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China LRG in Focus--Jiangsu Region

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China LRG in Focus--Jiangsu Region

This report does not constitute a rating action.

This is one of a series of reports on Chinese local and regional governments (LRGs). Using publicly available information, S&P Global Ratings will provide analytical opinions based on key credit metrics, allowing readers to assess the creditworthiness of each LRG. These LRGs form the backbone of the mainland economy and, together with their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), are among China's highest-volume debt issuers. Much of this report, and the series, will analyze the distinction between "LRG level" and "whole region" data. We apply our analysis on an individual basis, which means we largely focus on LRG-level government financial statements, with the whole-region data serving as a supplement to capture risks associated with lower tiers of governments. In its simplest sense, province-level data are the primary figures under analysis. We supplement this view using whole-province data, which encompass the cities, districts, and other lower-tier governments within the region.

Chart 1

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Jiangsu has the second largest GDP among Chinese provinces. It is on mainland China's east coast and encompasses one of the country's most vibrant metropolitan areas, the Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone. Jiangsu's industrial sector is steadily moving to higher value-added production on the back of continued investment into diverse enterprises (see chart 1).

The Jiangsu provincial government is a tier-one LRG under China's fiscal system and legislative framework. The province administers 13 city governments--including the capital city of Nanjing--which we collectively classify as tier-two local governments.

Regional Highlights

The income level in Jiangsu is high compared with other regions in China (see chart 2). The debt burden of governments in the region is also high, involving large borrowings by SOEs (see chart 3). Income levels and debt burdens vary widely across the 13 cities (see charts 4 and 5).

Chart 2

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Chart 3

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Chart 4

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Chart 5

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Provincial Government

Measures of creditworthiness

We assesses the creditworthiness of non-U.S. LRGs by combining its assessment of the institutional framework and individual credit profiles on governments to arrive at the anchor, a core element of our credit assessment on an LRG. In addition to our institutional framework analysis, we largely cover economy, budgetary performance, and debt burden, as three of the five credit factors to assess the individual credit profile on an LRG. Our analysis of the other two factors--financial management and liquidity--remains subject to more information, but we generally view these two factors as supporting the creditworthiness of most LRGs.

We view the Jiangsu provincial government (Jiangsu province, or Jiangsu) as a tier-one government. We assess its institutional framework as "very predictable and well balanced." China's stable public finance system supports this view. China's nationally defined fiscal policy framework helps LRGs manage fiscal risks, and this includes the possibility of exceptional support from the central government in times of stress.

Our assessment is constrained, however, by a lack of detail in China LRGs' fiscal disclosures. The sector also carries large exposure to government-related entities (GREs), and we can only estimate the extent of an LRG's ultimate obligations should one of these entities falter. In addition, China's centralized system gives tier-one LRGs limited flexibility to respond to a fiscal strain, should one materialize.

We generally view the individual credit profile on Jiangsu as strong compared with that on other tier-one governments in China (see table 1 and charts 6-9).

Table 1

Breakdown Of The Core Elements Of The Credit Profile On Jiangsu
Element View
Economy Jiangsu's income level and growth will remain high. This can be attributed to its good location, large economy, and balanced economic structure across manufacturing and services.
Financial management The province's financial management is satisfactory. The central government appoints experienced and senior people to leadership positions and sets out general guidance on financial planning. Jiangsu consistently meets its budget goals.
Budgetary performance Jiangsu's economic strength and low capital spending at the provincial level support its good fiscal stance. Its transfers to lower-tier LRGs bolster the fiscal standing of these entities. Jiangsu's deficit is likely to widen over the next two years but capital expenditure discipline should continue.
Liquidity The liquidity profile of Jiangsu is a supportive factor, in our view. LRGs in the region together control large deposits and liquid assets, and Jiangsu benefits from strong access to the domestic bond market.
Debt burden Jiangsu's high debt burden is mainly driven by its large borrowings on behalf of lower-tier LRGs in the region. Still, the adequate repayment capacity of most of its lower-tier LRGs mitigates these risks. Jiangsu owns a few SOEs. The risk that these SOEs may weaken and need LRG support is manageable considering the sector diversity of these entities and their general ability to manage liabilities with their own resources.
LRG--Local and regional government. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Chart 6a

