The past decade has seen a lot of activity in the European nonperforming loans (NPL) market as several banks from different European countries started to offload toxic loans from their portfolios. In this report, S&P Global Ratings focuses on five markets that either have dominated the scene since 2009, or are currently under the spotlight: Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

Italy

Chart 1

Thanks mainly to disposals and securitizations, the stock of gross NPLs in Italian banks' books halved over the past three years, decreasing to €165 billion as of the end of second-quarter 2019 from €341 billion at the end of 2015. That said, most banks still have gross and net NPL ratios well above the 5.0% and 2.5% benchmarks endorsed by the European Commission.

In the short term, most Italian banks have committed to further reduce their NPL stocks. As banks are now required to set aside more capital for NPLs not covered by provisions, they have fewer incentives to keep long-dated NPLs on the balance sheets. For instance, the recently approved final regulation on calendar provisioning requires banks to fully cover all NPLs arising from loans originated after April 26, 2019, within three years if not covered by collateral and within seven to nine years if secured by collateral. Conversely, the European Central Bank requested that all European banks cover legacy NPLs, with different timings that range between 2024 and beyond depending on the type of bank.

Italian banks predominantly sold one category of NPLs in the last four years, the bad loans ("sofferenze"), where banks concentrated most of their provisions. As of July 2019, the stock of sofferenze net of provisions was about €32 billion, nearing pre-recession levels. Securitizations played a big role in this decrease, particularly after the introduction of the Italian state guarantee, the "Garanzia sulla cartolarizzazione delle sofferenzi" (GACS), in 2016. Over the past three years, 22 transactions benefited from the GACS for a total gross book value of about €67 billion of securitized loans. The guarantee scheme was further extended in March 2019 for an additional two years.

Is a securitization of UTPs likely?

Italian banks have recently turned their attention to another category, the unlikely-to-pay (UTP) loans. We estimate that the stock of UTPs (net of provisions) was over €40 billion in June 2019. Banks are likely to look for solutions to manage this exposure because for regulatory capital purposes, such as the application of calendar provisioning, there is no difference between sofferenze and UTPs. However, UTPs continue to be out of the scope of certain initiatives, like the extended GACS.

UTP portfolios are not without complexities, particularly as the UTP label comprises a wide range of situations (see "Credit FAQ: Rating Considerations For Italian Securitizations of Nonperforming Loans," published on Nov. 13, 2018). Consequently, the work-out strategy depends on the specific case. As a result, one of the main difficulties we would face when analyzing those portfolios is the segmentation into different subgroups of homogenous loans to determine the work-out strategy's probability of success.

Despite the complexities, we believe there is the potential for rated UTP securitizations closing over the next 12-18 months. Compared to selected sales, rated securitizations would attract a wider investor base and facilitate the disposal of rather large portfolios that also include small exposures. In fact, we would expect those portfolios to be very granular, with low concentration among the top borrowers and comprising both residential and commercial loans. The largest third-party servicers in Italy moved into the UTP segment two to three years ago, so some have developed a track record with meaningful data that can also support our analysis.

Recovery timings: A changing landscape

Foreclosure and bankruptcy procedure recovery times have historically exceeded those in other jurisdictions. However, the government has enacted several reforms since 2015 to speed up the judicial proceedings.

Charts 2-3 show a statistical index adopted by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPJ index) to assess the disposition time expressed as pending cases at the end of a given year divided by closed cases in the same year. The index is a proxy for the actual speed of court proceedings.

The data combine loans granted to both individuals and corporates. The average time to resolve pending foreclosure cases has started flattening, falling by about 14 months between 2015 and 2018. According to a Bank of Italy report, the effect is more significant in the pre-sale and sale phases of the foreclosures, because it is too early to see the effect of these reforms on the later phases.

The extent of the effect varies by area, with the South experiencing a reduction of about 17 months, followed by the North with 15 months. However, the South still shows the longest disposal time for foreclosures in Italy. The average disposal time from 2015 to 2018 was 4.2 years in the South, compared with 3.6 years in the Center, and 3.1 years in the North (see chart 2).

Chart 2

The reforms' effect on bankruptcy proceedings has been even more noticeable--the average disposal time has decreased by about 31 months from 2015 to 2018. The South has again felt the biggest change, with a reduction of disposal time by about 35 months, followed by the North (about 32 months), and the Center (about 21 months). Similarly to foreclosure procedures, the South still shows the highest average disposal time for bankruptcy procedures. The average disposal time from 2015 to 2018 was 8.3 years in the South, compared with 7.0 years in the Center, and 5.9 years in the North (see chart 3).

