Key Takeaways
- European banks should remain comfortably profitable in 2023, although they will have to come to terms with new realities of higher-for-longer inflation, tighter funding conditions, and lower economic growth.
- Risks could emerge, but we expect they will prove resilient and a source of stability for the economy given their strong capitalization and liquidity levels.
- While we took few negative rating actions in 2022, we expect 2023 will deliver greater differentiation in performance and potentially credit worthiness as challenging operating conditions expose winners and losers.
- Long-term economic and societal shifts will accelerate and test European banks' competitive positions.
European banks will need to come to terms with a new economic environment in 2023, when the unfolding economic reset delivers on its unwelcome promises of higher-for-longer inflation, tighter funding conditions, and lower economic growth.
This will mark a significant change for European banks, whose results for 2022 can be expected to demonstrate the immediate benefits of last years' shift in policy rates. That resulted in widespread profitable growth, underpinned by rising net interest margin (NIM), while inflation had only a muted effect on banks' cost bases. At the same time, volatility generated opportunities for banks with capital markets and treasury services operations, but undermined investment banking revenues.
S&P Global Ratings expects that, in 2023, weaker credit markets will weigh on European banks without tipping the balance of risk into negative territory. Stagnating but generally resilient European economies, and powerful, though easing, tailwinds from rising rates support our base case that rated European banks have the capacity to absorb higher costs, and so remain comfortably profitable. We expect an average return-on-equity of about 7% in 2023, up from 6.3% in 2022. Even under our more negative scenarios, European banks should, on aggregate, remain broadly (though only barely) profitable (see "Rising Recession Risks Cloud Eurozone Banks’ Earnings Prospects," Sept. 30, 2022). We also believe that public authorities' past market reforms and banks' improved risk management will enable markets to avoid financial accidents that turn into full-blown financial crisis, though that remains a risk.
At the same time, we expect the end of extremely low interest rates and low inflation will usher in greater differentiation among European banks' profitability and balance sheet strength. This divergence will be driven by factors, including:
- Europe's economic slowdown during winter, and a likely slow recovery, which will weigh on business growth and contribute to higher credit costs. This will predominantly hurt banks that serve less resilient domestic economies, those most exposed to consumer and small and midsized enterprise (SME) lending, and those that were less prudent during the latter part of the previous economic cycle.
- Inflation's growing effect on banks' cost bases, through wages and the price of services. This will weigh most on banks that haven't streamlined costs or delayed investment (for instance in the digital transition), and those in countries where wages are contractually inflation-linked.
- Tighter funding conditions and an end to cheap and indiscriminate term funding from central banks, which will hurt banks with weaker deposit franchises, uncertain access to market funding, and which are unable to pass higher funding costs to clients. We fundamentally see this as an issue of cost rather than funding availability.
- Market volatility and tighter funding conditions that could expose the riskiest, nonbank financial intermediaries to funding issues, with ripple effects on banks that have significant counterparty risk or rely significantly on income from these companies.
It also seems certain that a volatile political environment will continue to provide challenges over 2023. The possibility that the Russia-Ukraine conflict will escalate remains a key risk, with adverse economic consequences that would extend far beyond the warzone. On the domestic front, some European governments' targeting of banks with windfall taxes (or other forms of social contributions) is likely to continue into 2023, underpinned by the continuing cost-of-living crisis, government fiscal constraints, and the rising profitability of the banking sector.
Finally, we expect a handful of long-term business trends will gain in importance in 2023 and could lead to further ratings differentiation. Stakeholders' will ensure that green and digital transitions, which are both a risk and opportunity, remain a priority for banks' management teams. Established banks will continue their digitalization journey, trying to harness the associated efficiencies and defend their market share from new entrants. We expect that banks with strong funding franchises will be able to use this digital transformation to reinforce their competitiveness against neobanks and nonbank players.
The Economic Reset Will Be Central To European Bank Ratings In 2023.
Banks' fates are largely determined by macroeconomic conditions and more specifically the interplay between the three main variables of economic growth, inflation, and interest rates. That is especially true in Europe, where operations remain focused on deposit-taking and lending in domestic markets.
