Major Factors

Rationale

S&P Global Ratings classifies the banking sector of Chile (local currency: A+/Stable/A-1; foreign currency: A/Stable/A-1) in group '3' under its Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA). Other countries in group '3' are Denmark, France, Korea, Australia, and the U.S. (see chart 1). Our bank criteria use our BICRA economic risk and industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit rating. The anchor for banks operating only in Chile is 'bbb+'. In our criteria, we define the BICRA framework as one "designed to evaluate and compare global banking systems." A BICRA analysis for a country covers rated and unrated financial institutions that take deposits, extend credit, or engage in both activities. The analysis covers the entire financial system of a country while considering the relationship of the country's banking industry to the financial system as a whole. BICRA scores range from '1' to '10', with the lowest-risk banking systems in group '1' and the highest-risk in group '10'.

Our assessment of economic risk in Chile incorporates the resilience gained over the last three decades due to a track record of sound and consistent economic policies, with a strong fiscal performance, low inflation, and a healthy financial system. After a GDP contraction of about 6% registered in 2020 due to the pandemic, we expect a rebound in economic activity of about 7% in 2021. GDP per capita is expected to return to levels of about US$15,500(from US$12,300 in 2020). The implementation of multiple actions by authorities in the country to cope with the pandemic is tempering credit losses and mitigating lower income of individuals and relatively higher corporate leverage compared to global peers. However, the outcome of the constitution amendment process in 2021-2022, and of presidential elections in November this year are relevant factors for the investment horizon and economic growth over the medium term, with impact in the financial system. Economic growth is expected to moderate in 2022 to levels of about 3%.

Our assessment of the industry risk for banks operating in Chile reflects a sound regulatory framework and ample supervisory coverage. Chile's implementation of the new banking law, starting in December 2021 up to 2025, would align domestic regulation with Basel III principles and raise capital requirements. Over the past few years, authorities and regulators in the country have been proactive in coping with volatility, such as the social unrest in late 2019 and the pandemic, which ensured liquidity and solvency and conferred stability to the system. However, the support haa reduced the authorities' ability to face other potential disruptive events. We believe Chile's financial system has an adequate funding mix, consisting of deposits (higher retail deposits stemming from excess cash from pension fund withdrawals), domestically issued debt, external debt (banks and capital markets), and more recently, the central bank COVID-19 lines (accounting for 10% of the system's liabilities as of December 2020). However, institutional deposits have historically played a significant role, especially for mid-size and smaller banks. We will monitor the impact on the financial industry from pension fund withdrawals and further developments in the domestic pension fund system.

Economic And Industry Risk Trends

Chile's BICRA economic risk is negative, reflecting downside risks until the economic recovery gains traction and prospects for the medium term improve amid the constitutional amendment and upcoming elections, and/or other global developments (further waves of COVID-19, potential additional withdrawals of pension funds, sudden increases in interest rates, etc.). In the meantime, incomes of individuals are lower and corporate leverage is higher than those of global peers.

If the negative economic risk trend materializes, we could lower the starting point (anchor) to 'bbb' from 'bbb+' when assigning a rating to a financial institution that operates in Chile, due to an erosion in conditions for banks operating in the country. In addition, the higher economic risk score, which calibrates the risk weights for our risk-adjusted capital (RAC) framework, could lead to higher risk charges, and therefore, lower RAC ratios for some financial institutions operating in Chile.

The trend in the industry risk remains stable, reflecting our expectations of continued stability, given regulatory and government measures to maintain adequate liquidity and solvency in the financial system during the pandemic. We continue to expect the government to provide support to the system, if necessary, but its scope has narrowed after actions taken to cope with the pandemic and the social unrest in late 2019.

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Economic Risk  |  4

Economic resilience: Many years of sound and consistent economic policies allowed the economy to weather business cycles

Economic structure and stability.   We view Chile's monetary flexibility, prosperous economy, and institutional effectiveness and governance as supporting the sovereign's credit quality. These factors, along with the transparent, rules-based fiscal policy and low debt, an autonomous central bank with a credible track record of targeting inflation, help temper vulnerabilities inherent to a small, open economy exposed to external shocks.

