KEY TAKEAWAYS
- In this report, we analyzed default and recovery performance data for 7,064 unrated global project bank loans for the period between Jan. 1, 1995, and Dec. 31, 2016, which based on external data sources and our own analysis we believe accounts for approximately two-thirds of total global project finance loans generated during this timeframe.
- For the performance of rated projects and rated infrastructure, see the study "2017 Inaugural Infrastructure Default Study And Rating Transitions," published on Nov. 20, 2018, on RatingsDirect.
- The 10-year cumulative default rate for all unrated project finance bank loans stood at 6.3%. However, the rate drops to 5.85% just for the core infrastructure sectors of power, transport/social infrastructure, and oil & gas (core infra). The percentage further drops to 5.6% for projects in the public sphere (PPP or PFI), illustrating their comparatively lower-risk nature.
- The unrated project finance loans had a 1.5% average annual default rate over 1995-2016 (1.3% for core infra), but this rate was much lower in the past 10 years at 0.9% (0.8% for core infra).
- The annual default gap between Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and emerging markets has fallen over the past decade. OECD project financings still showed a slightly lower average annual default rate (1.4%) over 1995-2016 than in emerging market and developing economies (1.5% for EMDE A and 1.6% for EMDE B). The difference is less than we expected, probably because emerging markets were less affected by the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the prolonged 2011-2015 crisis in southern Europe.
- Sovereign and economic-related stress, as well as industry-related crises (notably the U.S. utilities crisis in 2001-2003) have triggered the lion's share of project defaults in our view. Emerging-market countries with more severe past sovereign crises or higher country risks, such as Argentina, Thailand, Colombia, Indonesia, and Egypt, display the weakest project annual default performance. While not a sovereign default, Spain's economic downturn over 2011-2015 also led to above-average default rates. Finally, we believe the U.S. also showed comparatively above-average default rates, caused by a spike in 2001-2003 due to the dot-com bust and the U.S. utilities crisis.
- By contrast, we find comparatively low annual defaults across some OECD as well as EMDE countries: These include Canada, Japan, and Netherlands, most Middle Eastern countries, and, maybe somewhat unexpected, Turkey, Russia, and Mexico.
- Annual defaults by industry showed that transport/social infrastructure projects had the lowest average annual default rate over 1995-2016, and power projects the highest rate among core infra. However, the picture is different if the starting point is 2008, marking the start of the global financial crisis: over the last decade default rates for transport/social infrastructure projects, impacted by weaker economic conditions, rose comparatively more.
- Project finance loan recovery rates averaged a high 84% on a nominal basis (77% on a discounted basis). This is slightly higher than our rated senior secured recoveries of 80% for nonfinancial corporates and much higher than the 50% average for rated senior unsecured debt of nonfinancial corporates.
- Notably, we see no meaningful difference in recoveries for projects in OECD, EMDE A, or EMDE B countries, with discounted average recoveries of 78%, 77%, and 75%. However, we observed a meaningful difference in average time to recovery of 1.7 years for projects in the OECD, versus 2.6-2.8 years in EMDE-A and EMDE-B countries, which we think reflects the better predictability of insolvency proceedings and legislation in most OECD countries.
Data Access, Scope And Definitional Limitations
S&P Global Ratings prepared this report based solely on aggregated and anonymized project finance loan performance data provided by S&P Global Market Intelligence, a division of S&P Global. A consortium of project finance bank lenders contributed underlying project finance loan portfolio information to S&P Global Market Intelligence. The data set analyzed as part of our study consisted of 7,064 unrated global project loans banks for the period between Jan. 1, 1995, and Dec. 31, 2016 (the "Data Set"). In analyzing the Data Set, we also applied the World Bank's geographical classifications and country groupings. The scope of our analysis is a function of granularity we were able to derive from the Data Set.
This report focuses on the historical performance of unrated project finance loans. The concept of default applied for the purposes of this study to the Data Set is assumed to be consistent with the Basel II definition of default. Please note that for the purposes of credit ratings, S&P Global Ratings uses a different approach to analyzing default (See the Appendix).
Consequently, we caution that default statistics associated with the Data Set may not be fully comparable with default statistics for rated project finance loans.
For recovery statistics, we believe that the distinction between Basel II and S&P Global Ratings' definitions of default is less consequential and hence we have, in this report, drawn a more explicit comparison between recoveries for unrated and rated project finance debt.
For our just published default and recovery study for rated infrastructure, which includes rated project finance, see "2017 Inaugural Infrastructure Default Study And Rating Transitions," published on Nov. 20, 2018, on RatingsDirect.
Scope
Of the 7,064 project loans originated between Jan. 1, 1995 to Dec. 31, 2016, that were part of our report (see chart 1), 564 were reported to have defaulted over the period. Of the defaulted projects, we have recovery data for 376 projects that emerged from default, corresponding to 1,338 tranches or debt instruments.
