Key Takeaways
GDP growth: Economic momentum has slowed with a recession next year increasingly likely. As extremely high prices damage purchasing power and aggressive Federal Reserve policy increases borrowing costs, we continue to expect a shallow recession for the U.S. economy in the first half of 2023. Our U.S. GDP growth forecast is 1.8% for 2022 and -0.1% for 2023, a bit weaker than our September economic update (was 1.6% and 0.2%, respectively).
Midterm election: The outcome from the 2022 midterm election is a gridlocked Congress for the next two years, with slim majorities in both the House and Senate. A divided government usually reduces any prospects for major changes in economic policies.
Labor force: Job gains have softened slightly, particularly for interest rate-sensitive industries, as the economy cools, but not enough for the Fed to moderate its tightening stance dramatically. The workforce has 4 million fewer workers than its pre-pandemic trend rate, and 83% of those 4 million fewer workers are women.
Unemployment: The U.S. recession will weaken job market conditions next year. As demand dries up on reduced affordability, businesses will be forced to trim payrolls. The unemployment rate is expected to peak at 5.6% in fourth-quarter 2023, then slowly descend to 4.7% by fourth-quarter 2025, 1 percentage point higher than 3.7% in October.
Inflation: Inflation likely peaked in third-quarter 2022 and is expected to remain high on continued supply-chain disruptions. Core prices, excluding food and fuel, are expected to remain well above the Fed's 2.0% target until late 2024. On weaker demand, businesses may need to unload inventories at reduced prices, pushing inflation lower--good news for the Fed mandate, but at a cost.
The Fed: The Fed will keep monetary policy tight, despite economic damage, until inflation begins to moderate in late 2023. The fed funds rate is expected to peak at 5.00%-5.25% by second-quarter 2023 (previously our downside scenario). As prices stabilize, the Fed cuts rates in late 2023. The risk is for more rate hikes this year and the next.
Collateral Damage
Continued high prices through most of next year and the Fed's decision to aggressively raise rates--accepting, in our opinion, the collateral damage to the U.S. economy--are leading households to pull back on spending and businesses to cut costs in response to slowing demand.
With odds that the U.S. economy will avoid recession over the next 12 months dimmed, we continue to expect the U.S. will fall into recession in 2023. We now expect GDP growth to weaken to -0.1% in 2023. Peak-to-trough U.S. GDP will decline by 0.8%, a mild recession in line with the 1969/1970 recession (see table 1).
Table 1
History Of U.S. Recessions | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Peak | Trough | Length (months) | Previous expansion (months) | GDP decline (%) | Stock market decline (%)* | Unemployment rate increase (percentage points) | Federal funds rate decline (percentage points)§ | |||||||||
Apr-60 | Feb-61 | 10 | 24 | (1.3) | 1.5 | (1.30) | ||||||||||
Dec-69 | Nov-70 | 11 | 106 | (0.7) | (32.1) | 2.4 | (3.37) | |||||||||
Nov-73 | Mar-75 | 16 | 36 | (3.1) | (41.2) | 3.8 | (4.49) | |||||||||
Jan-80 | Jul-80 | 6 | 58 | (3.1) | (13.4) | 1.5 | (4.79) | |||||||||
Jul-81 | Nov-82 | 16 | 12 | (2.5) | (15.5) | 3.6 | (9.84) | |||||||||
Jul-90 | Mar-91 | 8 | 92 | (1.4) | (15.6) | 1.3 | (2.03) | |||||||||
Mar-01 | Nov-01 | 8 | 120 | (0.4) | (20.3) | 1.3 | (3.89) | |||||||||
Dec-07 | Jun-09 | 18 | 73 | (3.8) | (41.1) | 4.5 | (4.03) | |||||||||
Feb-20 | Apr-20 | 2 | 128 | (10.1) | (27.0) | 11.2 | (1.53) | |||||||||
Baseline | ||||||||||||||||
Dec-22 | Jun-23 | 6 | 33 | (0.8) | 0.2 | 1.0 | 1.23 | |||||||||
*S&P 500 reflects percentage change from the peak before the recession until the trough during the recession. §Discount rate in 1960 and 1970 recessions. Fed is expect to raise rates through the recession in first-half 2023. Sources: NBER, BEA, S&P, BLS, Federal Reserve, and S&P Global Ratings Economics' estimates for 2023 recession. |
Recent indicators support our view, as rising prices and interest rates eat away at private-sector purchasing power. Indeed, of the leading indicators we track in our Business Cycle Barometer, only one of the nine indicators was in positive territory through October--seven were negative and one was neutral (see "Business Cycle Barometer: Worsening Near-Term Growth Prospects," Oct 24).
