Turkish intervention

On 20 January 2018, Turkey launched a cross-border military operation, Operation Olive Branch, targeting the Kurdish-majority district of Afrin in Aleppo province, northwest Syria.

• If, as is likely, Russia chooses to restrict Turkey’s access to the airspace over Afrin, there will be an increased risk of unintended incidents between Turkish, Russian, and Syrian government aircraft.
• If, as claimed by Turkish President Erdoğan, the operation is eventually expanded to target Manbij, there will be an increased likelihoocd of the US being forced to make a choice between its NATO ally Turkey and its trusted Syrian proxy force, the SDF. It would also risk giving rise to casualties among US Special Forces working with the SDF.
• The likely high levels of domestic public support for the operation renders it likely that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will push for an early election in mid-2018, with a view to capitalise on the boost in popularity he will probably gain as a result.

Afrin is controlled by Syrian-Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel‎: YPG). The YPG has close ideological and organisational ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan: PKK), which has been waging a 40-year insurgency against the Turkish government inside Turkey. Turkey sees the elimination of Kurdish autonomist ambitions in northern Syria, both in Afrin and further east, between the border towns of Kobanê and Hasakah, as an extension of its campaign against the PKK. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that the operation would later be expanded to include Manbij, which is also controlled by the YPG, located east of Afrin.

Turkish preparations for an offensive targeting Afrin have been underway since the conclusion of Operation Euphrates Shield in March 2017 (see Syria: 28 Jun 2017: Limited Turkey-backed offensive likely against YPG in northern Syria, made possible by deal with Russia). Despite there being no reliable public survey available as of yet, the precedent of the consistently high level of domestic public support during Operation Euphrates Shield indicates that the Afrin operation is likely to enjoy similar levels of support.

According to the Turkish government, the operation started with a preliminary air campaign involving 72 Turkish jets, targeting 108 separate locations, followed by a ground invasion on 21 January along the northern and western borders separating Turkey from Afrin. The Turkish army is currently reported to have committed only 1,000 troops (equating to an infantry battalion group) in the operation, with the bulk of the fighting being conducted instead by Turkey’s allies in the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The YPG reportedly has a force of up to 10,000 thousand fighters in Afrin province and is redeploying forces via Turkey to the border with Aleppo governorate. Significantly, the bulk of Turkish armoured forces concentrated on the border for some weeks, have been held back, probably because President Erdoğan has not yet received unqualified Russian agreement to this operation.

Russian calculations

Given that Russia controls all Syrian airspace west of the Euphrates River, the heavy use of airstrikes by Turkey indicates that Turkey is likely to have acquired at least tacit acquiescence from Russia prior to the operation. Russia’s acquiescence is likely to have been motivated by the calculation that the operation will drive a deeper wedge between the NATO allies Turkey and the US, in light of the latter’s support for the YPG under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US’s key Syrian proxy. Moreover, faced with the threat of being overrun by Turkey and its FSA allies, Russia probably calculates that the YPG will now be more sympathetic to the option of handing Afrin back to the Syrian government.

A key risk indicator will be whether Russia provides Turkey with uninterrupted access to the airspace over Afrin, or if it will choose instead to restrict and control Turkey’s airspace incursions, as was the case during Operation Euphrates Shield. By doing so, Russia is likely to seek to control the tempo of Turkey’s Afrin operation, synchronising it with the Syrian army’s advances in Idlib province, located south of Afrin. This would allow Russia to give the Syrian army more time to consolidate its territorial control in Idlib province, bringing it to a better position to take over the remaining YPG-controlled areas in Afrin.

Outlook and implications

If, as is likely, Russia chooses to restrict Turkey’s access to the airspace over Afrin, there will be an increased risk of unintended incidents between Turkish, Russian, and Syrian government aircraft. There is a precedent to Russia and the Syrian government ‘accidentally’ targeting Turkish troops during Operation Euphrates Shield (see Syria: 24 November 2016: If confirmed, airstrike on Turkish forces near al-Bab indicates Assad’s determination to stop opposition advance on Aleppo.

The YPG most likely has the capacity to inflict a high number of Turkish army casualties, particularly if it draws the fight into built-up areas, such as Afrin city. As such, it is likely that Turkey will focus the operation on establishing a buffer zone along the northern and western borders of Afrin, while recapturing Tal Rifat in its east, which was captured by the YPG in 2016. This would allow Turkey to avoid becoming embroiled in fighting in built-up areas, with its high concentrations of civilians.

The key question determining the impact of Operation Olive Branch on US-Turkey relations will be whether it will be expanded to target Manbij. Manbij is controlled by the US-backed portion of the YPG, under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite the YPG controlling Afrin being one and the same organisation as the YPG at present in the Kobanê-Hasakah strip further east, Afrin’s territorial separation from the latter, combined with Russia’s control of its airspace, mean that the US would be likely to hold back from intervening against Operation Olive Branch, particularly as there are no US military personnel on the ground there. Manbij, however, is under the US’s sphere of control, with the US having previously prevented the expansion of Operation Euphrates Shield towards Manbij by positioning US personnel around the town. Such an eventuality would therefore increase the likelihood of the US being forced to make a choice between its NATO ally Turkey and its trusted Syrian proxy force, the SDF. It would also risk giving rise to casualties among US Special Forces working with the SDF. The likelihood of a head-on military stand-off with the US would increase if Turkey were to take similar cross-border action against the SDF east of the Euphrates river, where the US has signalled its intent to help establish a local border force.

Separately, the likely high levels of domestic public support for the operation renders it likely that Erdoğan will push for an early election in mid-2018, with a view to capitalise on the boost in popularity he will probably gain as a result. A likely date for the election would be 15 July 2018, or a date around this period, which would allow him to benefit from the symbolism of the anniversary of the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.