Chart 3

Analytical approach: recovery data

In order to derive our recovery timing assumptions for secured NPLs, we differentiate the loans depending on whether the property securing each of the loans is a commercial or residential asset. As a starting point, we use assumptions set in our European residential loans criteria for Italian portfolios.

We assume a 10-year recovery period for residential properties in the South and all commercial properties, and four and five years for residential properties in the North and in the Center, respectively. Finally, we adjust those assumptions to reflect the different workout stages for each loan.

Overall, there are already signs of decrease in the recovery time and we acknowledge that recovery timing for foreclosures might reduce further as the effects of the 2015-2016 reforms begin to be felt in the later phases of foreclosure procedures. That said, a new reform introduced this year allows debtors to stay in their foreclosed properties until judges provide the transfer of their properties to new buyers. That means that properties offered in auction might still be occupied by their relevant debtors, potentially reducing their sale prices and increasing time to recovery. We may reconsider our assumptions for recovery time in the near future to reflect evolving disposal rate trends.

Ireland

Chart 4

Following the start of the recession in late 2008, Irish banks' loan books began to deteriorate rapidly and NPLs ballooned to a peak of over 35% at end-2013. However, thanks to benign macroeconomic conditions, the banks' efforts to offer restructuring plans to borrowers, and an open market for NPL portfolio disposals, the rate has reduced drastically over the past six years, reaching just above 12% as of December 2018. Despite this reduction, the ratio remains high in the European context.

Although now less of a feature in the Irish NPL market, the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was a central participant during and after the economic downturn. Since its inception in December 2009, NAMA's role has been to support distressed Irish banks by acquiring their bad loans (NPLs) in exchange for Irish government-guaranteed senior bonds and unguaranteed subordinated bonds. Between 2009 and 2011, NAMA acquired property-related loans that had a combined nominal balance of about €74 billion from five banks. The loan sales to NAMA were predominantly backed by commercial property and land and development loans, with most residential NPL sales coming directly from the banks. This explains why mortgage NPLs currently make up the bulk of the banks' distressed loans--comprising over 50% of Irish NPLs--and we expect residential loans to be the main collateral backing future NPL and reperforming loan (RPL) sales and securitizations.

Chart 5

Restructuring arrangements are common in Ireland

Mortgage arrears peaked at 26% in 2013 and are currently at just below 14%. They still remain a feature of the Irish market with 720+ day arrears accounting for 45% of all accounts in arrears, according to the central bank.

The resolution of long-term arrears has been a protracted process in Ireland, initially due to the moratorium on repossession instigated in July 2011 due to legislative failings (resolved in 2013). The introduction of the Mortgage Arrears Resolution Process (MARP) by the Central Bank of Ireland in July 2013 has clarified the resolution process, but at the same time has resulted in an increase in restructures (see "The Irish RMBS Story: Improving Market Conditions And The 'Tail' Of Long-Term Arrears," published on Feb. 1, 2019).

MARP obliges regulated lenders and the owners of loans to follow a four-step plan with the aim of finding sustainable forbearance solutions for accounts in arrears. Under the framework, repossession for owner-occupied properties is only permitted if the lender can prove they have made every reasonable effort available under the framework to agree an alternative arrangement with the borrower, or if the borrower will not engage with the lender.

Financial institutions and other holders of Irish mortgages have been actively engaging in restructuring arrangements with borrowers, with arrears capitalization combined with other structure types being the most common arrangement. According to the Central Bank of Ireland, about 86% of restructures met the terms of their arrangement as of June 2019.

Chart 6

Overall, repossession cases in Ireland remain low in the context of a significant volume of outstanding long-term arrears, but have increased since the implementation of MARP and the resolution of the repossession moratorium.

Chart 7

Recent trends in NPL securitizations

We define RPLs as loans that are performing, but which have been 90 or more days past due in the five years leading up to the analysis date. While securitizations of bad loans and RPLs have been on par, historical Irish NPL transactions have combined both RPLs and NPLs. We expect this trend to continue, with increased focus on RPL issuance given the regulatory focus on offering sustainable forbearance solutions to borrowers and Irish banks' work-out strategies.

