U.K. buy-to-let (BTL) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions have become increasingly exposed to houses in multiple occupation (HMOs) and multi-unit freehold block (MUFB) collateral, which are typically grouped together as multifamily collateral. In 2021--the latest full year of issuance--14 transactions were issued which had an average exposure of 19.2% to this type of collateral. S&P Global Ratings believes this is primarily due to the search for yield in a competitive BTL market, increasing prevalence of portfolio landlords, and may be a consequence of other sources of lender funding excluding these types of properties.
These specialist properties have various differences from a standard BTL property, which can affect portfolio composition in several ways. This Credit FAQ addresses key questions about HMOs and MUFBs in the context of the U.K. RMBS market, and presents the findings of our scenario analysis.
In our scenario analysis, we analyzed the arrears performance of HMO and MUFB loans across six U.K. BTL RMBS transactions that we rate. On average, arrears are lower for HMO and MUFB loans than arrears for standard BTL loans in the same transaction. Considering performance history to date and underwriting standards, we do not expect the collateral performance of U.K. BTL RMBS transactions with exposure to multifamily collateral to be markedly worse than that of those backed by standard BTL collateral.
Frequently Asked Questions
What are the main differences between HMOs and MUFBs?
Table 1
| Differences Between HMOs And MUFBs | ||
|---|---|---|
| HMO | MUFB | |
| Property type | One property rented out by at least three people, not from a single household (e.g., a family). Historically large, older properties which have been converted to make them appropriate for shared living. | Separate independent residential units. Typically houses converted into flats, purpose-built flats, or separate houses under one freehold title. |
| Tenancy | May be split as individual assured shorthold tenancies (ASTs) for each tenant or combined under one AST. | Each residential unit has their own AST agreement. |
| Regulation | License required since 2006 in England and Wales. Although house shares with more than five bedrooms have always required a HMO license, many local councils have also adopted an additional licensing scheme (to improve local rental stock quality). This has required three-bedroom plus properties to also hold a license. Regulation offers no guarantee that landlords will always maintain property to a high standard, but it is likely to be a credit positive relative to the pre-regulated era. | Each residential unit has their own AST agreement. No specific licensing requirements. |
Chart 1
Chart 2
Why are we seeing more HMO and MUFB loans backing U.K. BTL RMBS transactions?
Although both property types have been around for some time, loan-level reporting has only recently started identifying these types of properties. From 2019 onward U.K. BTL RMBS transactions that we rate containing these types of loans increased and they started to represent a greater proportion of the pool. 2021 issuance saw 14 transactions containing multifamily collateral with an average exposure of 19.2% (see table 2).
Table 2
| S&P Global Ratings' Rated U.K. BTL RMBS Transactions Containing Multifamily Collateral | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year of issuance | Number of transactions | Issuance amount ((Mil. £) | Weighted-average multifamily property exposure (%) | Multifamily backed collateral (mil. £) |
| 2019 | 1 | 427 | 16 | 68 |
| 2020 | 10 | 3,694 | 17.8 | 659 |
| 2021 | 14 | 4,190 | 19.2 | 803 |
| 2022 | 11 | 4,134 | 17.6 | 726 |
| Overall | 36 | 12,445 | 18.1 | 2,256 |
We believe the multifamily lending trend is primarily due to a search for yield by both investors and mortgage lenders in a competitive BTL market. We have also seen lenders gradually pivot toward portfolio landlords, who may have more appetite to hold multifamily properties. It may also be a consequence of providers of other sources of lender funding such as forward flow agreements and repo arrangements explicitly excluding HMO/MUFB collateral, meaning it becomes more common in RMBS transactions.
Table 3 compares the average mortgage rate for multifamily and standard BTL properties in a selection of transactions that we rate. The average multiple of mortgage rate for multifamily property lending varies between 1.3x-1.8x compared to the mortgage rate for a standard BTL property.