Macroeconomic policy flexibility.   We expect that economic growth will rebound to about 7% in 2021 (after a GDP contraction of about 6% in 2020 due to the pandemic) thanks to higher copper prices and consumption. Consumption and economic activity have benefited from pension funds withdrawals (totaling about $49 billion or about 19% of GDP of 2020), government transfers, and effective vaccination program, which at a more advanced stage than those of global peers. Growth in 2022-2024 is likely to average 3.0%, but the constitutional amendment and looming elections will influence the investment horizon and growth in the future.

Chile's economy and wealth indicators remain vulnerable to external shocks. However, the impact of external shocks, both positive and negative, on the domestic economy has been diminishing gradually in the past two decades. A flexible exchange rate, credible inflation-targeting policy by the central bank that gives scope for countercyclical monetary policy, and manageable countercyclical fiscal policy have stabilized economic performance.

Political risk.   Chile has a record of stable democracy and rule of law. The sovereign's institutional strength has contributed over the years to stable economic policies along with smooth changes in government, consistent economic growth, a weaker but still healthy fiscal stance, and low inflation. Governance indicators are strong, perceived corruption is low, and human development indicators are higher than among most regional peers. The strength of public institutions helped to ensure better management of the COVID-19 pandemic and a severe economic contraction than in many peers, minimizing social costs.

Chile elected delegates to write a new constitution following a referendum that rejected the current one, which had been written by a military government in 1980 (and amended many times by subsequent civilian governments). Independent delegates gained room, while no force obtained a majority, requiring alliances and consensus to set the conditions for the process, the agenda, and priorities in the discussion. The new constitution is likely to have commitments to stronger social rights, which are likely to translate gradually into the provision of more public services in the next 5-10 years.

By law, the new constitution needs to retain basic aspects of the current constitution, such as democracy, a republican form of government, and existing judicial rulings and international agreements. While uncertainty about the process remains, our base-case scenario assumes that the pillars of Chile's current governance--such as political checks and balances, a transparent and cautious framework for fiscal and monetary policy, and an autonomous central bank--will persist after the change in constitution. The upcoming presidential election in November 2021 is another political milestone to monitor.

The constitutional amendment is the result of severe social unrest in late 2019 (prior to the pandemic) due to dissatisfaction with perceived lack of equal opportunity, social exclusion, and other grievances, including inadequate access to health care, education, and pension systems. In our opinion, these developments indicate political alienation of substantial segments of the population. However, the public dissatisfaction has been channeled into an institutional path, leading to an orderly and transparent process to choose delegates to write a new constitution and to seek public approval of it via another referendum, indicating Chile's political maturity.

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Economic imbalances: Moderate credit growth is still influenced by government actions and prudence of economic agents prior to presidential elections

We consider the country to continue to be in expansionary phase, with constant growth despite the economic contraction in 2020 due to the pandemic. Economic imbalances are manageable due to a modest credit expansion 2.1% on average for the past four years. Given this and the slowing growth in house prices in nominal terms, we don't see risk of asset bubble at this point.

Private sector credit growth.   Despite GDP contraction of 6% in 2020, lending grew 2.6% (on nominal basis) due to the implementation of credit lines guaranteed by the government under the FOGAPE COVID program, which totaled $12.5 billion and about 4% of the total loan portfolio of the banking system. These guaranteed loans compensated for the sharp contraction in retail lending due to lower consumption during the pandemic, and debt prepayments resulting from the pension funds withdrawals since mid-last year.

The rebound in economic activity in 2021 should help maintain lending growth but loan portfolios will still be influenced by government programs, given extensions in the FOGAPE COVID lines and the implementation of FOGAPE Reactiva. Retail lending would still be modest in 2021 until the effects of pension fund withdrawals cease. Overall, we expect credit growth to be moderate with nominal growth of about 5% in 2021 and 6%-8% in 2022, with a gradual normalization in the loan book mix following the amortization of government-guaranteed loans and resumption in growth of consumer lending.

Real estate prices.   Residential home price growth has moderated in real terms to about 5% for the past four years, according to central bank index that covers transactions around the country (for new and used units) and the Camara Chilena de la Construccion that tracks sales of new units in the Santiago metropolitan area. The trajectory of home prices is relevant, given the steady growth in residential mortgage lending of 4.6% in 2020 (on real basis), compared with an average of 7% for the past five years. Mortgage lending accounted for 31% of total loans at the end of 2020 and represented about 28% of GDP. The slowing home price growth reduces risks of accumulated economic imbalances stemming from the property market. Additional provisioning requirements for mortgages that link loan to value (LTV) of these loans and delinquency metrics introduced by the regulator in periods of higher growth have pushed down LTVs to the 75%-80% area.

