articles Ratings /ratings/en/research/articles/181107-china-property-watch-which-developers-will-be-dragged-down-in-a-sliding-sector-10764041 content esgSubNav
In This List
COMMENTS

China Property Watch: Which Developers Will Be Dragged Down In A Sliding Sector?

COMMENTS

First 100 Days Recap: What We’re Watching For U.S. Public Finance Sectors

COMMENTS

Saudi Banks Can Manage Their External Debt Spike

COMMENTS

SF Credit Brief: CLO Insights 2025 U.S. BSL Index: Loan Price Volatility Highlights Tariff-Affected Sectors; CLO Metrics Stable Except For Loan Prices

COMMENTS

Cyber Risk Insights: Sovereigns And Their Critical Infrastructure Are Prime Targets


China Property Watch: Which Developers Will Be Dragged Down In A Sliding Sector?

Property sales are past their peak in China. After robust growth for more than two years, the momentum waned in September and October, traditionally prime months. A downturn for such a cyclical sector has been widely anticipated, but the timing is particularly bad since credit conditions aren't conducive either. S&P Global Ratings expects the tougher operating environment to have a differentiated credit impact. It could bring opportunities for some and headaches for others.

Sales by area fell 0.8% in September from a year earlier; and other leading indicators such as land acquisitions and real-estate investments are also dipping for the first time in about two years. Various restrictive policies gripping the sector have finally taken their toll. From price caps in major cities to slower pre-sale approvals, policies are now gradually reversing runaway prices and dampening volume across China to varying degrees.

Chart 1

image

Chart 2

image

Developers are already starting to selectively increase promotional activities to drum up sell-through rates. Further price cuts are likely, given contracted sales progress are still lagging those of last year, while sales transactions are also tapering as homebuyers could be sidelined due to weaker sentiment. Stiff competition will intensify into next year.

As such, we expect prices to drop by up to 5% and volume to decline by 3%-7% next year, likely leading to an overall sector contraction of 8%-12%. However, most rated developers should achieve stronger sales than the sector average, as with the previous cycles. The challenging environment will allow larger developers to gain as uncompetitive players exit the sector and offer their ditched projects to market leaders for cash.

Unequal Decline By Location Will Have An Uneven Impact On Developers

Smaller cities with weaker economic fundamentals will likely lead the price decline. Caps have kept prices stable for tier-1 cities but have inflicted the most pain on developers this year. Most companies have weathered this with decent project diversity, with only a few exceptions. Developers such as Oceanwide Holdings Co. Ltd. (CCC+/Negative/--), Hopson Development Holdings Ltd. (B-/Positive/--), and Guorui Properties Ltd. (B-/Negative/--) were caught out by policies impeding planned pre-sales in tier-1 cities. Without sufficient project diversity, their sales took a hit.

However, lower-tier cities are much more vulnerable in a downturn and could quickly turn from growth drivers to sector drags. This would mean that developers focused on lower-tier cities such as Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd. (BB+/Stable/--) and China Overseas Grand Oceans Group Ltd. (BBB-/Stable/--) are likely to bear the brunt of price drops, compressing their improved profitability to levels seen in the upcycle. Lower sell-through will also test the fast-churn model exemplified by Country Garden and widely adopted by the sector. Many small developers that expanded rapidly during the past two years could be wrong-footed by a downturn.

That said, while weakening sales and profitability will undoubtedly affect credit profiles, the magnitude is unlikely to be significant. Most rated developers have large unrecognized sales containing solid margins, good sales execution, and decent project diversity. We believe they will continue to exceed average sector growth and to soak up market share in a downturn.

Chart 3

image

Chart 4

image

Land transactions and prices will continue to slide next year as they have since earlier this year. But we still expect land prices in higher-tier cities to hold up better, given they have smaller supply but higher demand. Developers have already done a fair amount of land replenishment while either expanding or adjusting their geographical footprint in the upcycle. These reserves should last them a longer period, especially when growth is fading, lessening further replenishment needs. Sunac China Holdings Ltd. (B+/Positive/--) and Ronshine China Holdings Ltd. (B/Stable/--) are among those that took the opportunity to replenish. In addition, financing has become harder and more expensive to obtain, and some financing channels that developers used to fund their land purchases are no longer available. As a result, developers are more discerning and more reliant on the cheaper alternative of project acquisitions rather than public auctions for land.

Refinancing Is Still The Name Of The Game

The key risks for developers still stem from liquidity and refinancing. Conditions have been tight on all major funding channels for developers. The financing landscape is the most unfavorable for years--whether it's a clampdown on alternative financing, domestic bonds being designated only for refinancing, or a surge in offshore bond yields.

Weaker players with poor sales prospects and passive financial planning may encounter liquidity shortfalls. A heavy bunching of maturities is mainly attributable to developers' domestic bonds, which typically contain put options. Companies facing such maturities and weaker liquidity include Xinyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd. (B/Negative/--) and China South City Holdings Ltd. (B-/Stable/--), and may see a strain on their liquidity given their weak cash generation.