Chart 1
Chart 2
Chart 3
For the purposes of this study we defined regions (see chart 2) according to the definition of region used by S&P Global Market Intelligence. We note that S&P Global Market Intelligence includes Russia and some other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Eastern Europe.
Furthermore, we have split the Data Set into three subsets according to the classifications the World Bank uses (see chart 3). Advanced economies are high-income countries that are members of either OECD or EEA. As for emerging-market and developing countries (EMDE), EMDE-A countries are all non-high income countries, while EMDE-B countries are the same excluding non-high income OECD and EEA countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, as well as Croatia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania.
Broken down by industry (see chart 4), power accounts for 40% of total loans, of which 25% are non-renewables and 15% are renewable projects. Public-private partnerships (PPP) and private finance initiatives (PFI) account for 24% of the total loans, largely concentrated in the transport/social infrastructure space.
Chart 4
Data sourcing
We believe the conclusions in this report should fairly well reflect the performance of global project finance loan activity, as based on external data sources and our own analysis, we believe that the Data Set accounts for roughly two-thirds of total global project finance loans over the period. However, project data available for this report from consortium banks have declined in relative terms to less than 50% of estimated global project financings for the 2012-2016 period.
Data samples and concentration
We caution that statistical conclusions stemming from smaller data samples, such as for specific countries, may not be as reliable or illuminating as those based on larger data samples. It should be noted that the number of projects by country varies widely: the U.K. and U.S. each account for more than 1,000 projects; followed by Spain (more than 600), Australia (about 400), and Germany, Italy, and France with about 300 each; and Brazil, Canada, and Mexico, with close to 200 each. Other major project finance countries with approximately 100 projects included each are Japan, Netherlands, Chile, Indonesia, Portugal, Turkey, Russia, and China.
KEY DEFAULT STATISTICS
Average annual default performance
We have found, over the period 1995-2016, an average annual default rate of 1.3% for core infrastructure projects (versus 1.5% for all projects). For projects in the public sphere, that is, PPP or PFI, the average annual default rate falls to a mere 0.7%, illustrating their distinctly lower risk profile relative to the Data Set overall. We believe that focusing on "core infrastructure" projects (core infra) makes this report more comparable with the rated project financings in our "2017 Inaugural Infrastructure Default Study And Rating Transitions" study. As such, we view core infrastructure (core infra) as comprising the larger segments of power (both merchant and regulated utilities); transport/social (which includes airports, toll roads, tunnels, ports and terminals; water, waste utilities, and other); and oil & gas projects. Further, we view core infra assets as excluding project finance activity in the fields of media, leisure, metals & mining, and chemicals, among others. We would normally also exclude exploration and production (E&P)-exposed oil & gas projects, but such subsector details were not available from the Data Set.
What's more, we see a sharp decline in bank loan project default rates over the past 10 years (compared with 1995-2007), with annual average default rates falling to 0.8% for core infrastructure and since 2015 back to the lows seen before the financial crisis.
Finally, we note large and smaller spikes in default rates over the 20 years. These coincided with specific sovereign crises, industry-driven downturns (such as the dot-com bust and the U.S. utilities crisis following the demise of Enron at the start of the decade), and economic fallout from the global financial crisis in 2008. Keep in mind that the effect on project finance default rates may lag because of the use of debt service reserve accounts (DSRAs, see chart 5).
Chart 5
Project finance cumulative and marginal default rates
We calculate a 10-year cumulative default rate for all (unrated) bank loan projects of 6.3% (see chart 7 and table 1). When narrowing the scope of projects to core infrastructure sectors, this rate drop to 5.85% and when limited to PPP/PFI projects the rate is 5.6%.
