AQAP's call to Yemeni Sunnis to support its anti-Houthi campaign aimed at accelerating state collapse

In the first incident on 28 September, an AQAP militant carried out a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a field hospital run by the Houthi in Majzar, Marib, killing 15 people and injuring 50. In the second, AQAP fighters ambushed a Houthi fighter vehicle, killing six. Both incidents were later claimed by the jihadist group, which also took credit for a 27 September light anti-armour weapon (LAW) attack on the United States Embassy in Sanaa, which wounded at least two security guards 200 metres from the building.

The two anti-Houthi attacks followed a recent AQAP statement that called on Sunni tribes to unite under one banner and to 'support the Mujaheddin in fighting and defeating' the Shia Zaidi movement. In the communique, AQAP described the recent Houthi advances in Sanaa as an attempt 'to complete the Shia project in Yemen', blaming clerics and religious figures for 'having turned a blind eye regarding the crimes committed by the Houthi against the Sunnis in Saada and elsewhere'.

The statement was clearly triggered by an expanding Houthi offensive that began in July 2013 by targeting Saudi-backed Sunni Salafists in their stronghold in Saada. However, over the past week the offensive has culminated in de facto Houthi control over Sanaa. The Houthi signed a UN-brokered peace deal with the Yemeni government on 21 September; however, security forces are to date still confined to barracks with Houthi fighters still largely in control of the capital. Although President Abdurabu Mansour Hadi has already appointed Houthi and Southern Movement presidential advisers as stipulated in the agreement, the prime minister has yet to be nominated. The Houthi have said they will not implement the agreement with President Hadi before this step, and there is no guarantee that they will do so, even after this step is taken. Unless the Houthi begin to hand control back to government forces, protracted fighting in the capital between the Houthi and their rivals is likely; this would risk state collapse (see 24 September 2014: Yemen state collapse likely unless security forces reassume control in Sanaa over the coming week). The Houthi's main rivals are Saudi-backed Salafist groups defeated in Dammaj Valley in Saada province in January 2014, security forces loyal to the dissolved First Armoured Division and General Ali Mohsen (who reportedly fled to Saudi Arabia), and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Islah Party, who were defeated by the Houthi in Amran and Sanaa provinces.

AQAP's statement's appeal to Sunni factions and the reference to the Houthi as 'the Rawafedhs' (a derogatory term for Shia) are clear indications that the group is attempting to play the sectarian card to capitalise on growing anti-Houthi sentiments among the Houthis' rivals. By presenting itself as the sole force able to reverse Houthi territorial gains and protect the Sunnis from the Shia group, AQAP is likely to be aiming at drawing support from local Sunni tribes and to forge opportunistic alliances with them. This would enable AQAP to draw on new sources of recruits and to have access to safe areas under tribal control, where establishing hideouts to elude the US unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) airstrikes would become easier. Indeed, on 4 September local media published a report claiming that a meeting between AQAP senior commanders and tribal elders had already taken place in al-Baida province. In the meeting, it was reported that AQAP had asked for tribal support to confront the Houthi both in central Yemen and Sanaa. 

From propaganda to action

AQAP had already voiced its strong hostility towards the Houthi in the past, calling on its supporters to wage jihad against the Zaidi group after the latter had besieged the Salafist Dar al-Hadith school in Dammaj, Saada, on November 2013. More recently, on April 2014, at the time that Houthi advances were clearly aiming for central Yemen, AQAP accused the Yemeni government of being involved in a 'conspiracy' to empower the Shia Houthi against Salafists, and announced the formation of a new brigade, 'Ansar al-Sharia in the Central Region'. The brigade was tasked with fighting the Houthi and halting their expansion. Despite hostile AQAP propaganda against the Houthi, their actions have been previously limited to one-off attacks, such as the May 2012 attack on a Zaidi mosque in al-Jawf. In contrast, the increasing pace, scale, and geographical distribution of attacks that AQAP has launched on Houthi targets over the past five weeks indicate that the group has effectively opened a new front against the Zaidi group. From late August to date, AQAP has carried out 11 high-profile attacks on Houthi targets in al-Bayda, Marib, Amran, Saada and Sanaa, all areas where the Zaidi group maintains a consolidated presence. Notably, one of the latest attacks that was part of this campaign, a 23 September SVBIED attack targeting a local court administered by the Houthi in Kataf, Saada, and killing at least 50 Houthi militants, was also the deadliest perpetrated so far by AQAP against the group in the country.

These attacks indicate that AQAP has established a large and effective underground network of militant cells far away from its traditional support base in the south, where jihadists are maintaining pressure on the army with frequent shooting and IED attacks on security targets. In the most recent such attack, on 9 September, a SVBIED attack on an army checkpoint in al-Qatn, Hadramawt, killed four soldiers.

IHS assesses that the anti-Houthi campaign reflects a broader and aspirational objective for AQAP, separate to its campaign in the south. By exploiting political uncertainty in Sanaa and by attracting on its side those tribal and Salafist factions resentful of the central government for having allowed the Houthi to acquire a new position of power, the group aims at clearing the ground and eventually hastening the collapse of the state. Unless the Houthi honour a 20 September agreement to hand power back to Hadi, the risk of a prolonged battle for the control of Sanaa between Houthi fighters and security forces is likely to remain severe. In this event, the government's already largely symbolic control over the majority of Yemeni territory would be rendered non-existent, hampering the army's ability to prevent AQAP from consolidating control in Hadramawt, Abyan, and Shabwa provinces and from making further inroads towards Sanaa. Indeed, the group's capability in the capital has not been disrupted, as indicated by the 27 September rocket attack targeting the US Embassy.

Outlook and implications

Even if the Houthi honour their agreement with Hadi, and begin to hand control back to government forces, a steady increase of AQAP attacks against Houthi targets is likely over the next two months. AQAP attacks are likely to grow in frequency in al-Jawf, Amran, al-Dali', Saada and al-Bayda' and to spread into Hajjah and Marib, and include ambush and shooting attacks, assassination attempts targeting Houthi officials and supporters, as well as VBIED, SVBIED and IED attacks targeting Houthi gatherings, rallies, offices, and checkpoints. Moreover, tribal factions resentful of the central government will answer to AQAP's call, meaning that energy assets like oil pipelines in Marib also face severe risks of regular targeting.

In the same vein, as long as the Houthi maintain their forces in the capital, AQAP militants are likely to attempt further attacks against them in Sanaa, in a likely effort to provoke a Houthi armed response within the city that would trigger protracted fighting. AQAP advances in Sanaa would also entail a severe risk of attacks targeting diplomatic assets, security, and government buildings and increse kidnapping risks for western and foreign workers, journalists, and diplomatic staff.

Outside Sanaa, co-ordinated and multiple attacks by AQAP, using suicide bombers, VBIEDs, and artillery fire targeting government and military posts and patrols are likely to grow in frequency, especially across Hadramawt cities, like al-Mukalla, Shihr, al-Qatn, as well as across Shabwa, Abyan, and al-Bayda’. Roadside IEDs attacks, drive-by shootings and assassination attempts targeting army personnel, police officers, intelligence, and government officials across southern and central provinces are also very likely to increase.