Chart 8

Banks and other entities selling mortgage books have gained particular attention in both the media and the Irish parliament ("Dáil"). On the back of this, the "No Consent, No Sale Bill" is still going through the various stages in the Dáil. The bill aims to ensure that no mortgage can be sold without the borrower's explicit consent, and if fully implemented, will likely constrain Irish RMBS issuance, particularly NPL and RPL transactions.

Analytical approach: Workout options

For a pool comprising solely defaulted loans, the first step in our analysis is to establish the type of assets in the pool. In particular for Irish pools, we analyze the historical data and whether the assets are owner-occupied or income rental property. This will determine the available resolution options for the servicer. We then overlay the servicer's business strategies and processes to see how it compares to the market standard. For RPLs, we apply case-specific assumptions based on months since restructure.

Under the MARP process, the lending institution typically reassesses the borrower's affordability capacity when a reperforming arrangement is made. Therefore, for pools classified as reperforming, we typically calculate seasoning credit based on the date a loan was last in arrears for 90 or more days.

Furthermore, buy-to-let (BTL) loans in Ireland are not subject to the same regulatory proceedings as owner-occupied mortgages. Similar to the U.K., the foreclosure process can be resolved considerably quicker by appointing a receiver, if allowable in the loan contract, rather than going through court proceedings. Therefore, in our analysis of Irish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), we use a foreclosure period of 42 months for owner-occupied property loans, and 24 months for BTL loans where the contracts permit the appointment of a receiver and the servicer actively implements this in its recovery processes. We apply a case-by-case assumption for commercial properties depending on the property type and servicing approach.

Spain

Chart 9

Chart 10

In 2012, the government created the "Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la reestructuración Bancaria" (SAREB, or "bad bank") to manage the NPL exposures of nine Spanish banks totaling about €106 billion assets (not net of provisions), 80% of which were developer land and 20% real estate assets. Even so, Spanish banks' NPL stock reached its peak of €282.24 billion in 2013, excluding what was transferred to the SAREB. Since then, Spanish banks have significantly reduced and provisioned for their NPLs. A combination of the Spanish authority's measures and banks' efforts have helped the cleanup of these assets in the balance sheets.

Spanish domestic NPLs totaled 9.37% (year-end 2018) of system-wide domestic loans, the lowest level since 2010. This figure is far below the peak reached in 2013 (19.49%), in the middle of the Spanish economic crisis. We expect that the stock will reduce over the next three years, reaching €56.16 billion in 2020.

The sale of NPLs and real-estate owned (REO) portfolios, done through both auction processes and private sales outside traditional auction processes, peaked at €51.7 billion in 2017. The housing market's recovery--house price growth recorded an annual increase of 6.9% in the first quarter of this year-- supported these sales, leading to an overvaluation of house prices of 29% (price-to-income ratio) and 41% (price-to-rent ratio). However, due to the fall in prices following the housing crisis in 2008, affordability is still not overstretched on a national level, and both price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios remain 26% below their peak. The strong demand, on the back of favorable economic conditions and low interest rates, should reduce the oversupply in housing and hold up price growth, tightening the housing market.

A nascent rated securitization market for Spanish NPLs

Following the wave of portfolio sales, we anticipate that some of the loans sold to third parties will be packaged into rated securitizations, triggering a securitization market of NPLs. The first publicly-rated securitization backed by Spanish NPLs and REOs properties hit the market in 2019, and we forecast further NPL securitization issuance, mainly due to the second sales of portfolios owned by private equity and hedge funds.

Generally, we expect portfolios to comprise both NPLs and REO properties. Borrowers will likely be a combination of individuals and small and mid-size enterprises, with the latter dominating. We also expect to see some portfolios comprise RPLs, similar to the Irish case discussed above. Foreclosure procedures in Spain are long, sometimes exceeding 18 months, depending on the regional courts. As a result, restructuring agreements have become common. In addition, the uncertainty or the lack of clarity in some court decisions relating to abusive clauses like the change in the stamp duty tax have led banks to increase their offer of restructuring agreements (see "Spanish Government Will Shift Stamp Duty Costs To Banks," published on Nov. 8, 2018).