Prior to 2022, European banks operated in an environment of persistently low inflation, low interest rates, and modest economic growth. Those conditions left most European banks struggling to generate sufficient profit but contributed to an overall improvement in asset quality that facilitated balance sheet strengthening through the prudent building of capital buffers. That, in turn, undermined banks' equity valuations, while leaving them better placed to withstand an economic downturn from a credit standpoint.
The war in Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis shattered that equilibrium, triggering a macroeconomic reset that will remain a key theme for European banks in 2023. That still unfolding situation means forecasts remain subject to significant uncertainties, but our economists expect headline inflation to gradually recede, while remaining above 2% in the eurozone until at least 2024 (see "Economic Outlook Eurozone Q1 2023: Reality Check," Nov. 28, 2022). We note that the European Central Bank (ECB) forecast is for inflation to remain above the 2% target until 2025.
Higher inflation will lead inevitably to higher interest rates, and our economists forecast the ECB's main deposit facility will reach a terminal rate of 3% in this cycle, up from the current 2%. Higher ECB rates have implications for other European central banks, including the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Bank of England (BoE), which despite a recession in the U.K. is likely to increase rates to 4% before pausing, according to our economists (see "European Housing Prices: A Sticky, Gradual Decline," Jan. 11, 2023).
Transition between states of equilibrium creates costs and benefits, as well as risks and opportunities for banks, though these different elements typically manifest at different speeds on profit and loss statements and balance sheets.
A new equilibrium will emerge this year in which banks' risks and costs become more prominent--though to what extent remains uncertain (see table 1). Under our base case, our economists expect a short-lived recession, which should limit costs and risks, while the European job market will prove resilient. This scenario envisages banks reporting slightly rising profits over 2023 (see chart 1). That will still leave many banks failing to make profits that cover their cost of capital--we expect the lowest quartile of rated banks will have an average ROE of under 5%.
Table 1
Key Analytical Questions For 2023 -- Base Case Expectations And Risks | ||
---|---|---|
Key questions for 2023 | Our base case at the start of 2023 | What could go wrong? |
How long and painful will the recession be? | A short-lived recession in 1H2023 followed by a weak rebound. The limited effect on employment will contain the increase in credit costs for banks. | External shocks and/or policy mistakes could trigger a protracted and painful recession that significantly reduces banks’ earnings, though most would remain (barely) profitable. |
How far and fast will funding costs rise for European banks? | The increase will probably equate to over half the policy rate rise, but this will prove to be just a drag on overall positive net interest margin developments. Greater credit spread differentiation and deposit competition will favor strong banks with solid deposit and wholesale market franchises. | Inversion of the yield curve and faster-than-expected repricing of deposits could neutralize or reverse the expected NIM improvement, particularly for banks with the greatest need to refinance their targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO). |
What impact will inflation have on operational costs via wages and service prices? | Operational costs will remain high, but banks should limit increases to below headline inflation. | Core inflation expectations rise and banks cannot avoid higher pass-through into wages and service costs. This would also likely lead to higher-for-longer interest rates, a positive for banks. |
Will market volatility trigger financial instability risks? | Volatility should gradually abate amid careful central bank management and barring new external shocks. Financial accidents are possible, but shouldn't challenge system resilience. Some banks could take losses on counterparty credit, but that should remain modest due to the avoidance of concentrations and credit risk mitigation. | A loss of trust in central banks’ inflation management leads to market volatility. This could accelerate deleveraging in shadow banks and again raise the specter of European financial fragmentation. Some banks could suffer but a negative feedback loop between market volatility, bank deleveraging, and protracted economic recession seems a remote possibility at this stage. |
Chart 1
Higher Rates Continue To Support Net Revenue Growth
The sharp rise in nominal market interest rates had a nascent positive impact on European banks' NIMs in 2022, as predicted by most banks and many market participants. Aided by sustained loan growth of 7% year-on-year, significant eurozone banks' net interest income grew 9%, or about €18 billion over the first nine months of 2022. Rising rates also led to a decline in the fair value of securities held by European banks, though this represents only a minor drag on profits and capital, so far (see "Will Unrealized Losses On Financial Assets Affect Ratings On European Banks?," Jan. 19, 2023).
