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Americas Sovereign Rating Trends Midyear 2020

The credit quality of sovereigns in the Americas, including Canada and the U.S., has deteriorated slightly over the last six years to just below 'BB'. However, the GDP-weighted sovereign rating for the Americas has remained stable, close to 'AA-' during that period, largely because of stable ratings in Canada and the U.S. Excluding these two countries, sovereign credit quality has declined since its historical peak of around 'BB+' in 2015. Both the unweighted and GDP-weighted averages for the Latin American and Caribbean region have dropped close to 'BB-' (see chart 1).

S&P Global Ratings rates 14 of the 31 sovereigns in the Americas in the investment-grade category ('BBB-' and above), the same as at the end of December 2019 (see chart 2). This group contains the largest share of the region's GDP. (All ratings refer to long-term foreign currency ratings.)

The region's highest-rated sovereign is Canada, which we rate 'AAA', while in the Latin America and Caribbean region, Chile and Bermuda are the highest rated, both at 'A+'. The lowest rated are Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, all of which we rate 'SD' (selective default). Argentina has been in and out from 'SD' since August 2019. We expect that the rating will remain at 'SD' until the defaulted debt is restructured. The rating on Venezuela has been 'SD' since 2017. We lowered our rating on Ecuador to 'SD' following the government's decision to seek a consent agreement with creditors in April 2020 to restructure its commercial debt. The rating category with the largest number of sovereigns is 'BBB', with 10, followed by 'B' and 'BB', both with six sovereigns.

Since December 2019, we lowered our long-term foreign currency ratings on Argentina to 'SD' from 'CCC-', on the Bahamas to 'BB' from 'BB+', on Belize to 'CC' from 'B-', on Bolivia to 'B+' from 'BB-', on Costa Rica 'B' from 'B+', on Curacao to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', on Ecuador to 'SD' from 'B-', on Mexico to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', on Suriname to 'CCC+' from 'B', and on Trinidad and Tobago to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'. We have not upgraded any sovereign since December 2019.

In addition to these rating actions, we also revised the outlooks on Aruba, Bahamas, Chile, Colombia, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Panama, and Suriname from stable to negative. We revised the outlooks on Bermuda and Brazil to stable from positive. We also assigned a stable outlook to Bolivia when we lowered the rating. We placed the rating of Belize on CreditWatch negative based on the government's decision to restructure its commercial debt. We have negative outlooks on 11 of our sovereigns and do not have positive outlooks on any of them (see chart 3).

We have eight investment-grade sovereigns that have stable outlooks: Bermuda, Canada, Montserrat, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos, the U.S., and Uruguay. We have six investment-grade sovereigns that have negative outlooks: Aruba, Chile, Colombia, Curacao, Mexico, and Panama. No investment-grade sovereign has a positive outlook. In December 2019, we had 12 investment-grade sovereigns that had stable outlooks, one with a positive outlook (Bermuda), and one negative outlook (Mexico).

Chart 1

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Chart 2

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Chart 3

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Table 1

Latin America And The Caribbean Sovereign Rating Strengths And Weaknesses
Sovereign foreign currency ratings Institutional assessment Economic assessment External assessment Fiscal assessment, budget performance Fiscal assessment, debt Monetary assessment

Argentina

SD/--/SD 6 5 6 6 5 5

Aruba

BBB+/Negative/A-2 2 4 4* 2* 4* 4

Bahamas

BB/Negative/B 2 4 6 4* 6* 4

Barbados

B-/Stable/B 5 5 6 4* 5 6

Belize

CC/Watch Neg/C 6 6 6 6* 6 5

Bermuda

A+/Stable/A-1 2 2 3 1 4* 5

Bolivia

B+/Stable/B 5 5 4* 6 2 4

Brazil

BB-/Stable/B 4 5 3 5 5 3

Canada

AAA/Stable/A-1+ 1 1 2 1 4* 1

Chile

A+/Negative/A-1 2 4 4 2 1 2

Colombia

BBB-/Negative/A-3 3 4 6* 3 4 3

Costa Rica

B/Negative/B 4 4 5 6 6*

Curacao

BBB/Negative/A-2 3* 4 2 3 1

Dominican Republic

BB-/Negative/B 5 3 5 5 5 4

Ecuador

SD/--/SD 6 5 3 6

El Salvador

B-/Stable/B 5 5 5 6* 6

Guatemala

BB-/Stable/B 4 6 3 4 4 4

Honduras

BB-/Stable/B 5 5 2 5 4 4

Jamaica

B+/Negative/B 4 6 4 2 6 4

Mexico

BBB/Negative/A-2 3 5* 2 3 4 3

Montserrat

BBB-/Stable/A-3 2 5 3 3 1 5

Nicaragua

B-/Stable/B 5 6 6 5 3 6

Panama

BBB+/Negative/A-2 3 2 5 2 3* 5

Paraguay

BB/Stable/B 5 5 2* 3 3* 5

Peru

BBB+/Stable/A-2 3 4 3 2 2 3

Suriname

CCC+/Negative/C 6* 6 4* 6* 6 5

Trinidad and Tobago

BBB-/Stable/A-3 3 4 3 4* 3 4

Turks and Caicos

BBB+/Stable/A-2 2 4 4 1 1 6

U.S.

AA+/Stable/A-1+ 2 1 2 4 6 1

Uruguay

BBB/Stable/A-2 3 3 2 5 4 5

Venezuela

SD/--/SD 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 (%) 3 6 0 10 13 6
2 (%) 23 6 23 16 6 3
3 (%) 23 6 19 19 16 13
4 (%) 13 29 19 16 26 29
5 (%) 23 32 16 19 13 29
6 (%) 16 19 23 19 26 19
Median 4 5 4 4 4 4
Mean 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.3
Standard deviation 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4
*Deterioration since December 2019. §Improvement since December 2019

Table 2

Americas Economic Outlook
--Real GDP growth-- --General government balance / GDP-- --Net general government debt / GDP-- --Current account balance / GDP-- --Narrow net external debt / Current account receipts--
(%) 2020 2021 2020 2021 2020 2021 2020 2021 2020 2021

Argentina

(8.5) 2.9 (10.1) (9.1) 95.3 95.5 1.6 (0.8) 274.2 267.1

Aruba

(25.5) 28.4 (22.5) (3.7) 66.9 55.1 (14.8) 0.4 27.4 18.6

Bahamas

(16.0) 8.5 (12.5) (6.9) 66.0 70.9 (20.4) (6.1) 101.0 66.8

Barbados

(17.6) 9.6 (3.2) (0.3) 135.5 124.6 (15.7) (7.3) 137.2 100.9

Belize

(15.0) 7.5 (8.0) (6.4) 111.9 109.1 (16.0) (15.7) 104.3 100.0

Bermuda

(1.5) 0.7 (1.7) (0.7) 7.9 9.9 11.5 11.7 (47.3) (42.0)

Bolivia

(5.7) 3.7 (9.9) (7.2) 39.8 46.0 (3.8) (4.9) 38.9 50.1

Brazil

(7.0) 3.5 (15.0) (8.2) 75.9 78.3 (1.4) (1.1) 0.6 14.4

Canada

(5.9) 5.4 (11.6) (2.6) 56.2 54.9 (3.0) (2.7) 124.0 124.9

Chile

(6.5) 5.5 (11.0) (5.5) 26.8 30.0 (0.4) (1.0) 77.1 70.9

Colombia

(5.0) 4.5 (9.4) (5.1) 55.7 56.3 (4.7) (3.7) 149.1 137.5

Costa Rica

(3.6) 3.3 (9.1) (8.5) 64.9 70.0 (4.5) (3.6) 74.2 74.3

Curacao

(14.1) 13.4 (20.9) (4.8) (24.3) (17.5) (24.4) (16.7) (27.0) (10.5)

Dominican Republic

(4.0) 6.0 (7.3) (4.8) 59.7 60.3 (4.7) (2.0) 115.1 92.1

Ecuador

(8.2) 3.4 (6.6) (4.0) 57.6 59.5 (2.4) (2.2) 195.2 189.8

El Salvador

(7.5) 3.5 (12.1) (6.8) 84.7 88.2 (4.0) (3.9) 121.7 105.6

Guatemala

(2.0) 4.4 (5.2) (2.7) 23.0 23.9 (0.0) (0.0) 43.7 44.5

Honduras

(2.5) 3.8 (4.4) (3.1) 40.8 41.3 (4.5) (4.4) 29.6 31.7

Jamaica

(13.0) 8.5 (4.2) 1.5 83.1 82.5 (6.2) (2.0) 99.7 76.1

Mexico

(8.5) 3.0 (3.0) (3.1) 49.9 50.1 0.2 (0.9) 38.3 37.9

Montserrat

(7.4) 3.7 0.0 0.0 (11.5) (9.5) (8.5) (9.4) (163.7) (186.6)

Nicaragua

(5.0) 2.0 (4.7) (3.2) 47.2 48.3 5.0 4.6 110.5 104.0

Panama

(3.0) 4.2 (7.5) (3.5) 39.4 40.7 (5.8) (6.1) 104.3 106.3

Paraguay

(2.5) 4.5 (7.0) (3.5) 22.8 25.2 (0.6) 0.4 17.0 16.0

Peru

(12.0) 10.5 (7.8) (4.3) 25.1 26.1 (1.4) (1.6) 32.1 30.9

Suriname

2.4 2.0 (14.1) (12.3) 73.9 78.7 (4.0) (3.2) 79.9 88.9

Trinidad and Tobago

(4.5) 2.2 (10.0) (4.3) 37.0 41.4 (3.7) 0.4 (19.8) (6.4)

Turks and Caicos Islands

(24.6) 17.9 (17.8) 3.0 (34.7) (32.3) (22.3) (0.6) (66.8) (38.6)

U.S.