The delayed introduction of the new mortgage law in the first half of 2019 should provide some comfort on this issue, clarifying and homogenizing the rules (see "Changes Ahead: How Spain's New Mortgage Law Could Affect New And Outstanding RMBS Transactions," published on Dec. 19, 2018). The extension of the timing for considering all outstanding debt due and payable has been one of the essential changes in the new legislation. Although the introduction of the new mortgage law might not have a direct effect on our time to recovery assumptions, market participants are optimistic that the new regulation will introduce more certainty and regularity across different provinces and will homogenize foreclosure proceedings in Spain's regional mortgage markets.

Analytical approach: Differences in foreclosure timings and recoveries

When we analyze a NPL securitization we focus on the recovery prospects. The total recovery discount (haircut) applied at each rating level is a blended calculation of haircuts defined for each subpool identified in the portfolio. In Spanish NPL transactions, the subpools would be secured loans granted to commercial borrowers, secured loans granted to individuals, unsecured loans granted to commercial borrowers, and unsecured loans granted to individuals.

The analysis of portfolios' regional composition also one of the main factors in our analysis as it directly affects our recovery assumptions. The Spanish property market is non-homogeneous and has exhibited unequal performance since the global financial crisis, with retail activity still sluggish in many regions. Important regional disparities persist: A square meter in Madrid costs more than three times that in Extremadura, a region that still posted negative house price growth in first-quarter 2019. Geographical concentration may also affect the time estimated for foreclosure procedures, as we have observed that they currently differ by region, and even within the same province and/or city, due to the regional court process ("Audiencias Provinciales"). We would consider the geographical distribution, bearing in mind that the disparities of the regional mortgage markets not only affect house prices, but also the foreclosure period determined by the different regional courts.

Finally, securitizations can be structured with the issuer owning the whole capital of property companies ("Propcos"), to maximize portfolio collections by purchasing the real estate assets backing the loans and selling them in the open market. We would closely review any proposed transactions structured with this set-up case-by-case to assess how they address legal and tax risks. We would need to closely consider, for example, whether an issuer ownership of real estate through a Propco would be compatible with an assessment of the SPE's insolvency remoteness under our legal criteria.

Portugal

Chart 11

NPLs in the Portuguese market peaked in June 2016, reaching €50.5 billion (Bank of Portugal data). The consequences of the financial crisis is still taking a toll on Portuguese banks, which are still dealing with a large NPL stock. Although they have been steadily decreasing, this type of loan still accounts for a significant share of gross loans in Portugal, with amounts outstanding at €23.4 billion as of June 2019. The gross NPL ratio decreased to 8.3% in June 2019, from the peak of 17.9% in 2016. While we expect this trend to continue, the ratio remains high in the European context.

Portuguese banks have primarily reduced their NPL ratios by directly writing them off or by selling them to private investors (mainly hedge funds). However, the number of NPL transactions has been significantly lower than other jurisdictions like Ireland, Spain, or Italy. This is mainly due to the structure of the Portuguese banking system. Unlike UniCredit SpA and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena in Italy or Santander S.A. and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. in Spain, most Portuguese banks do not have comparable capital flexibility to absorb the likely significant losses if they were to complete sizable transactions. Nevertheless, 2018 was a record year of sales in the Portuguese market: 16 transactions totaling €8 billion of NPL and REO assets were sold via private placement, versus only €1 billion in 2017. We expect Portuguese banks to continue to use selective sales as the main tool to gradually reduce the stock while preserving solvency.

Portuguese banks have also reduced their NPL ratios by improving the credit quality of the originated loans. We expect this to become even more evident in the near future as a result of the Bank of Portugal's recommendation on new credit agreements for consumers, which went into effect in July 2018. This affected, particularly, residential mortgage and consumer credits. The main provisions include tightening the underwriting criteria for new mortgages, adding a maximum limit on loan-to-value ratios, new stresses for debt-to-income ratios, and maximum terms for maturity, among others.

Analytical approach: Similarities with Italian NPL securitizations

Portugal does not have a very active market of rated NPL securitizations. This is partly explained by the government's decision to not create a structure that would encourage such a market, as opposed to Italy and its GACS scheme, for example. That said, we anticipate some rated NPL securitization to come to the market. Additionally, investors that purchased NPLs might try to proactively offer sustainable alternative arrangements to borrowers. Once they are able to cure the arrears, they could package those loans into securitizations of RPLs similarly to the Irish case.

The portfolios that Portuguese banks have so far sold comprise a mix of secured and unsecured loans granted to both commercial and individual borrowers, similar to the ones seen in Italy. The underlying properties are also a mix of residential and commercial assets, and land. The geographic distribution is diversified, with higher concentrations in the main cities (Lisbon and Porto).