Although our 10-year/three-month term spread indicator remained neutral in September, daily readings have been inverted since Oct. 25. Moreover, both the 10-year/one-year and 10-year/two-year have been inverted, on average, for three straight months, which signals a recession. The average 10-year/three-month is headed for an inversion in November, with the average through Nov. 22 at -0.35%. If it's inverted for the second straight month, that would also be a recession signal.
While economic momentum has protected the U.S. economy this year, what's around the bend in 2023 is the bigger worry. Extremely high prices and aggressive rate hikes will weigh on affordability and aggregate demand. With the Russia-Ukraine conflict ongoing, tensions over Taiwan escalating, and the China slowdown exacerbating supply-chain and pricing pressures, the U.S. economy appears to be teetering toward recession.
We expect the Fed to frontload more rate increases this year as it continues to reduce the size of its balance sheet. We expect the federal funds rate to reach 5.00%-5.25% by second-quarter 2023 and remain there until the Fed cuts rates in late 2023 on signs prices are stabilizing. Inflation will not approach the Fed's 2.0% target until later in 2024. The fed funds rate does not reach its neutral rate until fourth-quarter 2025.
Chart 1
Table 2
S&P Global Ratings' U.S. Economic Forecast Overview | ||||||||||||||||
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November 2022 | ||||||||||||||||
2020 | 2021 | 2022f | 2023f | 2024f | 2025f | 2026f | ||||||||||
Key indicator | ||||||||||||||||
Real GDP (year % change) | (2.8) | 5.9 | 1.8 | (0.1) | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | |||||||||
Real consumer spending (year % change) | (3.0) | 8.3 | 2.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.9 | |||||||||
Real equipment investment (year % change) | (10.5) | 10.3 | 4.6 | (1.4) | (0.2) | 2.0 | 2.8 | |||||||||
Real nonresidential structures investment (year % change) | (10.1) | (6.4) | (9.2) | (5.4) | 0.7 | 1.5 | 2.0 | |||||||||
Real residential investment, (year % change) | 7.2 | 10.7 | (10.4) | (14.3) | 5.6 | 7.0 | 2.2 | |||||||||
Core CPI (year % change) | 1.7 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.2 | |||||||||
Unemployment rate (%) | 8.1 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.6 | |||||||||
Light vehicle sales (annual total in mil.) | 14.5 | 14.9 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 15.7 | 16.0 | 16.4 | |||||||||
10-year Treasury (%) | 0.9 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 | |||||||||
Note: All percentages are annual averages, unless otherwise noted. Core CPI is consumer price index excluding energy and food components. f--forecast. Sources: BEA, BLS, The Federal Reserve, S&P Global Market Intelligence, and S&P Global Economics' forecasts. |
Our expectations for a recession (a broad-based, sharp reduction in economic activity, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) over the next 12 months reflects continued supply disruptions and a larger spike in prices. As a result, the Fed could continue to hike interest rates into mid-2023, damaging household purchasing power. As households shut their pocketbooks, businesses that built up inventory to meet surging demand will be left with full shelves. The Fed will ultimately get its wish of lower inflation, and businesses will be forced to sell at a discount, bringing down prices (and hurting profit margins).
Midterm Elections: Impact On The Economy
With the GOP winning a majority in the House of Representatives--albeit a slim one--the federal government will be divided come January's inaugurations. This result will almost certainly sustain, if not deepen, the acrimony between the two major parties. This is important because a divided government usually reduces any prospects for major changes in economic policies at a time when the U.S. will likely slip into recession. With the majorities slim in both the House (for Republicans) and the Senate (for Democrats), there may be some opportunities for bipartisan agreement between the two sides, as sponsors try to find a member from the opposing party willing to vote against their party. But, passage of major legislation is unlikely.