Chart 7
Table 1
Cumulative Default Rates For All Project Finance Projects | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
--Year-- | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
(%) | Issuers (no.) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |||||||||||||
1995 | 371 | 2.16 | 1.93 | 1.69 | 0.86 | 2.31 | 0.89 | 1.79 | 1.21 | 0.31 | 0.31 | |||||||||||||
1996 | 489 | 1.84 | 2.08 | 2.34 | 2.61 | 0.89 | 1.81 | 1.15 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.70 | |||||||||||||
1997 | 658 | 1.52 | 2.78 | 3.33 | 1.31 | 2.00 | 2.04 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.87 | 0.35 | |||||||||||||
1998 | 855 | 2.81 | 2.77 | 1.24 | 2.76 | 2.58 | 0.79 | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0.40 | 0.00 | |||||||||||||
1999 | 1,040 | 2.60 | 1.28 | 3.20 | 2.79 | 1.38 | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.44 | 0.22 | 0.11 | |||||||||||||
2000 | 1,276 | 1.25 | 3.02 | 3.52 | 1.70 | 0.95 | 0.52 | 0.61 | 0.18 | 0.09 | 0.00 | |||||||||||||
2001 | 1,540 | 3.05 | 4.49 | 1.89 | 1.00 | 0.58 | 0.51 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.07 | |||||||||||||
2002 | 1,733 | 4.73 | 2.73 | 1.00 | 0.75 | 0.57 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.13 | |||||||||||||
2003 | 1,839 | 2.50 | 1.00 | 0.68 | 0.62 | 0.29 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.17 | |||||||||||||
2004 | 1,944 | 1.08 | 0.73 | 0.63 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.37 | 0.11 | |||||||||||||
2005 | 2,134 | 0.75 | 0.61 | 0.29 | 0.24 | 0.33 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.34 | 0.10 | 0.19 | |||||||||||||
2006 | 2,279 | 0.61 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.36 | 0.13 | 0.32 | 0.18 | |||||||||||||
2007 | 2,578 | 0.27 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.40 | 0.20 | 0.44 | 0.24 | 0.12 | |||||||||||||
2008 | 2,956 | 0.61 | 1.06 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.56 | 0.32 | 0.11 | ||||||||||||||
2009 | 2,603 | 1.38 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.79 | 0.80 | 1.01 | 0.49 | 0.25 | |||||||||||||||
2010 | 2,639 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 1.02 | 0.48 | 0.40 | ||||||||||||||||
2011 | 2,606 | 1.04 | 0.81 | 0.86 | 1.18 | 0.56 | 0.40 | |||||||||||||||||
2012 | 2,793 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 1.28 | 0.66 | 0.37 | ||||||||||||||||||
2013 | 2,874 | 1.01 | 1.23 | 0.64 | 0.47 | |||||||||||||||||||
2014 | 2,907 | 1.27 | 0.66 | 0.53 | ||||||||||||||||||||
2015 | 3,049 | 0.72 | 0.53 | |||||||||||||||||||||
2016 | 3,133 | 0.51 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Marginal default rates | 1.27 | 1.19 | 1.01 | 0.84 | 0.67 | 0.48 | 0.36 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.15 | ||||||||||||||
Cumulative default rates | 1.27 | 2.45 | 3.43 | 4.24 | 4.88 | 5.33 | 5.67 | 5.93 | 6.12 | 6.26 | ||||||||||||||
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
In terms of marginal default rates (see chart 8 and table 1), all project financings show higher levels in the first three years, coming down to very low levels after year 5 when projects typically have established an operational track record and have dealt with construction risks.
Chart 8
Key recovery statistics
The average discounted recovery rate at the debt instrument level was 77%, compared with a nominal 84%. What's notable about project recovery rates is that they have been fairly constant across cycles and largely delinked from default performance years (see chart 9). In contrast, corporate recoveries tend to be negatively correlated to spikes in default rates, reflecting the more direct impact of adverse economic conditions on corporate valuations. The main exception relates to 2010-2011 when recovery rates dropped to 64% after the financial crisis, down from 80% previously. Since 2012, recovery rates have hovered around 71%.
Chart 9
Compared with rated corporate debt, we found that recoveries for projects emerging from default are more resilient. As mentioned, the average nominal recovery rate for the Data Set was 84% (or even 87% for core infra). This compares with only 59% for rated project recoveries: As mentioned above, the lower recovery rate than for unrated bank loans may result from the relatively small rated sample size (46 recovery tranches only), essentially of U.S. projects many with merchant power exposure, and possibly differences between bonds and bank recoveries.
The high nominal recovery level of (unrated) projects (of 84%) is nearly the same as that of rated senior secured corporate debt of close to 80%. Recoveries for all rated debt instruments for rated infrastructure corporate entities was observed to be equally high at 75%, well ahead of rated nonfinancial corporates (at 59% and 50% when considering unsecured bonds only, see table 3).
Table 3
Nominal Recovery Rates By Debt Instrument And Asset Class (Rated And Unrated) |
||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(%) | Average nominal recovery | Median nominal recovery | ||||
Unrated project finance (bank consortium) | 84 | 100 | ||||
Unrated core infrastructure project finance (bank consortium) | 87 | 100 | ||||
Rated project finance | 59 | 65 | ||||
Rated corporate infrastructure | 75 | 91 | ||||
Rated nonfinancial corporates* | 59 | 60 | ||||
Of which senior unsecured | 50 | 41 | ||||
*From 1995-2016. Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Ratings. |
Certain types of project finance loans may experience relatively high recoveries as:
- Certain projects may fund the provision of essential services such as power, water, and gas often have little or no practical substitute.
- Low industry risk and stable cash flows derived from long-term offtake contracts, such as power purchase agreements or availability-based payments under a concession, operations and maintenance contracts, or fuel supply contracts, among others.
