Since the 1990s, international institutions' standard policy recommendation to debt managers in frontier markets, not least those in Africa, has been to deepen domestic local currency capital markets. By developing commercial banking, establishing pension systems, and boosting domestic savings more generally, these countries can raise a larger share of financing in domestic currency, so the argument goes.

When it works, the strategy to denominate the majority of their debt in local currency can immunize government balance sheets from destabilizing terms-of-trade or exchange-rate shocks, such as those experienced by Congo-Brazzaville in 2015-2016 and Angola in 2019-2020. Many emerging markets in other regions, particularly in Asia, have had success in boosting and capturing domestic savings. In the process, they have transformed their debt profiles by shifting into increasingly longer-dated local currency financing, typically at very low real interest rates. Despite weak public finances, Brazil and India, for example, have developed captive markets where nonresidents hold just 11% and 1% of total domestic debt, respectively, and where local currency debt accounts for 94% and 95% of total government debt. India has been able to refinance its large stock of debt at interest rates below inflation, largely due to a combination of high domestic savings and capital account measures that regulate financial institutions and channel much of those savings into purchasing public sector debt.

The jury is still out on how this domestic financing strategy is playing out in Africa, given the major constraints of lower domestic savings and more shallow domestic markets compared with other emerging market peers. Where governments, such as Ghana, South Africa, and Zambia, have made progress in bringing in nonresidents to boost liquidity, they have done so at the cost of higher rates and more volatile portfolio flows. For example, during the 12 months to August 2021, nonresident holdings of Ghanaian domestic debt increased by one-third, only to decline by 18% during the following six months, contributing to downward pressure on the Ghanian cedi. South Africa too, experienced large-scale portfolio outflows at the onset of the pandemic, resulting in a pronounced steepening of its domestic yield curve and tightening domestic credit conditions. The scale of the sell-off was large enough to prompt central bank intervention in late March 2020, whereby the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) committed to an open-ended program of government bond buying to "provide liquidity and promote the smooth functioning of domestic financial markets."

At the same time, where African sovereigns have had success in boosting the size of domestic pension savings, and the nonbank financial sector in general, these alternative sources of financing should provide important buffers to reduce the sensitivity of currencies and rates to nonresident outflows in the face of the U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary tightening. South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya stand out as having larger pension and other nonbank financial institutions, albeit even these are not immune to broader fiscal pressures; in South Africa's case, insurance and pension funds currently hold over 30% of the total stock of domestic debt. Ghanaian nonbank financial entities, including pension funds, hold nearly as much.

Over our rating history, sovereigns have defaulted on local currency debt only half as often as they have on foreign currency obligations. As our "Sovereign Rating Methodology" explains, we consider that--other things being equal--the probability of default on a sovereign's local currency obligation could be lower than on a foreign currency obligation. Nevertheless, the debt capacity indicators we examine in this survey suggest that pressures on the domestic debt markets are rising, reflecting accelerating global inflation and slowing growth, rising U.S. interest rates, as well as the fallout from the pandemic on underlying fiscal positions.

Chart 1

African Domestic Debt Market Data

In this exploratory research article, we try to gauge the availability and sustainability of domestic funding for African sovereigns. To that effect, we analyze seven features of government debt and broader markets, each of which contribute to a sovereign's capacity to manage domestic debt. To this end, our domestic debt market dataset allows for a cross-continent comparison of rated African sovereigns' relative strengths and weaknesses in managing domestic debt from a purely data-driven perspective. It is important to note that our sovereign credit ratings rely on various other factors, most of which are not captured in this dataset, not least those relating to a sovereign's institutional capacity, economic resilience, external liquidity, and other balance sheet considerations.

Banking sector lending capacity:   This is an assessment of the size of banking systems. These vary widely, from 29% of GDP in Democratic Republic of the Congo to over 100% of GDP in Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa. The larger the financial sector, the more capacity there is to finance the sovereign. However, we also consider the current level of financial sector claims on the central government because the higher a banking sector's outstanding claims on the state, the less latitude it has to provide additional financing. For example, while Egypt has a large captive financial system (with financial assets estimated at 136% of Egyptian GDP), from which it benefits, banking claims against the central government account for 41% of total claims, the highest of all 22 African sovereigns included in this survey.