We expect the majority of rated European banks' NIMs will continue to grow over 2023 and 2024, rising to a median of 1.55% by the end of 2024, up from 1.42% as of the end of 2022. The main drivers will be the gradual repricing of loans, most of which carry fixed-interest rates that delay higher rates' positive effect until refinancing or new origination, as well as the boost from structural hedge programs.
Chart 2
The expected increase in NIMs over the next two years is relatively modest because:
- Bank profitability is influenced by both the overall level of interest rates and the shape of the yield curve, which flattened toward the end of 2022 (and inverted in some countries). Our economists expect that central banks will continue to increase policy rates at least in the first half of 2023, which should support short-term yields. Long-term yields will be influenced by the effects of gradual quantitative tightening policies recently launched or announced by the major European central banks. The central banks' retreat from the bond markets should lead to higher yields, all else being equal, but long-term yields also reflect market expectations of growth and inflation. Our current NIM forecast assumes a slightly upward-sloping yield curve, but the shape of the yield curve will be a key indicator to monitor in 2023.
- The ECB recently changed the terms of its targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) terms, and we expect TLTRO repayments to happen quickly in 2023. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the NIM boost from TLTRO was non-negligible for many banks, though that is hard to quantify given banks' various hedging strategies. The boost was likely particularly significant in the second half of 2022, when rising deposit facility rates exacerbated the positive carry trade effect. This will create a negative base effect for 2023.
- European banks are preparing to gradually reprice customer deposits, which account for around 56% of the total liabilities of EU banks. The European Banking Authority (EBA), in the results of its latest Risk Assessment questionnaire (December 2022), indicated that 57% of surveyed EU banks plan to increase the rates offered to retail clients, up from about 20% in the Spring 2022 survey, while 68% planned to increase rates for corporate clients, up from around 30%. Increases in deposit cost remained modest over 2022--we estimate that eurozone banks' deposit betas (the share of policy rate increase that fed through to average deposit costs) was a very low 15% until end November 2022. That was much lower than in the U.S. and U.K., where bank communications suggest deposit betas of around 30%. We consider that eurozone banks' low betas reflect the sizeable liquidity buffers that allowed them to avoid immediate deposit competition, while the regional discrepancy is largely because the ECB raised its policy rates after the U.S. and U.K. authorities and then did so extremely rapidly. European banks' deposit betas should gradually rise over 2023, resulting in a significant drag on NIM (see charts 3, 4, and 5).
The normalization of monetary policy and the tighter funding environment mean that access to cheap and stable sources of funding will, once again, be a source of competitive advantage for some European banks, and therefore a driver of rating differentiation. Where funding weaknesses and strengths were previously obscured by abundant and low-cost liquidity, banks will find the capacity to mobilize resources to fund business growth and seize business opportunities is a key advantage in 2023.
Chart 3
Chart 4
Chart 5
We expect that the positive effect on NIM of rising rates will be limited by slower growth in customer loans due to the economic slowdown and a cooling of the real estate market. These will reduce demand for loans at the same time as banks curb supply by tightening underwriting standards (see chart 6).
Chart 6
Eurozone banks' noninterest income proved resilient over 2022, with fee and commission income growing 5%, to about €124 billion, in the first nine months of the year, despite a contraction in investment banking and asset management revenues. We expect the economic slowdown will continue to weigh on those revenues in 2023.
Rising Operational And Credit Costs Will Drag On Profit
Noninterest expenses increased in 2022, rising an annualized 5% over the first half of the year. That increase remained below headline inflation, due in part to the lag in banks' main operational costs including wages, which are negotiated annually, and IT services, which are subject to medium/long term contracts. The extent to which core inflation rises or remains elevated, and feeds into higher wage and service costs, will be a key issue for banks over the coming year. We expect banks' noninterest expenses will increase but not rapidly accelerate beyond the 2022 levels (see chart 7). This is because most banks in Europe structurally lowered their cost base in recent years, and are likely to maintain or set ambitious cost-cutting targets. Higher inflation should also favor real-terms cost cutting as it reduces the need for painful nominal cuts.