Table 3
| Average Multiples: Mortgage Rates For Multifamily And Loans | |
|---|---|
| Region | Average multiple of HMO/MUFB rate to standard BTL rate |
| East Anglia | 1.70 |
| East Midlands | 1.78 |
| London | 1.30 |
| North | 1.44 |
| North West | 1.65 |
| South East | 1.60 |
| South West | 1.59 |
| West Midlands | 1.62 |
| Yorks and Humber | 1.68 |
| Scotland | 1.53 |
| Overall average | 1.59 |
What are the key differences between multifamily and standard BTL RMBS collateral?
Table 4
| Differences Between Multifamily And Standard BTL Collateral | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Characteristic | What’s different? | Expected impact | ||||
| Landlord | Typically in RMBS transactions the owners of multifamily property are portfolio landlords who have some experience managing a BTL property. This differs from a standard BTL where there may be some element of new, single property, or “accidental” landlords who have less experience and/or properties. This should mean HMO and MUFB landlords have a more professional approach to managing the property. This is important given they typically have more onerous requirements. Portfolio landlords should also have some degree of income diversification and so may be better able to cope with rental voids or arrears. | Positive | ||||
| Property type | HMOs and MUFBs are likely to have higher running costs due to the need to manage multiple tenants, licensing requirement (for HMOs) and that they have historically been converted older properties which are likely to have higher maintenance costs. This may also affect the property’s energy performance certificate, which may result in additional costs to improve this in line with current U.K. government standards of ’C‘ or above by 2025 for new tenancies. Finally, these types of properties are typically located in densely populated areas which can create a lack of geographic diversification, with exposure to London being typically high. | Negative | ||||
| Rental income | Rental yields are typically higher for this type of property, up to three times higher than a standard BTL in some cases. This gives the landlord much more flexibility to manage void periods and arrears. Rental income may be more diversified as it is serviced by multiple incomes. However, tenants are more likely to have lower overall incomes given they have opted to live in lower cost accommodation. Therefore, individual incomes may be riskier and social risks may be involved in managing tenants. HMO rental income may also be more countercyclical than standard BTL properties since they typically offer a lower rental cost for tenants. For student properties, a guarantor requirement may be in effect which de-risks the rental income. Given MUFBs are split out as separate apartments within the same block, landlords may be able to split the freehold and sell individual units, the proceeds of which could be used to service the mortgage. | Positive | ||||
| Valuation | Due to the specialist nature of these property types, where it is likely that the original property has been reconfigured to suit the current use, or has been specially built to be a HMO there may be a limited number of buyers for the property when it is sold. This may affect its resale value and take longer to achieve a sale. For large HMOs (defined by HMO licensing as over five bedrooms) or larger MUFBs, the lack of buyers could be more pronounced. Additionally, if the properties are valued using a favorable methodology of property valuation, the impact on valuation could be greater. A bricks and mortar approach to valuation, where the property is valued based on its fair market value citing local comparables, is typically used for smaller HMOs/MUFBs. For larger properties, an investment-yield based valuation approach may be used. Some lenders may additionally haircut either type of valuation for any expected costs to convert the property back into a standard BTL/owner occupied property, to capture additional valuation uncertainty due to a potentially reduced number of buyers. Any of these valuation methods may be appropriate depending on the dwelling in question. In our view it is important for lenders to have detailed policies on under which circumstances they would use different types of valuation. | Negative | ||||
| Underwriting | Most lenders specify at least one year’s experience of managing a BTL property. Some lenders also require a minimum portfolio size, or prior ownership of a multifamily property. This is more stringent than the market standard for standard BTL lending. The valuation basis can also vary by lender (see above). The market standard for UK BTL lenders is to take the standard BTL valuation (bricks and mortar) basis for properties of five or fewer bedrooms. For large HMOs with over five bedrooms, we see more variation in the approach between different lenders. Some lenders exclude large HMOs completely and just take a bricks and mortar approach on the smaller HMOs. Affordability requirements are also typically more stringent than for a standard BTL property, with lenders typically requiring a DSCR of at least 1.4x for this type of property versus 1.25x for a limited company BTL on a standard BTL property. Additionally, lenders will usually lend on a lower LTV ratio for these property types, with lenders typically reducing their maximum LTV ratio by at least 5% versus a standard BTL property. | Positive | ||||
| LTV--Loan-to-value. DSCR--debt-service-coverage-ratio. | ||||||
What is the impact of HMO and MUFB exposure on pool composition?