Real yields:   We determine real yields on domestic debt by calculating the difference between current yields or coupon rates (depending on data availability) on medium-term local currency-denominated government bonds and our average inflation projections over 2022-2025. While nominal yields on domestic debt should rise as investors demand a premium for higher inflation risk, certain sovereigns--such as Botswana--have been able to stabilize the real value of their outstanding debt by issuing at rates on par with our medium-term inflation forecasts. We also calculate nominal yields deflated by nominal growth as a debt sustainability metric, with negative differentials for Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin signaling a shrinking burden of domestic debt over time. Temporary inflation brings fiscal benefits to frontier sovereigns, as it enables them to deflate debt to GDP and, often, bring down budgetary deficits. However, it comes at the price of currency volatility and, often, social instability because surging food prices imply a sharp fall in real income.

Debt structure:   Usually, a higher stock of nonresident participation arguably reflects a more transparent market and debt priced on more commercial terms. That said, foreign holders of local debt had, in many instances, been more reactive to domestic dynamics and quickly headed for the exit. In less developed and shallow domestic markets this could complicate governments' ability to control their cost of debt, as well as their exchange rates. In addition, it could also harden the connection between domestic debt and fiscal sustainability and an economy's external position, as during periods of rising global interest rates, such as now, nonresidents tend to exit some local markets, placing pressure on foreign currency (FX) reserves and currencies (particularly when central banks are invested in stable exchange rates, and willing to use reserves to defend them). Here, we flag that South Africa, Zambia, and Egypt all boast foreign holdings of domestic debt in excess of 20%, although they don't all have the same propensity to use FX reserves to manage the consequences of nonresident outflows on exchange rates.

Size of nonbank financial assets:   We have also compiled comparable data on the size of domestic nonbank financial assets as a percentage of GDP where available. These are made up principally of insurance vehicles, and domestic pension systems, but in some cases (again notably South Africa) there are large private asset management and other nonbank financial companies that account for over 20% of government bond holdings. Nonbank financial sectors (including pension funds) are far less extensive in most of the other African sovereigns included in this survey.

Fiscal cost of debt:   Here we assess governments' fiscal cost of debt-servicing as a percentage of general government revenue and as a percentage of GDP. Ghana and Egypt stand out for their very high cost of debt from a fiscal (rather than real-yield) perspective, with interest bills consuming almost one-half of state revenue, among the highest of the sovereigns we rate globally.

Rollover ratio:   This is an estimate of what percentage of last year's stock of local currency debt must be refinanced during 2022. The higher the rollover ratio, the greater the perceived likelihood of a domestic debt restructuring, assuming the maturing debt must be refinanced at increasingly higher market-determined real rates. Kenya, Egypt, and Zambia face the highest local currency rollover ratios of about 20%-30% of GDP in 2022, which is a function of their relatively elevated shares of short-term commercial debt, which we include in the calculation. Sovereigns with greater nonresident participation in their local debt markets may also be more susceptible to global monetary tightening, with the U.S. Federal Reserve projected to raise rates at least another three more times this year (by 50-basis-points (bps) each, (although we cannot rule out a 75 bps or 100 bps move), followed by another four to five times in 2023.

The primary fiscal balance:   This captures governments' underlying fiscal position, excluding net interest payments on total public debt. This is an important measure when looking at debt sustainability dynamics. However, it can sometimes be skewed by one-off factors. For example, thanks to the run-up in Brent oil prices above $100 per barrel, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville are projected to post primary surpluses of around 5%-6% of GDP in 2022.

Our Observations On Individual Sovereigns' Domestic Debt Capacity

Table 1

All ratings referred to in this report are long-term local currency sovereign credit ratings

Zambia (CCC+/Stable/C)

• The Zambian banking system's capacity to fund the government is limited by its large exposure to the state, estimated at over one-third of total financial assets. Nonbanks also constitute important players in the local debt market, holding about 45% of government securities.

• While real yields of 2% appear benign, these are calculated based on four-year projected inflation rates of 11%. Inflation has been on a decelerating trend because the Zambian kwacha has appreciated almost 25% year on year against the U.S. dollar, supported by multiyear high prices on copper, Zambia's key export. That said, the country's high reliance on foreign currency borrowing continues to render its balance sheet acutely sensitive to movements in its exchange rate.