- The ability to add debt as well as to distribute profits is typically limited by covenants and debt is predominately secured.
Finally, when looking at the recovery profiles for various rated and unrated asset classes (see chart 10), we observe a barbell distribution with 52% of unrated project finance having a recovery more than 90% and a similarly elevated percentage of 53% for rated infrastructure corporates, compared with 34% for nonfinancial corporates. The rated project universe (predominately U.S.) also shows a barbell but with more variance among the 46 tranches.
Chart 10
DEFAULT ANALYSIS BREAKDOWN BY REGION AND INDUSTRY
Defaults by region and by advanced versus developing country
While project financing typically includes structural features such as pledged collateral and contracted off-take agreements, which can mitigate debt service coverage volatility and exposure to parents and other counterparties, analysis of historical time series suggest that it does not completely insulate a project from shocks within economic cycles.
Over the past 20 years, we have seen increases in project finance defaults both across sovereign stress and specific industry-related market downturns (see box).
Recovery rates by region As can be seen in chart 11, Latin American annual default rates have been outliers (averaging 2.2% over 1995-2016), followed by North America (1.8%), compared with the global average of 1.5%. Average annual default levels for Asia-Pacific have dropped over the past decade, now standing at 1.6% over 1995-2016, not far from the Western and Eastern Europe averages of 1.4%-1.5%. The region with the lowest average annual default statistics by far has been the Middle East.
Chart 11
Spikes In Project Finance Default Rates
Asian crisis (1997-1999). In July 1997, the Indonesian currency crisis started, leading to a major sovereign crisis in Asia lasting until 2003. Almost 30% of Indonesian projects defaulted over 1998-1999. A similar percentage defaulted in Thailand over 1997-2001. The other country with a high default percentage was Pakistan.
Argentine default (2001-2002). The performance of projects in Latin America was hurt initially by the Argentinian crisis in 2001-2002. Despite hyperinflation in the country at the end of the previous decade, projects resisted relatively well until the Argentinean peso devalued, leading to default of 40% of projects in 2002, mostly in the nonrenewable power, oil & gas, and transport/social infrastructure sectors.
Dot-com bust (2000-2002) and U.S. utilities crisis (2001-2003). The dot-com bust led to defaults in North America and Western Europe in similar absolute measure and timing. Driven by the bankruptcy of Enron and the resulting market disruption, the credit quality of many U.S. independent power producers deteriorated markedly. This contributed to major defaults among U.S. but also U.K. power projects. Over 2001-2003, across media and (mainly thermal) power projects, the U.S. represented a concentrated share of over 30% of worldwide project defaults. It also represented almost 50% of U.S. defaults over 1995-2016. Similarly, this period accounts for 50% of U.K. defaults.
The global financial crisis (2008-2010). After 2003, project defaults worldwide were at minimal levels until 2009. The consequences of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 started to hurt projects' performance in 2009, leading to a series of defaults, even though the financial crisis had a comparatively far lesser impact than the media and U.S. utilities crisis at the start of decade. The performance of infrastructure projects, usually linked to GDP trends, were the first to suffer the consequences, particularly in the U.S. The other asset class that saw a jump in defaults were commodity related (oil & gas and metals & mining). Other European countries were affected too, but to a much more limited extent. The same goes for Latin America, where Brazil and Chile saw a modest rise in defaults in 2009-2010. Projects in Asia-Pacific were hardly affected.
The crisis in southern Europe (2009-2014). After having suffered the global financial crisis, Europe experienced a double-dip recession, sparked by sovereign stresses in southern European countries, culminating in the default by Greece. However, Spain saw the largest drop in project performance. Although its sovereign ratings remained investment grade, a deep real estate and prolonged financial and economic crisis from 2009 until 2014 led to a decline in real GDP of 9% on an accumulated basis. Hence, default rates for Spanish projects saw highs over a much longer period--from 2011 till 2015. The first projects to suffer the consequences were those linked to the performance of the economy, mainly toll roads. The second was renewable projects, whose revenues were mainly derived from subsidies. The Spanish government announced in 2013 a modification to subsidies for renewable assets (mainly wind onshore and photovoltaics) effective 2014, leading to significant drops in expected revenues.
Recent sovereign and economic crises. There was a spike in default rates in Egypt in 2014. Afterward, in 2015 and 2016, the worldwide performance of project finance transactions rebounded to the pre-2008 crisis lows. The only exception was in Brazil where defaults climbed during 2014-2016, mainly in oil & gas and infrastructure as a result of fall in global oil prices starting in 2014, along with the emerging corruption investigations in the sectors.
