (8.8) (4.7) (168.1) (166.1) N/A N/A N/A N/A

Guatemala

4.0 3.5 (2.5) (2.4) 18.9 19.9 2.3 1.6 4.8 4.9

Honduras

3.0 3.6 (3.5) (3.6) 47.7 48.9 (3.8) (3.3) 11.2 17.0

Jamaica

4.0 2.5 0.5 0.4 70.0 65.7 (1.5) (1.5) 81.4 82.2

Mexico

2.6 0.8 (3.0) (2.9) 43.6 44.3 (1.3) (1.0) 22.9 23.8

Montserrat

3.2 3.0 0.0 0.0 (3.6) (2.0) (0.4) 0.9 (170.0) (167.3)

Nicaragua

4.0 3.0 (1.5) (1.3) 49.5 48.5 (4.4) (3.8) 75.9 75.1

Panama

6.0 4.5 (4.0) (3.0) 47.1 46.8 (3.9) (4.8) 68.5 61.2

Paraguay

(0.7) 5.0 (3.4) (2.7) 23.8 24.9 (5.0) (1.0) 40.0 39.7

Peru

2.2 2.5 (2.1) (2.1) 21.7 22.3 (3.9) (3.2) 28.4 26.5

Suriname

1.8 2.2 (6.1) (7.1) 86.8 76.2 (3.1) (0.1) 89.2 103.3

Trinidad and Tobago

2.0 2.5 (1.4) (1.9) 26.1 25.6 16.6 12.1 (38.3) (40.3)

Turks and Caicos

5.0 3.8 7.2 7.3 (53.3) (56.6) 16.5 16.6 (58.6) (57.9)

U.S

1.8 (0.1) (4.5) (4.8) 95.1 95.9 (3.9) (2.9) 374.9 374.0

Uruguay

4.8 2.9 (2.6) (2.7) 60.2 60.3 (2.3) (0.1) 12.4 12.9
GG--General government. CAR--Current account receipts.

Latin America And The Caribbean: Shortcomings In Governance And Weak Economic Growth

Shortcomings in governance and weak economic growth could contribute to some negative rating actions in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023. Regional growth is likely to dip below 1% in 2023 from an impressive 3.4% last year due to weaker domestic demand and higher cost of funding. Unemployment is generally back to pre-pandemic levels, although the labor force participation rate has not yet recovered to previous peaks in some countries. Governments face the challenge of slower growth while dealing with the legacy of the pandemic, including a much higher net general government debt burden and, in many countries, a weaker and divided social and political environment (see chart 4).

Chart 4

image

Although there are only two national elections scheduled in 2023 in Latin America (Paraguay and Argentina), the region faces serious political challenges. Public protests, and sometimes prolonged political impasse between the executive and legislative branches of government, have affected governance in many countries by limiting the capacity to effectively implement economic policies on a timely basis.

For example, conflicts between Congress and the president have led to frequent changes of government in Peru, which has had six presidents since 2016. Widespread public protests against the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador have hampered their ability to undertake difficult policy decisions to stabilize public finances. An attempt to write a new constitution failed last year in Chile after the proposed draft was overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum. While the constitutional process has been orderly in Chile, it has led to investor uncertainty about the new rules of the economic game. In Brazil, some supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who narrowly lost the presidential election last year to newly elected President Lula da Silva (commonly known as Lula), have contested the election results, leading to violence in the capital city.

International rankings indicate that the quality of public institutions is low in the region (with the exception of Chile and Uruguay). This shortcoming is reflected in recent concerns about potential weakening of institutions based on proposed changes to the election institute in Mexico. In Argentina, disputes over fiscal policy and other legal matters (involving former President Cristina Kirchner) have sparked confrontation between the government and the judiciary. In Honduras, the selection of members for a new supreme court has sparked political tensions. The new court may soon decide on sensitive issues, such as the right of the president and members of Congress to seek reelection.

Such negative political features, combined with a decelerating global economy, higher interest rates, and geopolitical uncertainty, contribute to poor GDP growth prospects in much of the region. The region is likely to continue its long-term trend of modest GDP growth this year (see charts 5-6). The two biggest economies in the region, Brazil and Mexico, both exhibit low GDP growth (below the level of their peers at a similar level of development). The two regional economies with the best growth history, Dominican Republic and Panama, are small countries.

Chart 5

image

Higher commodity prices, especially if China's economy recovers quickly from the impact of pandemic-linked lockdowns, could sustain exports and GDP growth in many South American countries but would have the opposite impact on most of the Caribbean and Central America, which are net commodity importers. Recently higher local interest rates, combined with low GDP growth, illustrate the need to undertake structural changes in fiscal policy to stabilize and eventually lower the sovereign debt burden, which has risen uniformly in the region since 2019.

Chart 6

image

The impact of negative external developments upon the region has been cushioned by monetary flexibility in many countries, typically based on a flexible exchange rate, inflation-targeting monetary policy, and growth of domestic capital markets that reduces reliance on external funding. Central banks in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil undertook timely steps to contain inflation and expectations of future inflation, safeguarding their monetary flexibility (a key factor in sovereign credit ratings). Decelerating inflation should contain the recent rise in interest rates and lead some central banks to cut policy rates later this year.

Chart 7

image

Country Highlights

Brazil

The quality of governance will be a key factor in promoting economic growth in Brazil, whose GDP recovered only in 2022 to its previous peak level of 2014. Growth is likely to dip below 1% in 2023 and rise barely above 2% in the next couple of years. The country's complex institutional framework, with extensive division of powers, has constrained the government's ability to address fiscal and economic rigidities that have limited GDP growth. The newly elected center-left Lula administration has to work with a largely centrist Congress within a divided political environment following a closely contested national election. Brazil recently amended its constitution to allow for higher government spending in 2023, illustrating the challenge of pursuing a fiscal policy that could stabilize public finances.

Mexico

Economic growth recovered to almost 3% in 2022, helping to stabilize public finances, but is likely decline this year. Success in capitalizing on changes in global supply chains could boost foreign direct investment and exports, potentially improving Mexico's lackluster long-term growth performance. On the political front, the governing center left MORENA political party will choose its candidate this year for the 2024 national elections while the currently weak and divided opposition parties will attempt to unite behind a single presidential candidate and a unified list for Congress. We expect continuity in economic policies in the next two years, but economic growth is likely to remain modest, just above 2% on average after this year.

Peru

Political deadlock and frequent changes of government have damaged Peru's institutional stability and raised uncertainty about its capacity to sustain key economic policies. Peru's weak interim government, led by the former vice president after the former president was removed from office in December 2022, faces continued violent public protests demanding early national elections. Congress recently voted for a constitutional reform to bring the next election forward by two years to 2024, but the electoral schedule may change again based on unpredictable political dynamics. The current turmoil reflects discredited political institutions and an extreme fragmentation of political parties. Economic growth decelerated in 2022 toward 2% due largely to political developments (which hurt private investment). The negative impact on public finances has been limited thus far (the fiscal deficit was around 2% of GDP in 2022) but could increase if political dynamics worsen beyond our expectations.

Colombia

The election last year of center-left President Gustavo Petro in Colombia, a country long-governed by centrist or conservative leaders, has injected uncertainty about economic policies, especially in the energy sector. The recent change in government, along with rapid economic recovery, has lowered social tensions after massive public protests in 2021. However, failure to meet heightened expectations of change could weaken the Petro administration's public standing or spark protests that result in higher government spending. The Colombian economy is likely to decelerate sharply in 2023 to around 1% growth after expanding around 8% last year.

Chile

Chilean authorities will try a second time to write a new constitution in 2023 after the first attempt was overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum last year. The new draft, which is likely to be more moderate in its contents than the first one, will be subject to another referendum in December 2023. The process of political reform is orderly and stable in Chile, in contrast with Peru, but it does impose short-term costs through investor uncertainty. The government of President Gabriel Boric has proposed pension reform (in response to public demands for a better pension system) and tax reform to garner added resources for more social spending. The Chilean economy is likely to contract mildly in 2023. That, plus the low popularity of the administration, could complicate the passage of the reforms.

Argentina

Entrenched political and policy disagreement across the political spectrum, combined with national elections later this year, will constrain policymaking in Argentina. High inflation, approaching 100%; dwindling foreign exchange reserves; and a drought that has hurt agricultural exports underpin the sovereign's weak credit standing. The government lacks access to global capital markets and has only limited ability to secure new deficit financing and smooth rollovers in the small peso debt market. As a result, it has been undertaking liability management operations to manage maturing debt, which led us to lower the local currency rating to 'SD' (selective default) on Jan. 6 because we viewed the exchange as distressed rather than opportunistic. The government is likely to continue with such exchanges to manage the majority of its peso maturities and then conduct auctions to refinance smaller amounts of debt coming due, at least until the elections.

Trinidad and Tobago

Favorable oil and gas prices helped arrest six consecutive years of economic contraction as the economy likely expanded by 4%-5% in 2022 and may grow 2.5% in 2023. Trinidad and Tobago is heavily dependent on oil, gas, and petrochemicals and should continue to benefit from high prices in these sectors this year (though prices may be lower than in 2022). Higher prices have offset declining oil output and lower-than-anticipated gas production in the economic recovery, and have supported improved fiscal balances. After a steep increase in net government debt to GDP in 2020, to 25% from 10% in 2019, we expect net debt will stabilize around 25% of GDP in the next two years.

Jamaica

Jamaica is likely to continue its long-term policy of reducing its heavy debt burden and strengthening the foundations of economic growth. GDP could expand 2.5% in 2023, after likely growing 4% last year, bolstered by strong remittances and tourism. The government's commitment to fiscal restraint was unwavering during the pandemic, and net debt as a share of GDP is once again declining. Inflation has declined recently but remains above the Bank of Jamaica's target range.