In the commercial real estate segment, vacancy rates of Class A offices in Santiago have increased to 6.1% from the 4.8% average of the three previous years. Additional slippage may occur in the upcoming quarters amid uneven recovery among sectors and potentially lower demand for office space, given the expansion of remote work. However, the potential vacancy rise would be from somewhat low and healthy levels.

Equity prices.   Inflation-adjusted equity prices have been volatile in Chile in the past five years, as a result of the withdrawals from pension funds that led to a sale of financial assets and portfolios rebalancing, with certain support from the central bank to smooth the process. In this sense, S&P IPSA index (Santiago's stock exchange index of large companies) declined about 17% in 2020 and rose to about 4% year to date as of Aug. 27, 2021. Given the domestic banks' low exposure to the equity market, we don't believe these shifts add risk. Chilean banks traditionally invest in government debt, and due to overall conservative investment practices, we don't expect this trend to change.

Current account and external debt position.   We consider Chile's current account and external debt position to be a moderate vulnerability for the banking system. As a small and open economy, Chile is prone to volatility from external shocks. However, the country's monetary flexibility, rules-based fiscal policy, large external assets, and capital market development have historically helped absorb the impact of external shocks. Movements in the Chilean peso have closely correlated with copper prices in recent years, creating an effective adjustment mechanism for the economy if prices fall. The flexible exchange rate partly protects the economy from external shocks. However, margins to absorb these shocks have somewhat narrowed after government actions taken to cope with events over the last two years (pandemic and social unrest events).

Although the Chilean economy continues to grow and diversify, copper mining production and prices still exert heavy influence. Copper exports accounted for about half of the country's total exports. About 50% of total exports went to China and the U.S., and Chile has the highest export exposure to China among the largest economies in Latin America. Favorable external conditions (including higher copper prices) are likely to reduce the current account deficits to an average of 1% of GDP during 2021-2024, compared with an average of 4% during 2018-2019. The current account deficits should be fully financed by foreign direct investment.

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Credit risk in the economy:Asset quality of banks still benefits from government measures

Private-sector debt capacity and leverage.   The country's banking sector is very developed with credit penetration measured as private-sector credit to GDP, at about 95% as of the end of 2020, compared with the 105% average among peers. This trend is driven by corporate debt which totaled 105% of GDP at the end of 2020, and household debt of 40%-50%. We expect credit growth to be moderate despite the rebound in economic activity until political uncertainties dissipate. About 52% of the corporate debt in the country consists of loans from domestic banks. In 2020, the corporations' fixed-charge coverage (EBIT to financial obligations) ratio deteriorated to 2.1x due to the pandemic from the 3.2x average for the past five years. We expect the ratio to gradually recover, although at uneven pace among sectors, also mitigated by actions taken by authorities.

Chile's population has lower income levels than those of global peers, but at the same time, lower debt. Household debt service to disposable income was about 22% at the end of 2020 and debt on average was equivalent to 5.5x monthly wages, influenced by lower rates. We expect leverage and coverage metrics to remain similar this year and gradually recover afterwards, as long as unemployment rates decline and quality of employment improves, and as far as extra liquidity of individuals fade.

All these factors resulted in historically low asset quality metrics, with nonperforming loans (NPLs; loans past due 90 days) of 1.5% at the end of June 2021, compared with 2.1% at the end of 2019. However, we expect metrics to worsen starting in 2022 as FOGAPE loans start amortizing and cash cushion of individuals shrinks. In the meantime, financial entities built specific and generic provisions with a total coverage of 2.7x NPLs by the end of 2020. The trajectory of metrics will also depend on how economic sectors emerge from the pandemic, along with the developments in the labor market and conditions.

Lending and underwriting standards.   In our view, the Chilean financial system's lending and underwriting standards are moderately conservative. On the retail side, new mortgages are mostly granted with a LTV ratio of about 80%, compared with 90% in 2005-2008. Banks incorporate the value of collateral, dividend-to-income ratios, and credit scoring to grant these types of loans. As of the end of June 2021, mortgages accounted for about 31% of total loans and 28% of GDP. Other consumer loans and credit cards accounted for about 11%, influenced by prepayments in debt. In the corporate and enterprises segment (58% of total loans of the system), there are no significant lending concentrations or exposures to risky segments, but with manageable exposures to sectors that are vulnerable to the pandemic. Loans denominated in foreign currency accounted for about 16% of total loans, but the bulk of them are with clients that are naturally foreign currency generators. In addition, the use of securitization or derivatives to shift risk from balance sheets has been very limited so far.