Breakdown by advanced versus developing country We found that EMDEs still have a higher average annual default rate over the 1995-2016 period at about 1.8% for EMDE-B countries and 1.6% for EMDE-A. This compares with 1.4% on average for OECD (and 1.3% for the European Economic Area; see chart 12.) However, the gap between the OECD's and EMDEs' performances has continued to narrow, as annual default rates converged to below 1% for both country groups over the last decade, explained by the fact that projects in Latin American and in particular Asia-Pacific economies were comparatively less affected over the past decade by the financial crisis.
Chart 12
We nevertheless found notable outliers in both OECD countries and EMDEs. Understandably, emerging markets that experienced a major sovereign crisis have shown above-average defaults, but so did Spain, while the comparatively weaker performance in the U.S. is partly explained by the utilities crisis in 2001-2003. By contrast, we uncovered a comparatively strong project performance by most countries in the Middle East, developing economies such as Turkey, and Russia, as well as in Mexico, with the lowest defaults in advanced economies observed for Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands, among others.
Default by industry
Largely reflecting the industry distribution of the project finance data, most defaults occurred in the power segment (39%), followed by infrastructure (23%), and oil & gas (10%; see table 4).
Table 4
Defaults By Industry | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(No.) | 1995-2003 | 2004-2016 | Total defaults (from 1995) | Total bank loan defaults (%) | ||||||
Power | 125 | 94 | 219 | 39 | ||||||
Transport/social infrastructure | 21 | 106 | 127 | 23 | ||||||
Oil & gas | 19 | 38 | 57 | 10 | ||||||
Media & telecom | 58 | 12 | 70 | 12 | ||||||
Metals & mining | 27 | 17 | 44 | 8 | ||||||
Chemicals production | 8 | 7 | 15 | 3 | ||||||
Leisure & recreation | 3 | 8 | 11 | 2 | ||||||
Manufacturing | 6 | 4 | 10 | 2 | ||||||
Other | 2 | 5 | 8 | 1 | ||||||
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
We have already highlighted that the three core infrastructure sectors (see chart 13) show a lower cumulative default rate and thus a somewhat lower risk profile than the other segments. While power projects have shown the highest (1.6%) average annual default rate over 1995-2016 for these three sectors (that averaged 1.3%), it actually became the lowest over the past 10 years. Explained differently, transport/social projects displayed the least volatile performance over the 20-year period, but nevertheless suffered more from the economic downturn following the financial crisis.
Chart 13
Power: renewables versus non-renewables The performance of power projects has differed depending on what underpins revenues. Renewable projects, as of today, tend to have benefited from predictable payments from power purchase agreements, contracts, or tariffs that are often subsidized, and therefore should have greater revenue stability than merchant power (so far mainly thermal) projects, which are exposed to energy price fluctuations. However, the annual default performance of renewables projects has not been lower than for nonrenewable (thermal) projects. This is in our view because of regulatory changes in Spain, with substantial downward revisions of remuneration in 2014, which particularly affected renewable projects, as well as due to contractual issues or deterioration of counterparty creditworthiness during the U.S. utilities crisis.
For completion's sake, we show the performance of the other industries below: Annual default rates for each of them exceeded 2% on average over 1995-2016 (see chart 14).
Chart 14
Time to default by region and advanced versus developing country
The median time to default was observed to be about three years. Differences among regions and World Bank country groups appear quite limited (see table 5).
Table 5
Time To Default By Region And Advanced Versus Developing Countries | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Years) | 10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | 90th percentile | |||||||
Western Europe | 1-2 | 2-3 | 3-4 | 5-6 | 8-9 | |||||||
North America | 0-1 | 1-2 | 2-3 | 4-5 | 6-7 | |||||||
Asia-Pacific | 0-1 | 1-2 | 2-3 | 4-5 | 6-7 | |||||||
Latin America | 0-1 | 1-2 | 3-4 | 4-5 | 6-7 | |||||||
European Economic Area (EEA) | 1-2 | 2-3 | 3-4 | 5-6 | 8-9 | |||||||
OECD (or EEA) | 0-1 | 1-2 | 3-4 | 5-6 | 7-8 | |||||||
EMDE-A | 0-1 | 1-2 | 3-4 | 4-5 | 6-7 | |||||||
EMDE-B | 0-1 | 1-2 | 2-3 | 4-5 | 6-7 | |||||||
EMDE--Emerging market and developing countries. EMDE-A countries are non-high income countries, plus East European countries in transition such as the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. EMDE-B countries exclude EMDE-A countries, as well as non-high income OECD countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Chile, and Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
RECOVERY ANALYSIS BY REGION AND INDUSTRY
In terms of the Data Set of the 564 projects that defaulted, we have recovery data for 376 projects that emerged from default, corresponding to 1,338 tranches. Based on the available recovery information, S&P Global Market Intelligence categorized each of the 1,338 recovered debt instruments as one of eight resolution types (see chart 15). Adjusted for projects for which data were not provided, we find that most (82%) of the recovered debt instruments were restructured, sold, acquired, or returned to performing. This compares with just over 10% of projects that did not find a solution and were liquidated.