We have looked at a random selection of four of our rated transactions issued in 2022 which contained HMO and MUFB collateral to determine the impact of the multifamily collateral on pool composition. We split the closing pools into two separate sub-pools: One containing the multifamily loans and one containing the standard BTL loans. Table 5 shows the parameters which are likely to be most heavily influenced by the inclusion of multifamily collateral.
Average loan size and average borrower exposure are greater for the pools which contain multifamily collateral, indicating that these are typically bigger ticket loans with associated concentration risks.
Three of the four transactions analyzed have a lower original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, while all transactions have a lower current LTV ratio at the time of origination. This indicates that lenders are generally more conservative on LTV ratios when lending on multifamily properties.
The debt-service-coverage (DSCR) ratio of the multifamily loans is considerably stronger than the standard BTL loans for all of the transactions, which indicates greater rental income for these types of properties. This is also driven by the tighter DSCR underwriting requirements which we typically see for multifamily properties.
Based on the transactions analyzed, we found it hard to draw a firm conclusion on geographic exposure, given some pools have greater diversification in the multifamily pool and some in the standard BTL pool. However, lending on both types of properties generally show a greater exposure to London. Additionally, given the risk of more concentrated lending, we may see greater geographic concentration in pools which contain multifamily properties.
Jumbo valuation is the adjustment we use to capture the risk of large valuation properties which can be more difficult to sell in a stressed housing market. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the larger loan size, we see a more jumbo valuations in the multifamily property pools than in the standard BTL pools across all of the transactions.
Table 5
| Multifamily And Standard BTL Exposures Within U.K. BTL RMBS Transactions | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlas Funding 2022-1 multifamily | Atlas Funding 2022-1 standard BTL | Lanebrook 2022-1 multifamily | Lanebrook 2022-1 standard BTL | Mortimer 2022-1 multifamily | Mortimer 2022-1 standard BTL | Stratton 2022-1 multifamily | Stratton 2022-1 standard BTL | |||||||||||
| Field - penalty | April 2022 | April 2022 | September 2022 | September 2022 | April 2022 | April 2022 | July 2022 | July 2022 | ||||||||||
| Total principal balance | £116,263,809 | £189,476,918 | £56,433,047 | £286,396,009 | £48,183,527 | £221,817,320 | £127,738,123 | £300,556,937 | ||||||||||
| Total number of properties | 197 | 545 | 264 | 2,188 | 149 | 1,157 | 370 | 1,372 | ||||||||||
| Average loan | £590,172 | £347,664 | £213,762 | £130,894 | £323,379 | £191,718 | £345,238 | £219,065 | ||||||||||
| Total number of borrowers | 164 | 369 | 234 | 1,658 | 131 | 859 | 317 | 1,028 | ||||||||||
| Average borrower exposure | £708,926 | £513,488 | £241,167 | £172,736 | £367,813 | £258,227 | £402,959 | £292,371 | ||||||||||
| WA OLTV | 70.6% | 70.8% | 71.7% | 73.6% | 72.4% | 73.1% | 74.5% | 73.8% | ||||||||||
| [0, 40] | 0.6% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.7% | ||||||||||
| (40, 50] | 1.7% | 1.4% | 2.8% | 0.5% | 3.8% | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.0% | ||||||||||