The likelihood of moderate cost increases coupled with positive revenue developments means we expect rated banks' cost-to-income ratios will improve over 2023 (see chart 8).
Chart 7
Chart 8
We expect credit costs will rise as a proportion of loans over 2023, but remain contained at a median of 25 basis points (bps) for rated banks, up from 16 bps in 2022, and 3 bps in 2021 (see chart 9). The moderate nature of that expected increase is due in part to banks' forward-looking provisions on nonperforming loans (NPL). We expect the median NPL ratio to be a modest 2.1% in 2023, up from 1.9% in 2021 and similar to its level in 2019 (see chart 10).
While such forecasts may seem largely benign, they include potentially significant divergence across rated European banks that will be driven by:
- The variable resilience of domestic economies and, in particular, domestic job markets. This has a significant effect on European banks due to their typical focus on domestic lending activities. European economies' strength and resilience to external shocks differ, although redistribution mechanisms and the temporary suspension of budgetary rules have enabled useful fiscal support in the EU.
- High inflation and a slowdown in consumer confidence that will predominantly affect consumer and SME loan portfolios, which together represent over 20% of European banks' aggregate loans, and traditionally exhibit higher delinquency rates (see chart 11). Meanwhile, we expect only limited losses from residential mortgages, which account for nearly one third of European banks' customer loans (see "European Banks’ Residential Mortgage Losses Should Remain Contained Even As Economies Slow," Nov. 15, 2022).
- Banks' differing capacity to manage and mitigate credit risk and thus limit asset quality deterioration and increased credit costs. This will be determined to a large extent by the quality of underwriting during the last part of the previous economic cycle and by a bank's capacity to identify troubled borrowers early and offer them remedial solutions.
- Intervention from public authorities, which could help to mitigate, or even suppress, deteriorating asset quality in some jurisdictions. Policy measures will likely be selective, reflecting the constraints faced by governments and national preferences. They could be supportive, though early examples in Spain and Poland have resulted in additional taxes on/ contributions from banks, while also encouraging them to accommodate struggling borrowers.
Regulatory stress tests conducted later this year by the EBA and the U.K.'s Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) will shed further light on the relative quality of banks' portfolios. The results will undoubtedly be an important source of information for market participants in 2023.
Chart 9
Chart 10
Chart 11
Satisfactory Capital And Liquidity Buffers And Improved Resolution
Banks' regulatory capital ratios proved slightly more volatile than usual in 2022 but remained at very high levels--the aggregate CET 1 ratio for EU/EEA banks was 15% as of September 2022. S&P Global Ratings' preferred metric for capital adequacy, the Risk-Adjusted Capital (RAC) Ratio, likely remained broadly stable and elevated over 2022, reflecting most European banks' satisfactory capitalization (see chart 12). Banks recommenced distributions to shareholders in 2022, ending a pandemic-triggered hiatus, but took a relatively prudent approach reflecting the heightened macro-economic uncertainties. We expect this to continue in 2023.
Chart 12
Over the coming year we will monitor the path of the EU's Capital Requirements Directive V and Capital Requirements Regulation III, which include the implementation of the remaining elements of Basel III, from 2025 onward. We anticipate final legislation will remain close to the Commission's proposal (see "Basel III Bank Capital Rules In Europe: Delayed And Diluted," published Oct. 28, 2021). We will also watch the evolution of countercyclical buffers (CCyB), after many European authorities announced planned hikes in response to perceived overheating risks. We expect that, if economies materially underperform central bank expectations and lending markets weaken, authorities will opt to keep CCyB on hold.
Because most rated EU banks will maintain substantial headroom over their Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process-Maximum Distributable Amount (SREP-MDA) thresholds, we expect additional Tier 1 (AT1) coupon nonpayment risk will remain low. However, we will watch leverage ratio (L-MDA) headroom, which is likely to increasingly become a constraint for European GSIBs in 2023. The end of the era of cheap hybrid financing, for now, means we could see further non-call events by European banks, but this likely carries no credit implications in our view (see "Credit Implications Of Hybrid Noncall Decisions," Nov. 24, 2022).