(5.0) 5.2 (16.9) (8.6) 103.5 104.2 (2.8) (2.9) 401.3 385.8

Uruguay

(3.6) 4.2 (6.4) (4.3) 71.8 70.0 (1.1) (1.2) 49.6 40.3

Venezuela

(15.0) (5.0) (30.1) (30.0) 19,031.8 20,034.9 (344.0) (396.7) 398.0 401.7

Sovereign Rating Trends: Coping With More Debt

The global recession will result in a rising debt burden for all sovereigns in the Americas, but the trajectory of debt servicing may rise less than the debt burden due to likely low interest rates. The potential impact of higher debt on sovereign creditworthiness, beyond our recent rating actions, will depend upon, among other things, future economic growth, fiscal policy, and debt management. The relationship between future real interest rates and real GDP growth will strongly influence the sustainability of higher sovereign debt burdens. Most of the negative outlooks in the region reflect concerns about how sovereigns will manage a higher debt burden and higher interest payments in a context of potentially low GDP growth after the downturn this year.

U.S. and Canada

We expect continuity in recent economic measures in the U.S. aimed at mitigating the effects of the pandemic, regardless of the election outcome. The U.S. economy is likely to grow around 5.2% next year, after contracting 5% in 2020. The U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency, the size and depth of the U.S. financial market, and economic recovery next year should sustain policy flexibility, giving scope for the government to manage its recently higher debt burden.

We expect a deterioration in fiscal and debt metrics in Canada due to the size of the government's unprecedented stimulus policy. However, Canada's public finances were well-positioned entering the pandemic to enable a strong policy response to contain its negative impact without deteriorating sovereign creditworthiness, despite a substantial rise in the government's debt burden.

Latin America and Caribbean

We have undertaken more negative rating actions in this region than in the world as a whole since the outbreak of the global pandemic, demonstrating the comparatively bigger impact of the global downturn in Latin America and the Caribbean. The majority of our recent negative rating actions on a global basis have been on speculative-grade sovereigns, and mainly in emerging markets. Most regional sovereigns fit into those two categories. However, the recent sovereign defaults in the region have not all been caused by the pandemic. Both Venezuela and Argentina had defaulted before the outbreak of the pandemic, and Ecuador and Suriname had very low ratings prior to the pandemic.

Many of the negative outlooks in the region reflect concerns that only weak economic recovery (starting in 2021) could worsen the sovereign's debt and fiscal metrics, resulting in a downgrade (in countries such as Panama, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, and The Bahamas). Our negative outlook on Mexico reflects concerns about long-term GDP growth prospects, the risk of contingent liabilities from the energy sector, and the effectiveness and timeliness of policy implementation. Our stable outlook on Brazil balances recession and poor fiscal performance in 2020 with gradual economic recovery and fiscal consolidation next year. We also assume slow progress in addressing structural fiscal vulnerabilities and in improving medium-term GDP growth prospects.

Much of the Latin American and Caribbean region had comparatively poor economic growth before the crisis (see table 3). The average per capita growth rate for most of the investment-grade sovereigns during the five years leading up to the current pandemic was only 1.5%.

Table 3

Average GDP Per Capita Growth For Sovereigns Group A
Five-year average*
Mexico 0.71
Chile 0.74
Uruguay 0.90
Colombia 1.29
Peru 2.25
Panama 3.04
*2015-2019 average GDP per capita growth.

The average per capita GDP growth rates for a selection of speculative-grade sovereigns during the same period was only 1.7% (see table 4). This data is consistent with S&P Global Ratings' relatively weak economic assessment for most countries in the region, compared with other parts of the world (the economic assessment is one of five pillars that help determine our sovereign rating, along with institutional, external, fiscal, and monetary assessments).

Table 4

Average GDP per capita Growth Sovereign Group B
Five-year average*
Brazil (1.40)
Guatemala 1.07
Jamaica 1.28
Honduras 1.77
El Salvador 1.88
Costa Rica 2.12
Dominican Republic 5.07
*2015-2019 average GDP per capita growth.

The region also ranks poorly in our measurements for fiscal and debt variables, compared with its peers. The debt burden of investment-grade sovereigns had already been growing in recent years, before a projected sharp rise in 2020 (see chart 4).

Chart 4

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There have been more divergent trends in debt burdens prior to 2020 for certain speculative-grade sovereigns (see chart 5). However, there will be a significant rise in the debt burden for many sovereigns in the coming years.

Chart 5

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The ability of sovereigns to manage a growing debt burden depends, in part, on the cost and composition of the liabilities. Global interest rates have fallen this year thanks in large part to unprecedented monetary stimulus from central banks in advanced economies, as well as increasingly in emerging markets. Subdued global demand, growing uncertainty about trade and investment flows, and the legacy of many years of low inflation are also likely to contribute to low interest rates, at least for the near term. Hence, the rise in the debt burden is not likely to create a proportionate rise in debt servicing for many advanced as well as emerging market countries in the near term.

Some investment-grade sovereigns, such as Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, may experience only modest deterioration in their debt servicing needs in the next couple of years, in contrast with others (see chart 6). Most of the investment-grade sovereigns entered the current economic downturn with a lighter debt-servicing burden than their speculative-grade regional neighbors.

Chart 6

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In some instances, a favorable debt profile (such as bilateral and multilateral funding on concessional terms, and reliance on long-term local currency debt issued domestically) should help contain the interest burden despite a higher debt stock (see chart 7).

The impressive progress over recent years in many regional countries to improve the profile of sovereign debt, making it less vulnerable to sudden spikes in interest rates or the exchange rate, has helped to moderate the fiscal and external impact of recent negative developments. Nevertheless, many sovereigns (Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Bolivia) still have more than 40% of their general government debt denominated in foreign currencies, highlighting their vulnerability to sudden changes in the exchange rate.

Chart 7

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One of the few positive economic developments across most of Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years has been low inflation. Greater monetary stability has helped contain debt-servicing costs, facilitated the development of domestic capital markets and enhanced the credibility of many central banks. The average rate of inflation in select investment-grade sovereigns during 2015-2019 was 3.9%, and only 3% for select speculative-grade sovereigns. Had inflation remained as high as it was in much of the region in the late 20th century and early years of this century, domestic capital markets and central bank credibility would have been much weaker. Hence, the current economic downturn would likely have resulted in more sovereign downgrades and perhaps more defaults.

Sovereign Summaries

Argentina (SD/--/SD)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: N/A

There is no outlook on our sovereign credit ratings of 'SD', or our long-term issue ratings of 'CC'.

We could lower the foreign currency issue (bond) ratings to 'D' from 'CC' when the government finalizes terms with bondholders for a potential commercial debt restructuring, which we would characterize as a distressed debt exchange based on our methodology. Such a restructuring could entail an extension of maturities, which will not be compensated for by the issuer, or a reduction in the face value of debt. Additionally, we could lower the issue ratings if economic and financial stresses further threaten timely debt service or the sovereign misses a debt payment. We expect the government could make an exchange offer for cross-border debt soon.

The government continues to manage peso-denominated debt by rolling over, paying, and placing new securities in order to build a local yield curve. Large peso maturities have been included in exchanges that we consider to be distressed. We will lower our ratings on Argentine-peso denominated issues to 'D' from 'CC', should they be included in an exchange, or if the government misses a timely payment.

We could raise the sovereign credit ratings following the conclusion of the comprehensive commercial debt restructuring, and upon issuance of new bonds. The post-default rating will reflect the resulting debt burden and the policy stance of the Fernandez Administration to support growth, including the prospects for improved private-sector confidence and investment, its fiscal consolidation plans, potential access to market and official financing, as well as its external and monetary profile. Our post-restructuring ratings tend to be in the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories.

(Originally published on April 7, 2020)

Table 5

Argentina
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 15.0 12.8 14.6 11.7 10.0 8.8 8.9 10.0 11.9
GDP growth 2.7 (2.1) 2.7 (2.5) (2.2) (8.5) 2.9 2.7 2.4
GDP per capita growth 1.7 (3.1) 1.7 (3.4) (3.1) (9.3) 2.0 1.8 1.5
Current account balance/GDP (2.7) (2.7) (4.9) (5.3) (0.8) 1.6 (0.8) (2.0) (1.7)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 133.8 136.1 149.9 133.2 111.2 131.5 138.3 140.8 138.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 154.6 153.6 192.2 185.2 231.5 274.2 267.1 240.6 209.1
GG balance/GDP (4.6) (6.9) (6.3) (5.8) (4.6) (10.1) (9.1) (8.1) (7.1)
GG net debt/GDP 42.6 45.5 49.4 75.5 83.7 95.3 95.5 84.1 72.4
CPI inflation 26.4 39.1 24.6 47.1 53.6 45.0 38.0 32.0 27.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 13.6 12.9 15.1 14.7 11.5 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Aruba (BBB+/Negative/A-2)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects that there is a greater than one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on Aruba over the next two years if the strong recovery in tourism that we currently expect in 2021 is weaker, or more prolonged, than our base case due to a failure of COVID-19 containment measures and longer border closures, or a longer-term fall in tourism demand due to changed travel behavior or consumers' weaker discretionary travel budgets. If such a scenario were to lead us to believe that GDP per capita would fail to recover to pre-pandemic levels over the forecast horizon, or if the impact on the government's deficits were to become more structural, leading to higher levels of government and external debt, we could lower the ratings. We could also lower the ratings by one or more notches if Aruba's institutional ties with the Netherlands deteriorate, eroding institutional and policy stability and predictability, and weakening the likelihood that Aruba would benefit from mutual aid and assistance from the kingdom.

