Saudi government blockade of al-Awamiyah unlikely to defeat Shia insurgency, likely trigger for deterioration in Iranian relations

The siege of al-Awamiyah by Saudi Arabia's security forces began after unidentified Shia militants attacked a construction project in the al-Masora quarter of the predominately Shia town on the night of 12 May. The al-Masora neighbourhood had been due to be demolished on 10 May, but the Saudi Ministry of Interior claimed that, on the same day, its workers were fired upon by Iran-backed militants using the neighbourhood as a hideout. Reportedly, two bystanders have been killed and 14 injured. Saudi authorities claimed to have killed one militant and that four police officers were wounded.

Masora project

The militants' attack was in response to a planned government redevelopment project in al-Masora, which sought to change the mainly residential walled town of 2,000-3,000 people into a commercial and service zone. In April, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called on the Saudi authorities to halt this project, which had already resulted in the forced eviction of residents and the demolition of many houses. UN human rights staff accused the Saudi authorities of using various coercive measures, such as power cuts, to pressure residents to leave. The militants' attack, although unclaimed as of 15 May, was, according to the Saudi Ministry of Interior, targeted at construction vehicles. Pictures on social media of bullet holes in construction vehicles appear to corroborate the ministry’s report. Militants have attacked the development project in al-Masora before; in February, gunmen fired on a construction vehicle, setting it on fire.

Insurgent capabilities in al-Awamiyah

Al-Awamiyah, a predominately Shia town of 20,000 people, has historically been the site of frequent social unrest and militant activity, and police forces have been the target of shootings and, in particular, of kidnappings. The town is the epicentre of a low-level Shia insurgency that has been incrementally escalating since 2011, particularly following the Saudi-led intervention to support the Bahraini monarchy against predominantly Shia protesters in that country. By 2014, shooting incidents near al-Awamiyah in the Qatif district targeting unknown vehicles and security forces became relatively commonplace, and raids by security forces frequently uncovered weapons caches and involved exchanges of fire with militants (see Saudi Arabia: 27 February 2014: Small-arms attacks targeting security forces likely to increase in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern province). Unconfirmed kidnappings of local police officers and officials have also been reported in Saudi media, but with few details, including regarding their release, available through open sources. Security forces have previously blockaded the town in October 2015 in response to a major incident involving heavy sustained gunfire from militants lasting several hours, targeting security force checkpoints.

Videos posted on social media on the night of the 12 May attack purportedly showed heavy gunfire in the town. Security forces have since launched a broader counter-terrorism operation involving blockading entry to the town and patrols with armoured personnel carriers. The Ministry of Interior also released security footage showing militants firing at the site in a drive-by shooting. As of 15 May, the construction project remains active but under heavy police escort. Saudi media reports state that militants used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against both police officers and the construction site. While the use of IEDs or ordnance and weapons other than small arms is not confirmed, photographs circulating on social media show explosions of unknown origin occurring in the town on the night of the initial attack.

Hard government line

Significantly, al-Awamiyah was the home of the imprisoned Shia cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, who was executed in January 2016, which triggered a diplomatic incident with Iran (see Saudi Arabia: 4 January 2016: Severing of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia raises war and protest risks across region). On 2 May, Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman clarified in a rare television interview that he was not interested in reconciliation with Iran; targeting an allegedly pro-Iranian community within the kingdom demonstrates this. Saudi authorities are likely concerned at a growing consolidation of armed Shia groups in the Arabia Peninsula and alarmed by the potential election of a revolutionary candidate in the upcoming presidential election (see Saudi Arabia: 10 July 2015: Retaliatory shooting indicates Islamic State strategy will likely succeed in exacerbating Sunni-Shia violence in Saudi Arabia).

Iranian and Hizbullah-affiliated media also began coverage of recent developments in the town, denouncing Saudi actions there as an unprovoked assault on residents of the town and accused security forces of carrying out collective punishment on civilians. Iranian media reported that Saudi police killed four civilians. Hizbullah-affiliated media also reported that residents in al-Masora quarter had no access to power and that there were severe water shortages.

Outlook and implications

The Masora project is likely intended to intimidate the Shia population and re-zone the al-Awamiyah hotspot to help security forces to more effectively contain the threat and monitor and interdict suspected militant activity (see Saudi Arabia: 16 October 2014: Cleric’s death sentence raises risk of protests in Saudi Shia areas, small-scale attacks in Bahraini capital). Nevertheless, escalation of a low-level insurgency in this region indicates that Shia militants have good access to smuggling routes, at least for small arms. Confirmed use of IEDs in al-Awamiyah would indicate a growing threat to accessible oil infrastructure such as remote pipelines, although the impact on Saudi Arabia’s oil production and export capacity would likely remain negligible.

Although the security operation will likely lead to a lull in the incidence of insurgents' violence around al-Awamiyah, this will likely be temporary. The Saudi state has shown no intent to engage with the key sources of Shia unrest and protest, namely the perception of institutional discrimination within the state bureaucracy and welfare system, and demands for the release of Shia political prisoners.