• Zambia's debt burden of over 120% of GDP is among one of the largest in Africa. About one-half of this debt is domestic, up from 30% in 2018, increasing Zambia's local currency gross borrowing requirement to an estimated 22% of GDP this year, the third-highest of all the African sovereigns included in our survey.

• Nonresidents comprise over one-quarter of the government's local currency creditors, a proportion only topped by South Africa. Ultimately, the willingness of nonresidents to remain invested in Zambia's domestic debt remains closely linked to the global commodity cycle and Chinese demand for industrial metals.

• There are factors that support Zambia's creditworthiness that we do not include in our dataset. Namely, that five-year highs on copper prices, and a sharp decline in external debt servicing on the back of Zambia's foreign currency debt default have pushed Zambia's current account into even deeper surpluses (estimated at 9.6% of GDP in 2021, and just under 6% of GDP in 2022), boosting FX reserve levels.

Ghana (B-/Stable/B)

• Ghana's modest-sized banking system (40% of GDP versus 61% on average for the 22 sovereigns in our data) with a large exposure to the state of 39% of total financial assets means that it has less capacity to absorb additional government debt in the aftermath of the global pandemic. More positively, nonbank financial institutions hold nearly one-third of total sovereign domestic debt and their share of the total has been steadily increasing. This is partly due to the decline in nonresident holdings since August 2021, but also reflects authorities' success in capturing a larger portion of domestic savings, including from remittances. Widening fiscal pressures have also started to weigh on the financial position of domestic pension systems, as the state appears to be delaying the transfer of some contributions.

• Real yields in Ghana are among the highest in our sample (8% versus 4% for the group), reflecting persistent inflation (at 12-month highs of 19%), combined with aggressive central bank policy rates aimed at dampening price pressures. Since November 2021, the Bank of Ghana has raised its benchmark interest rate by a cumulative 350 basis points to 17% to rein in inflation, which it targets between 6% and 10%. The still significant overall public deficit means the government has had to pay local rates as high as 25% on five-year domestic borrowing. The liquidity situation, moreover, remains complicated by constraints on converting local into foreign currency.

• Ghana's overall stock of debt is elevated at 80% of GDP, although more than one-half of it is denominated in local currency. While we expect that stepped up fiscal consolidation and a rebound in growth should place debt to GDP on a downward path, Ghana's debt ratio remains acutely vulnerable to exchange rate movements, as well as growth, or terms of trade shocks.

• Ghana's fiscal cost of debt servicing, projected at 45% of government revenue in 2022, is the highest of all sovereigns included in this survey, and most of that comes from the cost of domestic interest. Domestic rollover ratios are still manageable compared with Egypt, Zambia, and Kenya, but remain above the group's average of 9% of GDP.

• Several other factors support the ratings on Ghana, including our view of solid institutions and high potential growth, including on a per capita basis. Elevated key export prices (crude oil, cocoa, and gold) should also somewhat delay renewed pressures on the Ghanian cedi.

Egypt (B/Stable/B)

• Egyptian banks have the greatest exposure to their sovereign relative to their total assets--at 40% versus 19% among African sovereigns we rate. However, this is buffered by the Egyptian banking system being Africa's second-largest (beating even financial center South Africa). In our view, the Egyptian banking system has the capacity to lend further to the government if necessary, reflecting its relatively strong liquidity position, high annual deposit growth (due to the low base of financial inclusion), and relatively few options for private sector lending.

• We assess Egypt's debt structure as generally weak. Although about three-quarters of debt is denominated in local currency (shielding Egypt's sovereign balance sheet from exchange rate volatility), the relatively high reliance on nonresident creditors within local currency debt means the government is exposed to shifts in international sentiment to roll over its significant debt burden.

• Combined with Egypt's very high estimated local currency rollover ratio, whereby about one-third of its debt must be rolled over each year (by far the highest in Africa), we view Egypt as acutely sensitive to the global monetary tightening cycle, as demonstrated by the 14% devaluation of the Egyptian pound in response to the Russia-Ukraine invasion in March.

• Egypt also has a very high cost of debt. With debt service occupying 45% of government revenue, and domestic interest comprising a large 9% of GDP, there appears to be limited room for further domestic debt accumulation.