European banks will also, in 2023, finalize the issuance of instruments to meet their regulatory minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), which enters into force on Jan. 1, 2024. Most European banks already meet these requirements, as evidenced by the aggregate shortfall for eurozone banks of just €32 billion as of June 2022, but Greek banks notably have some work to do. Beyond building financial resources, we expect European banks will continue to enhance their operational readiness and funding in resolution.
From a broader funding perspective, the gradual normalization of monetary policies marks the end of an era for European banks. As of September 2022, EU banks' reported regulatory funding and liquidity ratios were still very high, at 126.9% and 162.5%, respectively, down from 129.3% and 174.8% in December 2021. We expect these ratios will trend downwards as central banks withdraw liquidity from the banking system.
Banks that are heavily reliant on central bank funding (See chart 13) will need to diversify their sources of funding, which is likely to have an impact on cost. We expect that a lack of access to stable and cheap funding will prove a drag on competitiveness for some banks--and potentially prevent them from reaping the full benefits of higher rates on the lending side.
Chart 13
The Key Dangers For European Banks
A protracted and painful recession leading to material asset quality deterioration. Our economists expect Europe's economies to gradually recover in the second half of 2023, leaving behind winter marked by an economic slowdown and the possibility of technical recessions in some countries. Yet the chance that this recovery is derailed, either due to external or internal factors, remains a key risk. As we enter 2023, the most obvious risks seem to be an escalation or broadening of the Russia/Ukraine conflict, with possible repercussions for energy prices, or a policy mishap likely characterized by excessive tightening by monetary or fiscal authorities.
A negative shock could materially depress the economic outlook and prompt banks to adopt protective measures, such as tightening underwriting standards, further provisioning against effective or anticipated credit costs, and potentially the curtailment of shareholder distributions. Such a scenario would not, however, nullify the positive effects of rising interest rates on banks' profits, which would still counterbalance rising credit costs at most banks.
We expect that European banks would still post aggregate profits, though barely, under our downside scenarios. These profits, however, wouldn't cover the cost of capital for many banks.
A faster-than-expected rise in funding costs driven by deposits. We expect short term rates will continue to rise over the first half of 2023, when major European central banks continue tighten monetary policy to stem the risk that core inflation expectations become de-anchored. Banks' funding costs have so far trailed policy rate increases and hikes in lending rates. We expect this gap will gradually close over 2023, notably due to higher funding costs. This shift comes with the risk that funding costs will increase more rapidly and precipitously than expected, and with notable variation across banks.
Customer deposits are European banks' main source of funding and competition for these deposits could rapidly increase, leaving banks with weaker brands at a disadvantage. The possibility of such competition, and its risk to banks, has been exacerbated by technological changes, which have considerably lowered switching costs for depositors. At the same time, access to cheap and stable customer deposits will be particularly valuable to banks with significant term-funding concentrations--including central bank funding, most of which falls due in 2023.
A lack of access to cheap and stable deposit funding could leave some banks unable to compete in the lending market, though robust liquidity buffers should prevent a full-blown liquidity crisis.
Rising operating costs due to pressure from core inflation. While headline inflation is expected to fall over 2023, core inflation could remain elevated, raising the prospect that it will materially outpace European bank revenues. That is problematic as core inflation includes key costs for banks, such as labor and services, while headline inflation's unexpected persistence was driven by energy prices.
We do not view this risk as particularly elevated at the start of 2023, notably due to recent cost cutting programs, some of which are still focused on delivering nominal cost reductions. Those plans are likely to prove challenging in a higher inflation environment but could still deliver real-term cost reductions.
The risk could also be offset by central banks, which we expect will raise policy rates if core inflation remains materially above their targets. Such an increase would have a broadly positive impact on bank revenues and should inhibit widespread and substantial increases in cost-to-income ratios in 2023. The exception to that could be at banks that are laggards in cost reduction, or which have materially delayed IT investments.
Market volatility triggering financial instability. Monetary policy tightening had consequences beyond its intended impact on demand and economic growth in 2022, notably in the financial markets where it led to a repricing of risk and negative revaluation of many financial assets. This volatility hurt some actors, notably in the non-bank financial intermediation space, which had been operating with elevated leverage, or with structural liquidity/ maturity mismatches. Further episodes of financial stress are likely to prove just as unpredictable and could unearth new dangers to the broader financial system and banks--for instance, the default of a major systemic non-bank counterparty.