Payment culture and rule of law.   Rankings for Chile's rule of law and control of corruption are stronger than those of other Latin American countries and are roughly in line with those of its BICRA peers. Transparency International ranked Chile 25th in its corruption perception index out of 180 countries in 2020. The country also has fairly adequate indicators for enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. According to the World Bank Doing Business indicators, it takes 519 days to enforce a contract in Chile, lower than 589.6 days for OECD member countries. On the other hand, resolving insolvency takes 2.0 years, compared with the 1.7 average for OECD countries, and its recovery rate is lower. The government amended the bankruptcy framework in October 2014. The changes consisted of allowing for the reorganization of economically viable--but financially distressed--companies to ensure the rapid liquidation of nonviable ones, and to allow for individual debt restructuring or a rapid liquidation of possessions to pay creditors. The changes also seek to shorten the liquidation process and to increase the loss recovery rate. The financial sector had raised concerns about the potential flood of individual insolvencies, but so far, the impact has been manageable.

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Base-Case Credit Losses

Cost of risk inched up to 1.7% in 2020 from 1.4% in 2019 given the social unrest that year, and previous levels fluctuated at 1.1%-1.3%. The increase in cost of risk in 2020 stemmed from banks' accumulated provisions for impacts of the pandemic. We expect credit losses to stabilize starting in 2021. Guarantees under FOGAPE programs should temper losses.

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Industry Risk  |  3

We base our industry risk score for Chile on our assessment of institutional framework, competitive dynamics, and systemwide funding.

Institutional framework: Sound track record of preventing systemic financial distress

Banking regulation and supervision.  We assess Chile's banking regulation and supervision as intermediate. The "Comisión para el Mercado Financiero" (CMF) is primarily responsible for banking and insurance regulation and supervision in the country. In our view, the regulator has solid coverage of the financial system, with broad enforcement capabilities and an adequate set of tools to monitor risks. The country has developed a risk-based supervision framework grounded in a bank rating system (based on solvency and risk management), and is mostly in line with most international standards for accounting, money laundering, related party transactions, financial statements disclosure, and derivatives oversight, among others.

Another positive development was the government's creation of the Financial Stability Council (CEF), through which the pension, insurance, and banking regulatory bodies confer with the Ministry of Finance on a monthly basis. The CEF monitors systemic risks and recommends policy measures; the central bank president is also invited to attend as an observer.

Due to the pandemic, the CMF postponed the implementation of the new banking law until December 2021, with full implementation by 2025. The new banking law aims to align the country with Basel III principles and introduces tools such as an early regularization plan, increases the regulator's authority to intervene in distressed banks more quickly, and raises government deposit guarantees. Areas to be further developed in the next few years are the resolution regime, conglomerate supervision, and risk-based supervision for insurance companies. Developments of the resolution regime are a relevant factor to monitor, given that we consider the Chilean government as supportive toward the financial system.

In 2016, the central bank and regulators rolled out a revised regulation on liquidity risk management, incorporating Basel III quantitative measures and setting a timetable for the implementation of the limits on liquidity coverage ratios (LCR)--starting at 60% from January 2019 and reaching 100% by January 2023. The regulator introduced a flexibilization in the compliance of the metrics due to the pandemic; however, liquidity is high given that individuals deposited their pension fund withdrawals to the banks.

Regulatory track record.   Our strong assessment of Chile's regulatory track record reflects the authorities' ability to maintain stability in the financial system while increasing banking penetration. The last financial crisis in Chile occurred between 1981 and 1983. Since then, the country's financial system has proven resilient to significant regional and global economic weaknesses. Chile's financial system performed well during the 2008-2009 global economic downturn, despite some external funding exposure. The Chilean regulator provided sufficient liquidity to the system during that time.