U.S. And Canada: Resilient Economies

The U.S. and Canada should sustain high sovereign ratings despite decelerating GDP growth and rising interest rates. Recent midterm elections in the U.S. led to a change in Congress, with Republicans holding a slight majority in the House of Representatives and the Democrats in the Senate. The close results set the stage for more political disagreements on economic and other issues. However, they are not likely to undermine the Federal Reserve Bank's monetary policy nor result in substantial change in fiscal policy. We expect Congress will engage in brinksmanship with the government debt ceiling but will address it on time, either by raising it or suspending it.

Economic recovery and fiscal adjustment has helped reduce fiscal deficits in Canada, which has been governed by a Liberal minority government since 2019. We expect Canada's general government fiscal deficit to drop to around 1.8% of GDP in 2023 from 2.1% in 2022, stabilizing its net debt burden around 49% of GDP (compared with 37% at the end of 2019, prior to the pandemic).

Sovereign Summaries

Argentina (CCC+/Negative/C)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects increased risks in containing pronounced economic imbalances as the 2023 primaries and national elections are less than a year away. Global capital markets are closed to Argentina while the small size of the local market limits debt management alongside large peso-denominated amortizations. Policy disagreement within the government coalition, and infighting among the opposition, are undermining the prospect of placing local debt at longer horizons. These factors are effectively shortening the tenors at which debt in the local market is placed.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next six to 12 months on unexpected negative policy or political developments that undermine already limited access to financing from the local market or official sources. Meaningful setbacks in execution under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) would complicate access to IMF financing, and potentially from other multilateral lending institutions (MLIs). This scenario would likely further damage local investor confidence and hamper access to peso-denominated debt markets. It could also exacerbate the need for recourse to central bank financing amid challenging inflation dynamics and lead to a downgrade. Heightened pressure in local financial markets, including the banking system's deposit base, or difficulties in managing central bank debt (LELIQs), could also lead to a downgrade.

Moreover, further debt exchanges at this low rating level would raise the likelihood that we would classify an exchange as distressed, since such developments would typically indicate a greater risk of a conventional default if creditors do not participate in the exchange.

Table 3

Argentina
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 12.79 14.63 11.82 10.02 8.52 10.61 13.83 15.18 19.18 25.23
GDP growth (2.08) 2.82 (2.62) (5.09) (7.01) 10.40 4.60 0.47 2.27 2.04
GDP per capita growth (3.05) 1.82 (3.55) (5.98) (7.86) 9.41 3.69 (0.39) 1.41 1.20
Current account balance/GDP (2.71) (4.84) (5.16) (0.78) 0.81 1.38 (1.29) (1.15) (1.56) (1.89)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 130.50 149.55 127.33 113.69 124.58 135.87 142.82 144.30 141.71 139.73
Narrow net external debt/CAR 147.28 185.15 208.41 229.22 272.56 202.40 174.97 165.66 139.30 110.76
GG balance/GDP (6.93) (6.67) (5.73) (1.60) (7.80) (4.07) (3.71) (3.71) (3.66) (3.60)
GG net debt/GDP 45.57 49.31 74.83 84.10 95.51 72.11 68.67 62.96 46.70 39.15
CPI inflation 38.96 24.84 34.28 53.55 42.02 48.41 71.04 94.97 76.03 50.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 12.93 15.10 14.52 11.50 11.87 9.97 9.79 9.59 9.26 8.95
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Aruba (BBB/Stable /A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook balances the pressures on public finances due to the lingering effects of the pandemic on tourism and the economy with our assumption of continued access to concessionary funding. This, coupled with successful implementation of Aruba's reform package, could lead to declining debt and more favorable fiscal outcomes over time. The agreements reached between Aruba and the Netherlands are credit-positive, but their implementation is key to ensuring favorable funding from the Netherlands.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next two years if there are difficulties in implementing the reforms agreed upon with the Netherlands to stabilize the government's fiscal outcomes, leading to persistently large government deficits and higher debt beyond our current expectations. If such difficulties were to prompt weakening in the bilateral relationship, signaling an erosion of institutional strength, we could also lower the ratings by one or more notches.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next two years if the pace of economic recovery significantly exceeds our expectations and Aruba's per capita GDP significantly improves, beyond pre-pandemic levels. This, together with the achievement of more sustainable public finances, potentially from a track record of successful implementation of the reforms envisioned in the agreement with the Netherlands, could lead to an upgrade.

Table 4

Aruba
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 27.45 28.45 29.41 30.85 24.03 29.03 31.28 33.11 34.67 35.62
GDP growth 2.12 5.48 5.25 0.65 (18.59) 17.16 3.56 2.60 2.50 2.00
GDP per capita growth 1.37 5.48 5.06 0.37 (18.14) 18.14 2.81 1.85 1.75 1.26
Current account balance/GDP 2.72 0.20 (0.73) 2.71 (12.28) 3.59 (3.89) (0.19) 0.27 0.58
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 107.03 111.28 110.30 104.93 132.27 107.20 128.22 119.05 122.90 126.31
Narrow net external debt/CAR 1.45 (2.65) (1.29) (0.51) 6.77 (3.53) 2.23 5.15 6.41 5.92
GG balance/GDP (1.59) 0.38 (0.32) 4.67 (14.13) (5.37) (2.52) (2.30) (1.57) (0.92)
GG net debt/GDP 36.98 36.86 36.67 33.60 58.34 55.67 53.76 52.66 51.39 50.43
CPI inflation (0.93) (1.03) 3.63 4.26 (0.80) 0.70 6.00 4.00 3.00 1.50
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 57.22 57.25 57.26 59.26 77.74 64.76 64.76 64.76 64.76 64.76
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

The Bahamas (B+/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that economic growth will support government revenues and reduce pressure on government expenditures, leading to smaller fiscal deficits over the next 12 months. The stable outlook also assumes no material adverse impact on The Bahamas, including to the local banking sector, from the recent bankruptcy of FTX, a crypto-currency exchange with a presence in the country. We expect continued, but decelerating, growth in the national debt. We expect the country's relatively large financing needs will be met by the domestic market and multilateral lenders.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months should economic performance lag, pointing to GDP per capita remaining below our expectations. We could also lower the ratings if we believe that The Bahamas' access to external liquidity will deteriorate sharply and suddenly.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next 12 months if the government advances faster than we expect to establish a track record of enacting meaningful financial reform, demonstrating an ability to raise revenues and leading to sustained near-balanced financial results and improved economic prospects.

Table 5

Bahamas
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 31.31 32.37 33.08 33.87 24.67 28.81 32.49 33.74 34.53 35.56
GDP growth (0.86) 3.05 1.83 1.90 (23.82) 13.72 8.00 1.11 1.38 1.38
GDP per capita growth (1.84) 2.02 0.81 0.89 (24.55) 14.96 6.63 0.09 0.37 1.38
Current account balance/GDP (12.44) (13.38) (9.40) (2.62) (24.47) (23.09) (9.92) (10.78) (11.31) (11.77)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 531.28 327.58 256.03 203.25 521.22 346.94 267.59 292.18 306.58 295.53
Narrow net external debt/CAR 42.58 35.31 29.12 11.16 103.82 65.06 49.45 48.36 46.24 43.54
GG balance/GDP (5.70) (3.43) (1.78) (6.44) (15.62) (7.39) (2.85) (2.22) (1.30) (0.79)
GG net debt/GDP 40.13 47.78 47.23 46.63 83.10 79.85 74.26 72.67 71.34 69.57
CPI inflation (0.35) 1.52 2.27 2.49 0.04 2.90 6.20 3.80 2.00 1.60
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 54.03 49.95 49.08 47.16 60.93 52.03 45.94 44.17 43.08 42.18
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Barbados (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects S&P Global Ratings' view that despite difficult global economic conditions, Barbados's new IMF program, underpinned by its domestic 2022 BERT program, will facilitate access to financing from multilateral institutions. At the same time, high reserves will continue to provide external liquidity to support Barbados' balance-of-payment position.

Downside scenario.  We could lower our ratings in the next year if the impact of external conditions leads to larger deficits than we expect, and we believe that the government would not have sufficient funding to meet its fiscal or external financing needs.

Upside scenario.  We could raise our ratings in the next year if the risks of global external conditions to the economy and government finances diminish sooner than expected, combined with strengthening confidence in government policymaking, which contributes to improved GDP growth prospects and supports primary balance surpluses and improved monetary transmission mechanisms. Higher economic growth would facilitate a reduced debt burden, which, together with an expectation of continued access to official funding, could lead to an upgrade.