| (50, 60] | 5.2% | 1.5% | 5.8% | 1.8% | 9.5% | 5.7% | 0.8% | 2.2% | ||||||||||
| (60, 70] | 26.3% | 30.7% | 10.7% | 7.6% | 13.4% | 11.4% | 7.4% | 11.7% | ||||||||||
| (70, 80] | 62.6% | 64.7% | 79.1% | 89.3% | 60.3% | 77.4% | 89.4% | 78.3% | ||||||||||
| (80, 90] | 3.1% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 13.0% | 4.2% | 0.9% | 6.1% | ||||||||||
| (90, 100] | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| >100 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| WA ELTV | 70.3% | 70.5% | 71.5% | 73.5% | 72.2% | 73.0% | 73.2% | 72.8% | ||||||||||
| BTL - from 1.25x to 1.7x depending on DSCR | ||||||||||||||||||
| No rental data | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| <=1.0x | 8.9% | 42.0% | 2.9% | 25.3% | 0.0% | 28.5% | 9.0% | 39.2% | ||||||||||
| >1.0x and <=1.20 | 14.0% | 27.4% | 15.4% | 25.8% | 1.6% | 29.9% | 12.4% | 30.3% | ||||||||||
| >1.2x and <=1.35 | 9.5% | 15.1% | 9.9% | 14.5% | 22.8% | 17.4% | 9.6% | 13.3% | ||||||||||
| >1.35x | 67.6% | 15.5% | 71.9% | 34.5% | 75.6% | 24.1% | 69.0% | 17.2% | ||||||||||
| Geographic concentration. - 1.2x to the excess above the threshold | ||||||||||||||||||
| East Anglia (18%) | 0.0% | 1.8% | 5.7% | 6.6% | 14.4% | 10.0% | 7.0% | 8.2% | ||||||||||
| East Midlands (14%) | 3.0% | 0.3% | 7.8% | 4.6% | 9.0% | 5.6% | 8.1% | 3.6% | ||||||||||
| Greater London (26%) | 61.9% | 76.9% | 31.7% | 28.4% | 26.2% | 45.3% | 29.6% | 54.5% | ||||||||||
| North (9%) | 1.1% | 0.1% | 2.1% | 5.1% | 0.4% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 1.2% | ||||||||||
| North West (23%) | 6.1% | 2.7% | 8.0% | 12.2% | 8.6% | 6.0% | 9.9% | 8.1% | ||||||||||
| Northern Ireland (6%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| Scotland (17%) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.3% | 12.3% | 0.7% | 4.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| South East (26%) | 16.4% | 14.2% | 11.9% | 11.6% | 10.7% | 12.5% | 24.1% | 14.2% | ||||||||||
| South West (17%) | 5.6% | 2.8% | 7.5% | 4.1% | 6.0% | 3.5% | 10.5% | 3.0% | ||||||||||
| Wales (10%) | 0.6% | 0.4% | 6.5% | 2.3% | 2.2% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 0.8% | ||||||||||
| West Midlands (18%) | 2.8% | 0.8% | 11.2% | 5.7% | 14.1% | 5.8% | 2.2% | 3.0% | ||||||||||
| Yorks And Humber (17%) | 2.4% | 0.0% | 4.3% | 7.4% | 7.7% | 4.1% | 5.6% | 3.6% | ||||||||||
| WA indexed CLTV | 68.9% | 69.4% | 71.0% | 73.1% | 71.5% | 72.7% | 68.0% | 69.1% | ||||||||||
| [0, 40] | 0.6% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.8% | ||||||||||
| (40, 50] | 2.5% | 1.4% | 2.9% | 0.6% | 3.8% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | ||||||||||
| (50, 60] | 6.7% | 4.0% | 5.3% | 2.1% | 9.5% | 6.1% | 4.2% | 6.3% | ||||||||||
| (60, 70] | 41.9% | 33.4% | 12.2% | 10.0% | 14.5% | 11.6% | 54.9% | 35.2% | ||||||||||
| (70, 80] | 46.6% | 59.4% | 77.5% | 86.5% | 61.6% | 77.7% | 38.9% | 52.5% | ||||||||||
| (80, 90] | 1.3% | 0.3% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 10.6% | 3.1% | 0.3% | 3.6% | ||||||||||
| (90, 100] | 0.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| >100 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | ||||||||||
| Jumbo valuations - 1.2x to the excess above the threshold | 38.5% | 10.8% | 0.6% | 0.0% | 25.9% | 2.4% | 26.6% | 5.2% | ||||||||||
| DSCR--Debt service coverage ratio. WA--Weighted-average. CLTV--Current loan-to-value. OLTV--Original loan-to-value. ELTV--Estimated loan-to-value. | ||||||||||||||||||
How do we analyze multifamily collateral in U.K. BTL transactions?
