Key Takeaways
- Speculative-grade borrowers inched closer to pre-pandemic leverage levels of 5.4x, with median lagging 12-month (LTM) leverage in aggregate dipping to 6.1x by the end of first-quarter 2021, down from 6.3x the prior quarter and 6.7x in second-quarter 2020. We base this median leverage on data pooled from 1,121 public and private companies across these quarters.
- The improvement in leverage has been a widely shared experience, but sectors benefiting the most from the rebound of consumer demand--chemicals, consumer products, and health care--are leading the way.
- The data also reveals leverage and trend disparities between loan-only issuers and high-yield (HY)-only issuers (identified on the basis of our rated debt structure). Loan-only issuers, which are skewed toward small and midsize companies, had median leverage exceeding 7x, while HY-only issuers had median leverage of 4x-5x. However, this gulf has narrowed as we move through the pandemic.
- Average recovery estimates of first-lien new issues in second-quarter 2021 hovered only marginally above the historic low. Leveraged buyouts and merger and acquisition activities remain elevated in 2021 and are likely to keep debt leverage high and continue to weigh down recovery expectations. As such, we expect recovery estimates to stay in the low- to mid-60% area.
The second half of 2021 began on an encouraging note for speculative-grade borrowers. Accelerating economic recovery has fueled optimism; transactions across the credit spectrum were executed on the perception that business operating conditions and results will continue to improve.
This report features the effect of the pandemic and the ensuing recovery on corporate borrowers' leverage and cash reserve statistics. In particular, we track the transition of median leverage and cash balances for the 12-month periods ended between Sept. 30, 2019, and March 31, 2021.
The Data We Used In This Report
Our larger dataset comprises 1,326 companies (tables 3 and 4), a representative sample of the speculative-grade industrial corporate entities that we rate in the U.S. and Canada but excluding those rated 'SD' (selective default) or no longer outstanding as of June 22, 2021, either because of default or because we withdrew the rating. The set captured in tables 1 and 2 is a slightly smaller set of 1,121 companies because some private companies had not reported first-quarter 2021 financials before our cutoff date.
Leverage in the study is calculated as gross debt over EBITDA, both as reported in companies' financial statements and without adjustment by S&P Global Ratings, which should provide useful insight into the leverage trends even if these statistics are different than those we use in our rating analyses.
Open For Business: Half Of Sectors Have Fully Returned To Pre-Pandemic Leverage Levels
Here, we spotlight some noteworthy trends that emerged in the first quarter:
- Speculative-grade borrowers are reporting encouraging earnings growth. About 70% of companies in our sample experienced LTM EBITDA growth in first-quarter 2021. This resulted in median LTM leverage on the whole continuing to slide. It dipped to 6.1x by the end of the first quarter, returning to levels last seen at the onset of the pandemic (tables 1 and 2). More companies such as Boeing Co. have vowed to prioritize debt reduction once normality restores.
- 'B' category ('B+'/'B'/'B-') companies cut their median LTM leverage by 0.2x-0.5x in the first quarter. Despite this meaningful decline, the recovery of lower credit tiers will likely trail that of higher-rated peers. One reason is the pressure to service excessive debt, which limits issuers' capacity to fund future growth initiatives. Also, there is a discernable bias toward smaller companies among lower-rated entities. Smaller business borrowers lack the funding options and the lender depth that their larger peers enjoy. Some public companies were able to access the equity market to obtain fresh financing at attractive costs. For example, AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc., helped by retail investors' enthusiasm for meme stocks, has raised about $1.83 billion in total equity so far this year. The liquidity infusion, combined with expected improvement in theater attendance, resulted in a two-notch upgrade in June. Our positive rating outlook indicates the potential for another upgrade if AMC prioritizes its sizable cash balance toward debt repayment. For small companies, loan funding is the principal source of outside capital.
- The leverage of 'B-' rated companies still runs a full turn above its 2019 record. Significant challenges lie ahead: Constrained labor supply, erratic commodity price movements, soaring transportation cost, and supply chain disruptions all could dampen any further acceleration of economic recovery and pressure smaller borrowers that are price takers.
- Improvements in first-quarter 2021 center on sectors most exposed to consumer demand: chemicals, consumer products, and health care. In fact, leverage for chemical companies declined to the lowest level since late 2019. We expect demand for chemicals will continue to rise as economies across the globe reopen and GDP recovers. The strong demand this year will make it easier for companies to pass on higher input costs to customers.
- Telecommunications and technology are among the least disrupted by COVID-19, evidenced by having the smallest swings of median LTM leverage. Leverage for each sector increased about 0.5x within our observation period.