We could revise the outlook to stable over the same time frame if the risks of a more severe or prolonged pandemic were to subside; economic growth, income levels, and fiscal balances reverted to their pre-outbreak levels on a sustained basis; and there was evidence that the Netherlands would provide financing to support Aruba's debt burden, if required.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 6

Aruba
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 26.7 26.8 27.5 28.6 30.1 22.1 28.6 28.8 29.6
GDP growth 5.7 2.1 2.0 0.9 (0.7) (25.5) 28.4 6.8 1.4
GDP per capita growth 4.4 0.8 1.6 0.2 (1.3) (25.9) 27.6 6.1 0.8
Current account balance/GDP 2.6 2.7 0.2 (0.8) 1.8 (14.8) 0.4 (0.6) (0.5)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 113.2 111.6 109.9 109.8 105.4 136.5 116.3 117.9 118.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 10.6 1.5 (3.1) (1.7) (5.8) 27.4 18.6 17.2 15.1
GG balance/GDP (2.8) (1.6) 0.4 (0.3) 2.2 (22.5) (3.7) (2.7) (2.4)
GG net debt/GDP 34.3 37.2 37.3 36.7 32.8 66.9 55.1 57.1 57.7
CPI inflation (0.9) (0.3) (0.3) 4.6 4.3 0.4 2.0 2.0 2.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 57.5 57.6 57.9 57.2 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

The Bahamas (BB/Negative/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on The Bahamas over the next year if the strong economic recovery that we expect in 2021 is weaker, or more prolonged, than our base case, due to a failure of COVID-19 containment measures or a longer-term fall in tourism. If such a scenario were to result in prolonged deficits at current levels, or a weakened ability to raise or service debt, we could lower the ratings. We could also lower the ratings in the next 12 months if the government fails to lower fiscal deficits following the COVID-19 pandemic. A continued erosion in fiscal results would suggest a deterioration in The Bahamas' institutional effectiveness in supporting sustainable public finances and economic growth.

Alternatively, we could revise the outlook to stable over the next 12 months if risks of a more severe or prolonged outbreak were to subside, and the country's finances stabilized at sustainable levels.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 7

Bahamas
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 30.4 30.5 30.7 33.0 33.5 27.8 30.6 32.5 33.4
GDP growth 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.6 0.9 (16) 8.5 5.0 1.6
GDP per capita growth (0.6) (0.7) (1.0) 6.5 (0.2) (16.9) 7.4 3.7 0.6
Current account balance/GDP (13.7) (6) (12.4) (12.0) 0.7 (20.4) (6.1) (4.2) (2.6)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 812.0 433.7 311.0 275.6 200.3 326.1 257.6 251.8 240.4
Narrow net external debt/CAR 47.1 33.6 45.5 43.4 21.7 101.0 66.8 62.4 59.9
GG balance/GDP (2.6) (5.7) (3.5) (1.7) (6.1) (12.5) (6.9) (2.9) 0.3
GG net debt/GDP 37.3 39.8 46.2 48.9 49.2 66.0 70.9 72.4 72.8
CPI inflation 1.9 (0.3) 1.5 2.3 1.8 (0.1) 2.5 2.9 2.2
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 56.5 53.7 50.8 50.4 48.8 58.6 53.2 49.7 48.3
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Barbados (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the COVID-19 pandemic will have a significant impact on Barbados' economy, fiscal balances, and external accounts in 2020, but that the progress and credibility that the government has built over the past year and a half under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program will facilitate access to sufficient multilateral financing.

We could lower our ratings on Barbados over the next year should the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic lead to a larger deterioration in fiscal balances than we currently expect, and should we believe that the government would not have sufficient funding to meet its fiscal or external financing needs.

Although we view this scenario as unlikely, we could raise the ratings over the next year if the risks of the COVID-19 pandemic to Barbados' economy, government finances, and external accounts were to subside, and if income levels and fiscal balances were to revert to their pre-outbreak levels on a sustained basis, strengthening confidence and contributing to improved GDP growth prospects. Higher economic growth would facilitate a reduced debt burden, which, together with an expectation of continued access to official funding, could lead us to raise the ratings.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 8

Barbados
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 16.6 16.9 17.4 17.8 18.1 15.4 17.0 18.2 18.9
GDP growth 2.4 2.6 0.6 (0.4) (0.1) (17.6) 9.6 4.9 1.9
GDP per capita growth 2.1 2.0 0.5 (0.6) (0.2) (17.7) 9.2 4.5 1.5
Current account balance/GDP (6.1) (4.3) (3.8) (4.0) (3.0) (15.7) (7.3) (8.0) (6.1)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 157.2 173.5 213.0 235.6 202.3 357.6 263.8 234.2 243.1
Narrow net external debt/CAR 61.9 61.4 64.9 78.4 63.1 137.2 100.9 92.6 89.5
GG balance/GDP (6.6) (3.4) (3.2) (9.1) 2.5 (3.2) (0.3) (0.1) 1.0
GG net debt/GDP 132.5 138.7 136.6 113.3 109.1 135.5 124.6 116.9 111.9
CPI inflation (1.1) 1.3 4.7 3.7 4.1 2.9 1.6 2.3 2.3
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 65.5 64.6 60.1 59.6 59.4 57.4 58.0 58.4 56.3
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Belize (CC/Watch Neg/C)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 5
CreditWatch: Negative

Our CreditWatch negative placement reflects the risk to debt repayment within the next three months in the context of ongoing liquidity pressures. We would lower the ratings to selective default ('SD') if the government undertakes a distressed exchange offer or if it is not able or willing to service the interest payment due Aug. 20, 2020, before the grace period expires.

On the contrary, we could remove the ratings from CreditWatch if we perceive that the likelihood of a distressed exchange in the next three months has decreased and the government honors its next coupon payment before the 30-day grace period expires.

(Originally published on June 30, 2020)

Table 9

Belize
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
GDP growth 2.9 0.1 1.9 2.1 (0.6) (15) 7.5 2.0 2.0
GDP per capita growth 0.2 (2.5) (0.7) (0.5) (3.1) (17.2) 4.8 (0.6) (0.6)
Current account balance/GDP (10.0) (8.6) (7.8) (8.1) (9.5) (16.0) (15.7) (13.5) (12.6)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 121.7 134.4 139.0 134.7 132.2 165.5 162.1 159.2 156.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 62.5 72.1 80.9 75.5 73.2 104.3 100.0 93.0 90.0
GG balance/GDP (7.6) (4.1) (1.4) (1.2) (0.8) (8.0) (6.4) (6.2) (5.4)
GG net debt/GDP 76.0 82.3 88.2 87.1 88.1 111.9 109.1 111.8 113.9
CPI inflation (0.9) 0.7 1.2 0.3 (0.1) 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 58.6 56.5 54.8 56.4 60.0 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Bermuda (A+/Stable/A-1)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 2
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that, while a moderate increase in debt and the impact of global market volatility on the government's liquid assets will weaken Bermuda's existing fiscal and debt positions over the next two years, the positions are strong enough to absorb the economic impact of the outbreak in 2020. In our current assumptions, we also expect that beyond 2020, real GDP growth will recover but remain below 1% and that the government will resume its efforts to achieve fiscal balance.

Unexpected weakness in Bermuda's IFS sector, as a result of sector uncertainty or material job losses tied to the sector's ongoing consolidation or the effects of COVID-19 that contribute to a larger economic contraction, could result in sustained flat or negative real GDP growth leading to below-average growth prospects compared with those of peers. Market losses that lower the government's large liquid assets to less than 25% of GDP on a sustained basis would weaken Bermuda's fiscal assessment. Under either scenario, we could lower the rating within the next two years.

Although we view this scenario as unlikely, we could raise the rating over the next two years if the territory realizes a return to more robust real GDP growth on a sustained basis and greater economic diversification that contributes to improving fiscal results that persist, leading to lower interest burdens and a net creditor position.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 10

Bermuda
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 101.9 108.1 111.7 113.6 115.7 115.0 116.9 119.1 121.4
GDP growth 0.8 (0.7) 3.6 0.1 0.9 (1.5) 0.7 0.8 0.8
GDP per capita growth 0.6 1.6 3.5 0.1 0.8 (1.5) 0.7 0.9 0.9
Current account balance/GDP 13.3 12.1 12.0 13.6 11.4 11.5 11.7 11.7 11.7
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 341.2 354.9 332.3 317.6 207.6 216.8 210.4 209.1 207.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR (54.3) (53.0) (58.7) (56.1) (56.7) (47.3) (42.0) (43.4) (44.7)
GG balance/GDP (3.2) (3.6) (1.2) (1.7) (0.6) (1.7) (0.7) (0.5) (0.5)
GG net debt/GDP (4.8) (2.0) (1.4) 1.3 2.0 7.9 9.9 9.1 8.3
CPI inflation 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 128.0 127.2 119.2 109.0 110.2 114.0 115.5 116.6 117.7
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Bolivia (B+/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook incorporates a gradual correction of Bolivia's fiscal and current account deficits after the negative shocks stemming from lower oil prices and the coronavirus pandemic. We expect that the hit to the economy from containment measures within Bolivia and its trading partners will diminish over the course of 2020 and be followed by a return toward trend growth. At this early stage, the presidential election dynamics remain open and fluid, including their exact date. Nonetheless, in our view, the challenging economic and fiscal scenario will lead whoever wins the presidency to adopt pragmatic corrective policies. At the same time, we believe that Bolivia's reserves and access to official financing options would cover its financing needs.

We could lower our ratings on Bolivia over the next year if the country's external debt and liquidity profile weaken beyond our expectations. This could stem from more prolonged fiscal slippage and a rise in government financing needs should failure to contain economic imbalances be delayed or weaken following the election. Alternatively, weaker credibility of monetary policy, including from prolonged misalignment in the boliviano, could also result in a downgrade.

We could raise our ratings on Bolivia in coming two years if the government undertakes corrective fiscal or other economic measures that strengthen fiscal and external imbalances and reverse the deterioration in the sovereign's financial profile, supporting greater resilience against external shocks.