Chart 15
In analyzing recoveries by emergence year, we find that the period 2002-2005 represents approximately 61% of recoveries. North America and Western Europe accounted for 71% of those recoveries.
Recovery rates by region, advanced versus developing country, and jurisdiction
Here, we focus on the regions--Western Europe, North American, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific (excluding Oceania) for which we believed we had enough data to develop meaningful conclusions.
Recovery rates by region Interestingly, differences among the above-mentioned regions is limited, with all showing average discounted recovery rates close to the global average of 77%. Generally, distributions are comparable, with the exception of North America, which shows a slightly weaker recovery for the 10% decile (see table 6).
Table 6
Discounted Recovery Rates Distribution By Region | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | 90th percentile | Average | |||||||||
Western Europe | 30-40 | 56 | 94 | 99 | 100 | 77 | ||||||||
North America | 20-30 | 65 | 88 | 99 | 100 | 76 | ||||||||
Asia-Pacific | 30-40 | 64 | 85 | 100 | 100 | 76 | ||||||||
Latin America | 30-40 | 64 | 93 | 100 | 100 | 80 | ||||||||
World total | 30-40 | 61 | 91 | 99 | 100 | 77 | ||||||||
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
Recovery rates by advanced versus developing country We observed only minor divergences in recovery rates between advanced economies and emerging and developing markets, with average recovery rates of 78% and 77%/75% respectively (see table 7) for the Data Set. However, recoveries for the lowest 10% quartile were somewhat lower for EMDE-B countries.
Table 7
Discounted Recovery Rates Distribution By Advanced Versus Developing Countries | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | 90th percentile | Average | |||||||||
European Economic Area (EEA) | 30-40 | 56 | 94 | 99 | 100 | 78 | ||||||||
OECD (or EEA) | 30-40 | 61 | 92 | 99 | 100 | 78 | ||||||||
EMDE-A | 30-40 | 63 | 90 | 100 | 100 | 77 | ||||||||
EMDE-B | 20-30 | 58 | 87 | 100 | 100 | 75 | ||||||||
EMDE--Emerging market and developing countries. EMDE-A countries are non-high income countries, plus East European countries in transition such as the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. EMDE-B countries exclude EMDE-A countries, as well as non-high income OECD countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Chile, and Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence |
Recovery rates by jurisdiction For this breakdown, we used our own classification of jurisdiction groupings, developed according to a specific methodology (see "Criteria | Corporates | Recovery: Methodology: Jurisdiction Ranking Assessments," published on Jan. 20, 2016.) This methodology is used for recovery analysis of nonfinancial corporate issuers, project finance recovery ratings, and for certain nonbank financial services companies. It classifies insolvency regimes into three jurisdiction groupings: Group A (comprising mainly OECD countries), Group B, and Group C (higher-risk emerging markets; see table 8). For this article only, we also added countries without any jurisdiction assessment to Group C.
The jurisdiction groupings are an indicator of our view of the relative degree of protection that a country's insolvency laws and practices afford creditors' interests and of the predictability of those proceedings. This assessment reflects, on a relative basis how insolvency proceedings and rule-of-law considerations in a given jurisdiction are likely to affect postdefault recovery prospects for creditors subject to insolvency proceedings in that jurisdiction.
Table 8
Country Ranking By S&P Global Ratings Jurisdiction* | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Countries | Jurisdiction | Countries | Jurisdiction | Countries | Jurisdiction | |||||||
Australia | A | Brazil | B | India | C | |||||||
Canada | A | Czech Republic | B | Indonesia | C | |||||||
France | A | Dubai International Finance Centre | B | Kazakhstan | C | |||||||
Germany | A | Greece | B | Romania | C | |||||||
Japan | A | Italy | B | Russia | C | |||||||
Poland | A | Mexico | B | Ukraine | C | |||||||
Portugal | A | South Africa | B | Vietnam | C | |||||||
Spain | A | Turkey | B | |||||||||
U.K. | A | United Arab Emirates | B | |||||||||
U.S. | A | |||||||||||
*Non-exhaustive list. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Analyzing the recovery data for projects according to these three groupings, our conclusions are similar to those we made for advanced versus developing countries above. Although one would expect higher outcomes for group A, the difference in recovery values between groups A and C is very narrow, with an average level of 77% and 78% (see table 9-10) for the Data Set. However, the median for group C is 10% lower. While this may indicate that project finance security structures are effective in emerging markets, outcomes are likely to be influenced as well by type of project, not just creditor laws.
We view group B data as less representative, given the limited debt instrument sample and concentration across four countries (Mexico, Italy, Greece, and Brazil) with high recovery values stemming from Mexican and Italian projects.