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Chart 6b

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Chart 7

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Chart 8

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Chart 9

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Measures of SOE support

Our analysis here largely focuses on a government's capacity to support the debt of its GRE sector, and not a government's capacity to pay its own debt. With the central government's increasing scrutiny of LRGs' budget plans, LRGs will not be able to spend--including to provide excessive support to GREs--unless such an activity were preapproved in the budget. We identify three measures to gauge a government's capacity to support its SOE sector: SOE size, SOE creditworthiness, and LRG control over nonbudget resources. Our metrics only refer to nonfinancial-institution SOEs. We extract SOE data mainly from Wind, which cover 70%-80% of LRG-controlled SOEs, measured by aggregated assets and aggregated liabilities as stated by the Chinese government. These metrics provide a simple financial gauge. Our analysis does not encompass the wider resources that LRGs can control. These options vary widely in their form and complexity, and cannot be easily captured using simple metrics.

We generally view the capacity of the Jiangsu government at the provincial level as sufficient to support its SOEs (see charts 10-12). However, such support is likely to turn increasingly selective in a stress scenario. Data from Wind suggest SOE debt at the Jiangsu provincial level (tier one), city level (tier two), and district level (tier three) at about 5%, 40%, and 55%, respectively, of total SOE debt in the whole region.

Table 2

Key Risks Presented By Jiangsu SOEs
Risk View
SOE size Jiangsu at the provincial level controls a few SOEs but their aggregated debt is not particularly sizable in the domestic context. Their businesses span infrastructure and many commercial enterprises. These SOEs have grown faster than Jiangsu's GDP or public services, with transport-related segments leading debt growth at the province's nonfinancial institutions. In addition, Jiangsu indirectly controls large financial institutions, with aggregated assets of Chinese renminbi (RMB) 3 trillion, by our estimate.
SOE creditworthiness Jiangsu's top SOEs generally appear better able to support their own finances than most other local government SOEs in China. While the leverage of most nonfinancial-institution SOEs in Jiangsu appears aggressive by international standards, most local SOEs have satisfactory business profiles, and can operate with low dependence on support from Jiangsu in the next two years.
Administrative capacity to support SOEs in stress We understand that no SOE in Jiangsu has experienced stress or has asked for extraordinary support. We view Jiangsu's SOE management as largely aligned with the framework of central government guidelines, which are leading Chinese LRGs to further tighten their SOE monitoring system to ensure that SOEs repay their bond obligations on time.
Financial resources to support SOE We believe the provincial government has capacity to support its SOEs if they encountered stress, but will would provide such support selectively. Jiangsu keeps a sufficient level of liquid assets under the government account and under SOE accounts. Jiangsu's control of sizable banking resources could provide an additional buffer to support its key SOEs whenever necessary.
SOZE--State-owned enterprise. LRG--Local and regional government. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Chart 10

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Chart 11

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Chart 12

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City Governments

Measures of creditworthiness

We view the 13 city governments under the administration of the Jiangsu provincial government as tier-two local governments. Their institutional framework is "evolving but balanced," in our opinion. China's stable public finance system, which is increasingly tied to centralized policies set by Beijing, supports this assessment. China's nationally defined fiscal policy framework helps tier-two LRGs manage fiscal risks, and this includes the possibility of exceptional support from the central government in times of stress.

Our assessment is constrained, however, by a lack of detail in the governments' fiscal disclosures. The governments also carry large exposure to GREs, and we can only estimate the extent of the ultimate obligation of an LRG, should one of these entities falter. In addition, China's centralized system gives tier-two LRGs limited flexibility to respond to a fiscal strain, should one materialize.

The individual credit profiles on city governments in Jiangsu are generally weaker than that on the Jiangsu provincial level, in our view. Individual credit profiles diverge widely across the 13 cities. The economic profiles on Jiangsu's city governments are generally stronger than that on other city governments in China. However, most of Jiangsu's city governments carry a higher debt burden, largely driven by large debt-funded capital spending by LRGs and key SOEs.

We provide a comparison of six city governments in Jiangsu by anchoring their credit metrics and assigning a local rank relative to 48 selected city governments in China (see charts 13-16, and see the risk indicators section in "Chinese Tier-Two Local Government Risk Indicators," published Nov. 28, 2021, on RatingsDirect). The six Jiangsu city governments account for about 60% of Jiangsu's GDP.