Table 1

Weak And Less-Than-Adequate Liquidity Profiles Weigh On Some Weak Developers
China Property Developers Rating Outlook Liqudity Assessment
Oceanwide Holdings Co. Ltd. CCC+ Negative Weak
Sunshine 100 China Holdings Ltd. CCC+ Negative Weak
Guorui Properties Ltd. B- Negative Weak
Hydoo International Holding Ltd. B- Negative Weak
Yida China Holdings Ltd. B- Negative Weak
China South City Holdings Ltd. B- Stable Less than adequate
Hopson Development Holdings Ltd. B- Positive Less than adequate
Xinyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd. B Negative Less than adequate
Ronshine China Holdings Ltd. B Stable Less than adequate
Huayuan Property Co., Ltd. B+ Negative Less than adequate
China Evergrande Group B+ Positive Less than adequate
Source: S&P Global Ratings

Put Options Add To The Liquidity Strain

If recent cases are any indication, companies have sometimes needed to redeem a large majority of their issuance at put dates, with the sector averaging about 50%. Not only that, exercising put options has instigated several defaults for companies in other sectors in recent months. For example, China Huayang Economic and Trade Group Co. Ltd. (SD/--/--) was unable to meet its put obligations in October 2018, which led to its default.

Furthermore, even if the puts are not exercised, the revised cost on the outstanding amount has been increasing. Coupons have on average stepped up by about 150–200 basis points (bps) after the put date. More recently, Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. (BB/Stable/--) had to drastically increase its coupon by 300 bps to avoid redemption.

Chart 5

image

Chart 6

image

Market Appetite And Currency Depreciation Don't Bode Well For Offshore Refinancing

Investor appetite for offshore issuance has retracted to a level where small players and newcomers may be priced out. With the domestic bond market shut for new funding, and alternative financing markedly more expensive or not even renewable, developers have once again shifted their attention to the offshore bond market. This swell in supply from the sector, paired with emerging market capital outflow, has led to substantially higher yields and a weak take-up of longer-dated issuance. Notably, Hengda Real Estate Group Co. Ltd. (B+/Positive/--) set a record high for issuance of similarly dated papers this year. Smaller developers will certainly have to endure higher coupons. In some cases, depleted investor demand will also make new issuances altogether unfeasible.

Table 2

Upcoming Offshore Maturities Are Pushing Up Refinancing Demand
Issuer name Issuer rating Outlook Maturity Amount outstanding (mil. US$)
China Evergrande Group B+ Positive 1/8/2019 5.0
KWG Property Holding Ltd. B+ Stable 1/14/2019 600.0
China Overseas Grand Oceans Group Ltd. BBB- Stable 1/23/2019 400.0
Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd. BB+ Stable 1/27/2019 1,994.9
China Vanke Co. Ltd. BBB+ Stable 2/7/2019 300.0
Future Land Development Holdings Ltd. BB Stable 2/10/2019 300.0
Future Land Development Holdings Ltd. BB Stable 2/11/2019 300.0
Powerlong Real Estate Holdings Ltd. B+ Stable 2/11/2019 254.4
CIFI Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd. BB- Positive 2/12/2019 240.2
Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd. B Negative 2/13/2019 300.0
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. Ltd. B+ Stable 2/13/2019 350.0
Beijing Capital Land Ltd. BB+ Stable 2/17/2019 41.2
China Resources Land Ltd. BBB+ Stable 2/27/2019 800.0
Redco Properties Group Ltd. B Stable 2/27/2019 300.0
Guorui Properties Ltd. B- Negative 3/1/2019 250.0
China Jinmao Holdings Group Ltd. BBB- Stable 3/19/2019 500.0
China Vanke Co. Ltd. BBB+ Stable 4/13/2019 470.6
Oceanwide Holdings Co. Ltd. CCC+ Negative 4/24/2019 100.0
China Aoyuan Property Group Ltd. B+ Stable 4/25/2019 250.0
Poly Developments and Holdings BBB Stable 4/25/2019 398.4
Hong Yang Group Company Limited B Stable 5/1/2019 250.0
Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd. B Negative 5/4/2019 246.4
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. BBB+ Stable 5/8/2019 800.0
Zhenro Properties Group Ltd. B Stable 5/10/2019 160.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 5/22/2019 500.0
Oceanwide Holdings Co. Ltd. CCC+ Negative 5/28/2019 400.0
Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd. B Negative 6/4/2019 100.0
China Vanke Co. Ltd. BBB+ Stable 6/4/2019 400.0
Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd. BB+ Stable 6/5/2019 250.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 6/25/2019 200.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 7/3/2019 400.0
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. BBB+ Stable 7/15/2019 656.8
Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd. B Negative 7/15/2019 140.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 7/28/2019 450.0
Yuzhou Properties Co. Ltd. BB- Stable 7/30/2019 193.4
Yuzhou Properties Co. Ltd. BB- Stable 8/6/2019 40.0
Road King Infrastructure Ltd. BB- Stable 8/9/2019 450.0
Xinyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd. B Negative 8/30/2019 300.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 9/6/2019 300.0
Yango Group Co. Ltd. B Stable 9/23/2019 250.0
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. Ltd. B+ Stable 10/8/2019 300.0
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. BBB+ Stable 11/6/2019 429.5
Sunac China Holdings Ltd. B+ Positive 12/5/2019 400.0
Ronshine China Holdings Ltd. B Stable 12/8/2019 400.0
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd. BB Stable 12/22/2019 180.0
China Vanke Co. Ltd. BBB+ Stable 12/23/2019 600.0
mil.--Million. Source: S&P Global Ratings, Bloomberg.