To analyze a Portuguese NPL portfolio, we would first look at the servicer's business plan, focusing on the servicer's historical performance data. As a second step, we would identify the relevant subpools in the portfolio. For each subpool, we estimate the recovery discount (haircut) to apply at each rating level by looking at the servicer's historical recovery performance and the assessment of conservatism embedded in the business plan.

In order to derive our recovery timing assumptions, we further differentiate the secured portion of the portfolio depending on whether the property securing each of the loans is a commercial or residential asset. As a starting point, for residential properties we use the assumptions set in our European residential loans criteria for Portuguese portfolios (48 months). For commercial borrowers, we would expect to receive historical recovery timing from the servicer and we would also analyze legal process timings from different tribunals depending on the pool's geographical distribution. We would also take into account the data from the "Direção-Geral da Política de Justiça," which state that the average duration of the judicial procedure in 2017 for this type of borrowers was 45 months. Finally, we adjust those assumptions to reflect the different workout stages for each loan and the type of legal proceeding. For the portfolio's unsecured portion, we would derive our assumption from the servicer's historical data.

Finally, Portuguese transactions might use an "asset manager" owned by the SPV to sell the properties in the open market for those not sold in the auction phase. The asset manager can purchase these assets, benefiting from fiscal benefits for three years as long as he or she resells the asset within those three years. We would review any proposed rated transactions structured with an asset manager to assess how they address legal and tax risks relevant to our analysis. We would need to closely consider, for example, whether the asset manager's ownership of real estate would be compatible with an assessment of the SPE's insolvency remoteness under our legal criteria.

Greece

Chart 12

Greek NPL stock has increased significantly over the past 11 years, and is currently the highest in the EU at 43.6% (Bank of Greece [BoG] data) compared to the EU average of 3% (European Banking Authority data). However, there has been a decreasing trend in recent years. According to the latest BoG data, the NPL stock was €75.4 billion as of June 2019, dropping by 4.2% on a year-on-year and 1.5% quarter-on-quarter basis.

The disposal of NPLs through sales of secured and unsecured loans continues to be Greek banks' priority. Table 1 shows the NPL reduction plans of the four major banks--Alpha Bank A.E., Eurobank Ergasias S.A., National Bank of Greece S.A., and Piraeus Bank S.A.--for 2019, which they aim to achieve mainly through direct sales and securitization transactions.

Table 1

Regulatory and legal initiatives

In 2019, a new insolvency framework for households and corporations replaced the existing household insolvency law, also known as the Katseli law. The old household insolvency law created a significant backlog of pending cases and, as of first-quarter 2019, 89,498 cases, part of which are so-called strategic defaulters, still needed to be processed. However, the government has appointed new court officials trained to reduce the number of pending cases. The first indicators show reductions in the processing time for these cases.

The new household insolvency framework, implemented from April 30, 2019 to Dec. 31, 2019, offers a restructuring option to debtors on their primary residence if they fulfill stricter eligibility criteria. It also includes a monthly state subsidy depending on an individual assessment of the borrower's financial income. The limits on the property value, loan amount, and financial belongings have been reduced compared to the Katseli law. Eligible applicants benefit from an extension of the maturity up to 25 years, a reduced interest, and a loan haircut of amounts exceeding 120% of the property value. In order to accelerate the process, applications are submitted via an online platform and have a pre-set recovery timing. The online platform has only been operational since July, and as of end-September, over 21,000 cases are in progress with only a few cases successfully accepted.

The recent implementation of online or "e-auctions" has facilitated the disposal of NPLs. Although the absolute number of e-auction properties has increased, only a small portion are successful (see chart 13). Furthermore, the four major banks' data show that over 70% of successful auctions are acquired back by the banks. One of the reasons for the low numbers of successful bids is that debtors file under the insolvency law or submit a petition to increase the starting auction price. Consequently, the property sale is put on hold for another year until a court decision is reached. In addition, one of the major hurdles of the e-auction is the lack of information on the auctioned properties. Another factor is language barriers that limit foreign investor interest given that the website and the documentation are entirely in Greek.

In order to fix some of the issues experienced with the e-auctions, the four systemic banks initiated a new online platform that provides more details of the properties. The aim is to reduce the number of unsuccessful bids to below 70% within the next year.