Table 6

Barbados
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 16.90 17.42 17.87 18.48 16.32 16.90 19.87 21.26 22.09 22.96
GDP growth 2.85 0.58 (1.00) (0.70) (14.00) 0.50 9.00 3.00 2.00 2.00
GDP per capita growth 2.68 0.43 (1.14) (0.83) (14.10) 0.38 8.87 2.87 1.88 1.88
Current account balance/GDP (4.26) (3.82) (4.37) (2.77) (5.92) (10.87) (10.24) (7.19) (6.72) (6.35)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 184.28 230.79 236.48 199.40 275.57 222.86 210.60 160.36 153.31 152.72
Narrow net external debt/CAR 66.06 65.77 84.17 68.08 91.68 92.95 66.05 61.81 61.91 64.51
GG balance/GDP (3.40) (3.20) (0.30) 3.63 (4.58) (5.05) (3.14) (1.94) (1.78) (1.40)
GG net debt/GDP 138.73 137.47 114.75 109.01 125.34 130.55 113.67 107.65 104.80 101.62
CPI inflation 1.28 4.66 3.67 4.10 3.00 2.97 8.00 4.00 2.00 2.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 88.75 88.04 83.86 81.15 92.35 88.24 76.34 72.82 71.65 70.70
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Belize (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook balances continued economic recovery with high inflation, weak external liquidity, and risks related to still-high government debt. We expect the government will make gradual progress strengthening public finances over the next 12 months.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next six to 24 months if adverse developments elevate fiscal and external imbalances beyond our expectations or hamper access to official lending. Failure to capitalize on the fiscal benefits of the recent sovereign debt restructuring, combined with poor external liquidity and a still-high debt burden, could eventually weaken the government's liquidity, leading to a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next 12-18 months if we see a track record of strengthening economic and fiscal results and sustainable improvement in external liquidity. Successful implementation of fiscal measures resulting in consistent debt reduction, and better GDP growth and long-term economic prospects, could lead to an upgrade.

Table 7

Belize
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.90 5.84 5.74 5.83 4.88 5.83 6.34 6.57 6.64 6.73
GDP growth (2.32) (0.98) 0.34 4.55 (13.68) 19.34 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00
GDP per capita growth (4.81) (3.51) (1.69) 1.32 (16.34) 16.29 1.36 0.39 (0.58) (0.58)
Current account balance/GDP (6.81) (6.36) (6.95) (7.76) (6.22) (6.26) (8.91) (7.37) (6.55) (6.71)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 134.35 139.14 136.75 134.64 151.44 144.28 150.08 156.10 159.92 165.29
Narrow net external debt/CAR 72.13 81.60 78.32 80.67 122.92 109.63 119.68 121.80 121.86 124.86
GG balance/GDP (3.27) (1.17) (0.88) (3.76) (8.57) (4.98) (5.29) (4.04) (3.18) (1.95)
GG net debt/GDP 65.55 71.53 71.70 70.42 89.88 66.53 66.94 66.97 67.75 67.11
CPI inflation 0.71 1.11 0.30 0.20 0.10 3.22 7.50 3.37 1.72 1.96
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 45.17 44.56 46.66 47.08 56.09 46.59 46.59 46.60 46.62 46.63
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Bermuda (A+/Stable/A-1)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 2
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the economic recovery underway in Bermuda will continue during the forecast horizon and assumes no negative impact from any possible changes in global regulatory or taxation regimes on Bermuda's international financial sector (IFS). We expect a fiscal deficit of 1.5% of GDP in line with the government's budget this year. We assume that a combination of GDP growth, recovering revenues, and a commitment to fiscal consolidation will lead to falling fiscal deficits, and reduce the government's net debt burden.

Downside scenario.  Unexpected weakness in Bermuda's IFS sector, as a result of sector uncertainty, or changes in global regulation or taxation that weaken the territory's external position, public finances, and growth trajectory could lead to a downgrade. Similarly, a failure to improve government finances leading to sustained fiscal deficits and an increased interest burden, or a fall in the government's large liquid assets to less than 25% of GDP on a sustained basis, would weaken Bermuda's fiscal assessment. Under either scenario, we could lower the ratings over the next two years.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings if the territory returns to more robust real GDP growth on a sustained basis, potentially through greater economic diversification. That, in turn, could result in persistently improved public finances that lead to a strengthened debt profile particularly a lower interest/revenue ratio. However, we believe that such a scenario will likely take longer than our two-year outlook horizon.

Table 8

Bermuda
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 107.74 110.91 111.96 115.80 107.12 110.46 119.83 125.92 130.12 133.88
GDP growth (0.66) 3.61 (0.43) 0.31 (6.85) 1.56 3.18 1.97 1.14 0.79
GDP per capita growth 1.62 3.46 (0.43) 0.32 (6.82) 1.56 3.28 2.07 1.24 0.89
Current account balance/GDP 12.13 12.10 13.22 11.12 12.47 14.37 11.77 11.47 11.62 11.78
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 354.93 332.30 319.28 208.87 225.29 186.42 185.26 183.40 181.17 179.10
Narrow net external debt/CAR (52.96) (59.35) (55.96) (54.68) (84.44) (77.79) (79.60) (81.48) (83.91) (85.83)
GG balance/GDP (3.64) (1.20) (1.72) (4.68) (5.87) (2.30) (1.50) (0.98) (0.96) (0.94)
GG net debt/GDP (2.02) (1.72) 1.28 2.12 2.48 5.39 5.01 4.38 3.33 2.56
CPI inflation 1.50 1.90 1.40 1.00 0.03 1.50 5.20 3.00 2.10 2.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 127.58 120.09 110.66 118.09 126.03 123.55 114.56 109.66 106.73 104.34
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Bolivia (B/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook indicates our expectation that continued economic recovery and some expenditure containment measures should gradually reduce Bolivia's fiscal deficit, resulting in net general government debt stabilizing just above 60% of GDP.

We also consider the benefits of the recent debt management operation that reduced foreign commercial debt payment obligations for 2023 to $183 million, from $500 originally. This liability management operation, coupled with our expectation of continued access to official and commercial funding, should help sustain external liquidity and manage rising--but still moderate--current account deficits (CADs) in the next 12 months.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next year if unexpected shocks to commodity prices or deepening political impasse deteriorates investor confidence and leads to a sudden loss of external liquidity, further weakening Bolivia's external profile. Gross external financing needs are set to continue rising amid CADs and higher external debt. In that context, the sovereign's continued access to external funding is key to preventing further strain on the central bank's foreign exchange reserves, in a de facto fixed exchange rate regime. Unexpected adverse movement in the exchange rate could increase the sovereign's debt and interest payments (as a share of its revenues) and affect the liquidity of the local banking sector.

We could also lower the rating if the country's trend rate of GDP growth declines to levels below that of other countries at a similar level of development.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings in the next 12-18 months if effective policy management leads to faster-than-expected correction of the fiscal gap and reduction of the sovereign's debt and interest burden. Political initiatives to curb expenditure growth or boost revenues while sustaining economic growth could bolster Bolivia's budgetary flexibility and help contain external pressures.

Table 9

Bolivia
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 3.08 3.35 3.55 3.55 3.14 3.41 3.55 3.56 3.50 3.56
GDP growth 4.26 4.20 4.22 2.22 (8.74) 6.11 3.00 3.50 3.00 3.00
GDP per capita growth 2.70 2.65 2.65 0.80 (10.03) 4.63 1.59 2.09 1.61 1.62
Current account balance/GDP (5.73) (5.06) (4.28) (3.37) (0.74) 2.10 (0.98) (1.67) (2.05) (2.08)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 55.69 67.08 66.12 68.56 66.22 71.92 86.40 91.46 93.24 95.36
Narrow net external debt/CAR (39.17) (22.72) (1.58) 37.45 75.20 58.66 60.07 69.23 79.04 81.04
GG balance/GDP (3.36) (5.03) (5.97) (6.91) (13.07) (8.46) (6.84) (5.52) (5.28) (4.49)
GG net debt/GDP 17.78 22.06 26.71 31.41 47.21 52.87 57.04 61.47 63.82 65.27
CPI inflation 3.62 2.82 2.27 1.84 0.94 0.74 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 59.84 60.13 62.84 66.71 77.77 73.36 73.36 74.34 75.30 75.55
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Brazil (BB-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our base-case assumption of some fiscal deterioration due to high interest cost and persistent fiscal pressure, but adherence to fiscal anchors, resulting in limited growth of Brazil's fiscal debt over the next 24 months. The outlook incorporates moderate economic growth, declining inflation, and a strong external position.

Downside scenario.  Amid a weak fiscal and debt profile, we could lower the ratings over the next two years if the incoming national government fails to provide a credible fiscal anchor, potentially signaling weaker institutional capacity. In our view, looser fiscal policy would reduce the sovereign's monetary flexibility, resulting in persistently high inflation and likely unsustainable trend growth. A worsening of Brazil's currently strong external position could also result in a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings in the next two years if better-than-expected policy implementation results in faster and sustainable GDP growth and structurally stronger fiscal performance

Table 10

Brazil
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 8.70 9.92 9.14 8.87 6.94 7.70 8.99 9.32 9.76 10.15
GDP growth (3.28) 1.32 1.78 1.22 (3.28) 4.99 2.89 0.54 1.99 2.15
GDP per capita growth (4.07) 0.51 0.99 0.47 (3.96) 4.30 2.24 (0.05) 1.42 1.61
Current account balance/GDP (1.70) (1.23) (2.86) (3.63) (1.91) (2.81) (2.49) (2.81) (2.76) (2.66)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 65.75 64.54 65.64 70.50 65.87 71.59 71.69 75.57 76.08 75.43
Narrow net external debt/CAR (0.93) (6.46) (8.18) (5.44) (10.43) 0.91 (2.82) (5.15) (6.68) (9.98)
GG balance/GDP (7.68) (8.83) (7.13) (5.33) (11.96) (2.60) (4.42) (6.26) (6.16) (6.23)
GG net debt/GDP 52.35 56.44 56.41 54.36 66.67 56.83 57.91 63.61 66.99 70.55
CPI inflation 8.74 3.45 3.66 3.73 3.21 8.30 9.27 4.27 4.24 3.39
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 59.67 53.58 51.23 51.76 58.55 58.48 61.81 64.19 65.15 66.51
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Canada (AAA/Stable/A-1+)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 1
  • Economic assessment: 1
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal Assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 1
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects S&P Global Ratings' view that Canada's high wealth, economic diversification, and ample fiscal and monetary buffers are helping the country recover from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and leave it well positioned to face future potential shocks.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next two years if Canada's fiscal or debt position weaken substantially, without positive signals from the government of future corrective actions, and if this is accompanied by unexpected poor economic performance. We could also lower the ratings should a much weaker fiscal position be accompanied by a substantial and sustained weakening in Canada's net external position, raising external vulnerabilities.

