The launch of Uganda's National Dialogue, originally scheduled for 21 November, has been postponed to 18 December. The dialogue is officially aimed at finding cross-party solutions to various recurrent political, social, and economic challenges, including political violence and high unemployment. In practice, President Yoweri Museveni has likely decided to take a leading role in the dialogue in order to use it to further divide and co-opt elements of the opposition parties. The largest opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), has insisted that the dialogue should be an avenue to discuss Museveni's succession plan, and has said it will not participate when the government is leading the discussions. In reality, however, the FDC will likely be willing to compromise on these positions. The first-ever summit of political party leaders under the Inter Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD) framework has been scheduled for 12 December, likely in effect creating two parallel dialogue processes. The IPOD framework only includes the five parties with representation in parliament, including the FDC and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), and therefore excludes the new and popular People Power movement of independent MP Robert Kyagulanyi, locally known as "Bobi Wine" (see Uganda: 20 August 2018: Alleged mistreatment of Ugandan parliamentarian increases likelihood of disruptive protests, but emergence of unified opposition movement unlikely).
Significance: The National Dialogue process as outlined will likely create division regarding how to participate (or not) among opposition parties, some of which will view his actions as moves by the president to take advantage of the process and weaken the opposition, especially ahead of the 2021 presidential election. Notably, Museveni has expressed eagerness to work with the other parties under IPOD to stamp out electoral violence, among other areas of possible co-operation during the process. Protests in capital Kampala and other urban areas against the National Dialogue process by some opposition and civil society groups are probable around the 18 December launch. However, these will likely be denied official permission and be suppressed quickly by security forces, entailing only minor disruption such as roads being blocked for several hours. A more divided opposition would pose a lower threat of disruptive mass unrest in Kampala and other cities around the 2021 elections.
Risks: Protests and riots; Government instability
Sectors or assets affected: All