South African president Jacob Zuma renewed negotiations between Lesotho's coalition partners on 9 September, with the aim of resolving a political and security crisis in the kingdom. Zuma threatened military intervention if the political crisis is not resolved by 12 September.
IHS perspective | |
Significance | If there is no agreement on the reopening of parliament by 12 September, South African and regional military intervention will be highly likely. |
Implications | South African military intervention would target some 200 Lesothan troops loyal to the former army chief currently based around the capital Maseru. |
Outlook | Any military intervention is likely to result in retaliatory attacks on South African assets and personnel, and trigger violent protests in cities. |
Lesotho's three-party coalition comprising Prime Minister Thomas Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC), Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing's Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and the Basotho National Party (BNP) led by Morena Maseribane, which was formed following the May 2012 elections, has been close to collapse after Thabane suspended parliament on 10 June. Thabane faced the threat of a vote of no confidence from the LCD party and the opposition Democratic Congress (DC) party headed by former prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili (1998–2012).
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Lesotho's Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing, left, during a media interview with visiting |
Metsing and Mosisili have claimed that Thabane has excluded coalition partners from key decisions, including those related to the USD3.7 billion Highlands Water Project, which supplies hydropower and water to South Africa's industrial hub in Gauteng province. In August, a South African-brokered plan with the coalition partners and King Letsie III to end the parliamentary suspension failed to be implemented. The suspension of parliament effectively allows Thabane to remain in power at least until March 2015, when he would be constitutionally bound to reopen parliament.
Political crisis has triggered a military 'coup'
In response to the suspension of parliament, Metsing and Mosisili have exploited ties with loyalists in the military, such as chief of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), Lieutenant General Tlali Kamoli. As a result, on 29 August, Thabane dismissed Kamoli and appointed Maaparankoe Mahao in his place to head the LDF by promoting him from the rank of Brigadier to Major General in one act. Thabane had no mandate to dismiss Kamoli, which should have been conducted through the Lesotho Defence Commission.
On 30 August, LDF soldiers loyal to Kamoli surrounded the headquarters of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS), which is loyal to Thabane. Thabane then fled to South Africa with the aid of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) special forces. A ban on planned protest action by the LCD over the delay in reopening parliament was a likely catalyst for LDF soldiers' intervention to disarm LMPS police officers.
The LMPS has effectively ceased to operate and has been unilaterally replaced by South African Police Service (SAPS) elite special task force (STF) units, which control key locations in the capital Maseru, including government buildings and major intersections. Thabane has since returned to Lesotho under the protection of South African STF units. He faces a very likely no-confidence vote should he reopen parliament at this stage.
Renegade general poses severe threat to capital
Dismissed LDF chief Kamoli has refused to relinquish his position and still enjoys the backing of Metsing and Mosisili. He has conducted several raids on armouries and withdrawn to an LDF barracks in the mountainous regions surrounding Maseru with approximately 200 soldiers, including a 40-strong LDF Special Forces unit. According to IHS-contracted military expert in South Africa and local media reports, Kamoli is reported to be in possession of rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank weapons, and possibly anti-aircraft weapons, as well as armoured personnel carriers, small-arms, and mortars. These are all low-technology, comparatively unsophisticated weapons.
South Africa plays key political and security role in Lesotho's crisis
South Africa has so far acted unilaterally to assist Thabane's flight to South Africa alongside SANDF special forces and to facilitate his return escorted by SAPS STF units. In doing so, Zuma effectively side-lined the regional Southern African Development Community (SADC), of which both countries are members, and the SADC's regional security body, the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security.
South Africa's primary concern is the protection of its nationals and commercial interests in Lesotho, including in the agribusiness, banking, hospitality, manufacturing, and retail sectors. A large number of South African businesses (such as textile and agricultural processing) are based in border towns such as Maputsoe and Maseru. South Africa's main interest in the country is the Highlands Water Project.
South African military intervention highly likely in one-week outlook
On 7 September, newly appointed LDF chief Mahao called for military action to mitigate risks of protracted and violent fighting with Kamoli's forces, and requested military assistance from SADC. Although the SADC has stressed diplomatic channels should be exhausted first, the SANDF is already preparing for possible intervention within the SADC framework. This is currently working under the name Operation Batho. Overall command of Batho would remain within the SADC security framework, but would heavily rely on the SANDF's Joint Operations Formation.
The SANDF would spearhead any intervention, focusing on disarming pro-Kamoli forces first, particularly the Special Forces contingent. This could comprise, in terms of an order of battle, SANDF Special Forces supported by paratroopers. South African Rooivalk attack helicopters are unavailable given commitments to peacekeeping in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Air support may be available from South African Air Force (SAAF) JAS 39 Gripen and Hawk aircraft, as well as Cessna 208 Caravan tactical surveillance aircraft.
For any operations outside of Maseru, a mechanised infantry and air assault tactical approach would be more likely than a full armour and artillery attack. This would probably be under the command of the SANDF's 43 Mechanised Brigade. Since the SANDF is very depleted in terms of available troops and budget, SANDF planners are also likely to lean upon allied forces, particularly the Botswana Defence Force.
Outlook and implications
Lesotho is currently operating as normal despite the military and political crisis. On 10 September, Zuma issued a two-day deadline for the government to agree on when parliament will re-open but again rejected a request for SADC troops. However, we assess that any further delays in re-opening parliament, which are likely, will elicit a military response from LDF troops loyal to Kamoli, thereby almost certainly triggering an immediate SANDF military intervention. Any threatened action to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which is less likely, will also trigger SANDF intervention.
Any such intervention will also raise the risk of attack by LDF troops loyal to Kamoli or Metsing supporters on South African nationals and assets, including in banking, diamond mining, manufacturing, retail, and textile processing. Any protests over the next month will face severe risk of a heavy-handed reaction by the LDF, raising collateral risk of harm to bystanders and of small-scale damage to nearby property.