- The technology sector remains of high interest among sponsors and lenders. The modest uptick in sector leverage observed in the first quarter coincided with a surge of first-time software and services issuers. About 18% of new corporate issuers in the U.S. and Canada in the first quarter came from the technology sector (16 in software and services, two each in semiconductors and tech equipment, chart 1). Further, there has been less caution from lenders regarding leverage levels as these companies are often cited for their predictable and sustainable revenue business models.
Table 1
Median Gross Leverage Transition By Credit Rating | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third-quarter 2019 to first-quarter 2021 | ||||||||||||||||||
Median gross leverage (x) | ||||||||||||||||||
Issuer credit rating* | Entity count | Third-quarter 2019 LTM | 2019 | First-quarter 2020 LTM | Second-quarter 2020 LTM | Third-quarter 2020 LTM | 2020 | First-quarter 2021 LTM | ||||||||||
BB+ | 100 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.0 | ||||||||||
BB | 106 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.8 | ||||||||||
BB- | 107 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 3.7 | ||||||||||
B+ | 133 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.0 | ||||||||||
B | 242 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.5 | ||||||||||
B- | 294 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 9.2 | 8.7 | ||||||||||
CCC+ | 110 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 13.7 | 14.0 | 14.3 | ||||||||||
CCC | 21 | 12.6 | 11.5 | 13.1 | 20.6 | 29.2 | 14.9 | 16.7 | ||||||||||
CCC- | 8 | 10.9 | 11.9 | 13.3 | 17.5 | 19.6 | 19.9 | 19.0 | ||||||||||
CC | - | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | ||||||||||
Total | 1,121 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.1 | ||||||||||
Ratings as of June 22, 2021. LTM--Lagging 12 months. N.A.--Not applicable. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Table 2
Media Gross Leverage Transition By Industry | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third-quarter 2019 to first-quarter 2021 | ||||||||||||||||||
Median gross leverage (x) | ||||||||||||||||||
Industry | Entity count | Third-quarter 2019 LTM | 2019 | First-quarter 2020 LTM | Second-quarter 2020 LTM | Third-quarter 2020 LTM | 2020 | First-quarter 2021 LTM | ||||||||||
Aerospace/defense | 27 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 6.1 | ||||||||||
Auto/trucks | 32 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 5.0 | ||||||||||
Business and consumer services | 89 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 6.8 | ||||||||||
Capital goods/machine and equipment | 128 | 5.7 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 5.5 | 5.8 | ||||||||||
Chemicals | 47 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.2 | ||||||||||
Consumer products | 106 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 5.5 | ||||||||||
Forest product/building materials/packaging | 42 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | ||||||||||
Health care | 98 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 6.8 | ||||||||||
Media, entertainment, and leisure | 148 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 6.2 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 7.5 | 7.4 | ||||||||||
Mining and minerals | 48 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.1 | ||||||||||
Oil and gas | 67 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 4.2 | 5.4 | 5.1 | 5.5 | ||||||||||
Restaurants/retailing | 81 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.9 | ||||||||||
Real estate | 32 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 7.9 | 7.5 | ||||||||||
Technology | 101 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 7.7 | ||||||||||
Telecommunications | 44 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.6 | ||||||||||
Transportation | 31 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.9 | 8.5 | 7.2 | 7.5 | ||||||||||
Total | 1,121 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.1 | ||||||||||
LTM--Lagging 12 months. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Chart 1
The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Been More Than A Hiccup
- On the downside, the pandemic has caused long-term damage across the board, such that median LTM leverages increased 0.8x year over year in 2020 on the whole and as much as eightfold in the bottom tier 'CCC-' (albeit a small population, tables 3 and 4).
- The largest increase came from the most vulnerable 'B-' (a 0.7x year-over-year increase) and 'CCC' ('CCC+'/'CCC'/'CCC-') categories (year-over-year increase of 4.8x-8.0x). While the number of 'CCC' category-rated companies in the U.S. and Canada has declined to a 15-month low, the remaining 'CCC' rated companies are facing crushing debt loads. The gap between this segment and the higher-rated entities has widened significantly over the pandemic.
- Unsurprisingly, leverage deterioration is most pronounced among the pandemic-battered sectors for which EBITDA of many turned negative for consecutive quarters. Leverage of the media, entertainment, and leisure sector, which contains companies that were severely hurt by social distancing such as cruise operators, movie theaters, and hotels, experienced the largest spike of three turns and only recently started to see signs of life.
- Transportation in general suffered during the pandemic, but airlines took the biggest hit as people stayed home, with LTM EBITDA falling an average of 150% year over year in 2020.