(Originally published on April 17, 2020)

Table 11

Bolivia
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
GDP growth 4.9 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.2 (5.7) 3.7 3.3 3.1
GDP per capita growth 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 0.8 (7.0) 2.3 1.9 1.7
Current account balance/GDP (5.9) (5.7) (4.9) (4.5) (3.2) (3.8) (4.9) (3.5) (2.7)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 56.7 59.5 71.1 71.5 73.6 83.9 88.1 91.8 92.7
Narrow net external debt/CAR (70.3) (45.7) (27.4) (6.2) 25.1 38.9 50.1 55.7 56.9
GG balance/GDP (4.5) (3.0) (5.0) (6.0) (6.9) (9.9) (7.2) (5.3) (4.0)
GG net debt/GDP 13.9 16.5 20.8 24.9 29.1 39.8 46.0 49.9 51.7
CPI inflation 4.1 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 2.7 3.5 3.5
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 52.9 59.7 60.1 62.2 65.6 65.2 65.0 64.8 64.9
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Brazil (BB-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects diminishing prospects for an upgrade over the coming year due to the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect Brazil's GDP growth and fiscal performance to suffer in 2020 due to the pandemic and extraordinary government spending, before gradual economic recovery and fiscal consolidation resumes. We also assume slower-than-expected progress on the reform agenda to address structural fiscal vulnerabilities and to improve low medium-term GDP growth prospects.

We could raise the ratings over the next two years if the fiscal trajectory recovers more quickly than we expect, along with better prospects for implementing structural reforms, suggesting stronger economic growth and debt stabilization in the medium term. We could also raise the ratings if we perceive that Brazil will maintain a net narrow external creditor position in the next three years despite global uncertainty.

Alternatively, we could lower the ratings over the next two years if--once the effects of the pandemic dissipate--the fiscal profile remains weaker than expected for a prolonged period, harming the prospects for a slow decline in government deficits or quickening the rise in debt. We could also take a negative rating action should unforeseen weakness in Brazil's balance of payments arise that impairs market access. Finally, a meaningful deterioration in monetary policy credibility, marked by a weakened commitment to a floating exchange rate, would also weigh on the rating.

(Originally published on April 6, 2020)

Table 12

Brazil
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 8.8 8.7 9.9 9.0 8.7 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.0
GDP growth (3.6) (3.3) 1.4 1.3 1.1 (7.0) 3.5 3.3 2.9
GDP per capita growth (4.3) (4.1) 0.5 0.5 0.4 (7.6) 2.9 2.7 2.3
Current account balance/GDP (3.0) (1.4) (0.7) (2.2) (2.7) (1.4) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 70.8 64.7 63.0 63.7 67.8 64.5 67.3 67.0 68.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 9.7 (0.9) (6.4) (8.5) (5.4) 0.6 14.4 19.2 22.8
GG balance/GDP (10.1) (8.9) (7.7) (7.1) (6.0) (15.0) (8.2) (6.0) (5.1)
GG net debt/GDP 49.8 52.4 56.5 57.4 55.4 75.9 78.3 78.0 77.2
CPI inflation 9.0 8.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 2.7 3.2 3.9 3.9
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 64.8 59.7 53.6 52.1 52.7 55.9 56.4 56.8 57.4
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Canada (AAA/Stable/A-1+)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 1
  • Economic assessment: 1
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal Assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 1
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that Canada's high wealth, economic diversification, and ample fiscal and monetary buffers will help the country weather the impact of COVID-19 measures on economic activity. Canada's public finances were well positioned entering the pandemic to enable a strong policy response to contain its negative impact without weakening sovereign creditworthiness.

We expect the Canadian economy to recover in 2021, which will partially compensate for the loss of output this year, and continued GDP growth thereafter. This recovery will lead to an improvement in the government's deficit in 2021, after a large rise in the deficit and debt burden this year.

However, we could lower the ratings over the next two years should the deterioration in the government's fiscal position become more severe and prolonged than we currently anticipate, without positive signals of future corrective actions, and should this be accompanied by unexpected poor economic performance after this year's sharp contraction. We could also lower the rating should a deteriorated fiscal position be accompanied by a substantial weakening in Canada's net external position beyond our current expectations, raising external vulnerabilities.

(Originally published on July 22, 2020)

Table 13

Canada
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 43.6 42.3 45.2 46.3 46.2 41.6 44.4 47.0 48.3
GDP growth 0.7 1.0 3.2 2.0 1.7 (5.9) 5.4 3.1 2.6
GDP per capita growth (0.1) (0.1) 2.0 0.6 0.2 (6.9) 4.3 2.0 1.5
Current account balance/GDP (3.5) (3.1) (2.8) (2.5) (2.0) (3.0) (2.7) (2.3) (2.4)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 164.5 154.9 154.8 150.6 154.5 177.4 175.5 173.4 174.2
Narrow net external debt/CAR 113.6 123.6 113.6 96.5 93.9 124.0 124.9 125.7 129.6
GG balance/GDP (0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (11.6) (2.6) (1.9) (2.4)
GG net debt/GDP 48.2 49.1 43.3 42.2 42.0 56.2 54.9 54.3 54.4
CPI inflation 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 (0.4) 1.2 1.7 1.9
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 164.8 168.3 168.4 170.8 171.9 178.9 178.1 178.9 180.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Chile (A+/Negative/A-1)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 2
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects an at least one-in-three likelihood that we could downgrade Chile within the next 24 months due to the consequences of a potentially prolonged period of low economic growth, following GDP contraction in 2020. Rising global uncertainty and the risk of weak recovery in global trade, combined with the legacy of recent public protests, could limit GDP growth prospects and contribute to an erosion of Chile's public finances, leading to a downgrade.

We could revise the outlook to stable within the next 24 months if a sustained pickup in growth starting in 2021, combined with policy measures, results in a rapid reversal of the recent deterioration of Chile's fiscal profile. That, along with a stabilization of Chile's net general government debt burden, which has deteriorated in recent years, could result in a stable outlook.

(Originally published on April 27, 2020)

Table 14

Chile
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 13.6 13.7 15.0 15.9 14.9 12.4 13.6 14.7 15.8
GDP growth 2.3 1.7 1.2 4.0 1.1 (6.5) 5.5 3.5 3.3
GDP per capita growth 1.2 0.4 (0.2) 2.5 (0.1) (7.3) 5.1 3.4 3.3
Current account balance/GDP (2.4) (0.3) (0.5) (1.5) (1.4) (0.4) (1) (1.2) (1.6)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 102.0 105.1 106.3 113.1 120.0 123.0 122.1 123.3 122.9
Narrow net external debt/CAR 29.2 24.8 33.7 41.5 54.4 77.1 70.9 64.1 60.2
GG balance/GDP (2.1) (2.7) (2.6) (1.5) (2.7) (11) (5.5) (3.5) (2.6)
GG net debt/GDP 2.7 7.1 10.9 12.9 15.1 26.8 30.0 31.6 32.3
CPI inflation 4.4 3.8 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 85.3 84.6 82.6 86.0 91.6 91.6 93.2 93.2 94.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Colombia (BBB-/Negative/A-3)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook indicates our view of downside risks to Colombia's fiscal and external metrics over the next 18 months. The recent drop in oil prices, along with the wider negative global impact of COVID-19, has weakened Colombia's external profile through lower export earnings and a wider current account deficit, and heightened concerns about its economic growth prospects.

We could lower the sovereign ratings if the negative external shocks undermine GDP growth prospects, contributing to worsening public finances, or pose further risks to Colombia's external liquidity.

Conversely, we could revise the outlook to stable if timely and adequate policy measures successfully stabilize the economy, sustain GDP growth prospects, limit the increase in the general government's net debt burden, and contain risks to external liquidity.

(Originally published on March 26, 2020)

Table 15

Colombia
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 6.3 6.0 6.5 6.8 6.6 5.6 5.9 6.2 6.6
GDP growth 3.0 2.1 1.4 2.5 3.3 (5.0) 4.5 3.6 3.3
GDP per capita growth 1.8 0.9 0.1 1.4 2.2 (6.1) 3.3 2.4 2.1
Current account balance/GDP (6.3) (4.3) (3.3) (3.9) (4.2) (4.7) (3.7) (3.9) (3.7)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 95.7 88.8 94.1 97.8 98.4 95.6 96.0 96.6 98.2
Narrow net external debt/CAR 97.6 123.8 117.5 113.5 114.5 149.1 137.5 134.5 133.8
GG balance/GDP (3) (2.8) (2.3) (2.0) (1.6) (9.4) (5.1) (3.8) (2.9)
GG net debt/GDP 36.7 36.8 38.2 41.6 43.9 55.7 56.3 56.3 55.7
CPI inflation 5.0 7.5 4.3 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.2 3.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 49.5 50.3 52.8 51.1 52.5 58.0 58.1 59.0 60.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Costa Rica (B/Negative/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook indicates the possibility of a downgrade over the coming 12 months should Costa Rica's political leadership fail to demonstrate a more concerted, consistent, and timely commitment to corrective fiscal actions to stem potential increased liquidity pressures from the sovereign's growing funding needs. Poor policymaking or uneven policy implementation could weaken the sustainability of Costa Rica's growth and public finance trajectories. It could also result in a less favorable view of the country's institutional framework--despite widespread checks and balances and a solid democratic tradition--and lead us to lower the rating.

Upon assuming office recently, Finance Minister Elian Villegas has underscored the need to lower Costa Rica's high interest burden, which has risen in recent years on higher debt and local borrowing costs. The expected hit to Costa Rica's revenue base amid COVID-19 exacerbates the budgetary pressure from the interest bill. A combination of large funding needs and potentially poor debt management decisions (including reliance on central bank financing or other unconventional financing) could also lead to a downgrade.

Conversely, we could revise the outlook to stable over the same period if the government is able to:

  • Lower its fiscal deficit sufficiently to gradually stabilize its debt burden,
  • Contain interest costs, and
  • Undertake more flexible debt management to reduce its exposure to potential adverse movements in interest rates and the exchange rate.

Such steps, along with a rebound in economic growth after the pandemic, could boost investor confidence, sustain foreign direct investment (FDI), and reduce the country's external vulnerability.