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the main points of our analysis when evaluating multifamily properties in U.K. BTL RMBS. If we believe additional factors are not captured within our analysis, we may apply additional qualitative adjustments through the originator adjustment.
Typical areas in our analysis where we would expect to see divergence versus a standard BTL property are shown in tables 6 and 7.
Table 6
| Weighted-Average Foreclosure Frequency Analysis For U.K. BTL RMBS Transactions Containing Multifamily Collateral | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjustment | Reasoning | |||
| BTL adjustment | As mortgages for HMOs and MUFBs are BTL, all loans attract our BTL adjustment. This is based on the DSCR of the loan at a stressed financing cost of 5.5% and is in line with our approach for a standard BTL property. However, given HMOs and MUFBs are typically higher yielding, we would typically expect to use a lower BTL adjustment for this type of asset. | |||
| Geographic concentration | Given the size and nature of HMO/MUFBs, we could see large concentrations of these in city centers such as London. This could lead to a geographic penalty. | |||
| Borrower concentration | Given the large typical loan size in HMO/MUFB lending, we expect to see increased borrower concentration when this type of properties are included within transactions. | |||
| Commercial property | If we believe that the lender has applied their valuation standard for HMOs/MUFBs inconsistently to achieve a more favorable property valuation, we may increase our WAFF assumption. This is to capture the risk that the valuation methodology may be more in line with that of a commercial property. For more information on how we analyze commercial properties within RMBS transactions see “How We Analyze Small Ticket Commercial Real Estate Assets In European Structured Finance”. | |||
| Originator adjustment | We may increase our WAFF assumption for factors not captured in the above adjustments such as high exposure to large HMOs or to specific use assets, such as student housing. | |||
| WAFF-Weighted-average foreclosure frequency. | ||||
Table 7
| Weighted-Average Loss Severity Analysis For U.K. BTL RMBS Transactions Containing Multifamily Collateral | |
|---|---|
| Adjustment | Reasoning |
| Jumbo valuation | Given the size and nature of HMOs/MUFBs, we typically see larger properties in transactions which may breach the regional jumbo valuation thresholds and therefore attract a penalty. |
| Commercial property | We would increase our market value decline (MVD) assumption where we believe that the valuation standard applied to HMO/MUFB properties is significantly different to the market standard for similar properties or has been inconsistently applied to achieve a favorable valuation. If a favorable valuation has been used, we would view the property as being more akin to a commercial property and apply a higher MVD. |
| Large exposure to atypical HMOs/MUFBs | We may increase our loss severity assumption for high exposures to large properties or those with specific uses, reflecting the fact that we do not have much data. |
How does HMO/MUFB backed loans' arrears performance compare to loans backed by standard BTL properties?
To analyze the impact of multifamily collateral on transaction performance, we evaluated a random subset of six transactions across different originators which contain HMO/MUFB properties and have current arrears. This included both prime and nonconforming transactions issued since 2019.
All of these transactions comprise loans which were originated post-crisis. Pre-crisis loans may show differences in performance. Additionally, since our analysis was at the pool level it aggregates arrears on loans which may have different levels of seasoning. Nonetheless, our conclusions are aligned with data we have received from U.K. BTL lenders on the performance of HMOs within their lending book.
We split our analysis into two areas. We analyzed loans containing HMOs/MUFBs across the entire pool of the transactions and ran an additional analysis of loans which were underwritten to a DSCR of 1.40x and above at closing (using our 5.5% stressed financing rate). The purpose of the higher DSCR is to control for the differences in underwriting to some degree by removing standard BTL loans which are underwritten to a lower DSCR.