Table 11

Canada
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 42.32 45.13 46.55 46.33 43.29 52.01 53.09 50.35 52.55 57.06
GDP growth 1.00 3.04 2.78 1.88 (5.23) 4.54 3.14 0.05 1.11 1.94
GDP per capita growth (0.14) 1.81 1.34 0.43 (6.25) 3.94 1.27 (1.03) 0.02 0.84
Current account balance/GDP (3.09) (2.80) (2.38) (2.04) (1.79) 0.04 0.03 (0.49) (0.78) 0.08
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 154.89 154.74 150.12 154.36 176.15 189.72 179.95 168.45 170.78 167.15
Narrow net external debt/CAR 122.22 120.16 103.12 104.22 108.36 89.88 95.16 109.34 116.98 119.61
GG balance/GDP (0.16) 0.82 1.19 0.70 (11.21) (3.60) (2.09) (1.79) (1.39) (0.99)
GG net debt/GDP 42.34 38.45 38.47 36.66 52.13 49.72 48.13 49.38 50.01 49.29
CPI inflation 1.44 1.60 2.24 1.96 0.73 3.40 6.62 2.66 1.41 2.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 170.96 171.59 173.83 174.91 192.56 184.03 179.94 185.41 188.66 188.79
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Chile (A/Stable/A-1)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
  • Monetary assessment: 2
Outlook: Stable

While the constitutional debate continues, we expect Chile's economic policy to gradually advance in addressing social tensions and the shortcomings of its economic model over the next 24 months. This will also help sustain economic growth over time. Restoring macroeconomic fundamentals will prevent further deterioration of Chile's external position.

Downside scenario.  Over the next 24 months, we could lower our ratings if persistent political uncertainty stalls policy implementation and hinders economic growth. Moreover, persistently higher-than-expected current account deficits, translating into a fast buildup of external debt and financing needs, could also lead to a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could raise our ratings over the next 24 months if Chile's economic growth prospects strengthen as a result of proper policy implementation. Stronger growth, added to prudent fiscal management, could help Chile regain fiscal and external buffers recently used to withstand the impact of the pandemic and social upheaval.

Table 12

Chile
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 13.72 15.00 15.75 14.58 12.99 16.18 15.16 15.94 17.55 18.62
GDP growth 1.75 1.36 3.99 0.77 (5.98) 11.67 2.52 (0.45) 2.88 0.28
GDP per capita growth 0.66 (0.03) 2.15 (1.11) (7.67) 10.88 1.47 (1.17) 2.21 (0.33)
Current account balance/GDP (2.62) (2.76) (4.49) (5.21) (1.69) (6.40) (7.95) (3.65) (3.51) (3.54)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 110.01 111.14 119.50 120.90 121.44 122.10 120.58 119.34 118.36 118.00
Narrow net external debt/CAR 27.28 36.33 44.67 59.64 76.42 85.64 97.29 92.60 88.90 87.10
GG balance/GDP (2.66) (2.63) (1.48) (2.73) (7.13) (7.48) 1.50 (2.70) (2.00) (1.50)
GG net debt/GDP 7.16 10.92 13.04 15.32 22.35 30.31 29.98 31.57 30.33 29.81
CPI inflation 3.79 2.18 2.43 2.55 3.06 4.52 11.53 7.90 4.19 3.01
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 84.99 82.77 86.88 92.87 94.08 86.18 84.04 83.79 84.14 84.51
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Colombia (BB+/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook indicates our expectation that sustained economic growth will help to curtail fiscal deficits and stabilize net general government debt at around 60% of GDP over the next two to three years. Moreover, we expect monetary tightening to help contain inflation. Our base case also assumes broad continuity in fiscal, monetary, and pro-growth economic policies after a presidential transition in August 2022.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings during the next two years if economic growth is below our expectations, potentially indicating less economic resilience in the context of tighter global and domestic financial conditions, or if the government's ability to maintain political consensus on policies to sustain growth prospects unexpectedly weakens. We could also lower the rating if large current account deficits (CAD) deteriorate, resulting in higher external debt and an unexpected deterioration in external financing conditions.

Upside scenario.  Conversely, we could raise the ratings over the next 24 months if economic growth is consistently and significantly faster than expected, coupled with structural measures that reduce Colombia's fiscal deficit, lower its debt burden, and strengthen public finances. A larger and more diverse export sector, helping to reduce external vulnerability and strengthen economic resilience, could also lead to an upgrade.

Table 13

Colombia
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 6.04 6.58 6.93 6.54 5.37 5.93 6.40 6.14 6.45 6.73
GDP growth 2.09 1.36 2.56 3.19 (7.05) 10.68 7.74 1.08 3.03 3.34
GDP per capita growth 0.96 0.10 0.78 0.81 (8.85) 11.04 4.82 0.02 1.99 2.32
Current account balance/GDP (4.45) (3.18) (4.20) (4.58) (3.46) (5.92) (6.50) (4.39) (4.17) (4.14)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 89.52 94.62 98.81 99.86 93.68 96.56 98.70 95.26 94.06 93.54
Narrow net external debt/CAR 120.93 114.78 113.80 116.72 171.69 145.41 131.29 126.35 121.00 113.43
GG balance/GDP (2.80) (2.32) (1.95) (1.88) (7.31) (7.01) (6.51) (4.54) (3.98) (3.54)
GG net debt/GDP 36.69 37.89 41.21 43.25 55.84 56.91 59.03 59.25 59.73 59.90
CPI inflation 7.51 4.32 3.24 3.50 2.54 3.49 10.02 6.70 3.57 2.98
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 50.26 52.73 51.14 51.41 55.82 52.32 49.36 49.88 50.94 52.18
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Costa Rica (B/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook incorporates our assumptions that fiscal consolidation efforts and slow advancement of some policy measures included in the IMF program will continue over the next year, irrespective of who wins the presidential election on April 3. We believe maintaining access to official external financing amid more challenging and uncertain global economic conditions is key to sustaining funding flexibility and maintaining confidence in the local and global capital markets.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if implementation setbacks or policy reversals threaten to worsen local market conditions and raise debt management risk. In 2021, deficit financing relied almost wholly on the local market, and space provided by official lenders--or potentially global capital markets--could prove important in 2022. While funding needs have declined as deficits have come down, they remain high.

Setbacks could include challenges in securing congressional approval for external financing, be it from capital markets or official creditors. Under such a scenario, recourse to the central bank or other unconventional financing could cause us to view the country's institutional framework and ability to support public finances less favorably--despite widespread checks and balances and a solid democratic tradition--and lead us to lower the ratings.

Upside scenario.  Conversely, we could raise the ratings over the next 12 months if the government and Legislative Assembly continue to advance concrete measures that anchor fiscal policy in line with the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), alongside execution of the public employment bill and 2018 fiscal reform. Such steps would likely support investor confidence, sustain fluid access to local market and official borrowing as well as foreign direct investment (FDI), and reduce the country's external vulnerability.

Table 14

Costa Rica
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 11.99 12.19 11.93 13.11 11.74 12.14 13.39 15.21 15.32 15.85
GDP growth 4.20 4.16 2.62 2.42 (4.27) 7.78 4.20 2.80 3.20 3.30
GDP per capita growth 2.97 2.96 1.47 1.35 (5.26) 6.71 3.09 1.70 2.10 2.20
Current account balance/GDP (2.14) (3.62) (3.12) (1.24) (1.06) (3.40) (4.88) (4.18) (4.02) (3.91)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 98.39 106.88 108.25 104.92 98.47 107.77 111.68 109.72 110.65 111.65
Narrow net external debt/CAR 49.19 50.49 49.63 44.97 54.53 51.39 44.43 48.21 49.58 51.08
GG balance/GDP (4.63) (5.28) (4.89) (5.54) (7.96) (4.58) (3.00) (3.40) (3.40) (3.50)
GG net debt/GDP 44.20 45.44 51.18 56.31 64.23 65.43 61.02 59.53 59.43 59.65
CPI inflation (0.02) 1.63 2.22 2.10 0.72 1.73 9.00 6.50 3.50 3.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 66.82 68.07 68.22 65.41 73.51 73.60 68.44 66.17 66.14 66.21
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Curacao (BBB-/ Stable /A-3)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that general agreement between the new administrations in both Curacao and the Netherlands on the direction needed for policy reform will limit the risk of potential future strain on the relationship between the two governments. At the same time, stronger economic growth will help to mitigate fiscal risks.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next two years if we see unexpected weakening of the political relationship with the Netherlands; a more polarized political environment; or significant signs of slippage in implementing reforms needed to improve the government's fiscal outcomes, affecting financing options or the economic recovery. We could view a failure to reach agreement on future financing provided by the Netherlands as an erosion in the bilateral relationship, if such a situation were to persist. We could also lower the ratings in the medium term if the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic lingered and resulted in unexpected deterioration in the government's deficits or net debt metrics, or significantly higher external debt.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the same time if Curacao's relationship with the Netherlands materially improved, leading to significant economic or fiscal benefits, including debt forgiveness.

