One month on from the deadly gun and grenade attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which was carried out by the Somalia-based militant group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, there has been a heightened security threat throughout the East Africa region promoted by the attack and other incidents in the region since. The militant group has in the past threatened to take retaliatory measures against countries that have troops deployed in Somalia in support of the country's internationally-backed government, such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
IHS Global Insight perspective | |
Significance | Fears have been intensified by two security incidents in the subsequent period: an improvised explosive device (IED) in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, that appears to have gone off prematurely; and a US intelligence report warning that a "Westgate-style" terrorist attack is being planned in Kampala, Uganda. |
Implications | Buildings housing international agencies and venues frequented by expatriates, such as hotels, restaurants, and shopping malls, in the troop contributing countries will be at high risk attack from Al-Shabaab or its local affiliates or sympathisers. |
Outlook | Although its ability to carry out successful large-scale attacks away from its home territory in Somalia remains limited, Al-Shabaab is still capable of organising attacks in East Africa over the six-month to one-year outlook, but the attacks are likely to be limited to rifles and crude IEDs, including grenades. |
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Forensics investigators work next to the collapsed upper car park at the Westgate mall |
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The 21-24 September attack on the Westgate mall in the Kenyan capital Nairobi and subsequent incidents in Ethiopia and Uganda have drawn attention to risks of attacks coordinated by Al-Shabaab against East African countries contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Al-Shabaab's chief (emir), Ahmed Godane, announced that the Westgate attack was in response to the successful campaign, led by the Kenyan contingent of AMISOM, to evict Al-Shabaab from its strongholds in southern Somali cities (see Kenya: 23 September 2013: Kenyan mall attack demonstrates terrorism risks; further high-casualty attacks unlikely in three-month outlook).
The Nairobi attack was followed by an explosion in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 13 October (see Ethiopia: 13 October 2013: IED explosion in Ethiopian capital demonstrates increasing capability of Somali jihadists). The Ethiopian government stated that two people were killed when an IED detonated prematurely at a rented residential property in the city's Bole district, which is near the main international airport and popular with Somalis. The two were officially identified as being of "Somali origin" and living in the country illegally. Security agents claimed to have recovered explosives and a handgun and other terrorist paraphernalia, including a suicide vest and detonators at the property. A Twitter account claiming to represent Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the incident and that more IEDs had been planted in central Addis Ababa, although none have exploded so far. The incident's connection with Al-Shabaab, including the claims of responsibility, remain questionable.
Barely 48 hours after the incident in Addis Ababa, the United States embassy in Kampala issued a warning to its citizens of a possible "Westgate-style" terrorist attack in the Ugandan capital. The alert prompted police to step up security throughout the capital, particularly at venues, including hotels, restaurants and shopping malls, frequented by expatriates. The US embassy alert has followed local media reports suggesting that Al-Shabaab member Andreas Martin Mueller, known as Ahmed Khaled, had entered Kampala through Lumulu, Kenya. Concerns are particularly heightened in Uganda, the first country to deploy under AMISOM, given the group targeted Kampala in its first high-profile attack abroad. In July 2010, Al-Shabaab leveraged its external network in Kenya to stage twin IED attacks in Kampala, which killed at least 74 football World Cup spectators at a popular Ethiopian restaurant and a rugby club.
Targeted for attack
AMISOM is made up of troops from Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone, with the first three providing the lion's share of the mission's near-18,000-strong force. Ethiopia also has a significant military presence inside Somalia, but continues to operate outside AMISOM's command.
Al-Shabaab has threatened to carry out attacks against all four countries at various times in the past few years. The group has been able to make good on its threat in Uganda and Kenya, due to the porous nature of their borders, which allows foreigners – westerners and those from the East African region – to travel with ease.
