Islamic State-Jabhat al-Nusra divergences are unlikely to be mended despite calls for truce

The 30 September proposal, titled An initiative and call for a ceasefire between factions in Syria, urged warring jihadist groups in Syria to set aside their violent disagreements and join forces to stand against "the Crusader attack on our Muslim brothers in Syria and Iraq". The document stated that "40 countries have united and gathered together to wage a war against Islam itself", a condition that "at the very least requires to stop the infighting if a permanent end to it is not possible". The statement also suggested that the contested territories between the warring factions can be transferred to an impartial body as long as the truce is in effect.

The document has been promoted by a group of prominent jihadist ideologues, including figures widely considered close to the Al-Qaeda central leadership, such as Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi; Palestinian Abu Qatada al-Filis?ini, Egyptian Hani al-Sibai; and Abdullah Muhammad al-Muhaysin, a Saudi cleric close to the Syrian group Jabhat al-Nusra. All those scholars have been critical in the past of Islamic State's decision to proclaim a caliphate in territory it controls in Syria and Iraq. Some of them were also involved in past reconciliation efforts to quell the jihadist infighting in Syria, which has pitted the Islamic State against Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and others Islamist factions since early this year over divergent strategies and competition for resources. Notably, Muhaysin's January initiative to set up an independent sharia (Islamic law) court charged to rule over the Islamic State/Jabhat al-Nusra divergences received wide support from jihadist groups across the region. However, Islamic State's rejection of it eventually pushed the Al-Qaeda leadership to disown the latter.

Previous failed appeals for a truce

The 30 September proposal mirrors recent statements released by established jihadist groups and supporters that have called for unity amongst jihadists amid the United States-led air strikes in Syria and Iraq. On 16 September, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), two groups officially affiliated with al-Qaeda and that have reiterated their loyalty to it, released a joint statement calling on warring factions in Syria and Iraq to stand as one against the military operations. The whole AQAP-AQIM communiqué revolved around the point, which is finding large resonance amongst the jihadist community of an ongoing "Crusader-Jewish-Safavid [Shia] –Apostate [Arab governments] campaign to fight Islam and the Muslims under the excuse of striking Islamic State and destroying it". The statement reflects how the two branches are speaking to Ayman al-Zawahiri's Al-Qaeda and Islamic State on an equal footing, and indicates their fear of splintering within their own organisations, as small groups of their supporters have pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Even a member of the Jabhat al-Nusra Sharia Committee, Abu Sulayman al Muhajir, posted on his Twitter account a series of comments in solidarity with the Islamic State. On 14 September, he stated that the "US is not fighting a jamaah (group) as it claims but [rather] Islam", calling on Muslims to stand united to "protect the ummah [the Islamic community]".

Jihadists' calls for rival groups in Syria to stop fighting each other have recurred since early this year, when the doctrinal dispute between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State concerning the involvement of the latter in the Syrian conflict escalated into open confrontation. Those calls were openly aimed at reasserting Al-Qaeda's authority over the whole jihadist community. This authority was openly called into question by Islamic State's defiant refusal to withdraw its forces from Syria, as ordered by Al-Qaeda emir Zawahiri, and by the support its self-proclaimed caliphate had received from jihadist organisations across Middle East and North Africa.

A lasting fissure

The US's decision to extend the aerial campaign from Iraq into Syria has provided those appeals with a different supporting rationale. As coalition air strikes have reportedly struck Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Syrian territory alongside Islamic State targets, many jihadists on social media are expressing their concerns that the internal power struggle will undermine their ability to cope with the military intervention. This would be detrimental to the entire jihadist project in Syria, especially if the air strikes provide a lifeline to Syrian government forces. By depicting the intervention as a "Crusade against Islam" and urging fighters in Syria to "rescue the ship of jihad", those urging a truce are making an appeal to a superior interest to be defended (the ummah) instead of wasting resources (both human and material) in internal conflict. However, the call for a truce, rather than for a definitive agreement, indicates that the fight over legitimacy between pro-Al-Qaeda voices and the Islamic State is not over. Equally, a complete reconciliation between Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State remains unlikely, as strong differences between them persist. The conflict between began in April 2013 when Islamic State (at the time known as Islamic State in Iraq) announced that Jabhat al-Nusra was its wing in Syria. This was rejected by Zawahiri, leading Islamic State to confirm that its establishment was not through Al-Qaeda, and that its pledge of allegiance to Osama Bin Laden was only intended to keep the Salafist jihadist movement united, and ultimately, to declare its caliphate and call on all jihadist groups to pledge allegiance to it. This means that joining forces with Islamic State would require Jabhat al-Nusra to pledge allegiance, an extremely unlikely move that would effectively put an end to its independence and lead to a break with Zawahiri's Al-Qaeda.  

Outlook and implications

Coalition air strikes against Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State will likely reshape the internal alliances of the Syrian armed opposition. The most likely immediate effect is to push brigades of the two groups to reach truce agreements on an ad hoc basis and stop fighting each other. On 2 October, social media sources indicated that Jabhat al-Nusra had already agreed a truce with Islamic State in the suburbs of Hassakah. However, should the coalition intensify the air strikes on Jabhat al-Nusra, the calls from group's members to reconcile with its rival and form a united front are likely to increase. As obedience to the central command has often proven precarious within Jabhat al-Nusra ranks, defections of group's fighters or entire brigades to Islamic State would probably increase. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that over 200 fighters had joined the Islamic State in the northern Aleppo area, the majority from Jabhat al-Nusra, since airstrikes targeted the group. On 2 October, social media reported that hundreds of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters have defected in Idlib and Aleppo and joined the Islamic State in Raqqa and Hassakah. These defections are likely to further fragment the Syrian insurgent landscape, weakening the armed opposition's fight against both the Assad government and the Islamic State and allowing the latter to hold and expand its controlled territory in Syria.

Furthermore, coalition air strikes are likely to hamper cooperation between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Western and Arab countries. The Islamic Front, several FSA factions, Division 13, Suqour al-Sham and Harakat Hazm, the West's most trusted FSA ally, were quick to express opposition to the airstrikes. As those groups currently operate in areas adjacent to Islamic State front lines, any coalition plan to sustain its aerial campaign with ground operations that rely upon those groups is likely to be hindered. This would likely complicate the campaign to recapture Islamic State-controlled territory in Iraq and Syria in a one-year outlook.