Table 15

Curacao
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 18.96 18.77 18.88 18.88 15.98 17.56 19.97 21.42 22.77 23.74
GDP growth (0.87) (1.73) (2.17) (3.37) (18.44) 4.20 5.50 3.00 3.00 2.00
GDP per capita growth (2.13) (2.56) (1.97) (2.55) (17.17) 5.93 7.32 3.27 3.27 2.27
Current account balance/GDP (16.30) (22.59) (26.91) (18.05) (27.59) (22.10) (26.91) (25.91) (24.91) (24.91)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 120.77 122.02 133.42 137.26 135.24 117.05 125.79 135.57 144.54 159.05
Narrow net external debt/CAR (47.45) (33.98) (31.39) (49.34) (65.66) (77.19) (45.57) (28.60) (16.21) (8.22)
GG balance/GDP (3.01) 1.12 (7.98) 0.75 (17.10) (2.79) (3.22) (2.23) (1.09) (0.11)
GG net debt/GDP (39.69) (35.37) (24.81) (33.04) (41.01) (45.36) (37.60) (33.04) (30.11) (28.75)
CPI inflation (0.08) 1.62 2.55 2.64 2.20 3.90 6.30 4.00 3.00 2.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 88.69 89.90 91.11 95.04 114.41 98.83 98.11 97.70 97.38 97.17
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Dominican Republic (BB/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 3
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation of continued favorable GDP growth and policy continuity over the next 12-18 months that will likely stabilize the government's debt burden.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next 12-18 months if economic growth loses momentum, potentially resulting in higher fiscal deficits and a worsening external profile. We could also lower the ratings if the current challenges in passing reforms translate into structurally higher fiscal deficits and debt.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next 12-18 months if the Dominican Republic demonstrates capacity to pass and implement reforms that improve its fiscal and debt planning, leading to lower government deficits.

Table 16

Dominican Republic
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 7.51 7.87 8.33 8.59 7.55 8.95 10.23 11.07 11.47 11.94
GDP growth 6.66 4.67 6.98 5.05 (6.72) 12.27 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
GDP per capita growth 5.66 3.70 5.97 4.12 (7.53) 11.34 4.13 3.14 4.13 4.13
Current account balance/GDP (1.08) (0.17) (1.54) (1.34) (1.70) (2.85) (5.10) (3.27) (3.04) (2.83)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 92.74 88.19 90.75 89.63 89.28 87.50 90.98 88.21 88.87 89.24
Narrow net external debt/CAR 83.25 83.50 78.37 84.91 113.83 84.87 80.68 76.55 76.52 75.93
GG balance/GDP (3.87) (4.21) (3.58) (3.42) (9.34) (3.83) (3.87) (3.63) (3.44) (3.22)
GG net debt/GDP 43.07 45.34 46.08 49.40 65.70 57.36 53.20 53.30 53.39 53.24
CPI inflation 1.61 3.28 3.56 1.81 3.78 8.25 9.00 6.00 4.00 4.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 27.33 27.95 27.69 28.26 30.23 27.73 27.96 28.20 28.45 28.70
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Ecuador (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that over the next 12 months, Ecuador's administration will remain committed to fiscal and economic policies aimed at reducing the sovereign's imbalances, despite execution risks amid weak support in the National Assembly and fragile socioeconomic conditions. The outlook also assumes continued progress under the IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement, which is expected to be completed by December this year. The latter supports access to official financing, which is key given the small local market and uncertainty about capacity to tap international markets.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if unforeseen political dynamics generate a reversal of policies and lead to fiscal and external imbalances beyond our expectations or hamper access to official lending. For example, large increases in permanent spending financed by high oil revenue could increase vulnerability to commodity price shocks. Because access to international markets is still uncertain, larger fiscal deficits could increase reliance on short-term debt, deteriorating the recently improved debt profile and rapidly increasing liquidity pressures.

We could also lower the ratings if legal actions taken against the sovereign following different litigation processes hamper Ecuador's capacity to make timely debt service payments or if we see prospects for a debt management operation that could be considered a distressed debt exchange.

Upside scenario.  We could upgrade Ecuador in the next 12-18 months if execution of fiscal and other policies translates into a faster-than-expected pace of fiscal improvement while current account surpluses are maintained. The combination of stronger fiscal and external flows would improve Ecuador's external debtor position and could support regaining global market access. We could also raise the ratings if real GDP growth strengthens and comes into line with that of peers with a similar level of economic development.

Table 17

Ecuador
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.98 6.15 6.25 6.19 5.61 5.92 6.24 6.54 6.69 6.85
GDP growth (1.23) 2.37 1.29 0.01 (7.79) 4.24 2.70 2.60 2.50 2.50
GDP per capita growth (3.06) 0.88 (0.25) (1.31) (9.04) 2.83 1.38 1.28 1.28 1.38
Current account balance/GDP 1.31 (0.18) (1.22) (0.05) 2.71 2.78 1.95 1.60 (0.09) (0.33)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 129.47 144.07 150.92 142.67 140.21 115.49 116.20 113.98 119.08 117.45
Narrow net external debt/CAR 111.13 128.27 125.93 135.65 157.55 120.37 98.71 101.62 111.19 109.50
GG balance/GDP (7.49) (6.34) (3.70) (4.00) (7.21) (2.60) (2.01) (1.78) (2.48) (2.01)
GG net debt/GDP 37.30 44.56 44.27 50.14 60.32 59.25 57.48 55.91 56.49 56.58
CPI inflation 1.12 (0.20) 0.27 (0.07) (0.93) 1.94 4.00 3.50 1.00 1.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 30.12 33.63 37.08 41.01 45.98 49.60 50.93 51.71 51.65 52.37
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

El Salvador (CCC+/Negative/C)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects the at least one-in-three chance of a downgrade over the next six to 18 months if the government does not make adequate progress in filling its substantial financing gap. We believe the government could tap alternative sources of liquidity to meet its debt service payments over the next 12 months. However, delays in obtaining more funding, as well as in undertaking corrective fiscal measures to reduce deficits, could hurt investor confidence and make it more difficult for the government to continue covering its financing gap. Depending on debt management and economic outcomes, the government's liquidity and financing needs might see a positive or negative impact, leading to a rating action.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next six to 18 months if the government's ability to secure adequate funding for its fiscal deficits and rollover needs or its capacity to undertake fiscal adjustment to stabilize its very high debt burden weaken. Higher refinancing risks, poor debt management, or signs of the government being less willing to service its debt would also lead to a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  In contrast, we could revise the outlook to stable over the next six to 18 months if the combination of improved debt management, continued economic recovery, and greater clarity about fiscal policies reduces the medium-term financing gap.

Table 18

El Salvador
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 3.81 3.91 4.05 4.17 3.79 4.41 4.81 4.98 5.15 5.30
GDP growth 2.54 2.25 2.41 2.44 (8.18) 10.28 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.40
GDP per capita growth 2.04 1.74 1.89 1.92 (8.64) 9.73 1.89 1.49 1.89 1.89
Current account balance/GDP (2.27) (1.86) (3.30) (0.42) 0.83 (5.07) (8.39) (6.22) (5.11) (4.26)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 126.69 121.33 127.58 121.95 113.55 123.33 125.51 128.87 126.24 128.80
Narrow net external debt/CAR 91.27 89.91 78.88 78.42 92.99 69.77 73.74 78.98 81.84 84.48
GG balance/GDP (3.10) (2.53) (2.70) (3.07) (10.17) (5.59) (3.11) (3.66) (3.53) (3.41)
GG net debt/GDP 65.42 66.13 65.98 67.10 84.21 78.49 74.75 75.50 76.18 77.06
CPI inflation 0.60 1.01 1.09 0.08 (0.37) 3.47 7.00 2.00 1.50 1.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 53.35 53.94 55.94 57.70 69.00 64.22 63.65 63.06 62.47 61.88
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Falkland Islands (A+/Stable/A-1)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 2
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook is based on our expectation of continued prudent fiscal policy, continued GDP growth, and strong public finances during the next three years. It also reflects our expectation of continued strong institutional links with the U.K., anchoring policy stability and security.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next two-three years if we saw an unexpected deterioration in public finances or economic growth prospects, including a worsening of the government's current net asset position. We could also lower the ratings if unanticipated changes in the institutional and political links with the U.K. were to raise uncertainty about future policies, governance, or security.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next two to three years if we saw a continued record of cautious policymaking that delivers balanced economic growth, sustains healthy finances, and improves the Falkland Islands' physical infrastructure. We could also raise the ratings if improvements in the availability of statistical data, such as full balance of payments and international investment position, lower our assessment of external risk and enhance transparency.

Table 19

Falkland Islands
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 118.94 87.60 107.03 101.47 103.29 115.14 103.77 114.81 123.19 128.20
GDP growth (6.66) (20.18) 3.77 12.25 (8.37) 2.00 2.20 2.20 2.00 2.00
GDP per capita growth (9.41) (20.18) 3.77 12.25 (8.40) 1.97 0.20 0.20 0.00 (0.00)
Current account balance/GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Narrow net external debt/CAR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
GG balance/GDP 7.30 6.44 8.73 (4.95) 1.29 2.18 (8.80) (4.74) (2.82) (2.17)
GG net debt/GDP (113.94) (162.22) (132.58) (153.52) (157.76) (171.90) (168.08) (166.12) (164.44) (162.71)
CPI inflation (1.83) 0.97 3.14 1.50 (1.45) 2.53 9.40 7.00 0.90 1.60
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.09 8.27 8.15 8.10 8.05 8.02 7.98
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. N/A--Not applicable. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Guatemala (BB-/Positive/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Positive

The positive outlook reflects an at least one-in-three possibility of an upgrade over the next six to 18 months if economic resilience persists amid global volatility and the run-up to the 2023 general elections. Sustained economic growth will gradually address long-standing social needs and infrastructure gaps.