Table 9-10
Discounted Recovery Rates Distribution By S&P Global Ratings' Jurisdiction | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(No.) | Debt instruments (no.) | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | Average | |||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction A | 936 | 67 | 90 | 98 | 78 | |||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction B | 42 | 79 | 87 | 96 | 88 | |||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction C and countries without a jurisdiction assessment | 321 | 63 | 81 | 95 | 77 | |||||||||||||||||||
Discounted recovery rates distribution by recovery rate | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
(No.) | 0%-10% | 10%-20% | 20-30% | 30%-40% | 40%-50% | 50%-60% | 60%-70% | 70%-80% | 80%-90% | 90%-100% | 100% | |||||||||||||
Jurisdiction A | 39 | 11 | 28 | 23 | 33 | 68 | 48 | 63 | 84 | 125 | 414 | |||||||||||||
Jurisdiction B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 15 | 18 | |||||||||||||
Jurisdiction C and countries without a jurisdiction assessment | 12 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 17 | 21 | 25 | 41 | 38 | 131 | |||||||||||||
Total | 51 | 21 | 37 | 29 | 47 | 88 | 69 | 90 | 125 | 178 | 563 | |||||||||||||
Note: On the basis of 1,299 total recovery data points (instead of 1,338, as countries with less than five debt instruments on recovery were excluded. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
Recovery rates by industry
Discounted recovery rates by industry show limited variance on average (see chart 16). Average discounted recovery rates for core infra were about 80%, slightly higher than the overall average of 77% for the Data Set. Equally relevant we believe is the lower observed downside recovery risk for core infra, with the 25% percentile of lowest recoveries averaging 68%, compared with 40% for other, higher-risk project finance sectors, such as media and metals & mining.
Chart 16
Time to resolution by region, advanced versus developing country, and jurisdiction
Time to resolution (TTR) is defined as the length of time between the reported loan default date and the reported resolution date.
TTR By region In contrast to average recovery levels, we see a clear distinction in TTR by region for the Data Set (see table 11), with advanced economies showing a faster workout process. Western Europe and North America show an average TTR of about 1.5 years versus 2.5 years for Asia-Pacific and Latin America.
Table 11
Time To Recovery By Region | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Years) | 10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | Average | |||||||
Western Europe | 4-5 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.4 | |||||||
North America | 3-4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 1.7 | |||||||
Asia-Pacific | 5-6 | 4.2 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 2.7 | |||||||
Latin America | 6-7 | 4.2 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 2.4 | |||||||
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence |
TTR by advanced versus developing countries Fully in line with TTR by region, we find longer resolution times for both EMDE-A and B countries (on average 2.7 years) versus 1.7 years for OECD countries. Moreover, the 10% decile shows the period to resolution can extend to five or six years in EMDEs, whereas the 10% of outlier OECD projects are resolved within three to four years (see table 12).
Table 12
Time To Recovery By Country | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Years) | 10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | Average | |||||||
European Economic Area (EEA) | 3-4 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 1.6 | |||||||
OECD (or EEA) | 3-4 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 1.7 | |||||||
EMDE-A | 5-6 | 3.8 | 2.1 | 0.7 | 2.6 | |||||||
EMDE-B | 5-6 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 2.8 | |||||||
EMDE--Emerging market and developing countries. EMDE-A countries are non-high income countries, plus East European countries in transition such as the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. EMDE-B countries exclude EMDE-A countries, as well as non-high income OECD countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Chile, and Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
TTR by jurisdiction Not surprisingly, we find a strong correlation between predictability of insolvency proceedings and time to recovery, with group A countries showing an average time to resolution of 1.2 years versus 2.2 years for group C (see tables 13 and 14) for the Data Set.
Table 13-14
Time To Recovery (TTR) By S&P Global Ratings Jurisdiction | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(Years) | Debt instruments (no.) | 10th percentile | 25th percentile | Median | 75th percentile | Average | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction A | 936 | 3-4 | 2-3 | 1-2 | 0-1 | 1.2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction B | 42 | 2-3 | 1-2 | 1-2 | 0-1 | 1.0 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction C and countries without jurisdiction assessment | 320 | 5-6 | 3-4 | 2-3 | 0-1 | 2.2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Number of projects by S&P Global Ratings jurisdiction and TTR | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(No.) | Debt instruments (no.) | <1 year | 1 to <2 years | 2 to <3 years | 3 to <4 years | 4 to <5 years | 5 to <6 years | 6 to <7 years | 7 to <8 years | 8 to <9 years | 9 to <10yrs | 10 to <11yrs | 11 to <12yrs | 12 to <13yrs | ||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction A | 936 | 413 | 224 | 155 | 73 | 35 | 8 | 18 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction B | 42 | 20 | 13 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||||
Jurisdiction C and countries without jurisdiction assessment | 320 | 95 | 48 | 58 | 39 | 36 | 19 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ||||||||||||||||
Total | 1,298 | 528 | 285 | 217 | 115 | 71 | 29 | 28 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||
Note: On the basis of 1,298 total recovery data points (instead of 1,338, as countries with less than five debt instruments on recovery were excluded. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. |
TTR versus recovery
An analysis of resolved project loans by TTR versus the corresponding average discounted recovery rate shows an inverse relationship (see chart 17). That is, the longer the time to emergence from default, the lower the recovery rate. Longer recovery processes typically incur higher costs, but equally very complex workouts are more likely to relate to highly distressed projects. Somewhat surprisingly and albeit statistically not representative, we note that a very small number of project resolutions in year 10 and beyond yielded stronger recoveries again.