• There are many factors not included in our dataset that feed into our sovereign ratings on Egypt. For example, Egypt is now a (slight) net exporter of natural gas, boosted by the discovery of the Mediterranean's largest field last year. On the financing side of Egypt's balance of payments, Saudi Arabia has already deposited $5 billion with the Central Bank of Egypt, an IMF program is being negotiated, and Gulf Cooperation Council sovereign wealth funds have announced major foreign direct investment commitments. Despite this, we project the current account will deteriorate this year because Egypt remains one of the world's largest importers of wheat and relies heavily on Russian tourism.

Uganda (B/Stable/B)

• Uganda's key weakness in terms of its capacity to carry domestic debt comes from the very high real interest rates paid on its domestic debt (9% versus 4% for the group), signifying a lack of appetite to fund the government domestically. However, this is counterbalanced by the country's low-income status, which allows it to access official funding at longer tenors and concessional rates--about 65% of its total public debt stock is external, of which 90% is owed to multilateral or bilateral creditors. This partially shields Uganda's debt profile from volatile external market conditions relative to peers.

• The Ugandan banking system is one of Africa's smallest (32% versus 61% the 22 African sovereigns in our survey) with a significant portion of its assets already tied up in government lending activity. Demand for domestic government debt securities from local banks has increased over the pandemic due to subdued loan demand and higher risk aversion related to the prolonged lockdowns and the Bank of Uganda's (BOU) recent lifting of credit support measures to the wider economy. Consequently, commercial banks have de-risked their balance sheets by increasing their holdings of government securities to 24% of total assets in 2021, from 19% in 2019.

• Offshore investors' holdings of Uganda's domestic debt have risen to 11% of total public debt in 2021, compared with 6% in 2020, due to relatively high real yields on domestic debt. While nonresident holdings of local government debt remain lower than those of several peers, continued offshore investor interest is increasing Uganda's susceptibility to capital flight and global risk aversion.

• Interest expenditure is also very high in Uganda (22% of government revenue) and occupies a similar proportion of the budget as in Angola and Nigeria. The high interest payments stem from elevated debt-servicing costs in the domestic market, estimated at two-thirds of total interest. To reduce interest rate risk of its domestic debt portfolio, the BOU has taken deliberate actions to lengthen its maturity profile including issuing longer-tenor instruments and, on two occasions over 2021-2022, converting maturing Treasury bonds into higher yielding, longer-dated paper. We did not view the latter conversions as distressed exchanges under our criteria, as they were conducted on a purely voluntary basis and provided participating bondholders with more value than the promise of the original security (70% of investors chose to participate in the switch while the remainder were settled in full and on time).

Kenya (B/Stable/B)

• One of Kenya's vulnerabilities is its very high local currency rollover ratio, among the highest globally, which exceeds one-quarter of its total debt. This reflects the country's relatively short domestic debt maturity profile--in June 2021, government securities with tenors of less than one year amounted to 25% of the total stock, while those of 1-5 years accounted for 21%. One of the authorities' key objectives is to lengthen the tenor of its domestic debt, which it has succeeded in doing by increasing the average time to maturity of its local currency bonds to 8.6 years in June 2021 from 6.3 years in June 2019. At the same time, nonresident participation in Kenya's domestic bond market is minimal, which to some degree shields domestic debt from external market volatility.
• Banking sector claims on the government increased to 25% of total assets in 2021. This is high relative to banks' loans and advances to the private sector, suggesting the government's higher pandemic-fueled domestic financing needs could have hampered the recovery in private sector credit growth. Our base case anticipates Kenyan banks will be able to meet the government's reduced future borrowing requirements without denying resources to the private sector, assuming continued fiscal consolidation measures and strengthening banking sector profitability.
• Interest expenditure in Kenya is the fourth-highest in our sample and is projected to approach 30% of government revenue in 2022. This reflects a sharp increase in domestic interest payments (80% of total interest expenditure) to 3% of GDP in 2021, in line with the growing stock of, and relatively higher interest rate on, medium-term Treasury bonds.
• Kenya is estimated to be running a material primary deficit of 4% of GDP in 2022, suggesting debt dynamics could yet worsen further. This is not our baseline, however, as we expect comprehensive fiscal consolidation measures from 2023, aided by an IMF program, will help slow the accumulation of government debt over our forecast period. Additionally, we assume Kenya will continue to benefit from ongoing multilateral and bilateral lending on concessional terms (50% of its external financing), which should assuage pressure on domestic markets.