Downside scenario.  We could revise the outlook to stable in the next six to 18 months if economic momentum dissipates and Guatemala's economic growth prospects weaken. A deterioration of Guatemala's fiscal or debt profiles beyond our expectations could worsen the sovereign's financial profile and result in a negative rating action.

Table 20

Guatemala
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 4.17 4.45 4.49 4.65 4.60 5.03 5.57 5.88 6.17 6.52
GDP growth 2.68 3.08 3.41 4.00 (1.76) 7.98 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.50
GDP per capita growth 0.99 1.42 1.77 2.39 (3.25) 6.39 2.51 2.06 2.10 2.15
Current account balance/GDP 0.96 1.20 0.89 2.36 5.05 2.38 2.26 1.60 1.54 1.46
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 91.90 88.29 84.51 80.26 69.82 71.72 70.18 71.28 71.66 71.94
Narrow net external debt/CAR 51.74 43.23 35.32 24.41 11.14 5.52 4.81 4.89 4.98 5.49
GG balance/GDP (1.11) (1.38) (1.88) (2.24) (4.92) (1.17) (2.51) (2.41) (2.54) (2.68)
GG net debt/GDP 17.88 17.31 17.29 18.08 21.44 18.32 18.86 19.93 21.06 22.24
CPI inflation 4.23 5.68 2.31 3.41 4.82 3.07 7.75 4.00 4.00 4.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 38.46 38.07 38.18 37.13 38.97 38.94 38.94 38.95 38.96 38.96
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Honduras (BB-/Negative/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on Honduras over the next six to 18 months if fiscal slippage worsens the sovereign debt burden beyond our expectations. Additionally, a consistent deterioration in the current account balance could weaken the country's external liquidity position and lead to a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could revise the outlook to stable in the next six to 18 months if faster-than-expected economic growth, along with cautious fiscal policy (including the fiscal impact of losses in the energy sector), stabilizes the sovereign's debt burden and anchors economic stability .

Table 21

Honduras
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 2.47 2.59 2.65 2.72 2.53 2.99 3.32 3.56 3.72 3.87
GDP growth 3.89 4.84 3.84 2.65 (8.96) 12.53 3.00 3.60 3.60 3.60
GDP per capita growth 2.17 3.12 2.16 1.02 (10.95) 11.48 1.42 2.01 2.01 2.01
Current account balance/GDP (3.17) (1.25) (6.62) (2.62) 2.86 (4.32) (3.77) (3.31) (3.46) (3.64)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 92.47 89.53 93.18 89.53 77.96 82.75 83.19 87.50 89.49 91.41
Narrow net external debt/CAR 18.79 17.57 20.03 16.41 3.86 2.02 11.24 16.99 22.75 29.17
GG balance/GDP (0.40) (0.42) 0.20 0.09 (4.49) (3.13) (3.50) (3.61) (4.12) (4.66)
GG net debt/GDP 37.81 40.94 38.48 38.81 48.68 48.55 47.74 48.88 51.15 53.71
CPI inflation 2.72 3.93 4.35 4.37 3.47 4.48 11.00 6.20 4.00 4.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 58.59 57.80 62.76 63.87 68.88 65.74 65.70 65.99 66.86 67.60
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Jamaica (B+/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Jamaica will continue to prioritize conservative macroeconomic policy amid a low growth environment. We assume the low fiscal surpluses will underpin a decline in debt over the next one-two years. Furthermore, we expect tourism will support external balances and growth, despite a weaker global backdrop.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the outlook period if fiscal results weaken beyond our expectations or the economy fails to perform as expected, putting pressure on external balances and weakening the country's external position.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next two years if Jamaica experiences economic growth that proves more resilient than expected vis a vis its peers, boosting government revenues, sustaining fiscal surpluses, and shrinking the country's debt and interest burden beyond our expectations.

Table 22

Jamaica
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.17 5.43 5.76 5.79 5.05 5.35 5.83 6.05 6.24 6.44
GDP growth 1.38 1.00 1.90 0.89 (9.91) 4.60 4.00 2.50 1.60 1.30
GDP per capita growth 1.29 0.85 1.71 0.78 (10.02) 4.48 3.86 2.36 1.48 1.17
Current account balance/GDP (0.31) (2.68) (1.49) (2.22) (0.44) 0.73 (1.48) (1.45) (1.15) (0.81)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 93.66 99.70 98.60 101.49 99.56 100.27 92.90 100.35 100.21 98.57
Narrow net external debt/CAR 106.87 100.21 88.31 76.80 106.85 74.94 81.44 82.21 80.54 74.65
GG balance/GDP 0.01 0.67 1.40 1.11 (2.87) 0.56 0.46 0.44 0.64 1.13
GG net debt/GDP 108.53 89.36 78.53 70.85 88.02 78.40 70.01 65.67 62.41 58.96
CPI inflation 2.42 4.39 3.66 3.95 5.25 5.84 10.50 6.40 5.00 5.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 39.59 42.18 44.01 48.73 57.08 55.13 52.89 54.22 56.75 59.57
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Mexico (BBB/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that cautious macroeconomic management will prevail over the next two years, notwithstanding a more complex global backdrop. We expect the administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador will pursue economic policies that will result in stable fiscal and debt dynamics.

Unexpected setbacks in macroeconomic management or in discussions between U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) partners on strengthening supply-chain resilience and cross-border linkages would likely weaken investor sentiment and investment, and could lead to a downgrade over the next two years. Higher general government debt and deficits would heighten fiscal risks associated with any needed extraordinary support for state-owned companies PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) and CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad) and could also lead to a downgrade.

Effective political and economic management that bolsters Mexico's subpar growth trajectory, such as with a more dynamic investment outlook, could lead to an upgrade. Similarly, initiatives that bolster budgetary flexibility, fiscal buffers, and broaden the non-oil tax base to mitigate the potential contingent liability posed by state-owned companies in the energy sector would improve creditworthiness.

Table 23

Mexico
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 8.72 9.28 9.68 9.94 8.44 9.93 11.02 11.61 11.89 12.15
GDP growth 2.40 2.33 2.19 (0.19) (8.25) 5.00 2.56 0.79 1.98 2.25
GDP per capita growth 1.18 1.16 1.04 (1.27) (9.21) 3.93 1.55 (0.17) 1.04 1.34
Current account balance/GDP (2.27) (1.76) (2.04) (0.24) 2.50 (0.38) (1.25) (1.03) (0.88) (1.03)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 87.41 85.40 86.46 84.60 77.90 83.81 85.49 85.01 85.73 86.09
Narrow net external debt/CAR 40.44 40.20 36.89 37.23 37.42 25.40 22.90 23.76 24.26 24.39
GG balance/GDP (2.79) (0.79) (1.83) (1.80) (2.32) (2.99) (2.96) (2.92) (2.76) (2.68)
GG net debt/GDP 43.10 41.25 41.23 41.49 46.75 45.90 43.59 44.33 45.10 46.08
CPI inflation 2.82 6.04 4.90 3.64 3.40 5.69 7.91 5.78 3.69 3.19
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 33.70 32.75 32.12 33.66 33.79 31.42 31.35 31.40 31.47 31.57
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Montserrat (BBB-/Stable/A-3)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation of continued budgetary and institutional support for Montserrat from the U.K. over the next two years as both countries recover from the aftermath of the global pandemic. We expect economic recovery in Montserrat will be driven mainly by its large public sector while tourism is expected to recover more gradually. We believe the U.K.'s support for Montserrat will remain unchanged and will continue to underpin the island's creditworthiness and mitigate the risks from external vulnerabilities, particularly given the continuing low-level activity of the Soufriere Hills volcano and the island's location in a hurricane belt.

Downside scenario.

We could lower the ratings over the next two years if the U.K.'s financial support substantially wanes before the domestic economy approaches self-sufficiency. This could increase external liquidity risks arising from Montserrat's significant gross external financing needs. Under this scenario, we expect the loss of a significant portion of government revenue would contribute to large deficits and could lead to a multi-notch downgrade. The U.K.'s failure to provide timely support in the wake of a natural disaster could exacerbate these risks.

Upside scenario.  Significant private-sector investment and development on the island could lead us to raise the ratings in the next couple of years. Such activities would increase the size and resilience of Montserrat's private economy, broadening the tax base. Sustainable private-sector growth--particularly in tourism and other export sectors--could raise the island's income and reduce the economic concentration in public services. This expansion, along with immigration to build the labor force, would also increase imports. To be sustainable, export growth and foreign direct investment would need to finance this expansion, limiting the increase of net external borrowing from the island's large external financing needs.

Table 24

Montserrat
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 13.22 12.60 13.47 14.50 15.24 15.66 16.76 17.52 18.13 18.77
GDP growth (0.32) (0.52) 6.63 7.04 (5.30) 8.12 3.20 3.00 2.00 2.00
GDP per capita growth 0.92 (1.06) 8.94 10.55 (3.37) 8.12 3.20 3.00 2.00 2.00
Current account balance/GDP (12.17) (10.07) (2.84) 2.16 (2.72) (2.60) (0.43) 0.88 0.96 1.77
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 136.84 126.46 123.30 118.66 128.37 124.86 118.32 120.42 122.08 121.99
Narrow net external debt/CAR (193.43) (166.31) (173.08) (174.44) (225.34) (174.33) (169.99) (167.31) (165.61) (163.90)
GG balance/GDP (0.48) 1.07 (6.58) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GG net debt/GDP (19.92) (17.67) (14.42) (7.53) (5.70) (4.39) (3.59) (2.01) (0.48) 1.04
CPI inflation (0.25) 1.19 1.31 (1.07) (1.89) 2.61 3.80 1.51 1.51 1.51
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 47.45 51.54 51.95 49.01 47.85 47.26 44.17 42.27 40.83 39.45
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Nicaragua (B/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view of continued economic recovery coupled with fiscal and monetary policies that sustain economic stability amid a complex international scenario of higher inflation and rising interest rates.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings in the next six to 18 months if Nicaragua's current economic recovery were to be undermined by weaker domestic and external demand, or further potential negative shocks or unexpected political tensions. Heightened pressures on the domestic financial system that hurt stability could also lead us to lower the rating.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next six to 18 months if favorable political and policy developments raise investor confidence, lead to higher-than-expected economic growth, and improve the sovereign's access to external funding. A track record of strengthening economic and fiscal results that lower Nicaragua's exposure to negative external shocks on a sustainable basis could lead to an upgrade.