(Originally published on June 9, 2020)

Table 16

Costa Rica
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 11.3 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.6 11.9 12.2 12.4 12.7
GDP growth 3.6 4.3 3.9 2.7 2.1 (3.6) 3.3 3.0 2.9
GDP per capita growth 2.4 3.0 2.7 1.5 1.0 (4.7) 2.1 1.8 1.7
Current account balance/GDP (3.5) (2.2) (2.9) (3.3) (2.4) (4.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.3)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 99.9 98.7 105.6 108.4 107.1 105.8 104.8 105.0 104.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 58.7 58.8 57.3 61.2 52.7 74.2 74.3 72.8 71.1
GG balance/GDP (5.7) (4.8) (5.5) (5.0) (6.7) (9.1) (8.5) (6.5) (5.8)
GG net debt/GDP 42.9 45.5 47.0 52.8 54.7 64.9 70.0 72.7 74.7
CPI inflation (0.8) 0.8 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.7 3.0 3.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 64.8 68.8 70.5 70.3 71.3 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.6
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Curacao (BBB/Negative/A-2)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on Curacao over the next two years, if the strong economic recovery that we currently expect in 2021 is weaker, or the pandemic is more prolonged, than our base case due to a failure of COVID-19 containment measures and longer border closures or a longer-term fall in export demand. If such a scenario were to result in a more structural deterioration in the government's deficits or net debt metrics, or higher external debt, we could lower the ratings. We could also lower the ratings by one or more notches if Curacao's institutional ties to the Netherlands deteriorate, jeopardizing access to concessional funding or external financing.

We could revise the outlook to stable over the same time frame if risks of a more severe or prolonged pandemic subsided, fiscal performance stabilized, and we believed the risks that Curacao would lose access to concessional funding were limited.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 17

Curacao
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 20.1 19.6 19.4 19.5 19.8 16.4 19.0 19.6 20.0
GDP growth 0.3 (1.0) (1.7) (2.2) (2) (14.1) 13.4 1.4 0.7
GDP per capita growth (2.1) (2.2) (2.6) (2) (1.2) (14.7) 12.7 0.7 0.0
Current account balance/GDP (16.5) (18.7) (21.5) (29.2) (16.3) (24.4) (16.7) (18.5) (18.8)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 111.7 124.5 121.8 137.2 131.5 136.9 123.0 129.3 130.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR (53.3) (49.3) (55.2) (49.6) (62.3) (27.0) (10.5) (4.9) (1.3)
GG balance/GDP (7.5) (2.9) 1.1 (7.7) 0.9 (20.9) (4.8) (4.6) (4.3)
GG net debt/GDP (37.8) (38.3) (35.7) (24.5) (37.6) (24.3) (17.5) (13.8) (10.6)
CPI inflation (0.5) 0.0 1.6 2.6 2.6 0.5 2.8 2.5 2.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 75.9 84.9 86.4 87.3 88.3 89.1 88.4 88.3 88.2
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Dominican Republic (BB-/Negative/B)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 3
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 5
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on the Dominican Republic over the next 12-18 months, given the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and associated containment measures, on the sovereign's vulnerable fiscal and external profiles. A more severe economic decline through both tourism and other material economic sectors, or a more prolonged impact from the pandemic, could limit the expected recovery in 2021. This could push the government to borrow more to implement a larger fiscal package, which could lead to materially worse debt and external profiles.

We could lower the ratings over the next 12-18 months if the economic recovery that we currently expect in 2021 is weaker, or if the crisis is more prolonged than our base case, because of a deeper impact of COVID-19 containment measures and longer border closures. If such a scenario results in a more structural deterioration of the government's external and debt profiles, we could lower the ratings.

We could revise the outlook to stable over the same time frame if risks of a more severe or prolonged crisis subside and pressures on fiscal performance and debt buildup ease. We would also expect a potential new government to take steps to improve structural fiscal trends, such as through fiscal and energy-sector reforms or tackling the quasi-fiscal deficit of the central bank. Lower fiscal deficits, coupled with sustained improvement in external liquidity ratios, could also stabilize the outlook over the next 12-18 months.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 18

Dominican Republic
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.6 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.7
GDP growth 6.9 6.7 4.7 7.0 5.1 (4) 6.0 5.0 5.0
GDP per capita growth 5.9 5.7 3.7 6.0 4.1 (4.8) 5.1 4.1 4.1
Current account balance/GDP (1.8) (1.1) (0.2) (1.4) (1.4) (4.7) (2.0) (1.2) (0.9)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 116.8 104.7 100.1 101.0 98.6 103.0 100.9 99.0 102.3
Narrow net external debt/CAR 81.1 80.4 80.9 75.4 79.7 115.1 92.1 89.1 84.7
GG balance/GDP (4.5) (4.0) (4.4) (3.7) (3.5) (7.3) (4.8) (3.8) (3.8)
GG net debt/GDP 41.0 43.1 45.3 46.1 49.4 59.7 60.3 60.1 59.9
CPI inflation 2.3 1.7 4.2 1.2 3.7 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 26.5 27.3 28.0 27.7 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Ecuador (SD/--/SD)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: N/A

We do not assign outlooks to 'SD' or 'D' ratings because they express a condition and not a forward-looking opinion of default probability. We could raise our ratings on following the completion of debt restructuring process and upon issuance of new bonds. The post-default ratings would reflect Ecuador's post-restructuring creditworthiness, considering the resulting debt burden and agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as policy prospects under the Moreno and next administration (with national elections scheduled in 2021). Our post-restructuring ratings tend to be in the 'CCC' or low 'B' categories, depending on the sovereign's new debt structure and capacity to support that debt.

(Originally published on July 23, 2020)

Table 19

Ecuador
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.2 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0
GDP growth 0.1 (1.2) 2.4 1.3 0.1 (8.2) 3.4 2.0 1.8
GDP per capita growth (1.5) (2.7) 0.9 (0.2) (1.4) (9.5) 1.9 0.6 0.4
Current account balance/GDP (2.2) 1.3 (0.1) (1.2) (0.1) (2.4) (2.2) (2.1) (1.1)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 136.9 129.5 143.9 151.3 143.1 161.3 152.5 148.6 140.1
Narrow net external debt/CAR 76.7 97.6 117.6 120.1 137.9 195.2 189.8 183.1 175.5
GG balance/GDP (4.5) (5.7) (5.0) (4.0) (3.1) (6.6) (4) (3) (2.3)
GG net debt/GDP 29.4 37.2 44.3 44.2 46.9 57.6 59.5 60.6 61.0
CPI inflation 4.0 1.7 0.4 (0.2) 0.3 0.0 0.5 1.3 1.3
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 28.9 30.1 33.6 36.6 41.3 42.6 43.8 46.0 48.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

El Salvador (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that enhanced funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other official creditors will provide liquidity and limit the rollover risk of sovereign debt over the next 12-18 months as the economy contracts due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also incorporates our expectation of only gradual economic recovery in 2021. Due to the pandemic, we expect the government will make only gradual progress over the long term in implementing its plans for boosting economic growth and strengthening public finances.

We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if El Salvador faces difficulties accessing financing from official creditors and international markets--stemming from either low investor confidence or heightened political polarization--which would significantly increase short-term rollover risks. We could also downgrade the sovereign if the impact of COVID-19 is more severe than in our base case, or if the economic recovery is delayed, weighing on long-term trend GDP growth and keeping fiscal deficits high for longer than we currently expect.

In contrast, we could raise the ratings over the next 12-18 months if the economy recovers quickly from the severe external shock and if the faster-than-expected growth translates into stronger fiscal and external results, which would portend a substantial decline in the sovereign's debt burden. In this scenario, we would also need to see a track record of political commitment by the legislative and executive branches of government to work more productively to advance key legislation.

(Originally published on April 21, 2020)

Table 20

El Salvador
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.2
GDP growth 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 (7.5) 3.5 2.4 2.4
GDP per capita growth 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.9 (8.0) 3.0 1.9 1.9
Current account balance/GDP (3.2) (2.3) (1.9) (4.7) (2.1) (4.0) (3.9) (4.1) (3.9)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 102.3 102.1 99.3 105.0 101.3 97.9 98.7 98.7 107.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 84.5 90.6 89.5 79.0 77.8 121.7 105.6 101.2 101.9
GG balance/GDP (3.6) (3.1) (2.5) (2.7) (3.1) (12.1) (6.8) (5.7) (5.3)
GG net debt/GDP 64.1 65.4 66.1 65.8 66.8 84.7 88.2 91.0 93.3
CPI inflation (0.7) 0.6 1.0 1.1 0.1 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 52.4 53.3 54.1 55.5 54.9 55.1 54.9 54.4 53.8
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Guatemala (BB-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the downturn in global growth, will result in increased government borrowing and a higher debt burden this year. However, we expect that a combination of economic recovery starting next year and cautious economic policies will help reverse the near-term deterioration in the sovereign's fiscal and debt profile, limiting the long-term negative impact on its financial profile.

We could lower the ratings over the next 12-18 months if the expected contraction in Guatemala's economy and rising government fiscal deficit in 2020 lead to persistently weak public finances over the long term. A weakening of Guatemala's fiscal or debt profiles, potentially due to limited economic recovery next year or greater-than-expected fiscal deterioration, could weaken the sovereign's financial profile beyond our expectations and result in a downgrade.

We could raise the ratings over the same timeframe if the impact of the current crisis is less damaging to the economy than we expect, and if good economic management were to substantially improve Guatemala's economic growth prospects and public finances on a sustained basis. Such an improvement would likely stem from the implementation of a reform agenda that strengthens Guatemala's governability and public institutions, increasing its tax revenues.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 21

Guatemala
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.4
GDP growth 4.1 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.9 (2) 4.4 3.5 3.5
GDP per capita growth 1.7 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.6 (4.0) 2.6 1.7 2.5
Current account balance/GDP (1.0) 1.0 1.3 0.8 2.1 (0.0) (0.0) 0.1 0.1
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 96.3 91.8 88.1 84.7 80.7 78.0 78.8 78.6 77.9
Narrow net external debt/CAR 56.0 51.6 41.9 34.8 26.5 43.7 44.5 44.0 48.4
GG balance/GDP (1.5) (1.1) (1.4) (1.9) (2.3) (5.2) (2.7) (2.5) (2.5)
GG net debt/GDP 18.9 17.9 17.3 17.3 18.2 23.0 23.9 24.7 25.4
CPI inflation 3.1 4.2 5.7 2.3 3.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 38.1 38.5 38.2 38.3 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Honduras (BB-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the government's commitment to fiscal moderation, its ample access to funding sources, and economic recovery in 2021 will contain the potential deterioration of public finances and external liquidity stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and global recession. We assume that fiscal deficits will remain contained after the one-off expansion in 2020. We also expect that a combination of economic recovery starting next year and cautious economic policies will help reverse the near-term deterioration in the sovereign's fiscal and debt profiles.