This would leave the Inflation Reduction Act as the last major policy victory for the White House before the next presidential election, in November 2024. From a broader economic perspective, two years of legislative inaction could be particularly costly.
On the bright side, in September Congress agreed on (and President Biden signed) legislation that will keep the federal government open through Dec. 16. But, if negotiations fail this time, the government will shut down right before the holidays, leaving many offices, museums, and parks closed.
The Job Market's Last Stand
With inflation rampant across most products and a policy-induced recession seemingly on the horizon, the job market remains defiant, refusing to cool down despite Fed actions.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased by 261,000 in October, much higher than the 200,000 consensus expected. Average hours worked rose by a solid 0.2% for the month, the fourth straight monthly increase, and the average workweek held at 34.5 hours for the fifth straight week, meaning current payrolls are overstretched, suggesting businesses will need to hire more.
Despite aggressive Fed action, the job market remains tight as workers continue to see fatter paychecks, giving people more to spend and push against Fed action. But overall inflation likely outpaced wage gains in October, with purchasing power squeezed by negative real wage gains. Hourly earnings were a robust 0.4% over September, with year-over-year wage gains moderating to a still solid 4.7% increase for the year. However, when adjusted for inflation, wage gains will remain negative for the 19th straight month. Personal income in real terms is now $1.3 trillion lower than its pre-pandemic trend rate (see chart 2). Even so, the huge number of new hires year to date, at 4.1 million, which is twice last decade's annual average, means many more paychecks to spend, with aggregate spending another force for the Fed to reckon with. Overall job gains were even hotter when considering net upward revisions of 29,000 the prior two months.
Chart 2
The unemployment rate rose by 0.2%, to 3.7%, as both more people counted themselves unemployed and more people left the workforce. This rate is still close to its precrisis rate of 3.5% in February 2020, which was a 50-year low. We forecast the unemployment rate will climb 1.3 percentage points to 5.6%, on average, in fourth-quarter 2023, and then moderate to under 5.0% by the end of 2024. The fourth-quarter 2025 unemployment rate is expected to be 1 percentage point higher than its current October rate of 3.7%.
While markets seem sanguine on the BLS report, discussions may be less rosy at the Fed. We believe the October report means the Fed--as it struggles to tame inflation--will need to remain vigilant in tightening monetary policy. We believe another 75-basis-point rate hike for the holidays is still on the table. While the healthy jobs report supports a strong holiday period, it's one that is a little less merry for the Fed as the window for a soft landing closes. We expect the Fed will top 5.0% by mid-2023.
They All Fall Down
Of the nine economic indicators we track in our Business Cycle Barometer, only jobless claims remained in positive territory in September. Six indicators were negative and two were neutral. The term spread indicator, based on the 10-year/three-month curve, was in neutral territory, though it appears to be joining the others that have already inverted.
Our 10-year/three-month term spread indicator has been inverted since Oct. 25. The 10-year/three-month average spread for November, through Nov. 25, hit -0.39% after nearing zero in October, all but ensuring that it has inverted, on average, for the month.
This follows both the 10-year/one-year and 10-year/two-year, which have been inverted, on average, for over four and a half straight months. The sustained inversions of these two spreads signal an impending recession (see "Despite Rising Risks, Yield Curve Is Not Yet Signaling Recession," May 4, 2022).
Keep in mind that an inverted curve is a signal that markets expect the Fed will need to loosen monetary policy in the future. The overarching reason is in response to fears that a slowdown in economic conditions could lead to recession. In other words, an inverted curve reflects market recession fears. Unfortunately, those fears are often right.
With that said, if the average 10-year/three-month remains inverted for two straight months (we look for a second month to confirm the first month), it is then considered a recession signal. But regardless of the preferred indicator, historically, through 2020, when any two of the four spreads invert for at least five months, a recession occurred within the next 12 months. This is a threshold that the 10-year/one-year and 10-year/two-year curves are about to cross.