Table 25

Nicaragua
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 2.10 2.16 2.02 1.93 1.91 2.10 2.32 2.46 2.57 2.68
GDP growth 4.56 4.63 (3.36) (3.78) (1.79) 10.34 4.00 3.00 3.50 3.50
GDP per capita growth 3.49 3.55 (4.36) (4.77) (2.80) 9.21 2.93 1.94 2.43 2.43
Current account balance/GDP (8.48) (7.16) (1.80) 5.99 3.95 (2.86) (4.40) (3.83) (3.62) (3.55)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 109.94 113.59 100.54 96.34 92.21 96.41 95.71 94.17 93.42 93.27
Narrow net external debt/CAR 116.14 109.14 121.14 111.80 111.90 90.45 75.90 75.10 74.37 74.21
GG balance/GDP (1.15) (1.26) (3.02) (0.33) (1.79) (1.22) (1.50) (1.29) (1.29) (1.28)
GG net debt/GDP 35.68 37.38 45.38 49.04 52.52 52.57 49.54 48.52 48.17 47.75
CPI inflation 3.52 3.85 4.95 5.38 3.68 4.93 9.50 6.00 4.00 4.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 37.20 39.89 38.53 31.12 28.26 26.18 25.05 25.74 26.46 27.19
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Panama (BBB/Negative/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 3
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view of downside risks to Panama's fiscal and economic metrics in the next six to 12 months.

We could lower the rating if we were to see a worsening of public finances as a result of a narrow tax base, spending rigidities, and the social security system's declining financial reserves. The degree to which policy choices weaken support for sustainable public finances can also weigh on the rating. We could also lower the rating in the event of potential unexpected slackening of Panama's historically strong GDP growth rate or an enlargement of its external financing requirements that worsens its external profile.

Alternatively, we could revise the outlook to stable during the same period if public finances stabilize due to effective economic management that limit the annual increase in the government's debt burden and sustain favorable economic growth and macroeconomic stability.

Table 26

Panama
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 14.34 15.18 15.61 15.88 12.62 14.66 15.88 16.87 17.75 18.60
GDP growth 4.95 5.59 3.69 2.98 (17.94) 15.34 6.00 4.50 4.50 4.50
GDP per capita growth 3.35 4.02 2.17 1.51 (19.09) 13.77 4.60 3.15 3.19 3.22
Current account balance/GDP (8.00) (5.94) (8.25) (4.83) 2.03 (2.22) (3.89) (4.83) (5.95) (6.48)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 181.32 178.03 177.34 174.41 180.65 146.42 150.78 150.10 151.12 150.12
Narrow net external debt/CAR 60.67 71.14 78.11 80.06 76.10 76.93 68.51 61.16 55.81 52.21
GG balance/GDP (1.94) (1.86) (2.80) (3.01) (10.13) (6.67) (4.00) (3.04) (2.67) (2.28)
GG net debt/GDP 20.46 23.73 26.09 30.61 49.23 47.04 47.06 46.78 46.57 46.22
CPI inflation 0.68 0.87 0.77 (0.29) (1.86) 2.62 3.50 3.00 2.00 1.50
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 84.17 84.24 84.47 83.60 101.63 87.62 83.82 83.82 83.82 83.82
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Paraguay (BB/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook indicates our view that economic growth prospects for the coming years should remain strong, despite damage caused by the recent drought. Both fiscal and external balances will suffer from the weather shock this year, but the government's commitment to fiscal consolidation should limit the impact and prevent a deterioration of Paraguay's external profile and its government debt burden.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the rating over the next six to 18 months if worse-than-expected economic performance or an unexpectedly poor policy response undermines Paraguay's long-term GDP growth trajectory and significantly worsens its fiscal and external profiles. Large and persistent fiscal deficits financed by external debt could increase the country's narrow net external debt and raise its vulnerability to external shocks, leading to a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the rating over the next 12-18 months if stronger resilience to external or climate shocks translates into faster-than-expected economic growth. Stronger growth could help the government to achieve its ambitious fiscal correction path while tackling its long-standing infrastructure needs. At the same time, a consistent reduction in the level of dollarization of the financial system could improve monetary flexibility, leading to an upgrade.

Table 27

Paraguay
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.27 5.61 5.70 5.30 4.89 5.37 5.55 5.84 6.14 6.48
GDP growth 4.27 4.81 3.20 (0.40) (0.82) 4.10 (0.70) 5.00 4.00 4.00
GDP per capita growth 2.77 3.32 1.75 (1.79) (2.19) 2.68 (2.04) 3.59 2.62 2.63
Current account balance/GDP 4.62 3.41 (0.24) (0.58) 1.95 (0.88) (4.96) (1.02) 0.23 0.16
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 74.94 73.33 76.88 77.04 69.96 71.85 80.50 79.31 77.02 77.42
Narrow net external debt/CAR (0.94) (2.26) 5.53 12.16 17.89 26.14 39.97 39.73 40.82 41.21
GG balance/GDP (0.37) (0.44) (1.00) (2.38) (5.72) (3.86) (3.42) (2.66) (2.21) (1.85)
GG net debt/GDP 5.21 5.81 7.90 11.27 19.20 20.61 23.76 24.87 25.53 25.88
CPI inflation 4.09 3.60 3.98 2.76 1.77 4.79 9.64 5.00 4.00 4.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 41.51 40.66 44.08 47.14 50.54 50.27 52.48 52.90 53.36 53.79
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Peru (BBB/Negative/ A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects the risk to the sovereign's creditworthiness from the enduring political standstill and challenging relationship between the country's executive and legislative branches of government. Former President Pedro Castillo's recent attempt to dissolve Congress and his subsequent ouster from office is the latest development of Peru's long-standing political impasse, which threatens to weaken the government's capacity to implement timely policies to support robust private investment and economic growth.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings by one notch if prolonged political impasse or further adverse developments reduce the predictability of policymaking or worsen institutional stability, auguring badly for economic policy outcomes.

Upside scenario.  We could revise the outlook to stable over the next two years if Peru makes progress on reducing the heightened political uncertainty and maintaining continuity in key economic--including fiscal and monetary--policies. A timely reduction of the uncertainties created by recent developments, along with prospects of greater stability in governance and solid economic policies, could sustain the current sovereign credit rating.

Table 28

Peru
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 6.12 6.81 7.05 7.10 6.25 6.76 7.43 7.62 7.84 8.08
GDP growth 3.92 2.52 3.98 2.15 (10.94) 13.55 2.20 2.46 3.06 3.27
GDP per capita growth 2.64 3.58 2.21 0.51 (12.19) 11.96 0.77 1.03 1.62 1.83
Current account balance/GDP (2.27) (0.92) (1.38) (0.73) 1.16 (2.33) (3.89) (3.20) (2.05) (1.66)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 76.70 80.21 74.10 72.82 61.69 68.42 74.45 75.93 75.31 75.63
Narrow net external debt/CAR 21.64 16.59 19.58 13.58 16.74 24.42 28.36 26.47 25.14 23.58
GG balance/GDP (2.35) (2.84) (1.99) (1.38) (8.31) (2.53) (2.10) (2.10) (1.90) (1.60)
GG net debt/GDP 8.11 9.78 11.57 12.87 21.91 21.56 21.65 22.33 22.89 23.22
CPI inflation 3.59 2.80 1.32 2.54 1.83 3.98 7.81 5.02 2.77 2.31
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 42.84 42.42 43.94 44.70 54.66 47.48 44.36 42.68 41.32 40.19
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Suriname (SD/--/SD)

- Analyst: julia.smith@spglobal.com

- Latest publication: Full Analysis: Suriname, April 4, 2022

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 6

Table 29

Suriname
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.76 6.16 6.77 7.12 6.89 5.28 6.20 7.58 8.68 9.61
GDP growth (4.92) 1.57 4.95 1.17 (15.98) (3.50) 1.80 2.20 2.70 3.00
GDP per capita growth (6.31) 0.24 3.76 (0.17) (16.81) (4.46) 0.79 1.19 1.68 1.98
Current account balance/GDP (4.84) 1.93 (2.97) (10.54) 6.25 3.38 (3.14) (0.11) (0.02) (0.18)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 117.12 96.64 107.29 112.35 97.14 101.89 102.13 104.54 102.53 106.34
Narrow net external debt/CAR 72.17 60.75 58.30 78.77 69.51 56.34 89.22 103.28 119.69 134.76
GG balance/GDP (10.64) (8.33) (9.92) (18.46) (11.10) 1.51 (6.11) (7.06) (6.12) (6.33)
GG net debt/GDP 62.26 64.05 57.48 66.77 113.89 110.47 86.75 76.23 72.07 70.79
CPI inflation 52.30 9.30 5.44 4.22 60.74 60.69 37.00 22.20 14.10 10.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 39.40 30.51 27.33 26.04 28.07 21.91 22.20 22.34 22.58 22.82
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Trinidad and Tobago (BBB-/Stable /A-3)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook indicates our view that Trinidad and Tobago will benefit from significantly higher energy and petrochemical prices, which will more than offset lower-than-expected energy production. We believe that higher prices will spur improved incomes and stronger government revenue collection than previously anticipated, helping to stem the rise in government debt.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings over the next two years if GDP per capita fails to recover to the degree that we anticipate and the pace of fiscal consolidation is materially slower than expected. Similarly, economic policies that contribute to a weakening of the long-term sustainability of public finances, limit the prospects for balanced GDP growth, or materially worsen the country's external position beyond our base-case scenario could also result in a lower rating.