We could lower the ratings over the next 12 months if the impact of the economic downturn is more severe than our base case, or if the recovery is less robust, weighing on trend GDP growth and keeping high fiscal deficits for longer. Additionally, a consistent deterioration in the current account that could weaken the country's external liquidity position could lead to a downgrade.

In contrast, we would raise the ratings over the next two years if the economy recovers faster than we expect from the severe external shock, and if the faster-than-expected growth translates into stronger fiscal results. Additionally, we could raise the rating if monetary policy flexibility improves, or if there is more effective policymaking and strengthening of public institutions of governance, thereby reducing the long-term risk of instability and policy uncertainty.

(Originally published on May 6, 2020)

Table 22

Honduras
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8
GDP growth 3.8 3.9 4.8 3.7 2.7 (2.5) 3.8 3.5 3.6
GDP per capita growth 2.1 2.2 3.1 2.0 (0.5) (4.0) 2.2 1.9 2.0
Current account balance/GDP (4.7) (2.6) (0.8) (5.4) (5.7) (4.5) (4.4) (5.2) (5.6)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 93.3 91.8 89.0 91.1 92.7 86.5 88.8 93.1 96.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 20.4 18.6 17.5 19.7 20.4 29.6 31.7 35.5 35.7
GG balance/GDP (0.8) (0.4) (0.4) 0.2 0.7 (4.4) (3.1) (2.4) (1.8)
GG net debt/GDP 39.8 37.8 40.9 38.6 38.8 40.8 41.3 41.5 41.4
CPI inflation 2.4 3.3 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 56.4 58.6 57.8 62.9 63.9 64.6 65.4 66.8 62.8
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Jamaica (B+/Negative/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 4
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the ratings on Jamaica over the next 12 months, if the strong economic recovery that we expect in 2021 is weaker, or the pandemic is more prolonged, than our base case. If such a scenario were to result in prolonged deficits at current levels or weaker external accounts, we could lower the ratings.

Alternatively, we could revise the outlook to stable over the next 12 months if risks of a more severe or prolonged outbreak were to subside, the country's finances returned to previous levels, and its external position remained in line with our forecast.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 23

Jamaica
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.8 5.9 5.3 5.8 6.3 6.5
GDP growth 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.9 1.5 (13) 8.5 6.0 2.0
GDP per capita growth 0.8 1.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 (13.2) 8.3 5.8 1.8
Current account balance/GDP (3.0) (0.3) (2.6) (1.8) (1.9) (6.2) (2.0) (1.7) (2.1)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 110.4 94.3 99.5 95.7 97.4 102.1 99.6 92.2 89.4
Narrow net external debt/CAR 114.3 109.9 90.8 76.6 76.0 99.7 76.1 66.6 53.5
GG balance/GDP (0.2) 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.4 (4.2) 1.5 1.9 1.9
GG net debt/GDP 113.3 108.4 89.4 82.7 71.6 83.1 82.5 74.1 69.1
CPI inflation 3.7 2.4 4.4 3.7 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 34.0 39.0 41.5 43.5 48.1 58.6 57.6 57.9 60.4
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Mexico (BBB/Negative/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook indicates the possibility of a downgrade over the coming 12-24 months due to uneven or ineffective policy execution, potentially weakening public finances, or higher off-budget contingent liabilities.

Managing pressure on Mexico's fiscal accounts in the face of economic and oil price shocks has been a challenge for policymakers across multiple administrations. This reflects a narrow non-oil tax base, notwithstanding some increase over the past five years, as well as limited accumulated savings in its oil stabilization funds during the era of high commodity prices, which were already partly rundown in 2019.

We assume that the government will take steps to contain our projected widening of the fiscal deficit and the increase in the sovereign's debt burden resulting from the economic downturn--caused by recent external shocks. However, prolonged poor fiscal performance and a resulting rising debt burden, or the risk of potentially weak policy implementation, could lead us to lower the rating.

In addition, potential increases in contingent liabilities from the energy sector could worsen the sovereign's debt burden and lead to a downgrade. The financial profile of government-owned energy company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) has weakened significantly over the past five years and has become more vulnerable amid the decline in oil prices.

At the same time, the shift in energy policy under the Administration of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador increases reliance on PEMEX for oil production and investment in Mexico. If the general government's fiscal profile remains weak for a prolonged period, notwithstanding some stabilization in production, PEMEX's poor operational and financial performance and technical capacity constraints could pose a more material contingent liability for sovereign creditworthiness.

Conversely, effective economic management that raises investor confidence, encourages private investment, and maintains moderate fiscal deficits could reverse the structural weakness in GDP growth prospects, helping to stabilize public finances and retain fiscal flexibility. That, along with steps to contain the potential contingent liability posed by state-owned companies in the energy sector or to broaden the non-oil tax base, could avoid an erosion of the sovereign's financial profile. We could revise the outlook to stable over the coming two years in that scenario.

(Originally published on March 26, 2020)

Table 24

Mexico
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 9.6 8.8 9.4 9.7 9.9 8.2 8.6 9.2 9.7
GDP growth 3.3 2.6 2.1 2.2 (0.3) (8.5) 3.0 2.3 2.0
GDP per capita growth 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.3 (1.4) (9.5) 1.9 1.3 1.0
Current account balance/GDP (2.7) (2.3) (1.8) (2.1) (0.3) 0.2 (0.9) (1.1) (1.5)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 90.2 87.4 85.4 87.3 83.1 80.2 82.8 84.1 85.6
Narrow net external debt/CAR 46.8 40.4 40.5 37.1 36.4 38.3 37.9 39.0 38.9
GG balance/GDP (2.7) (2.8) (0.8) (1.8) (1.8) (3.0) (3.1) (3.3) (3.3)
GG net debt/GDP 42.4 43.5 40.8 40.4 42.1 49.9 50.1 50.9 52.0
CPI inflation 2.7 2.8 6.0 4.9 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.2 3.1
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 31.2 33.7 32.8 32.1 34.0 34.0 34.2 34.8 35.4
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Montserrat (BBB-/Stable/A-3)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the global coronavirus pandemic will have a material impact on Montserrat's economy, but that with the U.K.'s support, the island will be able to return to positive economic growth in 2021 with no increase in government debt.

We could lower our ratings on the island over the next two years if the U.K.'s financial support substantially wanes.

Significant private-sector investment and development on the island could lead us to raise the ratings in the next two years. These activities would increase the size and resilience of Montserrat's private sector, broadening its tax base and increasing the sustainability of its public finances.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 25

Montserrat
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 12.9 13.3 12.7 13.4 14.2 13.3 13.9 14.2 14.6
GDP growth 1.2 1.3 (3.8) 4.0 4.5 (7.4) 3.7 1.5 1.1
GDP per capita growth 2.0 2.2 (3.0) 4.8 3.6 (8.2) 2.8 0.6 0.2
Current account balance/GDP (1.3) (11.7) (9.7) (2.0) (8.2) (8.5) (9.4) (7.0) (9.3)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 111.3 136.8 126.8 122.8 128.5 119.6 125.1 117.9 113.6
Narrow net external debt/CAR (164.4) (193.3) (169.6) (175.6) (180.1) (163.7) (186.6) (190.6) (194.4)
GG balance/GDP 18.8 (0.4) 1.2 (6.5) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GG net debt/GDP (21.4) (19.9) (17.9) (14.6) (12.1) (11.5) (9.5) (7.2) (4.8)
CPI inflation (1.2) (0.4) 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 42.7 47.3 51.9 52.6 48.3 51.2 48.5 46.9 45.3
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Nicaragua (B-/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that economic growth will moderately recover in 2021 after another year of contraction due to the negative impact of the global downturn and the COVID-19 pandemic. It also reflects our expectation that the sovereign will be able to cover its external financing needs this year and next year, balanced with continued political uncertainty ahead of the November 2021 general elections.

We could lower the rating in the next six to 18 months if Nicaragua's ability to gain sufficient domestic and external financing deteriorates as a result of a deeper economic downturn, larger fiscal slippage, or increased political tensions. Heightened pressures on the domestic financial system, which could put at risk the crawling peg exchange rate regime, could also lead us to lower the rating.

We could raise the ratings over the next two years if, as the COVID-19 shock subsides, political and policy developments raise investor confidence, reverse the contraction in GDP faster than we expect, and improve access to funding the country's fiscal deficit and debt service payments. A clear track record of strengthening economic and fiscal results and improvement in Nicaragua's external liquidity on a sustainable basis could lead to an upgrade.

(Originally published on April 20, 2020)

Table 26

Nicaragua
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9
GDP growth 4.8 4.6 4.7 (3.8) (4.1) (5) 2.0 2.5 2.8
GDP per capita growth 3.7 3.5 3.6 (4.8) (5.0) (6.0) 1.0 1.4 1.7
Current account balance/GDP (8.8) (6.6) (4.9) 0.6 6.5 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.8
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 113.9 105.2 108.2 95.4 93.0 92.0 92.7 92.7 92.9
Narrow net external debt/CAR 101.7 113.4 105.1 116.9 100.7 110.5 104.0 97.9 93.9
GG balance/GDP (0.8) (1.2) (1.3) (3.1) (0.8) (4.7) (3.2) (2.2) (2.2)
GG net debt/GDP 29.9 31.0 32.2 39.4 41.4 47.2 48.3 48.2 49.8
CPI inflation 4.0 3.5 3.9 5.0 5.4 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 34.6 37.2 39.7 38.3 31.3 31.2 31.2 31.2 31.2
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Panama (BBB+/Negative/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 2
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Negative

The negative outlook reflects our view of downside risks to Panama's economic and fiscal metrics over the next six to 24 months.