Chart 13a

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Chart 13b

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Chart 14

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Chart 15a

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Chart 15b

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Chart 16

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Measures of SOE support

The capacity of city governments in the Jiangsu region to provide SOE support is generally weaker than that at the Jiangsu provincial level, in our opinion. The capacity for such support varies widely. Some cities may not be able to provide timely support to their SOEs in a stress scenario, assuming that neither Jiangsu nor the central government stepped in (see charts 17-19). In line with the center's policy direction, city governments in Jiangsu can only selectively support liquidity-strained SOEs under their auspices. SOE debt at the city level of the selected six city governments together accounts for about 60% of the SOE debt of Jiangsu's city-level governments (see "SOEs In Focus: Jiangsu Province, China--The Year For More Balanced Growth," March 14, 2022).

Chart 17

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Chart 18

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Chart 19

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Related Research

Appendix

Table 3

Key Metrics Of Jiangsu And The Chinese LRG Sector
GDP scale (Bil. RMB) GDP per capita (RMB) LRG total revenue (Bil. RMB) LRG debt (Bil. RMB) SOE debt (Bil. RMB) Real GDP growth (%) BACA (%) TSD (%) TSD excluding onlending (%)
Jiangsu--provincial level
2016-2020 average 9,176 112,809 420 54 356 6.3 (1.2) 343.0 15.3
2020 10,272 121,231 489 65 455 3.7 (4.7) 393.0 17.1
2021e 11,636 136,812 451 77 N.A. 8.6 0.8 N.A. N.A.
Jiangsu--whole region
2016-2020 average 9,176 112,809 1,892 1,367 5,845 6.3 (10.5) 350.5 N.A.
2020 10,272 121,231 2,303 1,723 7,516 3.7 (14.4) 388.2 N.A.
2021e 11,636 136,812 2,577 1,903 N.A. 8.6 (7.9) N.A. N.A.
China:
2016-2020 average 90,004 64,699 22,349 19,459 45,283 5.8 (10.9) 211.9 N.A.
2020 101,599 72,447 26,535 25,661 57,553 2.3 (16.3) 242.0 N.A.
Note: Please refer to our glossary for a definition of terms. LRG--Local and regional government. SOE--State-owned enterprise. Bil.--Billion. RMB--Chinese renminbi. Source: LRGs' bureaus of finance and bureaus of statistics, Wind, S&P Global Ratings.

Table 4

Key Metrics Of Jiangsu Cities
GDP scale (Bil. RMB) GDP per capita (RMB) LRG-level Whole-LRG
LRG total revenue (Bil. RMB) LRG debt (Bil. RMB) SOE debt (Bil. RMB) LRG total revenue (Bil. RMB) LRG debt (Bil. RMB) SOE debt (Bil. RMB)

Jiangsu (Province of)

10,272 121,231 489 65 455 2,303 1,723 7,516
Changzhou (City of) 781 147,939 68 99 219 193 122 644
Huaian (City of) 403 87,507 34 45 273 83 63 428

Lianyungang (City of)

328 71,303 31 38 215 71 61 255

Nanjing (City of)

1,482 159,322 251 117 623 417 282 1,248
Nantong (City of) 1,004 129,900 65 73 85 226 168 686
Suqian (City of) 326 65,503 31 41 40 84 79 123
Suzhou (City of) 2,017 158,466 102 22 230 446 153 939
Taizhou (City of) 531 117,542 34 43 249 98 84 459

Wuxi (City of)

1,237 165,851 63 108 292 224 142 662
Xuzhou (City of) 732 80,673 68 57 118 171 117 383

Yancheng (City of)

595 88,731 48 65 314 144 137 533

Yangzhou (city of)

605 132,784 43 60 144 104 91 288
Zhenjiang (City of) 422 131,580 29 98 233 79 157 365
Note: All data are for 2020. Please refer to our glossary for a definition of terms. LRG--Local and regional government. SOE--State-owned enterprise. Bil.--Billion. RMB--Chinese renminbi. Source: LRGs' bureaus of finance and bureaus of statistics, Wind, S&P Global Ratings.

Table 5

Top SOEs In Jiangsu Region
Reference LRG* Tier of LRG Total debt (Bil. RMB)*

Jiangsu Communications Holding Co. Ltd.

Jiangsu (Province of)

T1 305

Nanjing Yangzi State-Owned Assets Investment Group Co. Ltd.

Nanjing (City of)

T2 169
Nanjing Metro Group Co. Ltd.

Nanjing (City of)

T2 123
Nanjing State Owned Assets Investment & Management Holding Group Co. Ltd.