Also, in response to social unrest in 2019 and the pandemic in 2020-2021, the Ministry of Finance, the central bank, and the CMF took substantial measures to cope with volatility and to ensure credit access, liquidity, and solvency. The measures included the availability of Central Bank liquidity lines totaling about $37.5 billion (15% of the 2020 GDP), the repurchase of bank bonds ($8.5 billion, equivalent to 3% of GDP), and the implementation of programs to temper exchange volatilities and reductions in interest rates (at some point to a minimum of 0.5%). Also, the central bank provided credit lines with guarantees under the FOGAPE COVID ($12.5 billion) and FOGAPE Reactiva ($7.1 billion) programs, which have a differentiated risk weight for the calculation of regulatory capital metrics. Also, the withdrawal of pension funds in 2020-2021 (about $49 billion, equivalent to 19% of GDP of 2020) conferred significant financial relief to individuals. Although we believe it could further improve a few regulatory areas, Chile's financial regulator is very proactive and introduces regulatory enhancements on a regular basis.

Governance and transparency.   In our view, governance and transparency in the Chilean financial system are at least adequate. Chilean banks follow adequate management practices, as seen in their strong profitability and asset quality ratios, and solid levels of capitalization. No events of dubious practices in the banking sector, which could lead to significant losses or failures, have occurred for several years. We believe the financial system has a high level of disclosure, benefitting from accounting standardization. Reports are available on individual banks and for the entire sector, which include financial statements, asset quality, solvency, and sources of funding. The central bank also publishes a semiannual report on financial stability and potential risks.

Competitive dynamics:A rebound in the profitability after a temporary hit from the pandemic

Risk appetite.   We view the Chilean banking sector's risk appetite as moderate, given the low share of innovative and complex products, and the absence of sophisticated securitization, both of which indicate limited risk-shared lending. We believe adequate pricing practices and sound origination standards support the sector's profitability. Banks don't offer risky or complex products, and the exposure to high-risk lending is limited. Banks' return on equity (ROE) deteriorated in 2020 to 5.8% from the 12.6% average of the past three years. This resulted from much higher provisions to cope with the pandemic, lower margins of loans under government programs, and a one-time impact of Itau CorpBanca's goodwill impairment (excluding this charge, the system's ROE would have been 9%). Cost-containment actions and cheaper central bank funding tempered the effect of these factors. We expect profitability to recover in 2021-2022, given lower provision requirements, positive impact on results of higher inflation levels in the country (given a higher proportion of assets indexed to inflation), and normalization in the portfolio mix.

Industry stability.  We assess the banking sector as at least moderately stable. Banks underwent consolidation over the past few years with 18 banks operating in the country as of the end of 2020, compared to 28 in 2004, of which 17 are private commercial banks and one is public (Banco del Estado de Chile [Banco Estado; A/Stable/A-1]). The five largest banks control about 77% of total loans, and given their financial strength, they ensure stability to the system. The likelihood of new entrants that could alter the competitive landscape is low, because of the difficulty of competing with well-established and large institutions and given high barriers to entry. Competition from fintechs is still manageable at this point, and banks are currently implementing full digital platforms.

Market distortions.  We don't believe Chile has any significant market distortions. Banco Estado is the only government-owned bank. Although it's one of the three largest banks, it has consistently followed market practices. Banco Estado has a share of 22% of total deposits and 14% of total loans as of June 2021. Its net interest margins have averaged 3% for the past five years, just below the system's 3.5% average, given the bank's role of providing the population access to financial services, and its more extensive coverage in unprofitable lending segments. There are no significant distortions stemming from nonbank participants, given that they're smaller than banks (including cooperatives and nonbank credit card issuers). The government doesn't intervene in the banking system's operating dynamics, such as interest rate caps for lending, administrative controls over deposits, or significant directed lending.

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Systemwide funding: Chilean banks continue to have diversified funding sources

Core customer deposits.   Chile's financial system has a funding mix that consists of deposits, domestic market debt, and external debt (banks and market). Over the past few quarters, the funding mix incorporated lines from the central bank as part of the actions to ensure credit and payment chain continuity during the pandemic. These lines account for about 10% of the system's funding base. Also, we have seen an increase in retail deposits stemming from pension fund withdrawals.