Table 3
Median Gross Leverage By Credit Rating | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2019 compared to 2020 | ||||||||
Median gross leverage (x) | ||||||||
Issuer credit rating* | Entity count | 2019 | 2020 | |||||
BB+ | 103 | 3.2 | 3.2 | |||||
BB | 113 | 3.4 | 3.8 | |||||
BB- | 113 | 3.5 | 3.7 | |||||
B+ | 148 | 4.7 | 5.2 | |||||
B | 294 | 5.6 | 5.8 | |||||
B- | 388 | 7.8 | 8.5 | |||||
CCC+ | 125 | 8.4 | 13.1 | |||||
CCC | 34 | 9.9 | 17.3 | |||||
CCC- | 8 | 11.9 | 19.9 | |||||
CC | 0 | N.A. | N.A. | |||||
Total | 1,326 | 5.6 | 6.4 | |||||
Ratings as of June 22, 2021. N.A.--Not applicable. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Table 4
Median Gross Leverage By Industry | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2019 compared to 2020 | ||||||||
Median gross leverage (x) | ||||||||
Industry | Entity count | 2019 | 2020 | |||||
Aerospace/defense | 30 | 4.7 | 5.5 | |||||
Auto/trucks | 41 | 4.0 | 5.9 | |||||
Business and consumer services | 108 | 7.2 | 7.0 | |||||
Capital goods/machine and equipment | 144 | 6.0 | 6.2 | |||||
Chemicals | 48 | 5.3 | 5.8 | |||||
Consumer products | 127 | 6.3 | 5.9 | |||||
Forest products/buildingg materials/packaging | 53 | 4.6 | 3.9 | |||||
Health care | 127 | 7.0 | 7.7 | |||||
Media, entertainment, and leisure | 181 | 5.3 | 8.3 | |||||
Mining and minerals | 52 | 3.1 | 4.9 | |||||
Oil and gas | 76 | 3.0 | 5.0 | |||||
Restaurants/retailing | 91 | 4.5 | 5.9 | |||||
Real estate | 33 | 7.0 | 7.8 | |||||
Technology | 126 | 7.7 | 6.9 | |||||
Telecommunications | 54 | 5.7 | 5.0 | |||||
Transportation | 35 | 4.6 | 7.2 | |||||
Total | 1,326 | 5.6 | 6.4 | |||||
Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Loan-Only Issuers Exhibit Credit Profiles Different From Those Of HY-Only Issuers
Loan-Only And High-Yield-Only Defined In This Report
As the name implies, a loan-only issuer in our sample (totaling 526 companies) has a rated debt structure that consists exclusively of loans, while a high-yield-only issuer (249 issuers) has a rated debt structure solely composed of high-yield bonds, according to debt rated by S&P Global Ratings. It is possible that an HY-only issuer has an asset- or reserve-based lending facility or a cash flow revolver that is senior to the notes but that we have not rated. Our larger dataset also included issuers with mixed debt structures (315 issuers), though we have not highlighted the statistics for this group because they largely sit between those of the other two groups.
A comparison of the data groups by funding source revealed significant variations in size, credit quality, and leverage reduction patterns for the loan-only and HY-only groups:
- Our review showed differences in leverage for the loan-only and HY-only groups, with the mixed-debt-structure group's leverage numbers falling in between.
- Loan-only issuers that we identify on the basis of our rated debt structure are clearly skewed toward small and midsize companies. About 30% of loan-only issuers generated EBITDA of less than $50 million in the 12-month period ended March 31, 2021, compared to only 14% of the HY-only issuers. In fact, more than 20% of the HY-only issuers generated EBITDA of more than $500 million.
- Similarly, loan-only issuers tend to fall on the lower end of the credit quality scale with ratings closer to 'B' or 'B-', compared to HY-only issuers, which we typically rate closer to 'BB+' or 'BB'.
- Loan-only issuers have lower recovery expectations in a default scenario (as measured by our recovery ratings and point estimates) on their first-lien debt, reflecting the impact of both higher debt leverage and thinner or no cushions of junior debt.
- The median LTM leverage levels for the loan-only group has shrunk since the latter half of 2020. In comparison, the median figures have barely changed for the HY-only issuers, which, when combined with their broadly better credit quality, suggest that these companies are likely more content with current levels of leverage. In other words, HY-only issuers feel less pressure to immediately reduce debt. As a result, the gulf between the two groups has narrowed to mid-2x from 3x-plus as we moved through the observation period.
Chart 2
Chart 3
Chart 4
Most Cash Has Yet To Be Deployed
- Companies are building up and preserving cash (chart 5). The median size of cash reserve (including cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments) is running about 175% above the year-end 2019 level after having remained elevated during the pandemic.
- Record tight credit spreads have reduced the opportunity cost of hoarding cash. Healthy cash reserves mean more headroom for absorbing demand volatilities and provide a guard against credit tightening. We see most companies being prudent about their post-pandemic strategies to allow for some level of financial flexibility.