The continued high prices through most of next year and the Fed's aggressive rate hikes, leading to households and businesses pulling back on spending and investment, further support our view.
Considering Upside And Downside Growth Scenarios
While S&P Global Ratings Economics sees a shallow U.S. recession in its baseline forecast, in such an uncertain environment, we also consider the U.S. economic outlook in a scenario of faster growth than the baseline and one with slower growth.
Most pressing is the timing and pace of U.S. monetary policy, as the Fed tackles inflation, which has remained high on continued supply-chain disruptions.
In a possible downside scenario, U.S. inflation remains high on continued supply-chain disruptions emanating from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and China's zero-tolerance policy on COVID-19. Still behind the curve, the Fed ramps up policy tightening through 2023 as U.S. economic activity falls further into the red.
In a possible upside scenario, supply chains stabilize sooner than expected, helped by an easing of quarantine measures in China. Although highly uncertain, one can't ignore the possibility of a faster resolution to the Russian-Ukraine conflict. On softening inflation as supply chains stabilize, the Fed is able to slow monetary tightening, reducing U.S. borrowing costs to elevate affordability concerns for the private sector. The Fed's wish comes true, and it manages a softer landing for the U.S. economy in 2023.
Table 3
S&P Global's Economic Outlook (Baseline) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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November 2022 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
--2022-- | --2023-- | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Qtr 1 | Qtr 2 | Qtr 3 | Qtr 4 | Qtr 1 | Qtr 2 | Qtr 3 | Qtr 4 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | ||||||||||||||||||
(% change) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Real GDP | (1.6) | (0.6) | 2.6 | 0.1 | (1.9) | (1.3) | 1.9 | 1.6 | (2.8) | 5.9 | 1.8 | (0.1) | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | |||||||||||||||||
GDP components (in real terms) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Domestic demand | 1.6 | (1.8) | (0.4) | 0.2 | (1.3) | (1.7) | 2.0 | 1.4 | (2.6) | 7.0 | 2.2 | (0.4) | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | |||||||||||||||||
Consumer spending | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.9 | (0.3) | (0.5) | 2.4 | 0.8 | (3.0) | 8.3 | 2.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.9 | |||||||||||||||||
Equipment investment | 11.4 | (2.0) | 10.8 | 0.9 | (5.4) | (6.2) | (1.1) | (0.2) | (10.5) | 10.3 | 4.6 | (1.4) | (0.2) | 2.0 | 2.8 | |||||||||||||||||
Intellectual property investment | 10.8 | 8.9 | 6.9 | 1.7 | (2.8) | (1.9) | (0.7) | (0.1) | 4.8 | 9.7 | 8.5 | 0.5 | (0.5) | 0.0 | 0.4 | |||||||||||||||||
Nonresidential construction | (4.3) | (12.7) | (15.3) | (6.4) | (3.5) | (2.6) | 0.5 | 0.7 | (10.1) | (6.4) | (9.2) | (5.4) | 0.7 | 1.5 | 2.0 | |||||||||||||||||
Residential construction | (3.1) | (17.8) | (26.4) | (24.0) | (11.6) | (9.1) | (2.3) | 3.0 | 7.2 | 10.7 | (10.4) | (14.3) | 5.6 | 7.0 | 2.2 | |||||||||||||||||
Federal govt. purchases | (5.3) | (3.4) | 3.7 | 1.6 | 5.8 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 6.2 | 2.3 | (2.8) | 2.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | |||||||||||||||||
State and local govt. purchases | 8.9 | 13.4 | 2.3 | 13.8 | (1.6) | 2.4 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 7.1 | 8.3 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.1 | |||||||||||||||||
Exports of goods and services | (4.6) | 13.8 | 14.4 | (0.2) | (3.0) | (0.1) | 1.5 | 3.3 | (13.3) | 6.0 | 7.3 | 2.0 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 3.8 | |||||||||||||||||
Imports of goods and services | 18.4 | 2.2 | (6.9) | 0.5 | 1.3 | (3.5) | 1.9 | 2.0 | (9.0) | 14.1 | 8.5 | (0.6) | 2.8 | 3.3 | 2.2 | |||||||||||||||||
CPI | 8.0 | 8.6 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 6.3 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 1.2 | 4.7 | 8.1 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | |||||||||||||||||