To make matters worse, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has depreciated about 7% this year, adding to the debt-servicing burden. Although developers in general have reduced their foreign currency exposure since 2016 when the U.S. dollar/renminbi rate dropped to US$1:RMB6.9, any further depreciation could exacerbate the negative impact. We estimate that as of June 2018 about 32% of our rated developers have more than 30% of their total debt denominated in foreign currency. For these developers, a 1% decline in the renminbi could on average add 0.4% to both their debt-servicing and repayment burden. While not a huge impact in isolation, further depreciation could stretch some marginal issuers that already face significant liquidity pressure or have a thin rating buffer (see chart 7). Issuers that have unsustainable cash flows and face additional refinancing and market obstacles have a real possibility of collapsing. That's already happened for several small-scale developers that defaulted onshore this year.

Chart 7

image

Table 3

Exposure To Foreign-Currency Debt Has Generally Lessened But Is Still Significant
Foreign-currency debt exposure as percentage of total debt
China Property Developers 1H2015 1H2018
China Resources Land Ltd. 58 28
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. 80 48.9
China Vanke Co. Ltd. 21.9 31.6
China Jinmao Holdings Group Ltd. 33 36
China Overseas Grand Oceans Group Ltd. 74.9 64.5
Shimao Property Holdings Ltd. 42 43.1
Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd. 47 28
Yanlord Land Group Ltd. 48 29.4
Agile Group Holdings Ltd. 50 36.2
Yuzhou Properties Co. Ltd. 58 40.4
CIFI Holdings (Group) Co. Ltd. 52 45.7
Road King Infrastructure Ltd. 47 60
Logan Property Holdings Co. Ltd. 28 39
Central China Real Estate Ltd. 62 61.3
China Aoyuan Property Group Ltd. 50 35
China SCE Group Holdings Ltd. 26.8 42.9
KWG Group Holdings Ltd. 48.4 29.2
Times China Holdings Limited 38 34
Landsea Green Group Co. Ltd. 19.6 55.7
Redco Properties Group Ltd. 42.6 59.4
Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd. 51.1 43.4
1H--First half. Source: Company announcements, S&P Global Ratings.

Hastening Consolidation Will Benefit Those With Execution Ability

With a shortage of financing, cash inflows from sales remain the most dependable funding option. Hence, most developers are focusing on sell-through, and may sacrifice pricing to achieve good cash generation. Those with strength in execution, including product positioning, location selection, and sales schedule and tactics, may gain the capacity to snap up more deferred or distressed assets amid a slump. Sector consolidation has started for some years, but is now shifting to a higher gear.

Harsher Policies Look Improbable For Now

If harsher policies on the sector are introduced, a much steeper decline could ensue. These could include measures to alter the pre-sales system, which has greatly benefited developers in the past, or implementing a widespread or draconian property tax regime, which could stifle homebuyer demand. But the increasing downward pressure on economic growth is compelling the government to signal more stimulus ahead. We therefore believe suppression of the property sector looks more remote. Mild loosening is more probable if the cycle turns too far south.

Chart 8

image

Chart 9

image

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analyst:Christopher Yip, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3593;
christopher.yip@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Cindy H Huang, Hong Kong (852) 2533-3543;
cindy.huang@spglobal.com
Matthew Chow, CFA, Hong Kong (852) 2532-8046;
matthew.chow@spglobal.com
Research Assistants:Yixia Zhang, Beijing
Oscar Chung, Hong Kong

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw or suspend such acknowledgment at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.

Any Passwords/user IDs issued by S&P to users are single user-dedicated and may ONLY be used by the individual to whom they have been assigned. No sharing of passwords/user IDs and no simultaneous access via the same password/user ID is permitted. To reprint, translate, or use the data or information other than as provided herein, contact S&P Global Ratings, Client Services, 55 Water Street, New York, NY 10041; (1) 212-438-7280 or by e-mail to: research_request@spglobal.com.


 

Create a free account to unlock the article.

Gain access to exclusive research, events and more.

Already have an account?    Sign in