Upside scenario.  We could raise the ratings over the next 24 months if stronger economic performance and favorable long-term GDP growth prospects lead to a sustained decline in government debt and ease external pressures.

Table 30

Trinidad and Tobago
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 17.06 17.19 17.50 17.10 15.05 17.89 19.07 20.06 20.92 21.63
GDP growth (6.76) (4.71) (0.87) 0.11 (7.68) (1.03) 2.00 2.50 1.70 1.70
GDP per capita growth (7.25) (5.15) (1.28) (0.26) (7.98) 1.30 2.10 2.19 1.40 1.40
Current account balance/GDP (3.30) 5.92 6.69 4.28 (6.44) 10.25 16.61 12.05 2.01 1.86
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 63.97 57.31 60.24 67.94 82.46 59.23 59.26 61.80 69.24 71.30
Narrow net external debt/CAR (86.81) (66.04) (55.61) (56.90) (89.65) (59.21) (38.28) (40.31) (48.54) (46.65)
GG balance/GDP (5.09) (8.39) (3.46) (2.50) (11.74) (7.47) (1.38) (1.92) (2.79) (4.39)
GG net debt/GDP 5.97 7.89 6.50 9.73 25.41 25.21 26.12 25.58 26.13 28.47
CPI inflation 3.07 1.88 1.02 1.00 0.60 2.06 4.70 3.00 2.90 2.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 44.55 44.67 45.80 49.70 55.40 47.98 47.50 47.12 46.82 46.59
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Turks and Caicos Islands (BBB+/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the economy will continue to recover given the strong performance of tourism, and will improve in 2022. Furthermore, we believe the territory will continue to adhere to prudent financial management and limit borrowing, and that fiscal reserve balances will increase during the next two years. We also expect continuity in TCI's institutional relationship with the U.K.

Downside scenario.  We could lower our ratings during the next two years if the rebound in tourism is interrupted or turns out to be weaker than expected, leading to prolonged stress on revenues that causes the government to run persistent fiscal deficits that materially worsen public finances. Similarly, an unexpected worsening of institutional ties with the U.K. that negatively affects governance, as shown in our institutional assessment of TCI, could result in a downgrade.

Upside scenario.  We could raise our ratings during the next two years if better-than-expected GDP increases and continued favorable growth prospects were to substantially boost economic resilience. We could also raise the ratings if better availability of timely data, especially on external flows and stocks, were to boost transparency and indicated that TCI enjoyed a significantly stronger economic or external position. (

Table 31

Turks and Caicos Islands
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 27.23 25.70 26.91 27.88 20.76 22.85 25.00 26.44 27.82 29.27
GDP growth 7.25 (2.49) 5.61 5.30 (26.76) 9.50 5.00 3.83 4.16 4.16
GDP per capita growth 3.80 (7.09) 1.57 1.41 (29.38) 5.73 3.96 2.80 3.13 3.13
Current account balance/GDP 23.83 3.40 17.25 23.69 (15.15) 7.30 16.53 16.61 16.68 16.74
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 132.27 161.36 116.14 117.82 226.00 137.63 118.93 116.78 114.59 112.51
Narrow net external debt/CAR 22.56 (45.54) (61.28) (32.55) (128.67) (69.84) (58.63) (57.87) (57.22) (56.46)
GG balance/GDP 6.12 8.57 7.94 5.59 (7.23) 9.81 7.22 7.26 7.44 7.60
GG net debt/GDP (23.57) (33.65) (39.56) (42.88) (47.84) (51.56) (53.26) (56.55) (60.13) (63.69)
CPI inflation 2.00 2.10 2.10 2.20 2.30 4.50 5.50 3.00 2.11 2.11
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. N/A--Not available. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

U.S. (AA+/Stable/A-1+)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 1
  • Economic assessment: 1
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 1
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the negative and positive rating factors for the U.S. will be balanced over the next two to three years. We expect that continued economic growth and moderating fiscal deficits after the unprecedented recent fiscal stimulus will stabilize the net general government debt burden at around 100% of GDP in the next couple of years. We also expect the U.S.'s institutional checks and balances, strong rule of law, and free flow of information to contribute to stability and predictability in economic policies. The resilience of American institutions, its economy, and the size and depth of the U.S. financial market sustain the U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency and support policy flexibility.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the rating over the next two to three years if unexpected negative political developments weigh on the resilience of American institutions and the effectiveness of long-term policymaking or jeopardize the dollar's status as the world's leading reserve currency.

Upside scenario.  Conversely, we could raise the rating over the next two to three years if effective and proactive public policymaking results in improved fiscal performance that reverses the recent deterioration in public finances beyond our current expectations. Sustained long-term GDP growth, along with fiscal adjustments, could diminish the recently high annual increases in the general government's net debt burden, strengthening creditworthiness.

Table 32

U.S.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 57.69 59.76 62.69 64.96 63.49 70.19 76.28 79.02 81.59 84.34
GDP growth 1.67 2.24 2.95 2.29 (2.77) 5.95 1.82 (0.08) 1.38 1.77
GDP per capita growth 0.97 1.66 2.44 1.80 (3.52) 5.79 1.55 (0.47) 0.90 1.27
Current account balance/GDP (2.12) (1.85) (2.14) (2.09) (2.94) (3.63) (3.92) (2.86) (2.51) (2.44)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 353.20 331.54 314.25 312.95 369.63 366.28 335.51 340.53 344.00 348.26
Narrow net external debt/CAR 337.88 328.49 313.23 338.08 429.81 390.79 374.85 374.00 377.77 377.19
GG balance/GDP (4.41) (3.31) (5.54) (6.21) (15.92) (10.94) (4.53) (4.77) (5.30) (5.15)
GG net debt/GDP 80.60 80.51 80.89 82.05 97.37 99.37 95.10 95.93 97.50 98.72
CPI inflation 1.26 2.13 2.44 1.81 1.23 4.70 8.14 4.26 2.71 2.31
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 150.83 152.53 151.69 151.52 163.86 156.95 151.65 152.11 152.92 156.48
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Uruguay (BBB/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 3
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that continuation of moderate economic growth and recent corrective fiscal policy will limit increases in debt over 2022-2025 after several years of debt increases. We expect growth to be solid in 2022-2023 as large investment projects are finalized and then decline to 2.5% in 2024-2025, supported by a diversified pool of investments in the pipeline.

Downside scenario.  We could lower the ratings on Uruguay over the next two years if worse-than-expected long-term growth prospects limit the government's ability to contain general government fiscal deficits. In this scenario, the already high net general government debt burden could continue to rise beyond our expectations. Moreover, a sustained weaker long-term growth trajectory could dampen Uruguay's per capita income, weighing on its economic resilience and leading to a lower rating.

Upside scenario.  A structural improvement in fiscal and debt dynamics beyond our current expectations, along with continued GDP growth, could lead to a higher rating over the next two years. Greater-than-expected fiscal consolidation could stem from advancement in a social security reform, if it narrows the fiscal deficit and places the government's debt burden on a downward path. At the same time, a sustained decline in inflation and further deepening of local capital markets could help the government increase the share of local currency in its debt stock. Falling exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt could reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the sovereign's balance sheet.

Table 33

Uruguay
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022e 2023e 2024e 2025e
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 16.62 18.58 18.64 17.69 15.44 17.03 19.49 21.74 22.76 23.72
GDP growth 1.69 1.63 0.48 0.35 (6.12) 4.37 4.80 2.90 2.50 2.50
GDP per capita growth 1.32 1.25 0.33 0.35 (6.45) 4.11 4.54 2.65 2.25 2.25
Current account balance/GDP 0.83 0.01 (0.41) 1.60 (0.84) (1.81) (2.34) (0.07) 0.74 0.69
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 100.33 101.10 90.47 85.77 98.80 96.62 97.56 91.58 89.68 89.64
Narrow net external debt/CAR 34.22 26.34 27.65 30.94 25.54 17.08 12.39 12.89 14.71 12.57
GG balance/GDP (4.87) (3.27) (3.46) (4.25) (5.19) (4.34) (2.58) (2.72) (2.75) (2.74)
GG net debt/GDP 46.83 51.81 54.16 56.76 66.04 65.20 60.23 60.25 60.79 61.45
CPI inflation 8.10 6.55 7.96 8.79 9.41 7.96 8.90 7.40 6.50 6.00
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 26.61 25.06 26.00 26.43 28.44 27.87 27.35 26.97 26.92 27.01
e--Estimate. CAR--Current account receipts. FXR--Foreign exchange reserves. GG--General government. CPI--Consumer price index. Source: S&P Global Ratings. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.
Primary Credit Analyst:Joydeep Mukherji, New York + 1 (212) 438 7351;
joydeep.mukherji@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Nicole Schmidt, Mexico City +52 5550814451;
nicole.schmidt@spglobal.com

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.

 

Create a free account to unlock the article.

Gain access to exclusive research, events and more.

Already have an account?    Sign in