IHS Global Insight Perspective | |
Significance | Defiant amid international condemnation, North Korea continues to test-fire short-range missiles, ramping up military exercises close to the South Korean border and re-activating its nuclear complex at Yongbyon. |
Implications | The driving forces behind North Korea's actions are primarily domestic, as it seeks to boost its credibility around a national cause, while securing the support of hardliners amid a succession crisis. |
Outlook | While the international community will need to demonstrate that North Korea faces some kind of consequence for its actions, the possibility for a robust, effective solution seems unlikely amid deep divisions over how to achieve an effective response. |
Risk Ratings | IHS Global Insight has downgraded the security ratings for North Korea, Japan, and South Korea by 0.25, to 2.75, 2.0, and 2.5 respectively to reflect the heightened stress in the regional security environment. |
Undaunted in the face of international anger at its second nuclear bomb test, North Korea has test-fired six short-range missiles and reportedly ramped up military exercises close to the South Korean border. These actions were coupled with a statement from Pyongyang that it was abandoning the truce that ended the Korean War, while threatening to launch a military offensive against the South and saying that it can no longer guarantee the safety of U.S. and South Korean vessels off its western coast. Meanwhile, the South Korean daily Chosun Ilbo reported that steam was rising from a nuclear processing plant at Yongbyon in the latest sign that the processing of spent fuel rods in order to produce plutonium has been re-activated.
The North’s anger was provoked by a UN Security Council statement on Monday unanimously condemning North Korea for its test, saying that it would begin work on a new resolution in response to Pyongyang’s "clear violation" of international law (see North Korea: 26 May 2009: UN Security Council Condemns North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test). Pyongyang’s latest moves have also been in response to the South Korean announcement that it had joined a U.S.-led proliferation security initiative, set up after 11 September 2001 to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see South Korea: 26 May 2009: South Korea Announces Decision to Join U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative).
Risk Changes | |
North Korea | IHS Global Insight has downgraded North Korea's security rating from 2.50 to 2.75 following the conduct of its second nuclear test on 25 May, raising regional security fears and sparking worldwide condemnation. |
Japan | IHS Global Insight has downgraded Japan's security rating from 1.75 to 2 to reflect the increased possibility that North Korea's nuclear test will lead to growing calls for Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons technology while heightening their sense of vulnerability. |
South Korea | IHS Global Insight has downgraded South Korea's security rating from 2.25 to 2.5 following North Korea's conduct of a second nuclear test on 25 May, and Pyongyang's statement that it has abandoned the truce that ended the Korean War, sparking fears of a military offensive. |
North Korean Motivations
For a country hard-hit by economic stagnation and food shortages, a nuclear arms programme may force Washington to be more responsive to its basic concerns, including humanitarian and economic assistance. North Korea may have concluded that no concessions would be forthcoming from President Barack Obama after recent government statements that there would be "no carrots" for Pyongyang, indicating a more hardline stance than previously expected. From this perspective, Pyongyang may have been aiming to force itself up the political agenda of the Obama administration, confronting it with the strongest possible challenge in order to win concessions and register a tough position, particularly as Washington has been bogged down with the global economic crisis and the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, Kim sought to do this with the 5 April rocket launch, receiving a somewhat muted international response (see North Korea: 14 April 2009: North Korea Announces Withdrawal from Nuclear Talks Following UN Statement). Ultimately, the North may also want formal recognition as a nuclear power to gain leverage in any future negotiations with the United States. However implausible that may sound, Pyongyang has seen how nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and India in 1998, initially condemned by the international community, were later overlooked.
However, North Korea’s motivations for testing the bomb are primarily rooted in domestic concerns. The first reason is technical. North Korea wants to improve its nuclear ballistic missile technology, particularly after the October 2006 test was widely considered to have been a failure. Pyongyang may have wanted to reassure itself that it had effective nuclear weapons capability. The latest nuclear test did just that, registering seismic activity consistent with a higher yield weapon (10-20 kilotons). Nonetheless, experts believe that Pyongyang remains a long way from possessing reliable missiles and the miniaturisation technology required to attach nuclear warheads to its missiles. The second reason may be the rise of hardliners within the regime. According to South Korean media, officials in the North who have adopted a more conciliatory position on the South have fallen out of favour with Kim, having been stripped of their positions and sent to work on labour farms. At the same time, Kim’s appointment of new chiefs for the communist nation’s military in February signalled a tougher foreign policy. Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army, Kim Yong-chun, became Minister of the Defence Commission, while General Ri Yong-ho became Chief of the Army General Staff. Both are styled as hard-line, hawkish figures, particularly Kim Yong-chun, who played a key role in the testing of an atomic missile in 2006. Kim may also be attempting to gain the support of hardliners for his preferred line of succession, amid rumours that he has been in poor health after suffering a stroke last August. His third and youngest son appears to be the favoured candidate as successor, accompanying his father on private visits and helping to launch an economic revitalisation campaign. Most recently, he was appointed to the powerful National Defence Commission (NDC), indicating that the grooming process for a successor has begun.