We could lower the rating if the pace of economic recovery after the downturn in 2020 is slower than expected, potentially reflecting lower trend GDP growth prospects. We could also lower the rating if the impact of the current economic downturn and the government's policy response to it lead to large fiscal deficits that are prolonged and weaken public finances, resulting in a rising net debt burden and increasing the government's interest payments as a share of fiscal revenues.

Alternatively, we could revise the outlook to stable during the same period if the government's debt trajectory suggests a declining trend over the next three years once GDP growth resumes, or if the country's external debt position improves significantly during this period.

(Originally published on April 24, 2020)

Table 27

Panama
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 13.6 14.3 15.2 15.7 15.8 15.0 15.5 16.1 16.5
GDP growth 5.7 5.0 5.6 3.7 3.0 (3) 4.2 4.0 4.0
GDP per capita growth 4.1 3.4 4.0 2.2 1.6 (4.3) 2.8 2.6 2.6
Current account balance/GDP (7.9) (8) (5.9) (8.2) (5.2) (5.8) (6.1) (7.0) (8.0)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 177.5 200.1 192.6 192.3 197.6 201.7 199.2 198.2 195.4
Narrow net external debt/CAR 42.7 55.9 66.4 76.5 80.0 104.3 106.3 105.4 101.6
GG balance/GDP (2.5) (1.9) (1.9) (2.8) (3.1) (7.5) (3.5) (2.5) (2)
GG net debt/GDP 19.7 20.5 23.7 26.0 30.7 39.4 40.7 42.2 43.2
CPI inflation 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.8 (0.3) (1) 0.5 1.5 1.5
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 84.7 84.2 84.2 84.2 83.8 81.2 81.2 82.6 83.9
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Paraguay (BB/Stable/B)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 5
  • Economic assessment: 5
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that in the next 12 to 18 months the global economic slowdown and the COVID-19 pandemic will translate into extraordinarily high fiscal deficits and a rapid increase in government debt for the sovereign. That said, an economic recovery in 2021 and sustained growth thereafter, in addition to the government's commitment to fiscal consolidation, should stabilize any erosion of Paraguay's external profile and its government debt burden.

We could lower the rating over the next 12 to 18 months if worse-than-expected economic performance or an inadequate policy response from the government undermine Paraguay's long-term growth trajectory and worsen its financial and economic profile. Failure to stabilize public finances following an expected deterioration in 2020 could significantly increase the net general government debt, leading to a downgrade.

We could raise our ratings over the next 12 to 18 months if we see more effective policymaking and strengthening of public institutions and governance, thereby reducing the risk of instability or unexpected changes in economic policy that undermine investor confidence. Stronger checks and balances between public institutions and greater predictability and transparency of policy decisions could improve our institutional assessment of Paraguay.

We could also raise our ratings if continued diversification of the economy increases per capita income and reduces vulnerability to low commodity prices and adverse weather conditions. Additionally, we could raise our ratings if monetary policy credibility strengthens, contributing to a sustained decline in dollarization in the economy, strengthening the central bank's ability to conduct policy.

(Originally published on May 5, 2020)

Table 28

Paraguay
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 5.4 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7
GDP growth 3.1 4.3 5.0 3.4 (0.0) (2.5) 4.5 4.0 4.0
GDP per capita growth 1.7 2.9 3.6 2.0 (1.3) (3.7) 3.2 2.7 2.7
Current account balance/GDP (0.4) 3.6 3.1 (0.2) (1.2) (0.6) 0.4 0.8 1.0
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 76.4 75.7 73.1 75.9 77.8 73.2 75.5 76.0 78.5
Narrow net external debt/CAR (8.2) (11.5) (13) (5.6) 0.5 17.0 16.0 14.9 13.5
GG balance/GDP (1.8) (0.4) (0.9) (1.4) (3.0) (7.0) (3.5) (2.4) (2.0)
GG net debt/GDP 6.8 8.7 10.7 11.9 15.4 22.8 25.2 26.4 27.2
CPI inflation 3.1 4.1 3.6 4.0 2.8 2.4 3.7 4.0 4.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 43.6 41.6 40.6 43.9 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6 46.6
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Peru (BBB+/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 2
  • Monetary assessment: 3
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that Peru's low government debt, availability of liquid assets, solid international reserves, and access to different funding sources will mitigate downside macroeconomic risks stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. We assume fiscal deficits will remain contained after the one-off expansion in 2020. We also expect broad continuity in economic and fiscal policies following the April 2021 general election.

We could lower our ratings on Peru over the next two years if the economic recovery is much weaker than we expect after the COVID-19 shock dissipates, putting the sovereign's budgetary position under considerable strain. The combination of weaker economic growth prospects and larger fiscal deficits in the medium term could lead us to lower the sovereign ratings.

In addition, an unexpected negative change in macroeconomic policies after the general election next year, or persistent political uncertainties that harm the country's track record of predictable policymaking and efforts to maintain favorable economic conditions and sustainable public finances, could also result in a negative rating action.

Over the same period, we could raise the ratings as a result of a much stronger economic recovery in 2021-2023 that would lead Peru's per capita growth to compare favorably with peers of the same level of development, without deteriorating its fiscal or external profile. We could also raise the ratings if we were to see stronger policymaking predictability and the government's ability to execute capital spending and implement reforms that would result in a sustained improvement of Peru's growth prospects in the medium term.

(Originally published on May 4, 2020)

Table 29

Peru
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 6.1 6.1 6.8 7.0 7.1 6.2 7.2 7.9 8.2
GDP growth 3.1 4.6 2.5 4.0 2.0 (12) 10.5 5.5 4.0
GDP per capita growth 1.7 3.3 3.6 2.3 0.4 (11.1) 11.7 6.6 5.1
Current account balance/GDP (5.0) (2.6) (1.3) (1.7) (1.5) (1.4) (1.6) (2.3) (2.0)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 72.7 77.3 80.9 75.1 75.6 65.5 71.7 75.7 76.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 20.9 21.9 16.8 20.5 13.5 32.1 30.9 31.1 31.5
GG balance/GDP (2.2) (2.4) (2.8) (2) (1.4) (7.8) (4.3) (2.3) (1.7)
GG net debt/GDP 6.4 8.1 9.8 11.6 14.9 25.1 26.1 26.6 27.3
CPI inflation 3.6 3.6 5.1 (0.9) 2.9 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 43.9 42.8 42.4 44.0 44.7 44.7 44.7 44.7 44.7
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Suriname (CCC/Stable/C)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook balances the possibility that Suriname will receive new official funding to support its budget in the next six to 12 months with the possibility that the country will not have sufficient liquidity, or the willingness, to honor its foreign or local currency debt obligations. Suriname's foreign and local debt obligations are substantial and the country faces unprecedented fiscal challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic. As well, we believe political uncertainty could constrain the new government's ability or willingness to implement the reforms necessary to put Suriname's finances back on the path to fiscal sustainability.

We could lower the ratings if continuing economic weakness and a lack of confidence that the new government will implement necessary reforms discourages new funding from official and commercial lenders, resulting in a lack of sufficient liquidity to honor the country's foreign and local currency debt obligations, or should the government's willingness to service these obligations falter.

We could raise the ratings if the new government adopts measures to restart the economy and implements reforms that give official and commercial lenders the confidence to provide new funding to Suriname to support its budget, including its foreign and local currency debt obligations, and we believe that the risks to debt service have receded.

(Originally published on July 16, 2020)

Table 30

Suriname
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 8.4 5.4 5.5 5.9 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5
GDP growth (3.4) (5.6) 1.8 2.6 (0.8) 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0
GDP per capita growth (4.9) (7.0) 0.4 1.3 (2.1) 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7
Current account balance/GDP (16.4) (5.1) 1.9 (3.4) (10.3) (4.0) (3.2) (2.0) (2.5)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 121.6 117.1 97.0 107.1 111.2 114.8 114.2 114.3 116.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 52.9 72.3 57.8 57.6 79.6 79.9 88.9 91.9 98.0
GG balance/GDP (9.8) (11.3) (9.3) (11.5) (10.6) (14.1) (12.3) (10.5) (8.9)
GG net debt/GDP 47.8 63.9 71.5 66.5 65.9 73.9 78.7 82.2 83.1
CPI inflation 25.2 52.3 9.3 5.4 4.2 21.7 5.0 5.0 5.0
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 38.5 41.8 34.1 31.6 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.8
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Trinidad and Tobago (BBB-/Stable/A-3)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 3
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 3
  • Monetary assessment: 4
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our expectation that lower oil and gas prices will lead to larger increases in net general government debt, a fall in exports that will contribute to a moderate current account deficit, and an economic contraction in 2020. Nevertheless, we believe that the government's liquid external assets provide some flexibility to mitigate the impact of lower hydrocarbon prices and current economic volatility.

We could lower the rating over the next 12-24 months should lower oil and gas prices, or the effects of COVID-19 on demand, contribute to a larger economic contraction; a deterioration of external liquidity or debt beyond our current expectation, should balance of payments outflows be larger than expected; or a weaker fiscal position; and if we believe that the government will take longer to unwind the deterioration in public finances expected this year, causing larger increases in the net general government debt or interest burden.

On the other hand, although we view this scenario as unlikely, we could raise the rating over the next 12-24 months should the government manage to limit the deterioration of public finances and stabilize the debt and interest burden, and should stronger-than-expected growth in the energy sector lead to significantly above-average economic growth, stemming balance of payments outflows.