South Africa (BB/Stable/B)

• Nonresident holdings of South African domestic government debt are substantial at just under 30% of the total stock for domestic financing, which exposes the sovereign to shifts in foreign sentiment. That said, nonresident holdings of local currency debt dropped to a 10-year low of 28% of total government bonds at end-2021, from slightly above 40% in 2017. South Africa also has limited exposure to foreign currency funding, with 90% of debt being rand-denominated. This is by far one the strongest proportions in Africa.

• As nonresidents have reduced their weight in South Africa's bonds, domestic banks have increased their exposure to the government. Banks' holdings of government debt rose to about 14% of total assets in 2021 from under 10% in 2015. However, we think there is still room for the large banking system to continue to absorb additional government debt. We note that the banks' exposure to the sovereign remains lower compared with peers such as Turkey, Mexico, and Brazil.

• South Africa has the largest nonbank financial sector of all the African sovereigns included in this survey (210% of GDP), capturing domestic savings and providing a buffer against nonresident outflows. We view that pool of potential funding as very meaningful, and along with South Africa's broader monetary flexibility, plays an important role in the sovereign's relatively higher rating in a regional context.

• However, we view the government's high interest burden a credit weakness. Even though we expect fiscal deficits to gradually decline, the interest-to-revenue ratio will inch toward 20% through 2025 on the back of decreasing tax windfalls from commodity prices and rising domestic interest rates. Further sell-offs of government bonds by nonresidents could put additional pressure on the yields.

CFA Franc Zone

• Our seven rated CFA franc zone members--Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community [CEMAC]-- all appear to have relatively more favorable metrics, implying further relative domestic debt carrying.

• One reason for this is that the West African CFA franc (XOF) and Central Africa CFA franc (XAF) afford members of the respective monetary unions some of the continent's lowest real yields. This is not only positive for debt dynamics, but also drives some of the continent's lowest observed cost-of-debt ratios (both as a proportion of GDP and government budgets). The fixed exchange rate with the euro and France's guarantee of convertibility have also long supported confidence in the peg. This has, in turn, helped drive down inflation, even during political crises and commodity price shocks, unlike in many other sub-Saharan African countries. Additionally, real yields on government bonds appear disconnected from the risk premium these countries would have in the absence of their arrangements with France.

• Rollover ratios are among the lowest in Africa (exceptions to this are Benin, Burkina Faso, and Togo, which have rollover ratios more in line with the continent's average). This may be because the domestic markets in WAEMU and particularly CEMAC are more shallow, implying these economies rely more on external financing.

• We estimate nonresident participation in local debt markets (defined as residents outside the respective two monetary unions, i.e., excluding intra-WAEMU or intra-CEMAC holdings) to be extremely low across all seven sovereigns. This limits the risk of nonresident outflows that cause pressure on the currency. WAEMU has been attempting to encourage nonresident participation in the WAEMU regional market, but this has not yet taken off. The reason for having low nonresident participation despite a stable exchange rate is explained by lower yields compared with the rest of the region and perceived administrative hurdles.

• On the other hand, banking systems are generally some of the smallest in Africa, suggesting more limited domestic capacity to lend to the sovereign (Togo is a notable exception to this, as Lomé hosts several regional banking groups' headquarters). This is somewhat offset by bank assets being relatively unencumbered by government debt. Moreover, governments' more seamless ability to borrow on the regional financial market remains a supportive factor.

Financial Repression

Many African sovereigns have consistently found a way to finance themselves at negative interest rates. Sometimes this reflects lower debt-to-GDP ratios (for example the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia). Equally important, it also reflects captive banking systems, often state controlled, where the banking model intermediates private savings back to the public sector.