We believe that the most egregious sources of market risk have been addressed since the financial crisis of 2008--for instance, with the migration of huge volumes of derivatives from bilateral markets to central marketplaces with clearing features. At the same time, we recognize that a feature of those reforms has been the transformation of some counterparty credit risk into liquidity risk, while market volatility has translated into the potential for a liquidity squeeze due to margin calls. Fiscal and monetary authorities intervened in 2022 to ensure a smooth functioning of the market and backstop its main actors. We believe they would likely do the same again should new contagion risks materialize.
While banks' disclosures of counterparty credit risk remain limited, we expect that only a handful of major banks have significant exposures to systemic non-bank counterparties. The default of such a counterparty would hurt some banks, but we see only a remote chance of a 2008-style scenario, when a total loss of market confidence led to a negative feedback loop of bank deleveraging and recession risk.
Green, Digital, And Competitive
Several long-term trends will continue to gain in importance in 2023.
We believe that green and digital transition will remain high on bank management teams' agendas, driven by demand from customers, regulators, employees, and investors. Delivering a seamless digital experience for retail and SME customers will take years, as will meeting the green transition ambitions of corporate borrowers, but both are must-haves for banks.
The climate transition events and topics we will be watching in 2023 include:
- The first set of climate disclosures as part of European banks' Pillar 3 reports, which are due in 2023 in accordance with EBA standards. These disclosures should help us gauge the level of banks' exposure to climate risks, although disclosures on Scope 3 emissions--which are the most relevant for banks--have been postponed to 2024.
- Further announcements relating to the transition to net-zero, including some banks' plans to exit certain energy-intensive exposures. We also expect banks will develop new initiatives in support of clients' carbon neutrality, including suitable financing solutions.
- Emerging litigation risk for some banks as investors, NGOs, or policymakers highlight discrepancies between stated intentions and actions to reach carbon neutrality.
- Regulatory demands to strengthen the management of climate-related risks, starting with the collection of data for disclosure and risk management purposes.
With regards to the digital transition, the key themes to watch in 2023 include:
- Regulation of the cryptocurrency markets to protect consumers and ensure prudential safeguards. This could create opportunities for banks that have platforms and capacity to meet regulatory demands more effectively than many cryptocurrency firms.
- Further clarity on the roles that banks will fill in the provision of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). We expect banks will continue to play an important intermediary role. That will likely require technology and commercial investment, the magnitude of which could become clearer as central banks communicate their preferred design for CBDCs.
- Cyber security's increasing importance in bank risk management. This will likely be driven by regular cyberattacks, the battle to attract and retain skilled staff, and increasing regulatory demands. Banks will also need to continue to invest in operational resilience to ensure business continuity.
- The opportunity for banks to acquire technology by purchasing financial technology (fintech) companies whose valuations have fallen. The fintech sector's depreciation could also attract bigger technology players seeking to expand their financial services operations.
While addressing these economic and societal transitions, European banks will also have to ensure they remain competitive, including with regards to non-European banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, and technology firms targeting lucrative banking segments. Rising profits due to higher interest rates may have provided a false sense of respite in this regard, but most banks will still barely cover their cost of capital, suggesting they remain under significant financial pressure.
The threat of an underinvested and inefficient banking sector remains a significant long-term source of risk for the European economy. Consolidation of the banking sector, facilitated by banking union, would be a key breakthrough in alleviating that risk, but further legislative progress toward that has been ruled out for 2023. Meaningful change, such as progress on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, will thus have to wait until the next legislative cycle, which starts in the second half of 2024. Progress toward long-awaited European bank mergers and acquisitions also remains barred by the usual roadblocks of business uncertainty, prohibitively low market valuations, and legislative and regulatory hurdles. But we will continue to monitor the situation, because addressing the competitiveness gap remains European banks' biggest long-term challenge.