(Originally published on March 26, 2020)

Table 31

Trinidad and Tobago
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 18.6 16.5 16.6 17.5 17.9 16.3 17.2 17.7 18.0
GDP growth 1.8 (6.3) (2.3) (0.3) (0.5) (4.5) 2.2 2.0 1.5
GDP per capita growth 1.5 (6.6) (2.5) (0.4) (0.9) (4.8) 1.9 1.7 1.2
Current account balance/GDP 7.0 (4.4) 5.4 5.8 4.8 (3.7) 0.4 3.3 3.8
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 54.6 64.4 57.6 60.8 67.6 78.6 80.7 81.0 79.1
Narrow net external debt/CAR (80.8) (89.3) (67.9) (52.4) (48.6) (19.8) (6.4) (10.1) (9.5)
GG balance/GDP (1.7) (5.4) (8.9) (3.5) (3.1) (10.0) (4.3) (2.8) (1.4)
GG net debt/GDP 37.5 32.0 29.3 28.1 25.1 37.0 41.4 41.8 43.2
CPI inflation 4.7 3.1 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 2.1 1.7 2.5
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 43.3 47.0 47.3 46.8 48.5 49.3 48.8 48.5 48.4
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Turks and Caicos Islands (BBB+/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot:
  • Institutional assessment: 2
  • Economic assessment: 4
  • External assessment: 4
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 1
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 1
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the COVID-19 pandemic will have a temporary, albeit sizable, impact on TCI's economy and government finances, but that the territory will resume its economic growth and fiscal surpluses over the next two years.

We could lower our ratings on the territory over the next two years should the rebound in tourism that we expect to occur gradually, toward the end of 2020 and into 2021, turns out to be delayed or weaker, leading to prolonged stress on revenues that causes the government to run persistent fiscal deficits or materially deplete its liquidity assets.

We could raise our ratings during the next two years should the government return to fiscal surpluses and GDP growth, or should new external data reveal significantly stronger economic or external positions and materially improved data quality.

(Originally published on April 16, 2020)

Table 32

Turks and Caicos
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 25.7 27.2 25.7 26.9 27.9 20.8 24.7 26.9 27.8
GDP growth 11.3 7.3 (2.5) 5.6 5.3 (24.6) 17.9 12.4 6.8
GDP per capita growth 6.7 3.8 (7.1) 1.6 1.4 (25.4) 16.7 11.3 5.7
Current account balance/GDP 14.8 16.6 3.8 (8.3) (2.6) (22.3) (0.6) (2.6) (6.1)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 180.8 145.7 159.3 166.2 165.8 226.9 151.7 156.1 163.0
Narrow net external debt/CAR 86.2 24.7 (44.4) (86.1) (43.8) (66.8) (38.6) (36.0) (36.7)
GG balance/GDP 7.7 5.5 9.5 6.0 3.6 (17.8) 3.0 4.4 4.5
GG net debt/GDP (19.3) (23.6) (33.6) (37.0) (41.5) (34.7) (32.3) (33.5) (36.1)
CPI inflation 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 (0.1) 2.1 2.2 2.2
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 98.2 85.3 85.5 78.1 74.1 98.4 83.7 77.7 N/A
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. N/A--Not applicable. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

U.S. (AA+/Stable/A-1+)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook indicates our view that the negative and positive rating factors for the U.S. will be balanced over the next two years. We expect continued political disputes about the implementation of economic and other policies in the lead-up to national elections in November. However, we expect continuity in the recent economic measures aimed at mitigating the effects of the pandemic, regardless of the election outcome. We also expect the U.S.'s institutional checks and balances, strong rule of law, and free flow of information to support stability and predictability of economic policies. The U.S. dollar's status as the world's premier reserve currency, and the size and depth of the U.S. financial market, should sustain policy flexibility.

We expect economic recovery in 2021, which will partly compensate the loss of output this year, and continued GDP growth afterward. A recovering economy will lead to moderate fiscal improvement next year after a sharp rise in the fiscal deficit and sovereign debt burden in 2020. However, a larger and more prolonged deterioration in public finances beyond our current expectations, without positive signals of future corrective actions, could place pressure on the ratings, leading to a negative action.

On the other hand, we could raise the rating if we see signs of more effective and proactive public policymaking beyond the quick policy response to the current recession, which could reflect greater bipartisan coordination between the executive branch and Congress than has been the norm in recent years.

(Originally published on April 2, 2020)

Table 33

U.S.
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 56.8 57.9 59.9 62.9 65.3 62.2 66.6 69.6 72.4
GDP growth 3.0 1.6 2.4 2.9 2.3 (5.0) 5.2 3.0 2.8
GDP per capita growth 2.2 0.9 1.6 2.5 2.0 (5.4) 4.6 2.5 2.3
Current account balance/GDP (2.2) (2.1) (1.9) (2.2) (2.2) (2.8) (2.9) (2.7) (2.7)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 369.1 353.4 332.2 314.4 314.8 370.5 342.5 345.7 350.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 326.3 334.2 325.1 311.4 327.9 401.3 385.8 373.7 374.1
GG balance/GDP (3.8) (4.4) (3.8) (6.3) (6.9) (16.9) (8.6) (5.2) (4.0)
GG net debt/GDP 78.7 79.9 80.0 80.8 82.5 103.5 104.2 103.9 103.1
CPI inflation 0.1 1.3 2.1 2.4 1.8 0.3 1.7 2.2 1.9
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 147.7 149.7 151.3 150.3 150.2 158.5 156.6 156.8 156.5
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Uruguay (BBB/Stable/A-2)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 3
  • Economic assessment: 3
  • External assessment: 2
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 5
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 4
  • Monetary assessment: 5
Outlook: Stable

The stable outlook reflects our view that the social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, including the downturn in global economic growth, will result in increased government borrowing and a higher debt burden for Uruguay this year. However, we expect economic recovery and corrective fiscal policy will contribute to reversing the near-term deterioration in the sovereign's fiscal and debt profile, limiting the long-term negative impact on its financial profile.

We could lower the ratings on Uruguay over the next two years if lower-than-expected long-term growth prospects, which depend partly on advancing important investment projects, limit the government's ability to correct fiscal deficits and reverse the near-term erosion in public finances. In this scenario, the already high general government deficit and net general government debt burden could continue to rise beyond our expectations. Moreover, a sustained weaker long-term growth trajectory could dampen Uruguay's per capita income, weakening its economic resilience and leading to a lower rating.

A sustained decline in inflation, along with further deepening of local capital markets, could facilitate the government's ongoing efforts to increase the share of local currency in its debt stock. Falling exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt could reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the sovereign's balance sheet. The resulting improvement in debt dynamics, along with continued GDP growth, could lead to a higher rating over the next two years. We could also raise the ratings if a combination of good GDP growth and greater-than-expected fiscal consolidation measures narrows the fiscal deficit and decreases the government's debt burden.

(Originally published on April 30, 2020)

Table 34

Uruguay
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 15.5 15.3 17.2 17.2 16.1 14.7 15.3 16.7 18.0
GDP growth 0.4 1.7 2.6 1.6 0.2 (3.6) 4.2 2.8 2.8
GDP per capita growth (0.4) 1.3 2.2 1.5 (0.1) (3.9) 3.9 2.5 2.5
Current account balance/GDP (0.9) 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.8 (1.1) (1.2) (0.9) 1.9
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 95.1 100.6 98.9 88.3 86.2 98.8 99.9 98.3 88.5
Narrow net external debt/CAR 36.0 35.3 25.3 25.3 33.1 49.6 40.3 36.7 24.5
GG balance/GDP (3.5) (2.4) (3.5) (2.8) (3.2) (6.4) (4.3) (4.1) (3.9)
GG net debt/GDP 52.0 50.9 55.9 58.6 62.5 71.8 70.0 70.2 70.3
CPI inflation 8.7 9.6 6.2 7.6 7.9 9.0 8.0 7.5 7.2
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 31.2 28.9 27.0 28.1 28.9 29.7 29.0 29.4 29.9
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

Venezuela (SD/--/D)

Rating score snapshot
  • Institutional assessment: 6
  • Economic assessment: 6
  • External assessment: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Flexibility and performance: 6
  • Fiscal assessment – Debt burden: 6
  • Monetary assessment: 6
Outlook: N/A

Our negative outlook reflects our opinion that there is a one-in-three chance that Venezuela could default within the next six months on its local currency debt obligations.

If the sovereign cures its default on the overdue foreign currency coupon payments or the announced restructuring debt operation moves forward and is completed, we would raise our long-term foreign currency sovereign issuer credit and issue ratings from 'SD' and 'D', respectively, to the 'CCC' category or 'B-'.

(Originally published on April 5, 2019)

Table 35

Venezuela
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020e 2021f 2022f 2023f
GDP per capita (in ‘000) 42.5 101.7 685.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GDP growth (6.2) (17.1) (15.7) (19.6) (30) (15) (5) 0.0 5.0
GDP per capita growth (6.3) (16.4) (14.4) (18.2) (29.1) (14.8) (5.9) (1.9) 5.0
Current account balance/GDP (1.3) (0.1) 0.0 163.2 122.1 (344.0) (396.7) (449.1) (502.7)
Gross external financing needs/CAR&FXR 158.9 187.2 170.8 165.9 233.8 210.8 219.2 227.0 228.8
Narrow net external debt/CAR 221.8 323.7 253.3 238.2 326.1 398.0 401.7 403.2 403.2
GG balance/GDP (10.7) (10.8) (16.6) (30.6) (29.8) (30.1) (30.0) (29.6) (29.6)
GG net debt/GDP 9.0 2.7 17.3 11,326.3 16,180.7 19,031.8 20,034.9 20,039.9 19,096.9
CPI inflation 180.9 274.4 862.6 130,060.2 9,585.5 2,589.8 634.2 249.4 95.4
Bank credit to resident private sector/GDP 34.6 21.0 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
e--Estimate. f--Forecast. A free and  interactive version of a larger number of sovereign risk indicators can be found at spratings.com/sri.

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analyst:Joydeep Mukherji, New York (1) 212-438-7351;
joydeep.mukherji@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Tomas Marinozzi, Buenos Aires + 54-11-4891-2153;
tomas.marinozzi@spglobal.com

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