Ethiopia, for example, has traditionally relied on state-owned banks to purchase government paper at deeply negative real interest rates against a backdrop of double-digit inflation (currently exceeding 30%). Latest available data shows that Ethiopia's domestic government bonds and treasury notes, comprising about one-half of the domestic debt stock and held entirely by the central bank or government-owned financial institutions and pension funds, are currently yielding real returns of about -30%. Mandatory direct advances from the central bank also remain a central tenet of Ethiopia's domestic financing strategy, heightening currency and inflationary pressures. Although conflict-induced external financing shortages have forced Ethiopia to develop its Treasury bill market and liberalize rates, the government has yet to witness a material spike in its borrowing costs given its fixing of domestic yields around 8%-10% despite rampant inflation and conflict conditions. This explains Ethiopia's low domestic interest bill (less than 1% of GDP) and rollover ratio of local currency debt (about 3% of GDP).

One of the questions we considered is whether these practices that in certain African sovereigns have helped keep the interest burden relatively low (which is realized in our collected data in the form of lower real yields and cost of debt) leads to a crowding out of the private sector, and, in turn, lower GDP growth rates. We were unable to establish any significant statistical relationship between the two. We did, however, note a strong historical relationship between key export prices and domestic credit growth (see chart 2). This observation should perhaps serve as an indication that the current commodity cycle boom may not last. And, should high commodity prices unwind, the implications for exchange rates, domestic inflation, and domestic debt sustainability might worsen even further.

Chart 2

There is also the question of whether all this domestic debt is actually being financed on commercial terms. S&P Global Ratings defines whether debt is commercial or official based on the creditor. Where banks are public and refinance the state at rates below inflation, it can be complicated to differentiate between liability management exercises and defaults. There are also questions about the profitability of banks that lend to the state at rates below inflation. Logically, a bank that has the alternative of lending to the private sector at positive real risk-adjusted rates would choose to do so. This is where financial repression kicks in via regulation, reserve requirement policies, or outright moral suasion, forcing banks to hold large quantities of public debt.

Challenges Ahead

Domestic debt--and the cost of financing it--has reached new highs across various African sovereigns. Limited pools of domestic savings--which ultimately reflect Africa's lower economic development--mean that a sizable portion of local currency debt is actually external via high nonresident ownership in many of the markets we track. This is a challenge in a world where the return on risk-free assets is quickly increasing via quantitative tightening and rate hikes from the world's most influential central banks.

Three African sovereigns--Zambia, Egypt, and Ghana--stand out for their relatively weak metrics in many of the datapoints we collected. Our ratings on these sovereigns, however, depend on our view of their generally improving economic prospects, and, in the case of Ghana, of its institutional effectiveness. Moreover, with relatively contained primary deficits in all three, and plans to consolidate budgets further into 2023, our credit ratings rest on the assumption that they will manage through the current year's difficult global context, including U.S. interest rate hikes, decelerating global growth, and ongoing inflation concerns. While we did not include any external indicators in our survey, it is not irrelevant that Zambia's (and to a lesser degree Ghana's) key export prices are on an upswing, benefiting their balance of payments, even though these export prices remain vulnerable to any pullback of global demand including in China for industrial metals and other commodities. Kenya's and Uganda's assessments too, perhaps do not fully reflect many of their strengths, including close to no foreign participation, and large and relatively well-developed pension systems for collecting domestic savings.

Over time, an unprofitable financial sector is likely to cause fiscal difficulties for the sovereigns whose debt the sector holds. Hence, there is probably much more (risky) quasi fiscal activity happening in jurisdictions with negative real rates than in those sovereigns refinancing themselves at positive inflation-adjusted rates such as Egypt, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa. Without large competitive banking systems that can channel domestic savings into high-yielding investments, the long-term outlook for growth and development remains unclear.

Appendix

Table 1

Table 2

Related Research

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• Sovereign Ratings Score Snapshot, April 7, 2022
• Sovereign Debt 2022: Borrowing Will Stay High On Pandemic And Geopolitical Tensions, April 5, 2022
• Sovereign Debt 2022: EMEA Emerging Markets' Heavy Borrowing Aims At Fiscal Shocks, April 5, 2022
• Sovereign Ratings History, April 5, 2022
• Sovereign Ratings List, April 5, 2022
• Credit Conditions: Emerging Markets Q2 2022: Conflict Exacerbates Risks, March 29, 2022
• Economic Outlook EMEA Emerging Markets Q2 2022: Weaker Growth, Higher Inflation, Tighter Financing Conditions, March 28, 2022
• Economic Outlook Emerging Markets Q2 2022: Growth Slows Amid Higher Commodity Price Inflation, March 28, 2022