Nanjing (City of)

T2 102
Suzhou International Development Group Co. Ltd. Suzhou (City of) T2 92
Nanjing Southeast State-owned Asset Investment Group Co. Ltd.

Nanjing (City of)

T2 87
Nanjing Dajiangbei State-Owned-Assets Investment Group Co. Ltd. Pukou (District of) T3 81
Zhenjiang City Construction Industrial Group Co. Ltd.

Zhenjiang (City of)

T2 77
Changzhou Urban Construction (Group) Co. Ltd. Changzhou (City of) T2 73
Jiangsu Wujin Economic Development Group Co. Ltd. Wujin (District of) T3 67
Suzhou Rail Transit Group Co. Ltd. Suzhou (City of) T2 64
Zhenjiang New Area Economic Development General Co. Ltd.

Zhenjiang (City of)

T2 61
Yangzhou Urban Construction State-owned Assets Holding (Group) Co. Ltd.

Yangzhou (City of)

T2 58
Nanjing Jiangning Economic Technology Development General Co. Ltd.

Nanjing (City of)

T2 57
Nanjing Pukou Economic Development Co. Ltd. Pukou (District of) T3 56
*2020 data. Note: Reference government refers to the ultimate owners as listed in Wind. Please refer to our glossary for a definition of terms. LRG--Local and regional government. SOE--State-owned enterprise. T1--Tier one. T2--Tier two. T3--Tier three. Bil.--Billion. RMB--Chinese renminbi. Source: LRGs' State‑owned Assets Supervision and Administration, Wind, S&P Global Ratings.

Table 6

Top Financial Institution SOEs In Jiangsu Region
Reference LRG Tier of LRG Assets (Bil. RMB)*

Bank of Jiangsu Co. Ltd.

Jiangsu (Province of)

T1 2,338

Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd.

Nanging (City of) T2 1,517
Bank of Suzhou Co. Ltd. Suzhou (City of) T2 388
Wuxi Rural Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.

Wuxi (City of)

T2 180
Jiangsu Zhangjiagang Rural Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. Zhangjiagang (City of) T3 144
*2020 data. Note: Reference government refers to the ultimate owners as listed in Wind. Please refer to our glossary for a definition of terms. LRG--Local and regional government. SOE--State-owned enterprise. T1--Tier one. T2--Tier two. T3--Tier three. Bil.--Billion. RMB--Chinese renminbi. Source: LRGs' State‑owned Assets Supervision and Administration, Wind, S&P Global Ratings.

Glossary

LRG:   Local and regional government.

Tier-one LRG:   Provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and cities with state-planning status.

Tier-two LRG:   Cities, autonomous prefectures, and districts of municipalities.

Tier-one sector:   An aggregation of 36 tier-one LRGs, as defined in our risk indicator article for such tier-one governments (see "Related Research," above).

Tier-two sector:   An aggregation of 48 tier-two LRGs, as defined in our risk indicator article for such tier-two governments (see "Related Research," above).

Oprev:   Operating revenues of LRGs.

Caprev:   Capital revenues of LRGs.

Ttlrev:   Total revenues of LRGs, mainly to consolidate both operev and caprev.

BACA:   Balance after capital account of LRGs.

BACA %:   Total revenue subtracted by total expenditure, as a percentage of total revenues.

Direct debt:   Bonds directly issued under the name of a given LRG.

Direct debt %:   Direct debt, as a percentage of an LRG's total revenues.

TSD:   Tax-supported debt, including direct debt and debt of key SOEs.

TSD %:   Tax-supported debt, as a percentage of operating revenues of an LRG and those of key SOEs.

TSD % excluding onlending:   Tax-supported debt excluding onlending to lower-tier LRGs, as a percentage of operating revenues of an LRG and those of key SOEs.

SOEs:   State-owned enterprises controlled by LRGs.

Key SOEs:   SOEs that focus on important infrastructure development or on providing services to fulfill public mandates in their regions, and which depend on LRG support.

SOE size %:   Aggregated debt of SOEs controlled by LRGs as a proportion of LRG total revenues.

SOE sector leverage (or SOE leverage):   The proportion of an SOE's aggregated debt to aggregated EBITDA.

SOE sector coverage (or SOE coverage):   SOEs' cash and short-term securities measured against their short-term debt.

Primary Credit Analyst:Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055;
susan.chu@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Wenyin Huang, Beijing (86) 10-6569-2736;
Wenyin.Huang@spglobal.com
Research Assistant:Yunbang Xu, Hong Kong

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