Core CPI | 6.3 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 1.7 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.2 | |||||||||||||||||
Nonfarm unit labor costs | 12.7 | 10.2 | 3.5 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 2.8 | (0.6) | 0.7 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 8.3 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | |||||||||||||||||
(Levels) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Unemployment rate (%) | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 8.1 | 5.4 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 4.6 | |||||||||||||||||
Payroll employment (mil.) | 150.4 | 151.6 | 152.5 | 153.4 | 153.3 | 152.4 | 151.5 | 150.9 | 142.1 | 146.1 | 152.0 | 152.0 | 151.5 | 152.6 | 153.2 | |||||||||||||||||
Federal funds rate (%) | 0.3 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 5.0 | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.6 | |||||||||||||||||
10-year Treasury-note yield (%) | 1.9 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.3 | |||||||||||||||||
Mortgage rate (30-year conventional, %) | 3.8 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 6.7 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 5.1 | |||||||||||||||||
Three-month Treasury-bill rate (%) | 0.3 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | |||||||||||||||||
S&P 500 Index | 4,530.4 | 3,785.4 | 3,585.6 | 3,777.0 | 3,770.9 | 3,789.0 | 3,816.3 | 3,819.6 | 3,756.1 | 4,766.2 | 3,777.0 | 3,819.6 | 4,036.6 | 4,123.8 | 4,284.1 | |||||||||||||||||
S&P 500 operating earnings (bil. $) | 1,668.6 | 1,583.5 | 1,767.0 | 1,713.6 | 1,646.3 | 1,596.1 | 1,618.9 | 1,650.3 | 1,019.0 | 1,762.8 | 1,683.2 | 1,627.9 | 1,650.0 | 1,689.0 | 1,761.2 | |||||||||||||||||
Current account (bil. $) | (1,130.2) | (1,004.4) | (880.4) | (879.6) | (896.9) | (826.5) | (829.0) | (838.0) | (610.3) | (846.4) | (973.6) | (847.6) | (861.0) | (908.4) | (879.0) | |||||||||||||||||
Housing starts (mil.) | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | |||||||||||||||||
Unit sales of light vehicles (mil.) | 14.1 | 13.3 | 13.4 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 14.3 | 14.9 | 15.5 | 14.5 | 14.9 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 15.7 | 16.0 | 16.4 | |||||||||||||||||
Federal surplus (fiscal year unified, bil. $) | (1,162.1) | 612.6 | (3,441.3) | (1,020.3) | (1,529.6) | (312.5) | (1,133.0) | (1,665.2) | (3,131.9) | (2,775.6) | (1,375.4) | (998.9) | (1,501.0) | (1,734.3) | (1,893.1) | |||||||||||||||||
Notes: (1) Quarterly percent change represents annualized growth rate; annual percent change represents average annual growth rate from a year ago. (2) Quarterly levels represent average during the quarter; annual levels represent average levels during the year. (3) Quarterly levels of housing starts and unit sales of light vehicles are in annualized millions. (4) Quarterly levels of CPI and core CPI represent year-over-year growth rate during the quarter. (5) Exchange rate represents the nominal trade-weighted exchange value of US$ versus major currencies. Sources: BEA, BLS, The Federal Reserve, S&P Global Market Intelligence, and S&P Global Ratings Economics' forecasts. |
The views expressed here are the independent opinions of S&P Global Ratings' economics group, which is separate from, but provides forecasts and other input to, S&P Global Ratings' analysts. The economic views herein may be incorporated into S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings; however, credit ratings are determined and assigned by ratings committees, exercising analytical judgment in accordance with S&P Global Ratings' publicly available methodologies.
This report does not constitute a rating action.
U.S. Chief Economist: | Beth Ann Bovino, New York + 1 (212) 438 1652; bethann.bovino@spglobal.com |
Research Contributors: | Debabrata Das, CRISIL Global Analytical Center, an S&P Global Ratings affiliate, Mumbai |
Shruti Galwankar, CRISIL Global Analytical Center, an S&P affiliate, Mumbai |
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