However, its ability to carry out successful missions in Burundi and Ethiopia remains limited due to its lack of local support network in the former and the greater counter-intelligence capability in the latter. Unlike the other three countries, Burundi does not have a Somali refugee community or a sizeable local marginalised Muslim population that Al-Shabaab can potentially turn to for support, limiting its threat.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, remains an attractive and a highly symbolic target for Al-Shabaab, as was is the first country to deploy its troops inside Somalia back in December 2006 in support of the country's transitional administration. Furthermore, it hosts hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and has a sizeable Muslim community, which is increasingly at odds with the government and can potentially offer support to Al-Shabaab. Like Kenya, Ethiopia also shares a common border with Somalia that is barely policed and has its own ethnic Somali population that feels marginalised.
Despite all the above elements, Al-Shabaab has not able to establish a strong local presence inside Ethiopia thus far due to the greater vigilance in the part of Ethiopia's numerous security agencies whose reach almost extends to every household. This allows the authorities to easily monitor the activities of foreigners or detect any active cells run by local sympathisers.
Outlook and implications
All the above mentioned incidents confirms that al-Shabaab is targeting that have troops deployed inside Somalia, and also demonstrates the group's ability to organise attacks outside of Somalia. As long as Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda continue to have a military presence in Somalia, they continue to remain a target for Al-Shabaab. Indeed, with the AU recently supporting a 35% increase to AMISOM's size, the regional force's uniformed personnel will increase to around 24,000 once it gets the required UN backing. Such a scenario will put Al-Shabaab under greater threat at home, but is unlikely to prevent the group from carrying out headline-grabbing attacks both in Somalia and the East African troop contributing countries in the six-month to one-year outlook.
Kenya: Of the four countries, Kenya will continue to remain more susceptible for another large-scale attack similar to Westgate than the others in the one-year outlook due to its relative openness – being home to hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries, particularly Somalia. This is in addition to the presence of attractive targets in the form of a number of international agencies and diplomatic missions. Kenya's decision to deploy its forces in Somalia back in October 2011 was aimed at improving security along the border region with Somalia by creating a buffer zone inside Somalia, but two years on from its engagement, it continues to remain vulnerable for cross-border attacks from Somali-based insurgents.
Uganda: Since the July 2010 co-ordinated IEDs in Kampala, and more recently the Westgate attack, there has been a demonstrable rise in vigilance in the parts of the country's security agencies. However, in common with Kenya, Uganda remains a relatively easy country to enter and travel around, with radicalised Westerns and nationals from neighbouring countries probably able to carry out a Westgate-style attack inside the country.
Ethiopia: With Addis Ababa being home to a number of international agencies, including the AU, and hosting the largest number of diplomatic missions in Africa, Ethiopia provides Al-Shabaab with a number of potential targets. However, the state of security vigilance that is part of everyday life in Ethiopia means it continues to be a difficult place to target. There is a heavy security presence throughout the Ethiopian capital, with local and federal police, supplemented by the army, prominent in guarding key installations that can potentially be targeted by terrorists – such as the city's airport, key government buildings, and diplomatic mission. Local groups that Al-Shabaab can potentially enlist include the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Furthermore, despite ongoing protests by the Muslim population within the capital, there have been no indications that this group has aligned themselves with Al-Shabaab or local affiliates. This is most likely due to ideological differences or fear of a heavy-handed response from the government.
Burundi: Finally, Burundi remains the least likely country to be targeted by Al-Shabaab out of the four countries in the medium term. While the country's border security is relatively lax and its security agencies are not experienced in counter-terrorism missions, Al-Shabaab's lack of a support network in the country and the symbolic value of any attack relative to the others due to the country's size and lack of any historical enmity.
While the risk of Kenya is being targeted is greater, the other three countries are also potential targets for al-Shabaab attack in the one-year outlook. Such attacks are likely to be limited to rifles and crude IEDs, including grenades. Western nationals, including aid and humanitarian workers, and non-Muslims are likely to be the focus of any attacks. Places of leisure, such as clubs and bars, and churches are also likely targets. Major cities are most at risk, given the relatively high concentration of foreign nationals and other symbolic targets. Top targets include Nairobi and Mombasa and the coastal region (Kenya), Kampala and Jinja (Uganda), Addis Ababa, Hawassa and Dire Dawa (Ethiopia), and Bujumbura (Burundi).