Appendix
Chart 14
Table 2
Rating Component Scores New | ||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Top 100 European banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Opco LT ICR/Outlook§ | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | CRA | SACP | Support type | Support notches | |||||||||||||
Austria | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Erste Group Bank AG |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Raiffeisen Bank International AG |
A-/Negative | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Oberbank AG |
A/Negative | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Belgium | ||||||||||||||||||||||
KBC Group N.V.§ |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Belfius Bank SA/NV |
A/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Argenta Spaarbank N.V. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Crelan S.A. |
BBB+/Stable | a- | Constrained (-2) (-2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Cyprus | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank of Cyprus Public Co. Ltd. |
BB-/Stable | bb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Denmark | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Danske Bank A/S |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Nykredit Realkredit A/S |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Jyske Bank A/S§ |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
DLR Kredit A/S |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Finland | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Nordea Bank Abp |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
OP Corporate Bank PLC |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
France | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Credit Agricole S.A. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
BNP Paribas |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
BPCE |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Caisse Centrale du Credit Mutuel |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Societe Generale |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
La Banque Postale |
A+/Negative | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | bbb | Group | 4 | ||||||||||||
RCI Banque |
BBB-/Stable | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate/Adequate (-1 notch) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Germany | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Deutsche Bank AG |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Commerzbank AG |
BBB+/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Volkswagen Bank GmbH |
BBB+/Stable | bbb+ | Constrained (-2 notches) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | Group | 3 | ||||||||||||
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG |
BBB+/Stable | bbb+ | Constrained (-2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 1 | bbb | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Greece | ||||||||||||||||||||||
National Bank of Greece S.A. |
B+/Positive | bb- | Adequate (no impact) | Constrained (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | b+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Eurobank S.A |
B+/Positive | bb- | Adequate (no impact) | Constrained (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | b+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Alpha Bank SA |
B+/Positive | bb- | Adequate (no impact) | Constrained (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | b+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Piraeus Financial Holdings S.A. |
B/Positive | bb- | Adequate (no impact) | Constrained (-1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | b | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Hungary | ||||||||||||||||||||||
OTP Bank PLC§ |
BBB/Negative | bbb- | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Iceland | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Landsbankinn hf. |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Ireland | ||||||||||||||||||||||
AIB Group PLC§ |
A-/Positive | bbb | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Bank of Ireland Group PLC§ |
A-/Positive | bbb | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Permanent TSB Group Holdings PLC§ |
BBB/Positive | bbb | Constrained (-2) (-2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Israel | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | Sovereign | 1 | ||||||||||||
Bank Hapoalim B.M. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | Sovereign | 1 | ||||||||||||
Israel Discount Bank Ltd. |
BBB+/Positive | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | Sovereign | 1 | ||||||||||||
Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Ltd. |
A-/Positive | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | Sovereign | 1 | ||||||||||||
Italy | ||||||||||||||||||||||
UniCredit SpA |
BBB/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA§ |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Gruppo Bancario Cooperativo Iccrea§ |
BB+/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Constrained (-2) (-2 notches) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | bb+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Mediobanca SpA |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Banca Mediolanum |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
FinecoBank S.p.A. |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Liechtenstein | ||||||||||||||||||||||
LGT Bank AG |
A+/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Luxembourg | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat, Luxembourg |
AA+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Banque Internationale a Luxembourg |
A-/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Netherlands | ||||||||||||||||||||||
ING Groep N.V.§ |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
BNG Bank N.V. |
AAA/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 4 | ||||||||||||
LeasePlan Corp. N.V. |
BBB-/Watch Pos | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate/Adequate (-1 notch) | -1 | bbb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
De Volksbank N.V. |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V. |
AAA/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 4 | ||||||||||||
NIBC Bank N.V. |
