On 21 February, the Brazilian Federal Congress approved a presidential decree placing the army in charge of public security in Rio de Janeiro state following a sharp increase in murders and robberies since the previous year.
Outlook and implications |
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Risks | Criminal violence; Death and injury; Ground |
Sectors or assets | Individuals; Cargo; Transport; Property; Defence and security forces |

A Brazilian Army tank blocking a street near a favela in Rio de Janeiro.
Getty Images 915344908 Mauro Pimentel / Contributor
On 21 February, Brazil's Congress approved a presidential decree authorising military deployment in Rio de Janeiro state until 31 December 2018. The measure represents the first time that the federal government has ordered an intervention on public security in one of the states, and follows a previous ad hoc military deployment in the city (see Brazil: 31 July 2017: Troop deployment to Brazil's Rio de Janeiro highlights worsening criminality, affecting cargo and elevating risk to visitors). The move comes as crime rates have risen sharply in Rio since early 2017 – mainly homicides, robberies, and police officer deaths – and following a particularly violent Carnival in mid-February, with at least three thefts per hour reported by tourists and two policemen killed during shootings, according to the Brazilian media. Murder rates reached 40 per 100,000 residents in 2017 according to official figures, a significant increase from the 30.3 in 2015; this was partly due to an increase in gun battles between organised criminal gangs over the control of drug-trafficking networks and with the police, and also stemmed from a fiscal crisis that has led to security budget cuts, thus undermining police capacity. Although victims are generally gang members or police officers, innocent civilians are at risk of being caught in a cross fire, as occurred n September 2017 when two bystanders were killed during shootings at the Rocinha favela.
Political driver is likely
Although President Michel Temer justified the measure by arguing that security in Rio had reached a critical situation, he was probably responding to political calculations – specifically, the need to divert attention from his failure to secure approval for pension reform. The move was also taken in consideration of the October 2018 elections: if Temer decides to run (there is speculation that he will do so), security would form the centrepiece of his campaign.
Temer's decision was endorsed by the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro and the mayor of the city. The president has appointed Army General Walter Braga Netto as the supreme commander of all security forces in the state. Netto, who will also maintain his role as the head of the East Military Command, is now in control of the military police, the civilian police, the fire brigade, and the state's prison system; he also holds full authority to deploy army, navy, and air force troops. He promptly appointed Army General Richard Fernandez Nunes as the new secretary of public security, replacing Roberto Sá, who allegedly resigned; this is a significant departure, as a civilian normally holds this role.
Temer also created a new Ministry of Public Security on 26 February, announcing that it would be led by Defence Minister Raul Jungmann, with the defence post being transferred to an army general – the first time in 18 years that a member of the military has filled this cabinet post.
Increased patrolling near favelas and cargo theft hotspots
Although the full details of the plan have not yet been revealed, the deployment will consist of tanks, armoured vehicles, and soldiers in the streets of Rio. The units will be highly visible, with the aim of reinforcing the perception of security among the population. Checkpoints are being established at the access points of Rio state, including Rodovia Dutra (BR 116), Rodovia Washington Luis (BR 040), and Rodovia Rio-Vitória (BR 101). Troops will also be based at the Arco Metropolitano (BR-493), a highway that circumvents Rio's metropolitan area. In Rio city, 3,000 military troops are being mobilised, together with 1,000 police officers. This number can be increased if necessary: for major events such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2015 Olympics, up to 15,000 troops were deployed.
The security forces will be concentrated around crime hotspots, mainly those involving shootings, at slums (favelas) such as Chapadão, Pedreira (close to Avenida Brasil), Cidade Alta, Kelson's, Pica-Pau, Cinco Bocas, and Tinta in Cordovil, the northern area, and São João do Meriti and São Gonçalo in Baixada Fluminense.

Outlook and implications
Criminal groups are likely to be deterred by the large number of soldiers over the coming months, reducing the number of gun battles between criminal gangs and with the security forces and thus mitigating collateral death and injury risks for bystanders. In addition, the large presence of troops and regular patrolling of highways such as Rodovia Dutra and Avenida Brasil is likely to contain cargo theft, which reached record levels in 2017 (10,599 cases on official figures, up from 9,862 the previous year), affecting transport of merchandise such as electronics, cigarettes, alcohol, and meat. Improved security would be a likely outcome even if only part of the planned deployment takes place, at least until the October elections. No specific budget allocation for the entire operation has to date been undertaken; unless funding is guaranteed over the coming months a scale-down is likely, rendering the operation unsustainable beyond December 2018.
The plan is also likely to face legal challenges: for instance, a proposal for "mandados coletivos", which allows security forces to carry out raids and searches without warrants (even if the property owners are not suspects of any crime) has already been challenged by prosecutors as unconstitutional. The police will also potentially resist accepting orders from the army.
A reduction of army operations elsewhere will provide an indicator of potential reinforcements to troops in Rio, raising the prospects for the operation's efficiency, as specific budget allocations are less likely due to Rio's fiscal crisis. An indicator of displacement of criminal gangs would be an increase of shooting incidents in neighbouring states such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, although troop deployments on the associated state borders are likely to mitigate this risk.