Chart 17
APPENDIX: DEFAULT AND RECOVERY DEFINITIONS AND CALCULATIONS
Basel II definition of default
The definition of default that we use in this article is based on the standard Basel II definition of default, which captures a wider range of defaults, including circumstances wherein a reporting bank considers the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligation in full. According to this definition, a project is in default if:
- A payment is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation.
- The lender takes a charge or an account-specific provision because of a perceived deterioration in credit quality of the project exposure.
- The lender sells the project instrument at a material credit-related loss.
- The lender consents to a distressed restructuring likely to result in a diminished financial obligation caused by the material forgiveness of principal or interest.
- The obligor has sought or has been placed in bankruptcy protection.
How the Basel II definition compares with S&P Global Ratings' definition of default:
- Our definition is stricter in that any payment beyond 30 days would be considered a default. However, we would not expect this to yield material differences as, unlike corporates, projects typically enjoy a six-month funded DSRA.
- Our definition of a distressed exchange tends to encompass broader situations where a project's credit quality is under pressure forcing lenders to extend maturities.
- Whereas our default definition focuses on missing a cash payment, Basel II requires a different approach in that it considers a default whenever the lender takes a charge or an account-specific provision following a perceived deterioration in credit quality of the project exposure.
Our definition of recovery
S&P Global Ratings' concept of recovery is not materially different than that used by the bank consortium with respect to the Data Set. The recovery definition used for the purposes of the Data Set considered whether:
- After default a project loan resumes scheduled payments on a regular basis (that is, returns to performing).
- Following a restructuring, scheduled payments resume based on restructured debt service.
- The lender sells or transfers the defaulted debt instruments.
- Liquidation proceeds have been distributed to creditors.
- The bankrupcty process is completed.
- The guarantor provides additional capital support covering some portion of scheduled debt service.
Static pool methodology
S&P Global Market Intelligence conducted the calculations on the basis of groupings called static pools, which they formed by grouping projects by performance status at the beginning of each year the study covered. They then follow each static pool from that point forward. Their analysis assigned all deals included in the study to one or more static pools. The pools are static in that their membership is constant, similar to a buy-and-hold portfolio.
When a project defaults, they assign that default back to all of the static pools to which the project belonged. S&P Global Market Intelligence's use of the static pool methodology is intended to mitigate certain issues that may arise in estimating default rates and allow calculations across multiple time horizons.
Annual default rate calculation
Annual default rates were calculated for each static pool as percentages of projects that defaulted during the year with respect to the number of projects at the start of the year in each category.
Marginal default rate calculation
S&P Global Market Intelligence defines the percentage of projects that default in nth year of performance history as the marginal default rate for that year.
Cumulative average default rate calculation
Cumulative default rates that average the experience of all static pools were determined by calculating marginal default rates, conditional on survival (survivors being nondefaulters) for each possible time horizon and for each static pool, weight-averaging the conditional marginal default rates, and accumulating the average conditional marginal default rates. Conditional default rates are calculated by dividing the number of projects in a static pool that default at a specific time horizon, by the number of projects that survived (did not default) to that point in time. Weights are based on the number of projects in each static pool. Cumulative default rates are one minus the product of the proportion of survivors (non-defaulters).
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analysts: | Trevor J D'Olier-Lees, New York (1) 212-438-7985; trevor.dolier-lees@spglobal.com |
Karl Nietvelt, Paris (33) 1-4420-6751; karl.nietvelt@spglobal.com | |
Gonzalo Cantabrana Fernandez, Madrid (34) 91 389 6955; gonzalo.cantabrana@spglobal.com | |
Secondary Credit Analyst: | Ben L Macdonald, CFA, Centennial (1) 303-721-4723; ben.macdonald@spglobal.com |
Research Contributors: | Massimo Schiavo, Paris + 33 14 420 6718; Massimo.Schiavo@spglobal.com |
Yogesh Balasubramanian, Mumbai; yogesh.subramanian@standardandpoors.com |
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