Table 8
| Performance Comparison: HMO/MUFB Loans Versus Standard BTL Loans | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arrears | All loans | Loans with DSCR over 1.40x | ||||
| HMO/MUFB total arrears | 1.50% | 1.11% | ||||
| Standard BTL total arrears | 2.43% | 1.15% | ||||
| HMO/MUFB 90+ days arrears | 0.53% | 0.41% | ||||
| Standard BTL 90+ days arrears | 0.99% | 0.67% | ||||
| DSCR--Debt service coverage ratio. | ||||||
Our analysis on an entire pool basis indicates that in the pools analyzed, HMO and MUFB loans have significantly lower total and 90+ day arrears than standard BTL loans. We believe this improved performance is mainly due to the tighter underwriting criteria which lenders have for these property types, which reduces credit stress in transactions.
We adjusted our analysis to account for the tighter underwriting of HMO and MUFB loans by removing all standard BTL loans with a DSCR of less than 1.40. In the pools analyzed, multifamily loans' total arrears perform roughly in line with standard BTL loans, but multifamily loans still have lower severe 90+ days arrears than standard BTL loans.
HMOs/MUFBs are still likely to have higher achievable rental income, while other factors such as increased flexibility to manage income (such as re-leasing rooms at a market rate) may aid performance of this type of collateral during periods of credit stress.
The performance history of transactions in our analysis is limited to a short period, during which mortgage rates have typically been very low and demand has typically been high for rental properties. However, this does cover the COVID-19 period which was relatively stressful for the U.K. rental market (see "Why U.K. Buy-To-Let Has Defied Gravity Through COVID-19"). As interest rates rise which makes refinancing more costly, and tenants are affected by the rising cost of living, we expect collateral performance to come under some pressure (see "Cost Of Living Crisis: How Bad Could It Get For U.K. RMBS?"). However, based on our findings, we do not expect the performance of transactions backed by multifamily collateral to be markedly worse than those backed by standard BTL collateral.
Further risks to performance could arise from greater concentration risk if we see transactions primarily backed by multifamily collateral without adequate diversification. For instance, if the top 10 borrowers represent a significant proportion of the overall loans in a transaction, a small number of foreclosures could lead to a comparatively large reduction in available revenue. We would also be wary of pools containing loans backed by several high value, large sized multifamily properties for which we believe there is a smaller potential pool of buyers. We believe this type of collateral could see greater market value declines in stressed macroeconomic conditions and a volatile housing market due to lack of buyer interest and costs to reconvert to a standard BTL or owner-occupied property.
Editor: Claire Ellis.
Related Criteria
Related Research
- EMEA Structured Finance Chart Book, published monthly
- European RMBS Index Report Q3 2022, Nov. 7, 2022
- European RMBS Market Update Q4 2022: The New Normal For How Long?, Nov. 9, 2022
- Cost Of Living Crisis: U.K. RMBS 2.0 Has Built-In Resilience, Sept. 6, 2022
- Cost Of Living Crisis: How Bad Could It Get For U.K. RMBS?, May 20, 2022
- How We Analyze Small Ticket Commercial Real Estate Assets In European Structured Finance, Jan. 19, 2022
- The Future Of U.K. Nonbank Mortgage Lending And How It Will Affect RMBS, Feb. 9, 2022
- Why U.K. Buy-To-Let Has Defied Gravity Through COVID-19, Aug. 3, 2021
- S&P Global Ratings' U.K. Buy-To-Let Market Primer, June 1, 2021
- U.K. RMBS 2.0 Origination And Structural Evolution Combine To Reduce Credit And Reinvestment Risk, Jan. 7, 2019
- Buy-To-Letdown? Recent RMBS Loans Will Struggle With The Perfect Storm Of Regulation And Tax Hikes, Jan. 24, 2018
- New U.K. Buy-To-Let Mortgage Rules Will Change The Face Of The Lending And Securitization Markets, Nov. 27, 2017
This report does not constitute a rating action.
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Josh Timmons, London (44) 20-7176-0831; josh.timmons@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Alastair Bigley, London + 44 20 7176 3245; Alastair.Bigley@spglobal.com |
| Vedant Thakur, London + 44 20 7176 3909; vedant.thakur@spglobal.com |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.