Test for Obama's Foreign Policy
The nuclear test will be seen as a major provocation, propelling the issue to the top of Washington’s foreign policy agenda, although the White House has yet to formulate a clear strategy towards the North Korean denuclearisation issue. Upon acceding to office, expectations were high that the president would pursue a strategy of greater engagement with the bellicose regime. But the North has complained that the new administration is no different from its predecessor. At the same time, Obama is unlikely to respond in the way that Pyongyang hopes for, particularly regarding U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. The stakes for Washington are high, not just because of the implications that it has for nuclear proliferation in Iran, but because it would severely undermine Obama’s global commitment to the non-proliferation issue. Obama will be treading a politically dangerous path, with many opponents considering it weak and unethical to succumb to Pyongyang’s blackmail, or to impose conditionality by offering aid to the communist country in exchange for progress on disarmament, particularly in the wake of Pyongyang’s recent test. In short, Obama could face greater polarisation at home over the nuclear issue should he appear too soft on Kim’s regime. In the international sphere, Obama would need to balance Japan’s desires for robust action with the more cautious approaches of China and Russia. Faced with an obstinate North Korea, the Obama administration has already begun to focus on reassuring Japan and South Korea of the American commitment to defend their interests.
The Chinese Predicament
It remains unclear how far Russia and China would go towards punishing North Korea at the UN Security Council. Both strongly criticised Monday’s test, but blocked a new resolution punishing Pyongyang for its 5 April rocket launch last month, including calls from U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice for stronger wording in the adopted resolution. In particular, two schools of thought exist regarding Chinese policy toward North Korea. The first of these is the buffer-zone school, in which Beijing sees North Korea as of strategic value, keeping American forces in South Korea at a safe distance from Chinese territory. The second school of thought argues that Beijing is coming to view Pyongyang as more of a threat to its interests than a zone of peace. Beijing knows that a nuclear test by North Korea would destroy six-party talks, while enhancing Japan’s security anxieties and fuelling talk of counter-measures. Clearly, Beijing is moving closer to the U.S. position, expressing "resolute opposition" to Monday’s test. As one of the key players in six-party talks, Beijing will find it hard not to succumb to international pressure for sanctions. However, Beijing is also concerned that too much pressure on Pyongyang could cause regime collapse, resulting in waves of North Korean refugees flooding into north-eastern China. Unwilling to risk the implosion of North Korea, the Obama administration may struggle to win support from Beijing to agree to strong measures in the form of trade and oil sanctions at the UN Security Council.
Implications for Japan's Pacifist Constitution
Japan’s Upper House has condemned North Korea for its nuclear test, calling for stern action in response, including tougher sanctions against the regime, a day after the Lower House adopted a similar resolution. After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, some right-wing members of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party called for investigations into whether the officially pacifist country should develop nuclear weapons. This time round, some legislators have called for Tokyo to acquire the ability to carry out pre-emptive strikes that could neutralise North Korean missiles. Monday’s test will doubtless spark increasing debate in Japan over whether or not to acquire nuclear capability, strengthening the hand of hardliners within the Diet who want it to become a "normal" country with a more robust military and assertive foreign policy. China has witnessed with growing anxiety Japan’s remilitarisation in recent years, fearing that the North Korean test could set off a regional arms race. In the near-term, Tokyo’s likely response will be to boost defence spending and intensify co-operation with the United States, particularly in areas such as missile defence. In the longer-term, there remains the possibility that Tokyo would invite Washington to station nuclear-armed short-range missiles in Japan as a deterrent. In the event of any revival of six-party talks, Japan’s participation will be lacklustre at best until Pyongyang comes clean on the case of Japanese citizens kidnapped by the North some 30 years ago.
Inter-Korean Relations Reach Break Point
For its part, Pyongyang’s reckless behaviour is another challenge adding to rising tension over the joint Kaesong industrial estate as well as domestic political instability caused by the suicide of former president Roh Moo-hyun last Saturday. Similar to Japan, the question is likely to emerge over whether Seoul should begin to develop its own nuclear weapons. South Korea has already abandoned its "sunshine policy" towards the South, making aid and humanitarian assistance to the North contingent on progress on nuclear disarmament—a move which Kim interpreted as a form of blackmail. Cross-border relations have been icy for the past year, and the downward spiral shows no sign of abating. Events over the next 24 hours could be followed by the staging of more hostile naval incidents directed against the Lee administration. In the near-term, Seoul is likely to look for reassurance from the United States over its commitment to defend them in the event of a military attack from the North.
Outlook and Implications
Monday’s events revived the long-standing differences of opinion over what is behind North Korea’s behaviour, and how the international community should react to it. The week-long delay in reaching a collective response to North Korea’s 5 April rocket launch underlined the depth of disagreement among leading powers, particularly those participating in the six-nation disarmament negotiations. Similar rifts are likely to plague current efforts to reach a joint resolution on the matter. The options to halt Pyongyang’s advanced nuclear programme are extremely limited. A military strike is not possible, given the North’s 1.1-million strong army and close proximity to Japan and South Korea. Theoretically, China enjoys enormous leverage over Pyongyang due to the North's dependence on Beijing for the delivery of essential food and fuel supplies. At the same time, however, China has long feared that the cutting off of supplies could precipitate the collapse of the North Korean regime. Lastly, in the event that the UN does come to a collective decision to impose sanctions on the regime, they would be of little effect. As one North Korean official put it, "We have been living under U.S. sanctions for decades… The United States' hostile policy towards us is like beating a rock with a rotten egg". Thus, while the international community will need to show that North Korea faces some kind of consequence for its actions, the possibility of a robust, effective solution being found seems unlikely.