- Decisions around financial policy influence credit quality and the potential direction of rating actions, particularly for borrowers on the cusp between two ratings. Currently favorable funding rates may continue to make more-aggressive financial strategies, such as shareholder distributions and debt-financed acquisitions, appealing, and they may limit improvements to credit statistics and ratings.
- Total debt reached new high in the first quarter of 2021. This is attributable in part to new issuers being added to the sample set at a record pace. The latest additions include borrowers returned from a Chapter 11 restructure such as car renter Hertz Global Holdings Inc. and guitar manufacturer and distributor Gibson Brands Inc. Tightening lending spreads and robust liquidity in the system should encourage continued high leverage borrowing, especially in the recession-resistant sectors such as technology, as noted earlier in the section about leverage transition.
Chart 5
First-Lien New-Issue Recovery Lingered In The Lower Half Of Its Multiyear Range
Recovery expectations on newly issued debt vary quarterly based on supply-demand conditions and the mix of issuers during the period. Chart 6 illustrates the quarterly trends of our recovery expectations for first-lien new issues, measured by the average recovery point estimates. Recovery estimates have predominantly hovered around the low- to mid-60% area over the past few years, with the latest cohort only drifting marginally higher from the historic low. The quarterly averages slumped to an all-time low of 62% at the end of 2020, after peaking at 71% in the second quarter.
While interest rates remain low, the market now expects rates to pick up over the next few years. That means floating-rate instruments such as leveraged loans, which have already benefited from strong collateralized loan obligation (CLO) formations, are becoming more attractive to investors. This may lead to a continuation of accommodative loan markets, with more aggressive structures (i.e., high leverage), which generally results in less promising recovery prospects, because recovery expectations generally fluctuate inversely with shifts in investor risk tolerance. That said, the magnitude of quarterly swings of average recoveries has been fairly rangebound over the past four years and may not deviate significantly from prior-year levels.
Chart 6
Breaking down by the trends by recovery rating category, we expected more than 60% of new issuance by count--or 213 new issues in the second quarter--to recover 50%-70% in a payment default, equating to a '3' recovery rating (chart 7). A much smaller share (31%) of new issuance was expected to recover 70% or more ('1' [90%-100%] or '2' [70%-90%] recovery ratings), which is substantially lower than would be expected based on historical norms with average recoveries for first-lien debt of 70% or higher. Our study of U.S. corporate debt recoveries found that about two-thirds of the first-lien debt of the companies that defaulted between January 2008 and June 2020 achieved 70% recovery or higher. We attribute the decline in first-lien recovery expectations to the influx of highly leveraged new issuers in recent years and an increasing reliance on first-lien debt, including first-lien-only debt structures and a shrinking cushion of junior debt where it still exists.
Chart 7
Related Research
- Credit FAQ: What Will U.S. Chemical Companies Face As They Recover In 2021 And Beyond?, June 28, 2021
- COVID-19 Heat Map: Pent-Up Demand And Supply Shortages Further Improve Recovery Prospects For Credit Quality, June 8, 2021
- U.S. Leveraged Finance Q1 2021 Update: As Issuers And Investors Collaborate To Keep Markets Active, Where Does The Excess Cash Go?, May 5, 2021
- From Crisis To Crisis: A Lookback At Actual Recoveries And Recovery Ratings From The Great Recession To The Pandemic, Oct. 8, 2020
Editor: Tracy M. Cook
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analyst: | Hanna Zhang, New York + 1 (212) 438 8288; Hanna.Zhang@spglobal.com |
Secondary Contacts: | Robert E Schulz, CFA, New York + 1 (212) 438 7808; robert.schulz@spglobal.com |
Steve H Wilkinson, CFA, New York + 1 (212) 438 5093; steve.wilkinson@spglobal.com | |
Olen Honeyman, New York + 1 (212) 438 4031; olen.honeyman@spglobal.com | |
Research Contributor: | Maulik Shah, CRISIL Global Analytical Center, an S&P affiliate, Mumbai |
Analytical Group Contact: | Ramki Muthukrishnan, New York + 1 (212) 438 1384; ramki.muthukrishnan@spglobal.com |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw or suspend such acknowledgment at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.
Any Passwords/user IDs issued by S&P to users are single user-dedicated and may ONLY be used by the individual to whom they have been assigned. No sharing of passwords/user IDs and no simultaneous access via the same password/user ID is permitted. To reprint, translate, or use the data or information other than as provided herein, contact S&P Global Ratings, Client Services, 55 Water Street, New York, NY 10041; (1) 212-438-7280 or by e-mail to: research_request@spglobal.com.