BBB+/Stable | bbb+ | Constrained (-2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Norway | ||||||||||||||||||||||
DNB Bank ASA |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Poland | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. |
BBB+/Stable | bbb | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Portugal | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. |
BB+/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bb+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Slovenia | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D. |
BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | bbb- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Spain | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Banco Santander S.A. |
A+/Stable | bbb | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. |
A/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
CaixaBank S.A. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Banco de Sabadell S.A. |
BBB/Stable | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Kutxabank S.A. |
BBB/Stable | bbb | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria S.A |
BBB-/Stable | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Bankinter S.A. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Cajamar Caja Rural S.C.C. |
BB/Positive | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | bb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Ibercaja Banco S.A. |
BBB-/Stable | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Caja Laboral Popular Cooperativa de Credito |
BBB/Stable | bbb | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Sweden | ||||||||||||||||||||||
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) |
A+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Svenska Handelsbanken AB |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Swedbank AB |
A+/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
SBAB Bank AB (publ) |
A/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Lansforsakringar Bank |
A/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | Group | 1 | ||||||||||||
Swedish Export Credit Corp. |
AA+/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | GRE | 5 | ||||||||||||
Switzerland | ||||||||||||||||||||||
UBS Group AG§ |
A+/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Credit Suisse Group AG§ |
A-/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Raiffeisen Schweiz Genossenschaft |
A+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a+ | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Zuercher Kantonalbank |
AAA/Stable | a- | Strong (+1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | aa- | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
PostFinance AG |
AA/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 2 | ||||||||||||
Bank J. Safra Sarasin Ltd |
A/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Basler Kantonalbank |
AA+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Luzerner Kantonalbank |
AA/Positive | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | -1 | a | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise |
AA/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Migros Bank |
A/Stable | a- | Moderate (-1 notch) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Graubuendner Kantonalbank |
AA/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 2 | ||||||||||||
Aargauische Kantonalbank |
AA+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank |
AA+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
Banque Cantonale de Geneve |
AA-/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | GRE | 2 | ||||||||||||
Schwyzer Kantonalbank |
AA+/Stable | a- | Adequate (no impact) | Very strong (+2 notches) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Strong (no impact) | 0 | a+ | GRE | 3 | ||||||||||||
United Kingdom | ||||||||||||||||||||||
HSBC Holdings PLC§ |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Strong/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | ||||||||||||
Barclays PLC§ |
A/Positive | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Lloyds Banking Group PLC§ |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Standard Chartered PLC§ |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Strong/Strong (+1 notch) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
NatWest Group PLC§ |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Nationwide Building Society |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (no impact) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
Virgin Money UK PLC§ |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate (-1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate (no impact) | Adequate/Adequate (no impact) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | ||||||||||||
FCE Bank PLC |
BBB-/Stable | bbb+ | Constrained (-2 notches) | Strong (+1 notch) | Adequate (no impact) | Moderate/Adequate (-1 notch) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | ||||||||||||
Data as of Jan. 20, 2023. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. CRA--Comparable ratings analysis. GRE--Government-related entity. ICR--Issuer credit rating. LT--Long-term. |
Related Research
- Greek Banking Sector 2023: Banks Face A Challenging Year As Economic Prospects Darken, Jan. 20, 2023
- Slides: Spanish Banks In 2023: Navigating Rough Seas Again, Jan. 18, 2023
- UK banks to enjoy higher profits in 2023 despite macro headwinds-S&P Global, Jan. 11, 2023
- Italian Banks Outlook 2023: Prepared For Challenges Ahead, Jan. 11, 2023
- Global Credit Outlook 2023: No Easy Way Out, Dec. 1, 2022
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analysts: | Nicolas Charnay, Frankfurt +49 69 3399 9218; nicolas.charnay@spglobal.com |
Giles Edwards, London + 44 20 7176 7014; giles.edwards@spglobal.com | |
Secondary Contacts: | Richard Barnes, London + 44 20 7176 7227; richard.barnes@spglobal.com |
Elena Iparraguirre, Madrid + 34 91 389 6963; elena.iparraguirre@spglobal.com | |
Benjamin Heinrich, CFA, FRM, Frankfurt + 49 693 399 9167; benjamin.heinrich@spglobal.com | |
Nicolas Malaterre, Paris + 33 14 420 7324; nicolas.malaterre@spglobal.com | |
Anastasia Turdyeva, Dublin + (353)1 568 0622; anastasia.turdyeva@spglobal.com | |
Karim Kroll, Frankfurt 6933999169; karim.kroll@spglobal.com |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.