Chart 13

New tools: The deferred tax credits plan and Hercules asset protection scheme

In addition to the above measures, the Greek authorities are exploring two further systemic initiatives to accelerate NPL stock clearance.

Under the draft deferred tax plan, Greece's four largest banks would transfer their deferred tax assets to an SPE, which would then issue bonds and use the proceeds to acquire NPLs held by the banks. These new loans would be sold at market prices and would be divided into three categories: Senior, mezzanine, and equity. The created asset management company would play the role of the bad bank. The plan is still subject to the approval of the European authorities and its technical complications are yet to be resolved.

The Hercules asset protection scheme, which is similar to the Italian GACS model, is currently the most advanced. Under this scheme, which the banks can use voluntarily, the Greek State would guarantee the senior tranches issued within securitizations backed by NPLs. The guarantee is expected to be remunerated at market conditions. Following several discussions, the European Commission approved the scheme in October 2019. The exact terms have not been disclosed, but we understand that its aim is to facilitate the securitization of as much as €30 billion of NPLs. The first draft of the law implementing this scheme is currently under discussion and we anticipate it to be in force by early December 2019, paving the way for rated securitizations.

Analytical approach: Restructuring plans

The economic crisis had several knock-on effects in Greece, including the judicial system. In 2015, the government froze liquidation proceedings, and although litigations have been allowed since September 2016, Greek banks still focus on restructuring plans, accounting for the uncertainty of the legal action and the long recovery period. Judicial costs and timing, as well as the objective of maintaining customer relationships, together with moral issues forced the banks to abstain from any litigation action. The new insolvency law has further incentivized banks to restructure the loans, as it can prove more profitable because they could benefit from the state guarantees.

As a result, one of the challenges we see when analyzing a securitized portfolio of Greek NPLs is assessing the robustness and accurateness of the business plan prepared by the servicers, since they would rely heavily on restructuring plans. We would need to receive a relatively wide set of historical data to be able to determine the appropriate stresses we should apply to the servicer's recovery assumptions. In particular, we would need to receive post-restructure data showing pay rates and re-default rates stratified by forbearance type.

Another challenge for our analysis is the significant backlog of cases resulting from the Katseli law. Under that law, if the borrower's application is rejected, litigation continues as normal thus further increasing the recovery timing. If the portfolio to be securitized includes a portion of loans where the borrower filed for protection under this law, we would need to understand the assumptions made by the servicer for both expected collections and recovery timing in the business plan. We would also expect to receive data to support those assumptions. Although the new insolvency law is more restrictive for borrowers, we would still need to understand the servicer's assumptions for loans eligible under the new framework.

Our current assumption for the recovery period of Greek residential mortgage loans is seven years. We might increase this assumption for loans protected under the old and new insolvency laws, and also apply different assumptions as sensitivity scenarios to test the effect on the transaction's cash flows. While the new legal framework--together with new tools--could potentially decrease recovery timings, it's too early to tell as a liable track record still hasn't been recorded.

Lastly, according to the Greek Civil Procedures Code, the proceeds of an auction following the enforcement of the property securing a mortgage loan must be first allocated to the creditors enjoying general privileges before they can be allocated to the creditors with special privileges. General privileges are claims for the borrower's living costs over the previous six months and claims to the Greek state, municipal authorities, and legal costs. Secured creditors with a mortgage over the property are classified as creditors with special privileges. The satisfaction of general privileges is limited to up to 35% of the auction proceeds. We would expect the business plan to incorporate potential claims arising from general privileges, including data to support the servicer's assumptions. Otherwise, we would consider the maximum 35% for special privileges.

Overview Of The Servicing Markets

Europe's servicing markets have evolved since the global financial crisis in response to country-specific financial and economic conditions.

Related Research

• The Irish RMBS Story: Improving Market Conditions And The 'Tail' Of Long-Term Arrears, Feb. 1, 2019
• EMEA Servicer Evaluation Industry Report 2018, Jan. 30, 2019
• Changes Ahead: How Spain's New Mortgage Law Could Affect New And Outstanding RMBS Transactions, Dec. 19, 2018
• Credit FAQ: Rating Considerations For Italian Securitizations of Nonperforming Loans, Nov. 13, 2018
• Spanish Government Will Shift Stamp Duty Costs To Banks, Nov. 8, 2018
• How We Analyze Residential Mortgage Loans Backing Greek Covered Bonds And RMBS, Aug. 29, 2018