The country's deposit base is fairly adequate, although historically, institutional deposits have played a significant role, especially for mid-size and smaller banks. Over the past few years, the largest banks replaced a significant portion of this funding type, mostly from Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), with bonds issued domestically or abroad depending on issuance conditions and the new liquidity requirements. We estimate that core customer deposits consist of a 40/60 mix between retail and corporate deposits. We've broadened our core customer deposit definition in Chile to include long-term domestic bonds issued in Unidad de Fomento (UFs), which have been a key funding source for mortgages. Considering all retail deposits and a haircut of 50% of corporate deposits and long-term indexed bonds, our ratio of domestic core customer deposits to domestic loans has averaged 65% for the past five years. We expect this ratio to remain above 60% in the next two years.

External funding.   Exposure to external markets is relatively low. Average net external debt for past two years represented about 2% of system-wide domestic loans in the past five years. We expect the metric to remain moderate in the next two years. We also expect banks to continue adjusting their funding mix, taking into account conditions in external markets versus those in the domestic market. The funding mix also depends on the cost of hedging for debt in external markets. Given the balance sheet structure of Chilean banks (the bulk of their assets are denominated in UF), they need to use swaps to hedge issuances abroad against exchange rate fluctuations.

Domestic debt-capital markets.   We consider Chile's debt capital market to be moderately broad and deep. The development of the Chilean capital market is a success story in Latin America and was significantly boosted by a pension reform in the 1980s and subsequent capital market reforms. Unlike other large markets in the region, given the moderate financing needs of the Chilean government, private-sector issuances dominate the market. Private-sector debt issuances averaged 37% of the country's GDP in the past five years, higher than in other Latin American countries and international peers. The Chilean capital market has been a funding alternative for banks. Available maturities range up to 30 years for inflation-adjusted bonds and 5-10 years in Chilean pesos.

Government role.   In our view, the Chilean government has a solid track record, and has been highly effective, in providing liquidity to the financial system. The absence of financial systemic crises since the early 1980s supports our opinion. During the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the central bank provided sufficient liquidity in domestic and foreign currencies to the financial system, eased its regulatory reserve requirements, extended the terms of its credit operations, accepted bank deposits as collateral in repo operations, and introduced the term liquidity facility for banks that granted liquidity at 90 days and 180 days at a fixed rate equal to the monetary policy rate. In addition, the Ministry of Finance deposited $1 billion into the banking sector. Also, role of the government support was evidenced during the social unrest and pandemic (refer to Regulatory track record section).

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Peer BICRA Scores

Chile's economic risk is higher than those of its BICRA peers, incorporating individuals' lower income levels but lower debt, and the relatively high leverage of corporations and enterprises. Pressures on economic risks for banks operating in Chile will intensify if investment and growth prospects over the medium term are lower than we expect, or if additional volatility arises from the constitutional amendment and the presidential election. Industry risk in Chile is in line with the peer average, thanks to adequate banking regulation and supervision and with the implementation of the new banking law as from the end of this year.

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Government Support

We classify the government of Chile as supportive towards the domestic banking sector. It has a long track record of providing protection, especially for depositors. During the last systemic financial crisis in the early 1980s, the authorities intervened in 22 institutions. With a few exceptions, the interventions protected depositors and creditors. The banking law of 2019 increase, the amount guaranteed with a coverage within one financial institution of UF200 per individual annually, and up to UF400 within the whole financial system.

Regarding the resolution regime, the new law incorporates tools such as an early regularization plan, an intermediate stage between early regularization and liquidation, and the possibility of appointing a provisional administrator if the plan is insufficient. The new law replaced bankruptcy proceedings (Convenio de Acreedores), which required all creditors to agree to a reorganization plan, which failed to preserve value during times of stress. At this point, current creditor preferences would remain unchanged and there would be some degree of bail out; and we expect regulators to keep flexibility. The CEF--along with the CMF, the central bank, and the Ministry of Treasury--is evaluating the resolution framework. We will monitor proposals and the potential impact on government support for banks in the system.

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Related Criteria And Research

Related Criteria

• Sovereign Rating Methodology, Dec. 18, 2017
• Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update, Aug. 24, 2021
• S&P To Publish Economic And Industry Risk Trends For Banks, March 12, 2013
• Analytical Linkages Between Sovereign And Bank Ratings, Dec. 6, 2011
• Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
• Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011

Related Research

• Constitutional Matters: Chile's Quest For A New Constitution, May 17 2021
• Chile Long-Term Foreign Currency Rating Lowered To 'A' On Weaker Fiscal Flexibility; Outlook Stable, March 24, 2021